Social Movements in Central and Eastern Europe

A renewal of protests and democracy

Geoffrey Pleyers,
Ionel N. Sava (eds.)
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Introduction

A second generation of grassroots movements in Central and Eastern Europe?

Ionel N. Sava

A quarter of a century ago, huge demonstrations marked the fall of communism. The right to protest was the first natural consequence of regime change for the people of central and eastern Europe. However, the transition to democracy and a market economy also meant constant and organized public participation. The sooner the better.

In such an environment, sustained by a multitude of donors and foreign organizations, international NGOs engaged in extensive programmes with local civil societies. Assisting organizations and groups as examples and vehicles of democracy and civil society-building was the preferred approach of that time. As a result, in 1998 there were some 5,000 foundations and more than 20,000 associations in Poland alone. The support was duly rewarded, when we consider that a group of former communist countries joined the western organizations by the end of the 1990s, followed by a second group a decade later.

The question is: what comes next for central and eastern Europe’s civil society and social movements? The integration with the west is secured in spite of a serious crisis in Ukraine. Under the umbrella of the EU and NATO, ordinary citizens in central and eastern Europe came to care more about the environment, natural resources, corruption, education and jobs. This brief essay explores to what extent central and eastern Europe are about to move, in both the medium and long term, from assimilating the dominant western model in this fashion to reinventing cultural difference, and thereby creating those arenas in which local players compete for strategic decisions. It focuses on what was termed ‘civil society’ in the 1990s, the ‘third sector’ in the 2000s and broadly the ‘SM sector’ today as the main location for change.

From Solidarnosc as a ‘total movement’ to civil society in the transition

The roots of post-communist civil society can be traced back to the time of ‘Solidarnosc’. In his pioneering work published in 1984, Alain Touraine called the Polish trade union a “total social movement” in the sense that it incorporated a broad societal aspiration of political freedom, national liberation and cultural emancipation. It was ‘total’ due to the
fact that, in the relationship with the totalitarian state, workers’ rights could not be achieved in the absence of political rights and of emancipation from Soviet domination. In the early 1980s, the tiny workers’ trade union in Gdansk was like David challenging Goliath. However, its fight was instrumental for the whole of central and eastern Europe. Its strength increased such that in under a decade, ‘Solidarnosc’ moved its programme from its trade union repertoire (stage I) to self-management of a state enterprise (stage II) and then to political democratization (stage III).

As predicted by Touraine, regime democratization made possible the cultural offensive of the mid-1980s, when dissident intellectuals took the lead. Vaclav Havel, Milan Kundera and Gyorgy Konrad, among others, depicted precisely the misery of central Europe that was culturally part of the west and politically part of the east.

Later on, and not much different from Touraine’s idea of the positive role of the intellectuals, the Hungarian sociologist Ivan Szelenyi and collaborators argued that in actuality, it was the former communist elite that changed its preferences and initiated political change. The difference was that the new elite recruited informally more from the industrial and administrative sectors and less from the ideological core. The potential for change was associated in Szelenyi’s view with the managerial elite. In opposing the party nomenclature, the technical and administrative elite (the directorial class) made a conjectural alliance with the ‘intellectual dissidents’. They were entrusted precisely with a cultural function during the transition from communism to capitalism: to spread the ideas of freedom, democracy and civil society as opposed to oppression, totalitarian state and mass society.

Other neoclassical sociologists of transition, such as Stark and Bruszt, were more sophisticated when it came to the idea of ‘civil society’. They saw the transition to capitalism and democracy as mutually reinforcing in the context of extended social networks empowered with deliberative and associational functions. The important role was not allocated to intellectuals but to something akin to deliberative networks, which were actually civil society networks that proliferated all over society with the aim of improving both the market and state functions. In this case, civil society organizations played a role somewhat similar to a watchdog of democracy.

On the one hand, Szelenyi and others considered that, in the absence of an economic bourgeoisie, the cultural bourgeoisie took over the post-communist societies in partnership with the managerial elite. On the other hand, for Stark and Bruszt, intellectuals’ moral discourse was not enough, as they considered post-communist societies anomic and therefore in great need of rebuilding sociability by confronting both the old socialist state and the anarchical new global market. During transition, extended accountability could be developed by deliberative and associational social networks, which prevented the formation of a capitalist class with an oligarchic orientation and of a cultural class alien to local needs.

Civil society was therefore an umbrella concept (or a ‘master frame’ in the terminology of social movement theory) extended to social networks as a necessary precondition for collective action during post-communism.
A second generation of grassroots social movements

It is worth mentioning that the American Sociological Association submitted its 1999 annual award to G. Eyal, I. Szelenyi, and E. Townsley, who premised their theory on the agency of a bureaucratic elite in alliance with civil society intellectuals in order to advance liberal reforms. However, just a couple of years later Michael Burawoy observed that “as the new bourgeoisie reaches for global hypermodernity, they could thrust the mass of the population into a pre-modern quagmire”. The well-known sociologist from Berkeley thought that central and eastern Europe would experience a kind of post-colonial syndrome: a disappointment with the post-communist transition. If true, then a form of “post-socialist critique” is about to emerge and encounter the current civil society and neoliberal ideologies of progress, which constitute the dominant culture.

However, is that turn going to reflect class struggle, as Burawoy suggests, or cultural struggle, as I think is the case? Taking into account that the working class has transformed itself over the last decades and the conditions to call it such have changed as well, my hypothesis is that a cultural turn is much more probable. Its source is not the past social experience (as the nineteenth century cultural ‘Bürgentum’ of Szelenyi and others, or the post-communist pathway, as in Stark and Bruszt’s theory), but rather current social practices that put more and more emphasis on urban middle-class cultural preferences. I am closer to Stark and Bruszt, but the focus is not as much on the formation of new institutions by deliberative and associational practices. The initiative is rather with the new individual and collective players and with their strategy.

This does not mean that ‘civil society’ is no longer necessary in central and eastern Europe. Kerstin Jacobsson recently pointed out in her edited book Beyond NGO-ization: the development of social movements in Central and Eastern Europe (2013) that “to focus on formal organizations (partly because they are easier to account for and are represented in official records) may lead researchers to miss important mobilization that take place in less structured formats, such as loose activist networks, local grassroots activism or short lived mobilization”. This is to say that social movements should go beyond NGO-ization and look for complementary collective actions. Fortunately, things seem to move ahead. As Jacobsson also notes in the introduction of the same book with Steven Saxonberg, “civil society in Central and Eastern Europe has undergone tremendous changes over the past three decades: from the state-controlled associational life… to the Western-sponsored ‘liberal’ civil society… to today’s more diverse civil life”.

One of the most notable developments today is grassroots activism across central and eastern European cities: a new type of activism which is domestically funded, grassroots driven, and has been developed in response to local problems and needs, while often being inspired by urban movements.

Grzegorz Piotrowski, a young Polish sociologist, argues that there is already a shift from civil society organizations towards grassroots groups in general, a process that suggests a significant shift in the composition and ways of collective action of the whole civil
society sector in eastern Europe. Due to information technology and new media, new opportunities for collective action are given to marginal groups. An example in case is the use of social media during the Romanian presidential elections in November 2014 when online migrants mobilized families and friends at home to cast their ballots. As reflected by social movement theory, the role of this second generation of grassroots movements in central and eastern Europe could be that of the production of new collective players and of social arenas. According to James Jasper, in a cultural perspective, beneath the images of ‘social movements’, ‘structural opportunities’ and ‘environment’, there are actually the incipient strategic interactions that engage individual and collective actors in a variety of exchanges. There is a social movement when these players feel and live togetherness and as such individuals, formal organizations, networks and clusters coordinate events and share goals and know-how about tactics.

At this stage, one could only guess to what extent a second generation of grassroots movements will change the course of central and eastern Europe social movements to more domestic and identity-oriented as well materialist-demanding organizations. Alongside transactional activism, which is still strong, the trend is for new forms of social participation that suggest community-orientation in their medium and long term collective actions. Usually, this is a laboratory where new styles, social meanings and cultural critiques are informally exercised and eventually institutionalized. The next decade shall show us the path on which central and eastern Europe is heading.

Bibliography:


Chapter 1

2013: A renewal of protests and democracy
Ideology and Social Movements.
A Comparative Analysis of the 2013 Protests in
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania

Diana Margarit

The 2013 protests in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania embodied the discontent and the disapproval of the citizens in the streets, against the domestic political authorities. Due to their similar recent histories and their geographical proximities, I propose a comparative analysis of the 2013 wave of uprisings in the three countries. Which are the ideological resources of the relative synchronicity of these protests? Are the ideological stakes of these uprisings “imported” from the simultaneous Western ones or the direct response to the domestic politics? The aim of my paper consists in answering to these questions and thus, highlighting the proportion in which on one hand, there are certain ideological recurrences (e.g. the Occupy movements) in the social movements from Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania and on the other, the domestic context shaped their specific deployment.

From a methodological point of view, I structured my paper in order to stress out, in a comparative manner, the elements which characterized the 2013 protests in the two countries which share a common border with Romania, on the Western and the Southern sides. Thus, the first part concentrates on a so-called presentation of the facts by determining the recent historical framework of their evolution, while the second underlines the ideological stakes of the protests in respect to two dimensions: a) an external one - the similarities between them and the Occupy movement; b) an internal one – their response to the domestic political opportunity structure. The analysis uses secondary sources, more precisely online articles and posts appeared in international coverage journals and national websites in English related to Bulgaria and Hungary. I tried to be consistent with similar sources also in the Romanian case, with few exceptions, the cases where it was almost impossible to find the necessary information in any other language than Romanian.

1. The 2013 protests in their national contexts

By analyzing the online coverage of the protests in the international journals, I intend to highlight the domestic evolution of the events in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The purpose of this rather descriptive part of the paper consists in familiarizing the reader with the general deployment of the protests and the presentation of the political context which faced the public revolt and resistance.

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The Romanian protests

The Romanian Autumn – the surname of the protests from 2013 – had been simultaneously a proof of civic discontent and political distress that began as an environmentalist movement and soon after evolved into a protest against political corruption, demagoguery and inefficiency. It started on September 1 and lasted until February 11 the following year and it represented a major political phenomenon on the Romanian scene due to its social mobilization, consistency and consequences. For six months, each Sunday, thousands of people from all the Romanian major cities and the Romanian diaspora around the world manifested their disapproval against the mining exploitation in Roșia Montană by a foreign corporation, project supported by local and national political authorities. The civic revolt also coincided with the time spent in Parliament by the law project permitting the gold exploitation until its definitive rejection. After six months of constant manifestations, the pressure of the public opinion constrained the politicians to definitely reject it.

The mining exploitation in Roșia Montană had a significant electoral stake, supposition confirmed by the numerous political actors who used it in order to increase their political status. Back in the 2009 campaign, President Traian Băsescu declared that he would support the mining project in Roșia Montană only after mindful consultations with specialists. In 2011, he re-approached the subject by stating that the explorations in Roșia Montană would contribute to the increase of the Romanian gold reserve. This finding had no financial impact, since the Governor of the National Bank had previously declined the necessity of the mining project because the institution proved no interest in increasing its gold reserve.

If by then RMGC placed an emphasis on lobbying, in 2012 it started acting more visibly through the political machinery. After the parliamentary elections, the Social-Liberal Union (SLU) (formed by the Social-Democrat Party and the National-Liberal Party) affirmed that extracting the gold in the terms imposed by RMGC was a strategic investment for the country. This new political position was contradictory to the statements made during the electoral campaign. Moreover, the SLU made clear statements against mining in Roșia Montană, being known that the President and the former Prime-Minister, Emil Boc – both members of an adversary party (The Democrat-Liberal Party) – were fervent supporters of it. Anyway, in 2013, the Romanian

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Government assumed a draft act for a special (dedicated to RMGC) mining law. Despite that the Ministry of Justice accused the lack of constitutionality of the draft, all the other ministries ignored it. Thus, protests began the Prime Minister Victor Ponta (representing SLU) declared that he would let the Parliament decide whether the exploitation should begin or not. Therefore, after almost eighteen years of constant delay in making a final decision, the Parliament was given the sudden mission of coming to a conclusion, following the prompt executive approval. In this respect, is was not the persistence of a pro exploitation message which irritated the people, but most certainly the governmental reaction toward this matter.

The particularity of the Romanian Autumn in respect to other previous Romanian social movements lies in the social heterogeneity of the protesters and the remarkable general mobilization, the most significant one in the last 25 years. The Sunday-protests gathered a motley crowd which was aware of its differences and yet inclined to solidarity. Thousands of people protesting in almost all Romanian cities proved that a local problem represented a symptom for economic and political chronic problems. The "United We Save Roşia Montană" (the slogan recurrently used during those months) protests thus became the most significant peaceful environmental movements in Europe.

Their claims focused on two aspects: the economic interests of a gold-mining corporation and the ways in which Romanian politicians gave up their political responsibilities on behalf of personal benefits. First, the situation in Roşia Montană did not represent a novelty for the Romanian public space. As a matter of fact, it began in 1995 when, after a fake auction, the Public Agency of Copper signed an agreement with Gabriel Resources (a Canadian corporation) through which Roşia Montană Gold Corporation (RMGC) was born, holding 80% of the stocks. Through this agreement, RMGC had the permission to start the geological prospects in search of the remaining gold, being known that the areas around Roşia Montană had a rich history of gold exploration ever since the Roman Empire. RMGC made the prospections and discovered that there were no more dykes of gold, but instead small amounts were ranged at the terrestrial surface. For its extraction, the company needed new technological methods – "melting" the muck in a lake of cyanides – and political support. Second, the discontent of the civil society manifested during the Romanian Autumn involved the negative public perception of the political actors. The notorious lack of confidence in the politicians’ integrity determined the protesters to doubt that, on this matter, the political decisions concerned the national interests and not some private ones.


The Bulgarian protests

The Bulgarian 2013 faced two severe long-term protests: a) the first one from January 28 until March 16 against the Borisov government. It initially expressed the revolt against the high price of the electricity, but continued even after the Prime Minister’s resignation on February 20, demanding structural changes in the political system and the nationalization of some economic sectors; b) the second round of the street discontent began in June 14 and lasted until July 23, the next year. This time, the rage was oriented against the recent leftist government of Plamen Oresharski and the political measures of the ruling coalition of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the Movement for Rights and Freedom and the nationalist party Ataka. In fact, the protests burst when the oligarch Delyan Peevski was appointed the State Agency for National Security. The mobilization on social media of thousands of people filled the streets of the major Bulgarian cities as never before in the recent post-communist Bulgarian history. The public opinion proved dissatisfaction with conjectural decisions (such as Borisov or Peevski’s resignation), as long as corruption and political inefficiency remained constant. Intellectuals, journalists, jurists and politicians even created “Charter 2013”, a Bulgarian line to the famous Charter 77, an anti-post-communist document pleading for the political and juridical reform. Despite its lacks, the charter encapsulated the civil society’s need to fight against corruption and other anti-democratic issues (such as a deficient judicial system, plutocracy and so on) as European Union itself recommended. In fact and in respect to this matter, EU officials not only criticized the political performances of Oresharski and his predecessors, but encouraged the Bulgarians citizens to express their discontent, fact which strengthened the civil cohesion and extended the duration of the uprisings.

Protests not only continued even after Peevski was forced to resign because of the civil pressure, but they became violent. The night of 23-24 July, protesters “sieged” the Parliament and clashed with the police that had to intervene in order to evacuate the

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politicians and the journalists from the building\textsuperscript{15}. The following two months characterized by relative tranquility were sending signals of dispersal. At least, this seemed to be the manner in which the political and judicial institutions interpreted the reality. In October, the revolutionary flames reignited next to the decision of the Constitutional Court to consider Peevski as member of the Parliament, despite the previous events. The students occupied the universities\textsuperscript{16} and the political institutions, by shouting the slogan “Ostavka!” (Resign)\textsuperscript{17} to the Oresharski government. As in a roller coaster of social and political anger, the protests continued with increases and decreases of intensity until July 23 2014, when the Prime Minister admitted his defeat and finally resigned\textsuperscript{18}.

The Hungarian Protests

As in Bulgaria, protests occurred in Hungary mainly due to political reasons. At the beginning of 2012, thousands of Hungarians protested against the constitutional changes considered as an offense to democracy and freedom\textsuperscript{19}. One year later, the Prime Minister Victor Orban not only neglected the popular will\textsuperscript{20}, but he stated that the increase of his political prerogatives does not concern any foreign institution or state\textsuperscript{21}. The neoliberal and neo-conservative political measures as reflected in the political decisions concerning family policies, public work, pension reform and the amendments of the constitutional law\textsuperscript{22} faced the general disapproval. In fact, those amendments to the Constitution expressed the ideological ideals of the ruling party, Fidesz, the Hungarian Civic Alliance. The general mobilization occurred on March 11, when young demonstrators blocked the entrance of the Parliament\textsuperscript{23} in a similar manner to the

Bulgarian protesters. Still, in all the three countries the revolts were in ex nse directed against the politicians as a group and their anti-democratic and illegitimate decisions. That is why protesters constantly “visited” the buildings housing the legislative body. In Romania they formed a human chain surrounding the House of People, the enormous building where the legislative institution exists, while in Bulgaria and Hungary they bumped into the force of the police. In several days, the number of protesters increased to several thousands in the streets of Budapest and other Hungarian cities. They feared that the country would become a dictatorship as a consequence to the decision of the Parliament to extend the power of the government and to limit the one of the constitutional court. The rage of the younger generations intensified from one month to another. They already protested in January 2013 against the governmental project to constrain them to work in the country after finishing their studies and to cut the subsidies for the universities. In March, their discontent was reflected in the general disapproval of the Hungarian people, fact which determined a larger social mobilization.

The anti-governmental revolt continued also the following year, on November 17, when the protesters criticized once again the centralizing power of the executive and accused the politicians of corruption. These ones happened a month after the civic mobilization against the government proposal to tax the data traffic. On October 28, protesters rallied against what was considered as an attempt to break the freedom of speech and, once more, an authoritarian measure of a government becoming more and more unpopular. The largest protests since 2010, the October revolt proved that civil society was ready to reject any measure that threatened its freedom. Eventually it was not the amount of the tax that enflamed the social spirit, but its symbolism.

Unlike the other two countries, Hungary did not have a flamboyant year of protests; on the contrary, 2014 might be more interesting in this respect. In addition, by analysing all the three cases, it seems that the magnitude of the uprisings directly determine the political change demanded by the protesters. In Romania, the law in favour to RMCG was rejected in the Parliament, while in Bulgaria the disliked governments were dismissed. Unfortunately, in Hungary the ruling party criticized by the popular

voice not only kept the political power, but systematically continued the series of controversial decisions.

2. The ideological backgrounds of the protests from a comparative perspective

Despite the particularities, all the three waves of protests have been influenced through a spillover effect by the social effervescence manifested all over the globe and especially by the Occupy Movements. Without having a solid policy platform, Occupy Wall Street became the symbol of the younger generations’ struggle with social inequity, corruption and social injustice. The precarious social conditions of the younger generation, mixed up with optimism and the will to “fight” the injustice transformed the citizens until 30 years old in the ideal candidates for civil activism. Ideologically identified with the wide spectrum of political orientations, the young ones’ mobilization for protests on different matters counterbalanced their apathy in respect to classical politics.

The external dimension of the protests

From 2011 until nowadays, it irrefutably changed the manner in which civil discontent was expressed and in which social movements evolved. The “we are here” movements as they have been called determined a social mobilization similar to the one in the 60s, but without any social category claims. Moreover, the social heterogeneity of the protesters reflected in the nature of their demands, the reasons determining them to be in the streets and the evolution of the movements. In the Bulgarian and Romanian case, the protests rose up when the Western democracies had already achieved a consistent experience with the Occupy phenomenon. It did not claim any affiliation to the later one, but it looked alike. The constant presence of the young people educated in the spirit of the liberal values and at the same time with a leftist eye, sensitive to problems such as inequity, exploitation, injustice represented the major collective actor in the process of social mobilization. In addition, these protests should be understood under the auspices of the Occupy movements in respect to other three characteristics: the lack of formal leaders (one of the protesters’ slogans was “Free people do not have a leader”), their peaceful and

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generally non-violent evolution (even though there were several exceptions) and the use of social media (Facebook - #United We Save Roșia Montană or #DANSwithme - and Twitter) as instruments of communication. In all the cases as in all the major uprisings after 2010, social media played a central role in the burst and the evolution of the movements, both at the national (social media and especially Facebook were used as the primary source of information) and local level (Facebook served in disseminating the information on the spatial and temporal coordinates of the protests)\textsuperscript{36}.

By sharing a similar post-communist recent history, with struggles in the process of democratization, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania had to face the same enemies: political corruption, clientelism, and weaknesses in consolidating the democratic regime or, differently put, the post-accession hooliganism\textsuperscript{37}. The inefficiency of the domestic politics, along with the unpopular, oligarchic and corruptive measures determined thousands of people to express their discontent. The general mobilization in the streets transformed these protests into the most significant ones in the recent post-communist history\textsuperscript{38}. Largely covered by the Romanian mainstream media (every national television and journal paid attention to the events)\textsuperscript{39}, the news revealed the endurance testing of the Bulgarian protesters during seven months and most certainly inspired the Romanian protesters to be persistent in their demands (as some protesters affirmed on the Facebook pages). The international support and echoes\textsuperscript{40} in respect to the Bulgarian protests, as well as in the Romanian case referred to the increase of the democratic prospects and the awake of the civic conscience\textsuperscript{41}.

The 2013 protests gathered a motley crowd which was aware of its differences and yet inclined to solidarity. Regardless of the heterogeneity of the Romanian protesters, some patterns are recognizable: an ideological and a socio-economic one. The ideological groups that openly declared their active solidarity with the protesters were: the ecologists (eco-christians and eco-urbanists), the nationalists, the socialists, while the socio-economical categories were: the young people, the local people/peasants, and the middle-class educated people with liberal, artistic professions.

The first major group is represented by the students and unemployed/freelancer young people – usually (self) declared hipsters. A rather marginalized group, it put a notable mark on the Romanian social culture. Its inclination toward fashion and tastes from the recent past, it’s constant quest for identity, its peculiar reference to the classical norms of work, family, industrialization and political life have never been remarked

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\textsuperscript{40} Krastev, Ivan. 2013. "Why Bulgaria’s Protests Stand Out in Europe". \textit{The Guardian}, July 30. \url{http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/30/bulgaria-protests-europe}.

\textsuperscript{41} Ciobanu, Claudia. 2014. "What Happened to the Protest Movements in Romania and Bulgaria?". \textit{Aljazeera, June} 27. \url{http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/06/protest-movements-romania-bulga-201462713325276686.html}.
neither by politicians nor by Romanian scholars studying anthropology or sociology. Nevertheless, I state that the protests begun through the involvement of the hipsters. The same category was primarily involved also in the Bulgarian uprisings, behaving like a \textit{porte-parole} of the entire society. Unlike the Hungarian protest from January, the Bulgarian or Romanian discontent did not manifested because the governmental decisions offended them as a group or targeted them as a group. On the contrary, in Romania the controversial decision was related to a local community, while in Bulgaria it concerned a national matter (see the Peevski case mentioned above).

Generally known as people who never voted because they refused to do it, the young ones’ ideological options converged on leftism (and environmentalism), but especially anti-capitalism. By using wordplays, subtle texts and images, they sanctioned the precarious capitalism promoted by the corporations, the demagogy of the political authorities and the dilettantism of the mass-media. They usually carried anti-capitalist and anti-corporatist messages, through which they condemned the political decisions. All the protests analysed in this paper declared themselves as pro-democratic manifestos and none as anti-austerity uprisings. One might consider the Central and East European citizens some pure idealists: ‘they lack financial resources, but they mourn the democracy’. Apparently, the austerity politics of the governments in all the three states were imposed by EU and IMF, without leaving any evident deep scars. In fact, as Brancati proves\textsuperscript{42}, the evolution of the recent worldwide protests reveals the fact that social frustrations concerning the bad economic performances are dissimulated in pro-democratic protests because the collective perception superposes the economic activity and the nature of the political regime, thus combining a functionalist measure and a substantial aspect.

The educated middle class has been another significant group which contributed to the visibility of the protests. Having different ideological preferences, they participated occasionally by invoking their discontent with the political corruption. In this categories it seems right to include also the notorious intellectuals, professors and even artists who demonstrated solidarity to the claims of the protesters. A particularity of this group is represented by the children who became the symptom of these peaceful protests. Their parents brought them both in the Romanian and Bulgarian streets in order to proclaim that the environmentalist concerns and the consolidated democracy are a responsibility toward the next generations and that a bright future can be only realized by honest and professional politicians.

In Romania, the increasing proportions of the protests were deliberately neglected by the local and national mass-media, which had already been blackmailed by RMGC. Meanwhile, the foreign media begun to show much interest in the events, for the Romanian civil society was making sign of reviving once again after almost twenty years.\textsuperscript{43} The same situation was reflected in respect to the international coverage of the


Bulgarian and even Hungarian protests. International mass-media was especially interested in the Romanian and Bulgarian cases due to their consistent problems in consolidating democracy. The bad surprise came from Hungary which, under the Orban administration, concerned EU. Therefore, these protests enjoyed notoriety for different reasons: in the Romanian situation because they were the most important environmental uprisings in the recent years in Europe, even though EU attempted to discourage them (EU was and is struggling with the urge to become resourcefully independent); in the Bulgarian one because it succeeded to determine an enormous social cohesion as never before and because of the European support; in the Hungarian one because of the European concern that democracy might be threatened under the Orban administration.

Protests as result of the domestic opportunity structures

Social movements in general, and street protests, in particular rise as the expression of emotional dynamics. “All social movements and their participants, if the ritual process builds up far enough to make for successful commitment-generating occasions, undergo the process of generating collective emotional energy”. 44 Starting with 2010, when the protests generally called the Arab Spring and one year later Occupy Wall Street rose up, the ”collective emotional energy” surpassed the limit of the nation-state, while the physical barriers had been demolished. Undeniably linked to it are the resources necessary in the start-up and the evolution of street protests. New technologies and especially social media erased the resource inequality necessary for the mobilization of the citizens. The democratization of the moral, cultural, human and material resources 45 led to an overwhelming wave of protests all over the globe which culminated in 2013. Because of their accessiblility, the Internet and in particular social-media have


such a democratic potential as no other technology before\textsuperscript{46}, and their instrumentality in the process of mobilization is irrefutable\textsuperscript{47}. As a consequence, the protester is embodied by the young generations, more and more active via social movements\textsuperscript{48}. In the diffusion of the information and the mobilization of the citizens the Internet thus replaced the dynamic of the direct action and street theatre\textsuperscript{49} or, at least left them as the ultimate solutions. Anyway, political activism has been reinvented in recent decades by a diversification in the agencies (the collective organizations structuring political activity), the repertoires (the actions commonly used for political expression), and the targets (the political actors that participants seek to influence). The surge of protest politics, new social movements, and internet activism exemplify these changes\textsuperscript{50}.

The 2013 protests made no exception in respect to the social categories implicated and their instruments of communication and diffusion of information. On the contrary, they manifested when the waves of uprisings in the world had reached the highest point in several years. As Ortiz et al.\textsuperscript{51} observed, at the middle of 2013 the number of protests almost doubled in comparison to 2006. Being clear cases of "constituent moments"\textsuperscript{52}, the 2013 protests in Romania activated a mottled crowds to stand up against a foreign corporation and/or political authorities. Such a trajectory has been labelled as spillover effect\textsuperscript{53} since "the effects of one movement have gone beyond its expressly articulated goals to shape the larger social movement sector"\textsuperscript{54}. The suitable "political resource"\textsuperscript{55} to counterbalance the corruptive liaisons between the financial interests of RMGC and the personal benefits of the politicians, the Romanian Autumn thus occurred in 2013 in an international favourable context and, at the same time, due to a domestic political synergy. The same situation occurred in the Bulgarian case.

The context in which the uprisings appeared and evolved can be suitably understood through the theoretical tools offered by political opportunity structure. By this, protests understood as manifestation and evolution of the social movements are undeniably related to formal and informal political institutionalism, the direct or indirect

\textsuperscript{50} Pippa Norris, 215-216.
response to the political conditions. As Kriesi puts it, the political opportunity structure refers to those aspects of a political system that determine movement development independently of the purposive action of the actors involved. This does not imply that the political opportunity structure is constant; it may shift over time as a result of factors that are not under the control of the actors involved or as a result of the cumulative consequences of their purposive actions. The point is that the actors cannot anticipate such shifts at the time when they engage in collective action, which means that they have to take the political opportunity structure as a given in their short-term strategic calculations. [...] within the POS domain, I propose to distinguish three broad sets of properties of a political system: its formal institutional structure, its informal procedures and the prevailing strategies with regard to challengers, and the configuration of power relevant for the confrontation with the challengers. The first two sets of properties provide the general setting for the mobilization of collective action, and they constrain the relevant configurations of power.

The street protests are directly linked to weak political institutions which lack performances, dismantled by interior tensions between the main actors, rivalries, corruption and inefficiency. This creates the political opportunity structure by permitting previously ignored groups to act and the 2013 protests represented the first major occasion when young people acted in a decisive and constant manner. When the system gives the first signs of openness, "the combination of the realization that system may be vulnerable or responsive to political efforts" is one of the first sources of mobilization.

The openness of the political system, the stability between the political groups or actors, the existence of elite allies, the possibility that a state repress the manifestation of marginalized groups build up the framework of opportunities necessary for a social movement. Despite the possible critiques, the political opportunity theory proves its usefulness because it reflects a "consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimension of the political environment that provides incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure". If the social mobilization tends to increase despite the hostile reaction of the political authorities, then the Bulgarian protests could not be more evident in this respect.

The manner in which protests appear rests upon the public perception of the political system and decisions. Once again, the 2013 realities seemed to be "prepared" for such a mass mobilization. While Europe was passing through social and political crises that generated an incredible effervescence, Romanian and Hungarian citizens seemed to gather strength for an apparently insignificant problem: the gold mining project in a small village. The opportunities of the collective action are created when their costs are high, the power of the revolted group(s) increases, their benefits transformed into collective goods and costs and benefits uncertain, depending on the information used in the interaction and the strategies of the involving parties. In all the three contexts, the conditions were favourable to protests because of the instability and thus fragility of the political system, the persistence of the public opinion to demand explanations for the political decisions, and the determination to sanction the politicians for corruption, misconduct and opportunism.

Probably the deepest concern should focus on the ideological roots of these protests. In all the three countries, the protesters firstly condemned some particular political decisions and soon after pointed out a more severe cause of their discontent. Protests were sustained by the anti-corruption manifestos and demanded immediate anti-corruption measures. The highest the perception of the corruption, more intense the riots. This seems to be the key to understand the severity of the confrontation between the civil society and the political authorities. For at least five years, the indignation against corruption was transformed into a global concern. In Europe, almost every country faced riots against corruption. In Slovenia, Spain, Great Britain, Turkey, Portugal, Croatia, Bosnia, as well as worldwide the discontent against corruption determined a huge mobilization (see India, in 2011 and 2012). Despite this, corruption remains a hot topic on the social mobilization agenda as the recent protests from Mexico, Pakistan, Singapore or Hong Kong in 2014, Brazil and Chile in 2015 proved.

Conclusions

An article from *The Economist* published on June 29, 2013 affirmed: "Nobody can know how 2013 will change the world—it at all.[...] Even now, though, the inchoate significance of 2013 is discernible. And for politicians who want to peddle the same old stuff, the news is not good." The world was facing an extraordinary wave of civic discontent and social cohesion, with a comparable intensity to the one of the ‘glorious’ 60s. The notable differences consisted in the sources of mobilization: while 1968 stood up for liberation, emancipation and peace, the 2013 struggled for democracy, legitimacy and representation. This is why the worldwide protests from 2013 consistently contributed to the revival of democracy and the civic activism. Almost every country was touched by social rage and political disapproval and the Central and Eastern Europe made no exception. On the contrary, states renowned for their civic passivity and the small steps made on the path of a consolidated democracy proved that their experiences can enrich the history of social movements. My analysis focused on Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania attempted to highlight, in a comparative perspective, the ideological and political offspring of the protests. Even though the uprisings can be affiliated to the Occupy movement, characterized by leftist, anti-capitalism and/or anti-corporatism, none of the three waves of protests had a determinant ideological reference (be it leftist or rightist). Differently put, protesters from Bulgaria and Romania did not reject the political decisions resulting from a peculiar ideological perspective, but instead they criticized politicians for corruption, lack of transparency and illegitimacy. Similar allegations were made by the Hungarians citizens, with some restrictions. In the latest situation, they also stood up against some neoliberal and neoconservative measures (the cut off the funds for the universities, the taxation of the data transfers on Internet) with dictatorial accents (the constitutional amendments). All in all, protesters struggled against the quality of the democracy (from an essentialist perspective) and not a particular decision. Even in those situations where the general distress manifested on a certain occasion (be it the gold exploitation in Rošia Montană, the taxation of the Internet or the presence of an oligarch as head of the agency of national security), in reality protesters acted under false pretences. The decisions they stood up against were not worse than previous others; they simply had enough of that kind of making politics and they felt the urge to do something, to act.

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In Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle writes that happiness is the highest good at which all human activity aims. In the Declaration of Independence of the USA Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness are pronounced self-evident truths and unalienable human rights. In contrast to the right of happiness however, a good everyone wishes for, the fact is that no nation of the most developed nations of Europe feels perfectly happy. 2000 years after Aristotle, there are still too many people who are increasingly pressured by problems of economic growth, environmental pollution, earth population growth and migration, job availability, income disparities, political government and corruption, security of life and deterioration of the quality of life. The last is especially a case in the less developed Balkan countries and in Bulgaria, where economic problems and law quality of life contribute for the result of 4 out of 10 points of happiness (World Happiness Report, 2013).

In Bulgaria since 1989, the transition from totalitarian regime to free market and democratic governing is considered generally unsuccessful in terms of social well-being and satisfaction with life. In the very first decade after 1989, the transition turned into failure when savings were devoured by rampant inflation. This led to impoverishment of population and percentage of poor people has grown from 2% in the 80-s to 22% in 2013 (Prodanov, 2013). The calculated amount of money necessary per person for a month was 280 euro in 2013 (KNSB, 2013). Households with higher than 280 euro income per person were 20 %. That means that 80 % of households in Bulgaria live with less income than needed (KNSB, 2013). Another research in 2013 points to the formation of a middle class of 3.5 million people (calculated on the base of 1200 euro of income for a four-member family), but in the same time 60% of Bulgarians are reported to had difficulties to meet their everyday expenses (Prodanov, 2013). Such was the complex situation in 2013 when several waves of protests swept over the country. This article will discuss two of them: the anti-monopole protest in the beginning of 2013 and the anti-government protest in June 2013.

A protest against poverty

The anti-monopole protest started in January and spread around many towns of Bulgaria. It was initiated by people who had endured the difficulties of the 25 year transition from totalitarian to democratic political system and had not reached the

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standard and quality of life they were promised and expecting. The protest was against high electricity prices, because people were not able to pay the bills and provide for their families/themselves in winter. Protesters raised their voice against political system and living in poverty and material deprivation, although still working or have retired after 30 or 40 years of work experience. At that time prices of electricity in Bulgaria were the cheapest in EU.

These protests were used by proponents of left ideas in Bulgaria to point to the inability of neo-liberal paradigm to provide for a decent life of people. Easily this left-wing critique could be exclusively related to the fact that Bulgaria is a post-communist country. The truth is that there is a revival of left ideas all around the world. From the works of Slavoi Zizek in Slovenia to David Harvey’s End of capitalism in USA, many researchers now believe that economic and social situation has reached a critical point and neo-liberal paradigm doesn’t work well neither for environment, nor for economy and human development. One approach to this discussion, accepted here, is to agree that neo-liberal paradigm promotes the right principles - free market and separation between politics and economy, but it fails because, unfortunately, these principles get easily corrupted.

The first problem of neo-liberal policy in Bulgaria is that free market is not free.

In the End of Capitalism Harvey explicitly writes that free market, where all practices are legal, is too ideal to exist. On the contrary, there are many illegal practices/or agents on the free market like drug cartels, arm trafficking, mafia and criminal organizations with significant share in international trade; manipulations, violence, robbery, monopolies and privatization also distort the “invisible hand” (Harvey, 2014).

In Bulgaria after 1989 there was a sudden rise of criminality and it was created by impoverished and marginalized people, but also by the processes of capital accumulation. The big business in Bulgaria rose from the darkness of the post-socialist privatization and criminal practices contributing for the initial accumulation of capital. For this reason, “businessman” for 20 years was a bad word in the country applied with the meaning of “immorality”. The first years of transition to democratic society and free market economy gave plentiful of examples for illegal practices of “accumulation through dispossession”: the big private business was built with capital which was bought from the state cheaply; people who lead privatization took their share from land property assets, state factories, agricultural cooperations and probably many others. Harvey describes the process in the following way: “Social wealth disappears into the pockets of private persons” (Harvey, 2014: 268). Accumulation through dispossession is used to describe also the continuing process of concentration of wealth all around the world and according to the French economist T. Piketty the levels of inequality in 21 century may become even bigger than in 19th century (Piketty, 2014:237).

Neither privatization, nor liberalization of trade in Bulgaria provided for the expected improvement of live-standard or satisfaction with life after 1989. Cutting public expenditures, low salaries, oppression over small businesses, illegal practices and corruption contributed significantly to the deterioration in the standard of life and
increase of indebted families. For the first time there were suicides in Bulgaria caused by indebtedness or unemployment. Three self-immolations happened in the winter of 2013 in the context of the protest.

Another problem of neo-liberal paradigm in Bulgaria is the existence of oligarchy and mafia. Neo-liberal paradigm fails, because politics and economy are not independent domains and this leads to corruption of democracy and market as well. Capital in Bulgaria was accumulated generally by representatives of the ex-communist nomenclature and this went in parallel with pauperization of the electorate. Bulgarian oligarchy was created as a result of merging the new financial with the old political power and its existence kept hold of the “free” market. Now there is a big problem to control illegal or shady practices in the market while political system is not independent from private business interests and fight for political power goes far from representing the electorate interests.

People in Bulgaria who were on the streets in January 2013, were there because they were living on the edge of survival, in time of corrupted democracy and non-free market economy and they wanted more decent life expressed in their ability to pay their winter electricity bills. Monopoles in the energy sector were the primary focus of the protest. The demands combined insistence for stronger state regulation, namely less free market equalled to less poverty.

This first protest is interpreted here as a protest against neo-liberal paradigm. People rose because they were poor and unsatisfied with their life. Winter protest resulted in resignation of the right government and after several months new government was headed by socialists. The stage was prepared for the second wave of protests in June, 2013.

A protest for morality

In June 2013, in Sofia started a protest for moral in politics.

This protest was broadly regarded as an upheaval of the middle class, of the right wing against the left leadership (the government was composed by three parties, including a far-right party, but it was headed by socialists). Some people saw in this anti-government protest a threat for the social state and social benefits. A conviction that the protesters must have been paid has spread.

The proponents of the protest, on the other side, believed they react to immorality of politics. Never and nowhere in the newest Bulgarian history moral became a point of big political discussion, not to mention mass protests. So this protest really marked a turning point in social movements in Bulgaria.

The reason the protest to start was the announcement that the newly formed government appointed to the position of a Chairman of the National Agency for State Security a member of Bulgarian parliament who was considered young and inexperienced. He was a deputy from the list of a party, promoting Turkish interests in Bulgaria. He was politically and financially influential. His family controlled 80% of Bulgarian newspapers and 100% of newspaper distribution, two TV channels and Internet media. The long-lasting criminal practices, political corruption, nepotism, social unfairness, the problem of oligarchy in power suddenly resonated into the image of this candidate for protector of state security and unexpectedly for everyone the protest started.
There is something similar between the Bulgarian anti-government protest and the way the protests in Tunisia put the beginning of the Arab spring in the end of 2010. The both protests were provoked by corruption and abuse with power which were not an accident or an isolated case in the recent history of the country. On the contrary, they were part of a routine practices existing for long time. This kind of corruption and power abuse has penetrated everyday life of people and they have been living with this for many years. And unexpectedly a single reaction suddenly grew bigger than the isolated case and burst into a massive outcry of criticism and discontent.

Bulgarians as a nation are notorious for enduring with patience the economic troubles of the last decades, and also political corruption and criminality, malfunctioning juridical system, strong connections between business and power. The anti-government protests in 2013 seems to be a rare example of an open and massive remonstration activity. The most surprising feature of these protests was the demand for morality in politics. The question is: how it happened that a nation which for years was peacefully living with the conviction that politics is “dirty” suddenly raised this demand for morality? One answer to this question gives the Internet and the growing usage of social networks.

What influenced particularly the specifics of the summer protest was the age of participants – predominantly young people, living on the Internet and social networks like Facebook. Technically, the protest started when one person initiated an event on Facebook and till the end of the day 40 000 people have clicked “Going”.

Influence of Internet culture on the participants in the protest could be analyzed in terms of digital citizenship with specific values, attitudes and tools for civic activism. Internet culture promotes transparency, solidarity, voluntarism, anti-bureaucratism, freedom of expression and informality. These values were hallmarks of the early Internet culture and they are believed to give the essence of the free Internet now (Himanen, 2001). Presently, they result into the free sharing of knowledge (MIT open courses), writing free and open code software, collaboration for writing free online encyclopedias (Wikipedia), and many others. The wide resistance against ACTA supported by Internet users is based on values of free Internet, resistance to government control, surveillance and censorship and defense of individual privacy.

Having in mind the growing Internet population in Bulgaria with high quality Internet access to the net, the fast growing influence of Facebook culture adds important difference to life-style of Internet users: experience in creating/participating in large communities, involvement in joint work for causes, signing/organizing petitions, fund raising, personal visibility and self-expression. Users get familiar with Internet cultural environment which changes their experience about the world, their expectations and consequently – their behavior. Social networks as a digital tool give the frame for individual self-expression, transmission of emotions via text messages and photos, networking with other people for causes and recruit of supporters. Through the Internet social activism acquires a digital face and constitution today.

The assumption here is that the summer protest bore the influence of Internet environment as much because it used digital tools for communication, as a new kind of values of the Internet culture were also reflected.
1. The protest demonstrated a new kind of fight for a principle - morality in politics. For the proponents of the protest socialist government was morally obliged to admit its political dependence and resign because of its discredit. The fact is that government admitted the “mistake” and the appointment was cancelled, but no one resigned. So the protest continued for many months afterwards demanding a moral redemption from the leaders.

   At present, social networks are very influential in leading fight for principles. Facebook users, for example, are very active in voting, liking, or signing and sharing petitions for causes which are not of immediate importance for the user. It often happens to sign a petition because of solidarity with ideas; there are petitions for ecological causes, for unfairly sentenced people and etc. Social networks promote activism for ideal purposes.

   Due to the Internet, users are more active than in their normal, off-line lives. How effective are the petitions in real life is an important point, but the main point is that Internet users get used to this kind of activism: they click likes or dislikes, vote thumbs up or thumbs down. Interactive Internet tools create environment, where users are being trained to take active position, instead of being passive and receptive. For teen users this is part of their everyday life. Very important is that these activities or activism are not provoked by user’s need to survive physically. Most often they are based on values, attitudes and norms. For this reason, giving active support to a principle is ordinary activity in social networks, although not such in real life.

2. Networks and groups on Facebook stimulate solidarity, which is among the defining features of social movements. Building solidarity and community, social networks promote civic activism among nations like Bulgarian, where civic activism, civic society and voluntary work for society are not well developed off-line.

3. Social media and Internet usage seems to have influenced another feature of the summer protest-leadership. Being a tool for organization and dissemination of information the Internet and social networks contributed to the fact that anti-oligarchy protest did not produced leaders. Horizontal communication on the Internet and in social networks reflected and supported horizontal structure of the protest. It is a fact that Internet culture undermines hierarchies and is well suited to the horizontal structure of social movements in general. In the course of protest activities all political attempts for taking the leadership were rejected. The protest finally identified its form through the so called “Network of protest”. So although the accusations about corruption of the protest are most probably based on existing facts, there is much uncertainty left for the corruption of the whole protest which combined various and distant activist groups, communities and hundreds of thousands individuals going on the streets as well.

4. Network communication is closely related to the refutation of hierarchic political system. On the Internet ideas for abandoning representative democracy, the hierarchic and centralized governance are very popular. During the anti-oligarchy protest these kinds of ideas were present, although met with suspicion. The Facebook page Participatory democracy was an active agent in the anti-oligarchy protest on line with
slogans against the political system. There were also suggestions to create a political party without leaders. The participatory democracy ideas were supported by the *Alliance for participatory democracy* community Facebook page, they gained about 1500 votes in 2013 and reached 10 000 voices in 2014. It seems that together with the general disappointment with the political system in Bulgaria, the digital inclusion makes the idea of the participatory democracy more pronounced.

During the summer protest enthusiasts organized a performance of the famous painting of Delacroix (*La Liberté guidant le peuple*) creating a connotation with French revolution. Reference to French revolution is a very significant mark of how they perceived their protest as a flag of critical political change when the “monarchy” should be abolished in favor of a new “republic”. It also gives a clue that the protest in winter and the summer protest had much in common in terms of Marxist interpretation of “class struggle” - literary or figuratively.

The Internet and social networks visualized processes in Bulgarian civic society, which were not easily detectable during the last 25 years. During the summer of 2013 the contribution of Internet culture was to give to civic activity not only visibility but viability as well. Internet reflected the processes in society and the processes in society got strength because of this. Internet culture could be considered a source of values and activities which are “framing” civic activism in a way that reflects the architecture of the Internet space (events, “going”, voting, “like”). In this way it gradually facilitates a change in the culture of protests and civic activism.

**Conclusions**

The protests in winter and summer were not as different as interpretations make them to look like. The justification of the first protest in public opinion was understood in terms of correlation between low income and low satisfaction with life. The second protest was justified in terms of higher income and higher expectations of life.

People who were not able to pay their bills were protesting against the consequences of the unsuccessful transition and they found their salvation in the stronger state regulation. People in the summer protest were protesting against the reasons for unsuccessful transition and they wanted a state stronger than mafia. Both groups wanted to have a decent and happy life. Nevertheless Marx or values are used to explain social protests in Bulgaria, Aristotle is right and the most important question is how to move closer to the happy and satisfying life? Should we better rely on policy or culture to promote a change?

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After the Orbán-revolution: 
the awakening of civil society in Hungary?

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Abstract

In the last month of 2014 a massive protest cycle began in Hungary against the so called internet-tax. Later the protests were reframed, and it gave space to express a general dissatisfaction with the third Orbán-government. In the domestic context these post-election protests can be placed in the series of the “civil ethos” protests in Hungary, which are marked by apolitical stance, rejection of the particularity of party politics, civil consciousness. In an international comparison the protests shares the characteristics both the Western anti-austerity protests and the Eastern color revolutions. A protest survey of 357 responds proved, that during the protest the critic of the Orbán-government was the most important issue. The active protesters had clear political preferences and a general critique of the political system had only a marginal support. By the end of the protest cycle, the events and actors became part of the agony of the Hungarian left. The protesters were more partisans without effective parties, than the constituency of a new emerging party.

Introduction

Two weeks after the 2014 municipal elections in Hungary, which resulted in the triumph of the ruling Fidesz party for the third time that year, the proposition of the so called internet-tax triggered a massive protest wave. The number of protesters at the second event (ca. 35 000) shocked the government and inspired the oppositional media and supporters of the disintegrated left-wing parties. As the government withdraw the internet-tax, the organizers reframed the messages. The corruption of government

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officials and the pro-Russian policies of Viktor Orbán became the main topics. The EU flag became a standard accessory at those events. At this point the demonstrations spread from Budapest to other major cities in Hungary.

Our research team at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences conducted a survey at the last major protest in Budapest with ca. 8000 participants on the 16th December. We handed out 1650 fliers with the link to an online survey. In two and a half days 357 respondents finished the survey of 11 questions. We regard the respondents as an active core of the protesters, and our survey more a qualitative as a quantitative one. We will have a second wave of survey on the 15th March.

According to our first findings, the vast majority of the active protesters participated at the 2014 general elections, and still have party preferences. This active core has also a balanced financial and social background. Many organizers claimed to condemn the last 25 years as a dead-end of democratic development, while our data shows, that the protesters rather disapproved only the Orbán-system. The preliminary data suggests, that this protest wave follows similar patterns as the Democratic Charter in the early 1990s and the Milla protests in 2011-2012 (i.e. strong civic-ethos and anti-political sentiments).

The number of protesters, visual observation and a social media analysis suggested that there has been a lot without less stable party preferences at the beginning of the protest cycle. Though, our data of a protest survey at a later stage demonstrates that the active core of the protesters had clear party preferences.

The protests were bearing both the patterns of the post-crisis movements in Western Europe and those of the ‘colorful revolutions’ in Eastern Europe. Social exclusion and pro-Russian foreign policy were also important topics, which were also reflected in the protest slogans and the interpretation of the organizers. Thus, In an international comparison, the protest wave can be placed in between post-crisis protests and the colorful revolutions in Eastern Europe.

Political activity in Hungary

The level of non-electoral political participation in Hungary is relatively low compared to West-European countries. The European Social Survey (ESS) measures the European societies from different aspects in every two years since 2002. There are 16 countries which participated in every six round of ESS. In the ESS 13 countries from 2002 to 2012 an average of 7-8 percent of the population participated in a lawful demonstration in the last 12 months before the survey was conducted. In the case of post-socialist countries, this rate of participation in lawful demonstrations is significantly lower. The lowest is in Poland with 1-2 percent, in Slovenia this proportion is 2-3 percent. Depending upon the year of general elections, 3-4 percent of the population attended a lawful demonstration in Hungary. Thus the protest activity in the Hungarian society is considerably lower than in West-European countries, however that is higher compared to two post-socialist countries.

Three important features of the protesters can be identified. Independently from the year

78Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
of the survey, protesters in Hungary are younger and more educated than the average. Until 2010 protest activity was more common by people who placed themselves on the right of the ideological scale. After two terms of the left-liberal coalition, in 2010 the center-right coalition of Viktor Orbán could form a government. The ideological character of the protesters in the 2012 round of the ESS is more balanced. Accordingly, between 2002 and 2012 the „typical” Hungarian protester is younger, more educated and rather rightist.

**The methodology of the research**

A real time empirical study, which measures the opinion and social background of protesters hasn’t been conducted before in Hungary. However, protest surveys are common research methods in the social movement research (Walgrave–Verhulst 2011). Hungarian social movement researchers relied before on media content analysis, structured and in-depth interviews. The most important advantage of the protest survey, that we can approach the protesters on the field, thus it is possible to get a more accurate image. With the so called snowball sample, where the study subjects are recruiting themselves the other subjects from their personal network, it is possible to map an already existing activist networks. Our empirical study aimed to investigate the protesters at the demonstration on December 16, 2014 with three different but interrelated means.

On December 16 we handed out 1650 flyers with a call for participating in the survey among the participants of the demonstration on three different stages of the event: at the gathering, during the march, and at the Parliament building, which was the final destination of the protesters. On the flyer were details about the object, the aim of the survey and about the affiliation of the researchers. There was also a link to the homepage of our institute, where the protesters could access the online questionnaire. The flyers were handed out by university students and young researchers. We encountered only with one protester, who didn’t have internet access, however, we admit, that an online questionnaire restricts the respondents to those with an internet access. Every flyer, which was handed out was registered on a quota-page. According to this, 55 percent of the flyers were handed out for males and 45 percent for females. 40-40 percent were received by people under 30-35 years and by middle-aged and 20 percent by seniors. These proportions roughly meets with those of the respondents of the online questionnaire.

The online questionnaire was published on December 16 afternoons on the homepage of the Institute for Political Science, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. It was accessible for two and a half days. The questionnaire could be filled from PCs, tablets, smartphones even during the protest event. 467 started to fill the questionnaire, but until 8 AM December 18, 357 respondents finished it. This is 21,6% of the 1650 invitation, and 77% of those, who started the questionnaire. 83 percent used a PC or a laptop, 13% a smartphone, 3 and 1% used tablet or other device respectively.

The students and young researchers, who conducted the survey on the field also kept a participant observer log on four different stages of the demonstration. The data registered in the logs suggests that there were more males and rather younger people at the demonstration. The number of participants changed dynamically, many people left the protest after the speeches of the gathering site (József Nádor square), but the many people
Geoffrey Pleyers, Ionel N. Sava (eds.)

joined the demonstrators at the Parliament building (Kossuth square). According to our observation different kind of people attended the two sites. Although, we consider the protest survey more as a qualitative as a quantitative method. The reason of this, that a basic multitude can't be identified on which a sample could be set up. We assume that the respondents constitute the most active group of the protesters, since they answered our questions despite any inconveniences. However, this doesn't necessarily means, that the respondents would be the members of a single activist network, since the flyers were handed out randomly to the participants of the demonstration, which is the greatest advantage of the method as well. The output of the study were the quantifiable results of the quota-sheets filled in at the event, the descriptions of the participant observation logs and the results of the online questionnaire. The following analysis relies on the information from these data. Due to the relatively low item number and because of methodological considerations we didn't want to undertake multivariate statistical analysis.

Results

The Facebook group called "Free Education" and "One-hundred-thousand against the Internet-tax" announced a protest event called "There is no space to retreat" on December 16, 2014 in the downtown of Budapest. 13 733 people marked to join the event on Facebook, but we estimate the number of participants between 8 000 and 10 000 on the three sites of the event: the gathering at the József nádor square, during the march through downtown Budapest and at the demonstration and speeches at the Parliament building (Kossuth square). The renewed square is the "main square" of the country. The parliament building is the seat of the government and the national assembly, and several government buildings are in the area.

The social background of protesters

According to our empirical study the respondents of the online questionnaire differ from the average Hungarians: they are younger, more educated, and more active economically and have a better financial status than the Hungarian society in general. Due to this, we considered the respondents as an active elite of the protesters.

The participatory experience of protesters

At the beginning of the protest cycle in the last months of 2014 media pundits started to interpret the events as the mobilization of those, who were not interested in politics until then. This hypothesis was confirmed by the Facebook analysis by the firm Maven 7, which observed, whether those, who liked the Facebook page “One-hundred-thousand against the Internet-tax” also liked the pages of political parties. The method has its obvious limits, since voting behavior and party engagement is not necessarily involves ‘liking’ the Facebook page of the given political party.²⁹

²⁹ http://network.blog.hu/2014/11/11/internetado-tuntetes
Our research couldn’t verify the abovementioned hypothesis. We should remark however, that the protest event on December 16 was the 8th major event of protest cycle since the end of October. The event we analyzed belonged to the downward phase of the protest wave. Until then, the “elite” of the protesters already obtained a notable protest experience. A part of this experience was made in the era of the second Orbán-government, between 2010 and 2014, while the rest was made during the current protest cycle. Concerning the protests against the second Orbán-government between 2010 and 2014, 70 percent of the respondents participated on at least one of them.

It tells a lot, where the participants had their first protest experiences. These were mostly protests of the so called “civil ethos” like those in the first half of the ‘90s (BOZÓKI 1996). At these “civil ethos” protests the demonstrators took action on behalf of a civil ethos, which involves a civil obligation to control the decision makers and political power holders in general. The “One million for the freedom of press” (Milla) was registered as a Facebook group on December 21, 2010, which marked a new era in organizing protests as well. (HINSEY 2012). Their initial issue was the new media law, which - according to them – restricted the freedom of press. The Facebook site and the group assured publicity for their cause and for the organizations and individuals, who were protesting against the new media law. A new network of activists, conscious citizens emerged around Milla. These activist organized protest on January 14. and 27. Later, the Milla organized protests against the Orbán-government and for democracy with several thousand participants on every major Hungarian national holiday (March 15, October 23). The biggest event was probably the protest on October 23, 2012, which was attended – according to some estimations – by nearly 50 000 people. The two-dimensional crosstab shows, that college graduated respondents and those over 35 attend the Milla protests on the first place.80

Another source of protest experience is more political, namely the events organized by the leftist inter-parliamentary opposition of the Orbán-government between 2010 and 2014. These were attended by 37 percent of the respondents. Those over 60 were overrepresented in this group.81

The student protests organized by the HaHa (Student Network) in late 2011 and early 2012 mobilized the younger respondents and especially those, who were college students at the time of the survey. The HaHa was strongly represented on Hungary’s biggest University, the Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest (ELTE). The HaHa introduced new, innovative protest forms, which suited the logic of news value. Thus, these practices quickly drew the attention of the media. Such innovative forms were the occupation of a building of ELTE, the spontaneous march and the cell organizational structure. Though the protest had only a limited impact, the organizational and action experience of the HaHa could be converted into political capital at the 2014 general elections. At the December 16 protest 24 percent of the respondents participated at the HaHa demonstrations. It is not surprising, that those under 35 and students were over-

80 Degree: Pearson Chi-Square value= 20,722, sig=0,000, Cramer-V=0,241 and Age: Pearson Chi-Square value= 21,881, sig=0,000, Cramer-V=0,248.
81 Age: Pearson Chi-Square value= 33,823, sig=0,000, Cramer-V=0,308.
represented among them.\textsuperscript{82}

As the second Orbán-government took office, the problem of debtors of Swiss-franc loans were already an urgent social problem. Due to the financial crisis and the suddenly increased exchange rate of the Swiss-franc, individuals and municipalities fell into a debt spiral. This situation could be handled only with centralized measures. In fact, from the spring of 2010 debtors organized protests time to time in Budapest. However, these demonstrations had a right and even extreme right orientation than a leftist one in terms of framing and symbols. About 5 percent of the respondents participated in such debtor protests.

The more recent protest experiences have a similar significance. These were the experiences gained at the different events of the protest cycle, and especially at the so-called ‘net-tax’ protests. Only 10 percent of the respondents admitted not to participate at any protest of the last weeks. Two-third participated on more, 9 percent on ‘every’ demonstration.

All in all, the participants of the protest event on December 16 (and the respondents of the questionnaire) can be considered as a definitely active group, since only 5 percent was not involve in any protest action between 2010 and 2014 nor at the events of the protest cycle. By contrast, one-third of the respondents had protest experiences both under the second Orbán-government and during the current protest cycle.

\textit{The protesters’ political orientation}

The desirous interpretation or – to put is more exactly – hope, that circulated in the Hungarian media about the political non-involvement, party detachment of the protesters couldn’t be confirmed at least for the active core by our findings. The study revealed, that 90 percent of the respondents – as they recalled – attended the general elections in 2014. According to the data, those who voted for the governing Fidesz party didn’t participated at the protest event or didn’t fill in the online questionnaire, but the voters of the radical rightist party Jobbik were also underrepresented at the event. The voters of the former left-centrist electoral coalition and of the ecological party LMP constituted 82 percent of the respondents.

The ‘elite’ of the protesters proved a similar electoral activity on an upcoming general election. More than 80 percent stated to certainly participate on an upcoming election, while there was nearly no one, who would in no case attend an upcoming election. Which is more surprising, that only 6 percent would not attend the election, if there is no other option than the already existing parties. This is a clear sign, that the active core of the protesters didn’t rejected the established parties to such an extent, as some commentators thought.

We changed the usual four grade scale of public opinion research, and introduced the option “if only the already existing parties can be chosen, then I wouldn’t go to vote”. This option was picked by mostly those, who didn’t participate at the 2014 general

\textsuperscript{82} Age: Pearson Chi-Square value= 17,470, sig=0,000, Cramer-V=0,221. Activity: Pearson Chi-Square value= 13,820, sig=0,05, Cramer-V=0,197
elections as well. Many different slogan, message, opinion were present at events of the protest wave started at the end of October 2014. We were curious, which one of these is the ‘lowest common denominator’ of the protests. According to our hypothesis, the mobilization in Budapest was an issue oriented protest wave, which bears the messages both the financial crisis and of the so called Eastern-European colorful revolutions. The former manifests in the fight against the increasing level of poverty caused by the crisis, while the latter can be discovered in the dissatisfaction with the Orbán-system and in the rejection of the 25 years of failed transformation, insufficient democratic development.

We listed nine different quotations from speakers at protest events. The respondents of the online questionnaire were asked to name the two most important for them. The analysis of the answers suggests, that the critic of the Orbán-government was eminently important for them. This general feature of the protests, that is the critic of the Orbán-government was recorded in the participant observation logs as well. Both on the banners could be read and were chanted by the protesters such slogans. The most popular chants were: “Dirty Fidesz!”, “Get away Orbán!”, “Viktor!”, “You should resign!” . On the banners were messages like: “Game over!”, “Fideszmafia!”, “Viktor, you screwed it!”, “The king is naked!” , Transparent government!”. All in all, the protests were peaceful altogether.

Compared to the critic of the Orbán-government other issues were less relevant. The issue of the internet tax, which triggered the whole event, became obsolete. The critic of the Orbán-government was a catch-all issue, could involve any other problems. From this aspect, it tells a lot, that the other catch-all issue, the critic of the last 25 years since the democratic transition in 1989 was only the fourth most important message. However, it should be noted, that the fight against the increasing poverty, which peaked during the time of the second Orbán-government was the second most important issue.

Between Western anti-austerity protests and the Eastern “colorful revolutions”

The protests had the same features as the abovementioned protests of the “civil ethos” in Hungary after the democratic transition. At these demonstrations, the organizers and supporters are rejecting the particularity of politics, and they emphasizing and promoting civil public activism, which represents universal values and common goals. This universality also justifies their action and the right for controlling politicians, decision makers. On the other hand, even if the protests of the civil ethos are emerging due to a specific single or set of issues, there is the opportunity to express a general dissatisfaction with the currently reigning government and by so integrating different groups. Because of this latter function, the protests of the civil ethos have a particular role in the era when oppositional parties are relatively weak. For the reason of this integrative or catch-all character, these protests can mobilize quite a lot of people for Hungarian standards. In an international comparison, the protest cycle can be placed in between the Western anti-austerity protest and the Eastern “color revolutions”. The EU flag became a standard accessory, people chanted “Europe! Europe!” regularly, the pro-Russian foreign policy of the Orbán-government was criticized on many banners, and speakers condemned the infamous concept of the “illiberal democracy” and the anti-poor social policy of the
government. But not only the dramaturgy of the protest or the symbols, slogans of the activists suggest this position, but both the protest survey and the context of mobilization supports this assumption.

These protests were triggered after the municipal elections in Hungary. Since the 2002 general elections, there are protests of the elected government about half a year after the general elections. According to McFaul’s definition (2006), the electoral revolution means, that a fraudulent election catalyzes the protests, the opposition applies extra-constitutional means, like protests, both the incumbents and the oppositional candidate declares authority and both sides avoids a significance use of violence. None of these criteria are fully valid in the Hungarian case; however, there have been a lot of controversies due to the new election law introduced by the second Orbán-government. The new law redraws the electoral districts in favor of the reigning Fidesz party (gerrymandering), and decreased the proportionality of the whole system. These changes and the obvious bias of the public broadcasters also fueled the dissatisfaction with the election results. Despite these contradictions, the 2014 elections were fair and democratic. It is not by accident, that the new election law didn’t appear as a protest topic alone.

It is also a difference, that the protests were organized by independent actors, and not by oppositional parties. Even at a later stage, the possible ways of cooperation between the protesters and political parties was disputed. Many civil organizers rejected the cooperation with political parties because of the abovementioned civil ethos of the demonstrations. However, the protest survey shows that the active core of the protesters voted for the electoral alliance of left wing opposition parties, and there was no significance number of protesters, who would reject established parties and the whole 25 years of Hungarian politics after the democratic transition. Due to this similarities and differences, we would label the later events not as an electoral revolution, but as a series of electoral protests.

Another similarity with the color revolutions is the role of internationally funded NGOs. Both in the Serbian electoral revolution in 2000 and in the Ukraine in 2004 civil organizations, NGOs were the catalysts of the mass protests. In Serbia the social movement organization Otpor (Resistance), which was initially a student’s movement, organized major protest campaigns and trained activists (NIKOLAYENKO 2007). Otpor also set up the Center for Applied Non-violent Actions and Strategies (CANVAS), where young Ukrainian activists of the Pora organizations were also trained. Pora (It’s time!) had a similar role in the Ukrainian “Orange revolution” in 2004 as the Otpor had in Serbia. These organizations and others, which mobilized protesters during the color revolutions in the post-soviet region received funds from US based NGOs, donor organizations, i.e. the Soros Foundation and the National Democratic Institute (BEISSINGER 2007). Civil organizations, network of activists with protest experiences were important contributors to the demonstrations. As the protest survey shows, many respondents also had protest experiences during the previous events of the protest cycle or

from even before, during the second Orbán-government. Former activists of the HaHa (student network) and various NGOs and their representatives, which have been involved in the mobilization as organizers or just as speakers at the protest have also received support from the Soros Foundation. Another important financial source of these organizations were the EEA and Norway Grants.84

While in Western and Southern European countries domestic austerity measures were seen in relation with the Euro-crisis (PIANTA–GERBAUDO 2015), in Hungary this aspect is fully absent, since Hungary is not the member of the Eurozone. This also involves, that there is no critic concerning the EU troika in Hungary, in fact, the visit of the German chancellor in February 2015 was celebrated by many activists and her personality was seen as a guarantee against the illiberal state of Viktor Orbán. Also, the anti-poor social policy of the government is also seen as a purely Hungarian issue, and not as a part of the neoliberal agenda of the European Union.

There is also a contrast between a certain group of organizers and the participants of the protest events. A distinctive group of younger activists are more critical with the whole political establishment. Many of them made their first experiences with protest participation during the abovementioned student protests and social movement organization (HaHa). This group has the same features in terms of protest frames, horizontal decision making, symbols as in the case of the Occupy or the Indignados movement. Similar to the global justice movement, this activism has subcultural characters in many ways (GRZEGORZ 2013). Though, the students protest and the activists gained a notable media attention, and their networks can be mobilized, they have a limited impact beyond academic and leftist intellectual circles. While the leftist concepts of post-politics, radical democracy or post-democracy are used as analytical-ideological means for diagnosis and action in the case of Occupy and Indignados, these are not used beyond the activists subculture. Moreover, the data of the protest survey suggests, that the vast majority of the protesters rejects the Orbán-government and wouldn’t criticize the whole “system”.

Conclusions

In October 2014 a massive protest cycle began in Hungary, which was triggered by the plan of an internet tax. Later the protests were reframed, and it gave space to express a general dissatisfaction with the third Orbán-government. In the domestic context the protest cycle can be placed in the series of the “civil ethos” protests in Hungary, which are marked by apolitical stance, rejection of the particularity of party politics, civil consciousness. In an international comparison the protest cycle shares the characteristics both the Western anti-austerity protests and the Eastern color revolutions. The pro-Russian policy and the illiberal tendencies are criticized after the municipal elections; the cycle can be seen more as series of electoral protests than an electoral revolution.

84 The Hungarian government accused the donor organizations of the Norway grant with supporting directly political organizations and causes: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/02/us-hungary-norway-funding-ngo-idUSKB0ED1DQW20140602
According to the survey among the ca. 8000 protesters on 16 December, 2014, the active core of the protesters didn’t rejected the whole political establishment and the 25 years of politics after the democratic transition. The vast majority of the respondents also participated at the general elections in 2014. However, a certain group of protesters are condemning the whole political establishment. This group is similar to the Occupy and Indignados movements as they are the bearers of subterranean politics in Hungary, however with a limited impact on mainstream politics.

The protest cycle in Budapest in the last months of 2014 also had a limited scope. The colorful revolutions aimed to overthrow authoritarian regimes, the anti-austerity protests criticized the European governance structure and neoliberal regime. In contrast - as the protest survey shows - during the Budapest protests the critic of the Orbán-government proved to be the most important issue. At time of our survey the active protesters had clear political preferences and a general critique of the political system had only a marginal support. As the mass mobilization was celebrated the awakening of the civil society, by the end of the protest cycle, the events and actors became part of the agony of the Hungarian left. The protesters were more partisans without effective parties, than the constituency of a new emerging party.

References


The emergence of environmental subjects within the conflict over Rosia Montana: a political ecology of shifting subjectivities

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Abstract

Arun Agrawal’s concept of environmentality illustrates how government, individuals and the environment interact and shape each other. Focusing on how people relate to government and the environment, this paper explores what specific factors play a decisive role in the case of Rosia Montana, adapting Agrawal’s theoretical framework to include globalization. The influence of international organizations on both sides of the dispute is shown to complement the state’s historical influence on constructing the environment and environmental subjectivities. Using political ecology and social construction, this paper aims to open research on social movements to the concept of environmental subjects, by proposing that fundamental changes in subjectivities related to the environment significantly shift as a result of and in support of grassroots environmental movements.

Introduction and thesis

The conflict over open pit gold mining at Rosia Montana, involving cyanide and massive relocations, represents a milestone in the living history of environmental and democratic social movements in Eastern Europe, with plenty of still unearthed lessons to be drawn from it. One cannot help but be baffled by the (apparent) paradoxes of the situation. One example is the invocation of tradition both to save, and to exploit Rosia Montana: some members of the community want to hinder the project in order to preserve Rosia Montana’s mining tradition, while others want to continue the tradition of mining, despite this meaning the destruction of Rosia Montana.

Although studies on the political ecology of the mining project and on the social construction of environmental risk at Rosia Montana have offered valuable insights into the multiscale constellations of Europe’s largest potential gold mining project, the emergence of environmental subjects in this process has remained unexplored. Given the relative novelty of environmental protest and resistance movements in Eastern Europe, mapping the formations and shifts in subjectivities that the Rosia Montana project has

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generated is paramount to a richer understanding of its long-term impact on the human-environment interface at Rosia Montana itself and beyond.

It is in these complex interactions of conflict and solidarity, competition to define the problem and collective action that individuals and groups redefine and reorient themselves. The question posed by Arun Agrawal on how and why environmental subjects emerge from certain settings (such as, but not limited to, technologies of government) can be used as the theoretical link between political ecology and identity formation in the case of Rosia Montana. The argument is that relocation, reconfiguration of livelihoods and political mobilization in this context in particular have generated profound shifts in identities, creating environmental subjects at the local, national and international level of involvement.

The actors most reactive to and involved in this conflict are the local community, divided into those that have accepted relocation and those who are rejecting it, and the protesters who defended the cause of the latter on the streets of Romanian cities and abroad in the fall of 2013. To the local community issues of change and adaptation are crucial, while issues of political participation and environmental conservation are important for all of those involved. Apart from the political ecology of the project and the resulting interactions, this paper analyses the grand narratives around the project, containing certain understandings of the environment, as well as the noticeable processes of adaptation (such as professional reorientation of Rosia Montana citizens in rejecting monoindustrialism) and communicated self-identification in relation to this issue (especially in the case of the protesters). After analyzing the potential of environmental subjects emergence around this conflict, a special focus on the local community opposed to the project shows which interactions have the most potential for creating environmental subjects and how new identities are managed or even leveraged.

The identity paradox mentioned earlier is, of course, an illusion, the result of the oversimplification in the media of this multifaceted problem. However, it should inspire us to ask what such an experience means for the overlapping, contradictory, constantly becoming identities of those involved, and what their identities mean for the future of environmental social movements in Romania.

Social movements not only take place within a specific system of government, but they also, as in the case of Rosia Montana, refer explicitly to policies and world views and may express dissatisfaction with other aspects of politics, in general. The state, local communities, transnational interest groups and the environment are inextricably linked in the outbreak of conflicts and in the entire process of changes in understandings, policy and government that are all visible in the constellation of the Rosia Montana mining project. It is therefore impossible to look at social movements without referring to their political context and to the subjectivities constitutive to them. Rosia Montana exemplifies an instance of democratic and environmental subjects emerging and transforming these relationships between state, community and the environment.

Theoretical framework

Agrawal’s account of the „making of environmental subjects“ (Agrawal, 2005) is considered by Robbins to contain one of five fundamental theses in political ecology,
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namely that of "environmental subjects and identities" (Robbins, 2012, Ch.11). The argument is that subjectivities do not precede, but form as a result of certain institutional arrangements, behaviors or actions. More specifically, environmental subjects emerge as a result of political action or reaction to environmental problems (Robbins, 2012, pp.215-217). Agrawal studies an issue of conservation and control which leads the villagers of Kumaon to burn the forests regularly as a form of protest against the turning of most their forests into reserves controlled by the government. The people’s outrage was a response to their everyday lives and behaviors having been criminalized overnight (Agrawal, 2005, p.3). Having been politically caused, this environmentally damaging behavior was solved by giving the local populations self-governing and rights and enforcement responsibilities with regard to the use of forests. This led not only to the end of the protest fires, but also to a more responsible overall governance of the consumption of the forests’ resources.

While the main issue tackled by Agrawal is the government of the environment, one of the most consequential aspects of his work relates to the formation of environmental subjectivities. The mechanism explored is how technologies of government create new arenas for the exercise of political power and for conflict, but also new sets of relationships, alliances and divisions (Agrawal, 2005, p.4) between individuals, groups and the environment. It is in these interactions between the three spheres of government, society and the environment that the environment is constructed, technologies of government evolve, and subjectivities are shaped.

Agrawal defines environmental subjects as people who have redefined their ways of thinking and acting in relation to the environment being disputed (Agrawal, 2005, p.4). The framework of analysis is based on power/knowledges, institutions and subjectivities and their interactions. This is expressed through the concept of environmentality, inspired by Foucault’s governementality (Agrawal, 2005, pp.5-6).

Conflict arises in the Kumaoni context as a result of the state’s governmental and economic development strategies. The latter define the economic value of the environment and how to best extract it, which conflicts with the local population’s traditional lifestyle and relationship to nature (Agrawal, 2005, pp.10-11). Despite the appearance of the situation as a conflict between two sides, Agrawal suggests that looking at this conflict as a process through which policy and people’s practices reshape each other. This steers away from looking at the situation as a problem and a solution to it, and instead underlines the long-term evolution of people’s understandings of the environment (Agrawal, 2005, pp.10-11). This means avoiding the description of the situation as coercion by the state, resistance or negotiation. Discourse, actions and regulations shape these understandings.

To study environmental subjects, Agrawal interrogates the relationship and mutual shaping between individuals, the state and the environment, by studying how the environment has been historically "governmentalized", how policies evolved and changed the roles of community and state, and how environmental subjects emerged as a result of these shifts. For this purpose, he first defines some key terms and shows how they play out and lead to environmental subjects.

The utility estimated as being the most efficient is promoted by the government through specific policies and instruments, born from and that themselves generate a
certain type of knowledge and beliefs about the environment, defining what uses and to what extent are appropriate or not (Agrawal, 2005, p. 13).

The Governmentalization of the environment and environmental subjects

Government is defined by Agrawal as the “conduct of conduct”, inspired by Foucault. This however goes beyond the institutionalized, classical form of government by the state to include people’s own efforts to change their practices. This broad definition allows the taking into account of other factors that shape subjectivities, beyond technologies of government employed by the state. If technologies of government shape subjectivities, a failure of the former to change and an obvious change in the latter points to the need to look at other factors.

The governmentalization of the environment refers to the process shaping the environment, summed up by institutions, practices and subjectivities. Political ecological analysis and social constructionist analysis help to show how the environment is shaped and thus governed, by way of definition as a domain of government and specification in terms of usefulness, surveying, regulation of access and conservation, decision-making procedures etc. (Agrawal, 2005, p. 11). Economic interest defines the best uses for nature, and therefore defines the environment and the ways in which individuals and communities can legitimately interact with it. Although initially only the state had agency regarding the governmentalization of the environment, trends in India and all over the world, have increased community participation in the management of natural resources (Agrawal, 2005, p. 12).

Furthermore, the utility estimated as being the most efficient is promoted by the government through specific policies and instruments, born from and that themselves generate a certain type of knowledge and beliefs about the environment, defining what uses and to what extent are appropriate or not (Agrawal, 2005, p. 13).

The concept of environmentality, uniting environment and Foucaultian governmentality, refers to the study of environmental politics with the use of three core analytical concepts of power/knowledges, institutions and subjectivities, considered indispensable.

Governmentalized localities are local centers of environmental decision-making, or regulatory communities which self-regulate and participate in governing the environment and therefore in the production of environmental subjects. The decentralization of environmental regulation represents a great shift not only in state-locality relations, but also in the relationship between the community and the environment and among community members themselves.

Decentralization creates environmental subjects by changing the ways in which people relate and understand the environment. The concept of environmental subject refers to “people who have come to think and act in new ways in relation to the domain being governed” (Agrawal, 2005, p. 4). Their understandings of the environment are shaped continuously by their practices, discourse and regulations, and their role in regulation and enforcement is crucial to their environmentalization (Agrawal, 2005, p. 17). Historically, the community-environment relationship has undergone tremendous changes, not least due to the centralization and more recently the decentralization of state-
locality relationships. Symptomatic of the great changes in environmental subjectivities are the terms in which people refer to the environment and the changes in their behavior towards it (Agrawal, 2005, p.18). Furthermore, despite the link between technologies of government and environmental subject formation, the latter is not based on coercion, in a top down process, but about becoming aware of the fragility of natural resources and acting accordingly. Institutionalized incentives (Agrawal, 2005, p. 23) are of course a core instrument, but when environmental subjects seem to form independently of such state-driven initiatives, the question is what other factors may shape subjects. On the whole, this approach is not as anthropocentric as it may seem, but takes seriously the community-environment relationship by reflecting how people experience the environment and issues of conservation (Agrawal, 2005, p. 24). This goes beyond looking at the environment as a simple scarce resource or an arena for political conflict, and acknowledges its reverberations in human livelihoods and consciousness. Nature is accorded its agency in Agrawal’s framework, similarly to Bird’s work on social construction: while nature is being theoretically constructed and physically changed, the extent to which it imposes limits or cooperates is decisive (Bird, 1987, pp. 258-259). Its configuration may be an object of political rule and social construction, but ultimately it determines how communities and institutions will act.

In the first part of his analysis, Agrawal studies the strategies of power/knowledge used in the construction of the environment. The political ecology of Kumaoni forests is explored in order to explain the incentives for and limits to the approaches to governing the environment. He then goes on to analyse the formation of environmental subjects in this context.

Relevance for the Rosia Montana case

One fundamental difference between the Kumaoni case and the case of Rosia Montana is the nature of the environmental conflict and of the solution. Although conservation is at the heart of both examples, in the Kumaoni case, conservation was a state initiative, achievable only if the community cooperated. This makes community participation through decentralization central to the case and shifts in environmental subjectivities directly influenced by the changing state-community relationship. In the case of Rosia Montana, however, a community is fighting for the preservation of its environment, against exploitation by the state and a transnational corporation. People fighting for their environment makes them environmental subjects. Decentralization might not be the case here (although long-term there have been significant shifts and the fight started after communism), but democratization and globalization are significant structural factors which, combined with precedents in environmental disasters, a threat to an entire community and irreparable damage to the environment could have contributed to the emergence of environmental subjects. Therefore, although a large part of Agrawal’s discourse on institutional decentralization is inapplicable, I argue that his insights on environmental subjects are not limited to this situation.

The interconnectedness of institutions, subjectivities and the environment illustrated by Agrawal is certainly useful in understanding the complexity of conservation issues. However, the political and historical context of his case study somewhat leave out
the effects of globalization on these interactions, and specific actors that play an increasingly important role in these issues. Based on works around the political ecology of Rosia Montana, I will argue that globalization and other institutional and social specificities of the case contribute to the emergence of environmental subjects independently of technologies of government employed by the state. First, the power to socially construct nature, define its uses, quality and measurement techniques and to produce understandings of it is shared with governmental and non-governmental international organizations and corporations. In this framework, the state itself is prescribed actions and incentivized in certain directions and environmental subjects directly interact with these actors.

Rosia Montana is a classic case of degradation and marginalization in the way Robbins crystallized this political ecological thesis. Integration in the global market leads to plans of overexploitation at great costs for the local community and the environment, and with inequitable resource distribution (Robbins, 2012, p.159). Through the implementation of the mining project, costs would be passed down to the community level by state and corporations, irreversibly damaging the environment, dislocating entire communities and destroying venues of great cultural and archaeological significance. The link between degradation and marginalization is obvious not only in some relocated families, but especially in those remaining in Rosia Montana, depleted of resources necessary for their livelihoods. The environment is politicized and political conflict is ecologized (Robbins, 2012, p.200).

Case description

The highly controversial case of Rosia Montana, a semi-urban village in the Western Carpathian mountains in Romania is an instance of great clashes of local, national and international interests, of an environmental, cultural, social, economic and political nature. The Canadian-Romanian Rosia Montana Gold Corporation’s (RMGC) plan to develop the largest open-cast mining project in Europe, using cyanide-based process, has reconfigured the agenda and the lives of local inhabitants since the 1990s, and has been at the center of Romania’s most significant grassroots movement since the fall of the socialist regime. Large displacement and relocation of the local population and environmental degradation are the most salient issues at hand, however democratic government, sustainable development alternatives and conservation of cultural heritage sites are also important aspects of the case. The scale of the project is the most visible through the planned destruction of four mountains, the creation of a massive tailings pond of almost 300 hectares containing cyanide-processed waste behind a 185 m dam, and through the necessity to relocate or displace more than half the population of Rosia Montana (2064 out of 3865) (Bran, 2010, pp.111-112). Though the project is in deadlock, having been denied the licence to proceed by the Romanian government due to political and judicial action against its controversial Environmental Impact Assessment, its effects in the area have been massive over the past decade. The acquisition of property by RMGC has already reached 77% of the properties on the projected site and _____ families have been relocated. The project also entailed the relocation of several cemeteries and the destruction of several churches (Bran, 2010, pp.111-112). In its
extensive history, the environment in Rosia Montana has been defined by its rich mineral resources. Having been mined since the time of the Roman Empire (Vesalon & Cretan, 2013, p. 542), it is due to this long-standing extractive tradition that the value assigned to it today consists, among other aspects, of gold and silver deposits, and invaluable archaeological sites. To protect the landscape, heritage, population and future of Rosia Montana, over 400 families from the affected area created the core of the resistance movement in 2000, the Alburnus Maior organization (Velicu, 2012, p. 127).

Although halting the project has been one of the biggest victories of Romanian civil society yet, public opinion and many prominent political leaders still support it, even if only provided that there are significant changes in its implementation. The main arguments for supporting the project have been the direct and indirect creation of jobs, improvements in infrastructure and increases in tax revenue for the state. On the other hand, expenses related to overseeing the project, managing the risks in dealing with hazardous waste and restoring the environment, population dislocation and the destruction of cultural and sacred sites have been some of the concerns raised (Bran, 2010, p.112).

Analysis

The governmentalization of the environment at Rosia Montana primarily consisted of regulating its use so as to turn it into a mono-industrial area, monopolized by the state until its closure in 2006 (Alexandrescu, 2011, p.85). Although mining was an important economic activity in the area before the socialist era, it was in this time that mining was developed extensively and thus became defining for the area (Vesalon & Cretan, 2013, p.542). Conventional development, focused on “economic growth, a top-down approach, technocratic expertise and bureaucratic management” (Vesalon & Cretan, 2013, p. 541) has been the paradigm of the governmentalization and construction of the environment by the state, both in socialist and in post-socialist policies. This particular construction of the environment, of the society connected to it and, in the end, of subjectivities has led to high unemployment rates, degraded infrastructure and a high mortality rate (Vesalon & Cretan, 2013, p. 542), convincing a part of the local population to accept the destruction of their natural and cultural landscape in exchange for ‘conventional development’ and jobs.

The effect of mono-industrialism on the construction of the environment is that its development becomes (at least in discourse) inextricably linked to its extractive industry, making alternative development strategies seem impossible, undesirable or unsustainable (Velicu, 2012, p.126, Barna, 2006, p.152). The social and economic consequences of mono-industrialism are numerous and disastrous (Vesalon & Cretan, 2013, p. 541), and contribute paradoxically to both cases of social construction of the environment that the two opposing camps in this conflict have backed: on the one hand, dependency on extraction for job creation is emphasized by the state and the RMGC, while on the other hand, the local community, INGOs and Romanian civil society actors warn that not converting to other development models will further entrench these consequences (Vesalon & Cretan, 2013).

But in a globalized world, the state was not alone in constructing the environment: the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and European Union structural adjustment
policies have guided the restructuring of the Romanian mining sector and the withdrawal of the state from the local economy while incentivizing foreign investors (Alexandrescu, 2011, p.85, Anghel, 2013, p.95). Therefore, the ‘conduct of conduct’ and the governmentalization of the environment is no longer traceable only to the state. It has become a product of the global market and international regulatory organizations.

Though many factors contribute to how the local population relates to the environment, its governmentalization (or regulation) and the configuration of their livelihoods within and around it play a decisive role. However, ‘grand narratives’ of development which may limit, extend or change their idea of feasible development for the region have also influenced their relationship with the environment. The Rosia Montana case is a compelling example of such ‘grand narratives’ competing for adherents. As illustrated by Vesalon and Cretan (2013), counter-discourses delivered by environmentalists (the local Alburnus Maior, INGOs etc.) have managed to gain audience for alternative development strategies and conceptions of risk.

This suggests that, as in the Kumaoni case, beneficial policies or instruments arise from the conflict between the community and the state, but also that sources of change in environmental subjectivities are also traceable to other influential actors and settings. These factors shape the ‘conduct of conduct’ as well, even without regulatory authority, by challenging regulation and discourse.

Globalization has also facilitated the involvement of INGOs in the Rosia Montana case, creating environmental subjects in the process. They provided access to transnational networks of information and cooperation, know-how in organizing social movements and protest, channels of political and judicial contestation, mobilizing support and promoting their case and worldview (Anghel, 2013, p.3).

One of the ways in which the emergence of environmental subjects is visible in this case is the counter-movement to conventional development, namely the local, national and international protests demanding that alternative, sustainable development strategies be implemented.

Political involvement in protest at a local, national and international scale is only one way in which Romanians, and especially the locals of Rosia Montana (Rosieni) acted as environmental subjects in this conflict.

One aspect related to the reconfiguration of their livelihoods in anticipation of and to exemplify the feasibility of alternative development models is professional conversion from mining to farming or tourism. Some of the most vocal locals have converted from mining engineers to subsistence farmers, and some activists of INGOs have even opened agrotourism businesses (Rosia Montana, Town on the brink, 2012).

Conclusions

The emergence of environmental subjects in the case of Rosia Montana has been analyzed using Agrawal’s theoretical framework by illustrating how the governmentalization of the environment has shaped the way in which people relate to the environment, even though in this case as a contestation of these policies. However, the specificities of the Romanian context compared to the Kumaoni case studied by Agrawal lead to the necessity of considering the effect of democratization and globalization on the formation of environmental
subjects. Thus, technologies of government or more broadly the ‘conduct of conduct’ is no longer limited to classic institutions and regulatory channels (such as the state or the colonial power), but influenced by governmental and nongovernmental international organizations and transnational networks. Some of these provide regulatory frameworks for the state while others provide grassroots movements with channels for expressing discontent, organizing resistance and challenging those very policies. In this contentious process, that cannot be defined as a mere competition ending in one specific outcome, Romanian civil society has grown in many ways, and with it I argue that the individuals and groups most involved in the protest movement have become environmental subjects. By embracing alternative development discourses and strategies, by joining networks of advocacy and activism and by converting their lifestyles they have changed their “way of thinking about and acting upon the environment” (Agrawal, 2005), despite policy-making and technologies of government in a traditional sense lagging behind. A bottom-up approach can only go so far in the transformation of community-state-environment relations and a more participatory decision-making process is needed before communities can forge their own relationship with their environment, especially in the case of mono-industrial areas.

The discussion around environmental subjects is inextricably linked to social movements research, being especially relevant for how social movements form and how they shape their participants. Though this connections needs further empirical and theoretical research, and a better operationalization of the concept of environmental subject formation, there is reason to believe that this type of movement affects all aspects of individual-state-environment interaction. Movements of this magnitude, making comprehensive political and environmental claims and changing livelihoods, cause shifts beyond the mere preoccupation with participating in the movement or with saving Rosia Montana itself: instead, the shifts in environmental subjectivities will surely be seen in future Romanian grassroots movements and hopefully in the development of Rosia Montana itself.

References


What surrounds us now: cultural animation and the participatory and cultural voids in Poland

Brendan James Daniel

One view of the relationship between culture and civil society, especially in a democratic society, is that they can work in tandem; the former is meant to promote the creation of a tolerant and diverse society by developing the third sector in culture. Likewise, civil society creates a cultural offer that responds to the needs of people by implementing large-scale co-operation, stimulating individual initiative, and diminishing disproportionate access to culture by involving marginalized groups (Ilczuk 2001, 25). It is the primary mission of Poland’s Ministry of Culture and National Heritage to promote the historical pillars of their culture at home and abroad. Karen Hauff (2001) has written that politicians involved with cultural policy play to popular cultural preferences while cultural leaders are excluded from input toward official policy (24), and that the MKiDN seeks to repress art that is controversial (46). The portion that is not dedicated is distributed in funding schemes whereby individuals, collectives, and NGOs compete against each other for relatively small amounts to fund their projects. It seems that the more a project is likely to promote a positive face of Poland, and the less likely it is to reflect on or critique Polish society, the more likely a project is to be funded. Little money is available for fresh projects because so much money goes into funding the staples. Additionally, the government has not promoted the concept of private sponsorship as a viable source of funding (Ilczuk 2001, 82).

Poland is a place where the level of civic engagement has been, on the whole, low since the events of 1989. While the Constitution provides for the establishment of a civil society, its implementation leaves much to be desired. Issue advocacy-related organizations have had a difficult time affecting social change because important figures involved in Poland’s social dialogue are reluctant to adopt progressive stances. Moreover, a combination of mobilization burnout from the communist era, lackluster outreach of political parties, and distrust of politicians have contributed to an under-representation of voices in Poland’s social dialogue. The non-profit sector, whether in culture, advocacy, or service provision, is a client of the state rather than a partner (Murzyn-Kupisz 2010; Kozuch & Sienkiewicz-Malyjurek 2013). Additionally, young people are not a priority for

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86 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
87 From hereon referred to by its Polish initials, MKiDN.
Polish political parties. Here, aparcipatorty void exists because there is a weak civil society sector and people, especially the youth, do not have widespread access to civic education.

In view of the situations of the Polish cultural and participatory spheres I ask, does an engaging alternative option that is rooted in cultural practicexist in Poland? The following is an explanation of how cultural animationis a practice that works as a social micro-process that attempts to address the cultural and participatory voids that exist in Polish society by proposing an alternative to the status quo. Cultural animation arose in Western Europe (particularly France) as an aspect of 1960s counterculture. Those times brought a renewed urge to participate in social action and public life, and so cultural animation became a practice and philosophy that uses “psycho-social methods to expand the capacities of people,” and that promotes “the abilities of people and groups to participate in and to manage the social and political reality in which they live” (Pollo, quoted in Lorenz 1994, 101). It seeks to foster community interaction by creating an environment for participants to enact projects based on what they feel is culturally important to people in a neighborhood, and fostering honest interpersonal communication, which includes an expression of ideas, wants, and needs in the process.

I begin by explaining in detail what cultural animation is, how animation projects are constructed, and who participates in them. Next, I establish the local context for the practice of cultural animation, demonstrating the influences on the current practice of cultural animation of past activities such as those of Jerzy Grotowski and his Laboratory Theater, and the Orange Alternative anti-socialism movement of the 1980s. I then outline the voids – the cultural void because it lowers the barrier to access and, and the participatory void because of cultural animation’s. Cultural animation is important because it is a cultural activity that addresses the cultural void by encouraging participants to create a conversation around their activities, which are an extension of voiced needs. It contains a possibility of crossing over to answer issues of the participatory void because of the inherent participatory nature, and because its potential geographic and demographic reach is larger in scope than those of the political parties or non-governmental organizations. Ultimately, I find that cultural animators, while artists and thinkers, are unheralded social actors in post-communist studies that could be fueling the capacity to create another kind of society altogether.

While cultural animation has been written about in the discipline of social work, it has yet to be touched upon in the field of post-communist studies. I initially embarked on this analysis in view of Jan Kubik’s most recent edited volume, Postcommunism From Within (2013), which marks a shift in focus from the actions of elite actors to the actions of individuals within structures in the field of post-communist studies. He introduces a perspective that he calls “contextual holism,” which emphasizes relations between agents within structures; legacies based, in part, on asynchronous changes and policy outcomes; focus on semiotic practices; formal-informal institutional hybrids, and localized agents as the basic unit of analysis. (2013, 36) Though I will not thoroughly analyze cultural

89 Walter Lorenz (1994, 101) notes that the movement found its first concrete expressions in community theatre, though he does not specify exactly where or when this development came about.

90 Also referred to elsewhere as socio-cultural animation and culture animation. From this point forward, I use the term to refer solely to the Polish incarnation of its philosophy and/or practice.
animation through the prism of contextual holism in this paper, I do discuss the individual elements of cultural animation that fit the framework, such as the history of Polish arts-based community-building activities, the process by which animators encourage the creation of culture, and the hybrid formal-informal nature of education.

CULTURAL ANIMATION

Rather than having a single locus of origin, cultural animation is enacted throughout the country. It is an inclusive exploit, featuring participants of all age groups and backgrounds, and sets the lowering of social barriers as its primary goal. Cultural animation seeks to help people realize their capacities for expression and action, and the commonalities they share with the people in geographic proximity to them. It is rooted in theatrical performance, and this foundation is key for two reasons. First, because it is an effort to help individuals present their own narratives, and together find their intersection within a given locality. Second, theatrical exercises help participants gain a sense of awareness about their environment and other people around them. These are sometimes verbally and physically trying (Ronen 1978) and other times fun and amusing (Dworakowska et al. 2002). The practice shifts emphasis from imposing a hierarchical structure of community action, to a horizontal model that gives participants control of proposing and enacting ideas for projects in which animators become partners and furnishers of the means to bring ideas to fruition. Though the practice has a theatrical background, the role of the animator is not so much to actively direct as it is to suggest. Once animators provoke discussion between participants and ideas are being shared, they aggregate the ideas and suggest a way to materialize them.

PROJECT METHODOLOGY

The Cultural Animation NOW! (Dworakowska et al. 2008) handbook outlines a general path that projects follow, though it is by no means restricted to this depiction in content or structure. First, a community that desires to act upon local issues in some way must express a need. Second, animators work in concert with participants to discern the goals, methods, and tools for the project, based on the participants’ interests and talents. Animation projects are not limited to a single collective idea. They can involve multiple ideas pursued by multiple segments of a community. Third, funding must be secured. Animators apply to European Union cultural programs, such as the Leonardo da Vinci Education and Culture programs; the cultural department of the government at the national, voivodship, county and municipality levels; and cultural associations and NGOs

91 The local practice is harmonious with the social work and pedagogical principles of Polish sociologist Helena Radańska, who believed that social work – more than simply being a remedial course of action – should aim to remove existing forces that interfere with the development of human beings, and should also be a way to inspire people to fulfill their potential (Brainerd 2001). In Poland, it serves as an extension of Jerzy Grotowski’s workshops in that it is “aimed at enlivening the desires, aims and aspirations in the individual and the environment,” which in turn will help “facilitate[...] both individual and group participation in more active and creative life, by better understanding of changes, easier communication with others and participation of life in the society”. (Zebrowski 1990, 86)
in Poland. Fourth, it matters as to which animators are working together on a project. As much as they are trying to help a community to cohere, the animators must do the same thing themselves in working as a team. Fifth, although a team of animators may have already encountered members of the community they are working in, a number of the participants will likely be strangers. It is up to the animator to facilitate contact by playing a game, or engaging in other exercises that are meant to stimulate participants’ awareness of themselves, their surroundings, and each other (including the animators). The exact activity depends on the animators’ assessment of the group of participants. Animators must keep attuned to the mood of the project for its duration, and must be both ready to assuage personal difficulties and amenable to re-evaluating the project’s trajectory in case of a shortcoming or personal conflict. Finally, the project is wrapped up with a concluding event (or series of events). These could take the form of a presentation of what the participants learned, or some other thing. Most important of all is the animators’ documentation of the entire project, from inception to conclusion, while being inclusive of setbacks and problems. These documentations (which can be written, photographed, and/or captured on video) are used to justify any funding the project received, for public exhibition, should the animators get a chance to exhibit it, to share with the participants in the project who may have nothing else but their memories of the experience, and so that animators can continuously develop their practice. They actively pore over the results of their ventures and share their findings to other animators so that the whole animator community may learn.

WHO ARE THE ANIMATORS?

A cultural animator is a facilitator or “midwife” of the cultural effect of group work. Instead of providing content, like an artist would, an animator’s goal is to provide context by provoking conversation and encouraging project participants to use a relevant mode of expression (Dworakowska et al. 2008, 9). A significant portion of individuals in the cultural animation talent pool comes from other specialties in the arts and humanities. A multitude of backgrounds bring unique perspectives that inform the practice of cultural animation as it relates to understanding groups of people and how they engage in creative collaboration within Poland. There are those who came out of the communist generation, which are not simply limited to those who participated in, or were otherwise present for, Jerzy Grotowski and his active culture projects or the happenings of Orange Alternative. Of course, the practice could not be perpetuated without new generations of curious students. Younger students have a fair chance at gaining entry to the world of cultural animation. They become aware of the animation specialty through their high schools, and can volunteer at community centers for credit.92

When the cultural animation practice caught on in Poland after 1989, it found a home in state-funded higher educational institutions. For example, the Institute of Polish Culture at the University of Warsaw offers a specialty in cultural animation through their department of anthropology, which makes use of seminars and workshops alike to train animators. The basic curriculum includes an “anthropology of everyday life” course, in

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92 Personal communication with volunteers at Centrum Współczesne Cicha4 in Lublin, Poland.
which student coursework in noting the phenomena of their daily subjective experiences in modern Polish society becomes the basis for future animation activities, and a managerial workshop in which, as part of creating and promoting a cultural event or club, students actively engage with the problems that budgetary limitations and cultural policies pose. Students meet and converse with representatives of the MKiDN and other cultural institutions. A seminar on “designing creative situations” and a theater anthropology course are also in the curriculum (Godlewski et al. 2002).

Cultural animation education also exists outside of institutionalized academia at cultural centers across the country. Cultural centers give animators a point of association with each other, allowing them to meet, teach together, and share expertise and experience. These centers are funded by art- and culture-oriented NGOs to the extent that it is possible to do so. One of the longest standing centers is the Borderlands Center of Arts, Cultures, and Nations in Sejny, near the Polish-Lithuanian border, established in 1990. Because of its location near the borders of Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia, it is an important meeting place of nationalities and religions such as Catholicism, Judaism, Protestantism, and Russian Orthodoxy, especially the variety practiced by Old Believers. Borderlands is a center that emphasizes the teaching of intercultural dialogue and expands the concept from the immediate locality to similar regions; the education on offer draws students, not just from the aforementioned adjacent countries, but also Ukraine and Georgia. A simultaneous Borderlands Foundation was established alongside the center that stays independent of political and economic activity (Fundacja Pogranicze 2015). Whether old or young, being a cultural animator requires being a constant student.

Animators supplement their association with each other through mass meetings such as conventions, in addition to typical means of communication such as social media. One such convention is called the NieKongres, which is a fairly new event for the community of animators. Meeting in 2014 for the first time, animators came together and shared their ideas and experiences, as well as recognized their practical shortcomings and biases, in meetings that took much the same shape as animation projects. An online messageboard component supplemented the convention, which let animators publicly document each event and allowed anyone to read the agendas and outcomes of the meetings. However, these meetings seem to be inconsistent; another NieKongres has not been scheduled despite its aims to be an annual event.

WHO PARTICIPATES IN ANIMATION PROJECTS?

Though projects take place in urban and rural settings alike, cultural animation activities are defined by communities and sub-communities that exist inside...
administratively defined geographic boundaries. One example is that different age groups are gathered for projects. Predictably, elementary school children are one focus. However, older Poles are also invited to participate in projects. Another workshop series entitled The Super Grandma and Super Grandpa School focused on preparing the elderly to be volunteers for the sake of children and their development. It was predicated on developing creative ways for children and the elderly to spend time together, and to allow grandparents to learn strategies for helping children manage negative emotions. This project worked extensively with older Poles in the city of Wrocław, and it also extended to them the same sorts of activities, like theatre exercises and photography workshops, in which younger people typically partake. These exercises, meant to pique and enhance awareness of one’s surroundings and of others in the surrounding space, opened up the floor for critiques of authoritative child-rearing practices and advocacy in favor of understanding children and their emotions (Towarszystwo Inicjatyw Twórczych “ę” 2015).

Two valuable things are gained from the completion of a project. The first is the tangible results of the work, which are not always the main focus of the project but are present nonetheless. For example, a series of workshops entitled *The Warsaw Breakfasts* were set into motion as a way of enabling several districts in Warsaw to tell stories about themselves using the inherent interests and talents of participants, who were secondary school students in this particular case. The project instituted communal breakfasts as launchpads for citizen collaboration on how they could best get their districts to say what they wanted to say about themselves, and what should be done with the final product of the collaboration. Students then asked residents about their memories about life in the district, which enabled each neighborhood to tell a story about itself in composite. The final product consisted of presentations of these stories in conjunction with a final extra task; members of one community attached these stories to kites and let them fly away, while another imprinted them on a cardboard tree to be planted in that district (Dworakowska et al. 2008). During the Breakfasts, animators taught these participants how to map their understanding of their locality onto the physical space by using the tactic of storytelling.

The second thing consists of the relationships forged in the name of working together on these projects. The ideas come from the participants themselves, and the animators’ accommodation of these ideas contributes to a feeling of being heard and accepted, relatively rare sentiments in participatory structures of the Third Republic. The animators’ accommodation also fosters exploration and genuine interest in the project, and in turn, participants’ genuine interest in each other. By using this hands-off approach to creative projects, animators believe that they have the potential to create a more inclusive environment, and also the potential to build a more interwoven.

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96 in Polish: Śniadanie warszawskie.
A HERITAGE OF ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS

Cultural animation is a recent incarnation of alternative community experiments, following Jerzy Grotowski’s Laboratory Theatre in the 1960s and the Orange Alternative movement in the 1980s, which have taken place in Poland. Each one has played with the boundaries between exhibition and collaboration, and has espoused a particular vision of what collective life could be. How each of them has been oriented toward the political sphere is the linking factor. With Grotowski, the political content is more implicit; he saw his activities as a meaningful way to heal “the many splits both within an individual and between people” (Kumiega, quoted in Cioffi 1996, 85) in the era of Leonid Brezhnev and Władysław Gomułka. Orange Alternative's program was inherently, pointedly political as their happenings subverted official propaganda messages from the government, which impacted people’s thinking. In cultural animation, however, the state is an actor in the background, and something to transcend. As the practice has an anthropological background, cultural animation advocates that all social behavior be treated as cultural phenomena grounded in reality, and not as phenomena defined by “narrow, politically-conditioned rules of interpreting modern social life” (Godlewski 2002, 71) To do otherwise would be to reinforce the we-versus-they dynamic that is pervasive in Polish social relations, which is one of the issues that cultural animators are decidedly against.

JERZY GROTOWSKI AND “ACTIVE CULTURE”

Jerzy Grotowski was a visionary director in the Polish alternative theatre scene of the 1960s, and received his tutelage at the Krakow Drama Academy during the political thaw that characterized Polish October of 1956 (Cioffi 1996, 82). It was under these conditions that he spearheaded the Laboratory Theatre (initially in Opole, but later in Wrocław), a small troupe that would become internationally well reputed but little known inside of Poland.

Grotowski demanded self-sacrifice of his actors – not for the purposes of a quality production, but for the quality of their ability to work together as a team, which for him meant the unlearning of their drama school training and the “sacrifice of their personalities” in the name of self-discovery and self-awareness. This self-sacrifice was done in order to reveal their authentic selves on stage. He called the actors’ initiative to reveal themselves the role of the “holy actor” meant to reconstruct a “ritual in theatre, in a way meaningful for our times and our society, as a way of healing the many splits both within an individual and between people” (Cioffi 1996, 85). Their times and society, of course, were the times of high socialism and of redoubled forced mobilization based on social objectives that were top-down rather than bottom up.97

When he took this acting exercise as far as he could go with his actors, he reached out to other young people in Poland “who, simply because they need to, would choose to leave behind personal comfort and seek exposure in work, in an encounter, in movement and

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97 For more on this tension, which was pervasive throughout Central Europe, see Václav Havel’s essay “Power of the Powerless” in Open Letters : Selected Writings 1965-1990. New York: Knopf.
freedom" (Osiński 1986, 123). Additionally, actors from Grotowski’s long-running production *Apocalypsis cum figuris* recruited curious audience members and discussed with them possibilities for work. Such was the beginning of what he termed “active culture,” meant to be a therapeutic solution to those splits based on theatrical practice, but with an added emphasis on interpersonal communication. Active culture would ideally serve as “an alternative community, where the basis is: meeting, man-man, the act.” Most of all, it aimed to give “creative inspiration to investigate [the actors’] way, their own original means of expression […] and expressing their real problems and psychic states (Cioffi 1996).

Through the methods of active culture, typically carried out in multi-day workshops in rural areas, Grotowski wanted to break down the barriers of the actor/spectator dynamic during induced audience-participation portions of plays. These workshops typically had participants in close contact with each other, and performed tasks assigned by the workshop director. These tasks included acting exercises, some of which were extremely physical and demanding, and simple chores like maintenance of the space that the workshop occupied. Often, these tasks were carried out in silence at the behest of the director, who would demand the utmost mental concentration. All of this was done in the name of each person developing an awareness of the physical space and the others around them. During non-silent portions of the workshop, participants were prompted to “proposition” each other with their personal needs. These participants, who would otherwise have been spectators or other consumers of culture, became creators of culture through the process of opening up to each other. Their actions may not seem extraordinary even in tandem, but as a workshop participant was quoted, “The various propositions were the initial stimuli, the basic structures that define the particular terrain of a specific experience. It is entirely up to the individual, or group of individuals, where these stimuli were to spring into a creation” (Ronen 1978, 76).

**ORANGE ALTERNATIVE’S “HAPPENINGS”**

Waldemar Fydrych, nicknamed “Major,” was one of the ten thousand-plus participants in Jerzy Grotowski’s active culture experiments. In the 1980s, when Polish society was pinched between martial law one hand and the ideas and actions of the government-opposing Solidarity trade union, he created the New Culture Movement in Wrocław, later renamed Orange Alternative98 which was more explicitly political than was active culture. The movement was characterized by mass street protests with a playful and theatrical flare. These “happenings,” as they were known, were part of the “socialist surrealism” mantle, which Fydrych (nicknamed “Major”) described as “what surrounds us, in this country, now” (Cioffi 1996, 175). In reality, this phrase depicted the incorporation of their mass actions, which distorted the struggle and mundaneness of everyday life; by hijacking control over mobilization and trumpeting ironic support for existing socialism, Orange Alternative made people aware of how their lives were connected to the communist system.

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98 In Polish: Pomarańczowa Alternatywa
Orange Alternative occupied an important space in Polish public life during its existence, as it provided a cognitive escape from the duality of communist-era life. Bronislaw Misztal agrees about the movement’s importance:

The 'First' world, or the 'first project of society' as it is sometimes called is the one produced by the (until recently) official communist propaganda. It is fake, full of empty symbols and meanings and yet for the past forty years it was proclaimed the only valid and state-licensed reality. The 'Second' world, or 'the second project of society' is the one which stems from everyday experience, where the socialist values look much less gleaming, the grey reality negatively verifies every statement of the official propaganda and where people learn the emptiness of signs and symbols displayed by the 'first project'. The two worlds remain in conflict; they contradict and complement each other, thus creating a permanent cognitive dilemma for those caught in either of the two worlds. (1992, 67)

Misztal further explains that the ‘first society’ had enabled a “learned helplessness” among people that then triggered a spontaneous generation of non-state action that strengthened the ‘second society,’ even as that strength remained largely publicly unexpressed (1992). Orange Alternative was, in part, one of those spontaneous forms, and it was one that bridged official messages with private doubt, and added a touch of guts to pull it off publicly. It had a way of effectively drawing people into its happenings because they were held where they could not be ignored. In so doing, they created a temporary third culture, apart from the cultures propagated by the state and Solidarity trade union that energized the spirit of people far beyond Wroclaw.

THE VOIDS. THE PARTICIPATORY VOID
Party Politics

As in other democracies, political parties in Poland have established youth wings for each one to inculcate their brand of political values. However, constant changes in political culture have made young people less likely to participate in electoral politics (Blais et. al. 2004, quoted in Robertson 2009), and the turbulent first twenty years of the Third Republic seem only to have confirmed this. Unfortunately, though these youth wings do exist, the main parties do not often see them as an integral or unique component of electoral strategy, as they are treated as a mere extension rather than a separate organization. While this means that more young people in their twenties and thirties can become eligible for the parliamentary candidacy, they are also not given priority on the party list (Robertson 2009).

Additionally, youth party organizations are primarily based in large urban areas and administrative centers, with little to no penetration in many municipalities across Poland. Young people participate in these organizations for professional, ideological, and social reasons, and those who wish to participate in political engagement must usually travel to the nearest city with a party office. Even the urban youth suffer from limited engagement; city-based party outlets are only occasionally organized by neighborhood or district, and gather all local members at the same meeting (Robertson 2009). Political
parties’ failure to organize the youth contributes to a sense of distrust toward political figures and the parties they belong to.

New outlets for partisan participation have been created to account for the failure of parties to capitalize on youth mobilization. On the right, organizations such as the Young Republic Foundation\footnote{In Polish: Fundacja Młoda Rzeczpospolita. http://www.mlodarp.pl/} are attempting to inculcate and galvanize patriotic sentiment in young people, while the radical umbrella group National Movement has a neo-Nazi flavor\footnote{Called Ruch Narodowy in Polish, they are alarming people in places abroad with Polish minorities. See http://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/protest-mounted-in-dublin-against-polish-far-right-event-1.2171704.} that has, for now, a small corner of support at home as well as abroad.\footnote{In Polish, Krytyka Polityczna. http://www.krytykapolityczna.pl.}

The formation of these organizations is of particular interest in the context of the 2010 Smolensk aircraft tragedy that killed the Polish president and numerous members of the government and military, as members of these upstart organizations see it as an assassination on Russia’s part rather than an accident. These groups stand in contrast to the partisan organizations that already exist on the left, such as the Political Critique\footnote{In Polish, Krytyka Polityczna. http://www.krytykapolityczna.pl.}\footnote{In 2014, however, Poland did hold elections to select representatives for the European Parliament. The results saw the election of the euroskeptic Congress of the New Right to the EP. http://pe2014.pkw.gov.pl/pl/} intellectual publication and the cultural centers and activist clubs that they run nationwide. How this mobilization of the right will play out on the electoral field is yet to be determined, with both presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for later in 2015.\footnote{In 2014, however, Poland did hold elections to select representatives for the European Parliament. The results saw the election of the euroskeptic Congress of the New Right to the EP. http://pe2014.pkw.gov.pl/pl/}

**CIVIL SOCIETY**

Polish curriculum seems to have no civic education content, and for all of the political parties that have jockeyed for power in the past twenty years, not a single one has made civic education a part of their platform. Piotr Gliński condemns the “ignorance and arrogance” (2011, 285) of the Polish political elite for having never been interested in developing civil society, or for even developing a program of civic education. Negative connotations surrounding the concept of civic engagement might also explain the difficulty in changing the culture. Historically, the term *volunteer* meant to sign up for a stint in the army or to participate in aid drives in foreign countries. As state-sponsored communism was built around constant mobilization, a lack of engagement could be a reaction to the mandatory involvement faced by older generations.

Additionally, due to the limited room for political debate that existed under communism, Polish elders might lack useful civic experience – in the modern democratic sense, that is – that could be passed down to younger generations. This lack could possibly be attributed to the fatigue of permanent mobilization that comes with living in communist societies, a fatigue which was certainly passed down. In established democracies, political socialization that begins in the family is an important precursor to learning civic education (Robertson 2009). A young person who lacks opportunities for political socialization in the home and at school is a lost opportunity for a civil society to grow and evolve. Intergenerational cultural animation projects like the Super Grandma
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and Super Grandpa School, which promote understanding between the youth and elder Poles, might be a rejuvenating force in family-based political socialization. Even if that socialization is not partisan or ideological, the emphasis on listening and understanding breeds human compassion and openness to diversity.

The state, though meaning to provide space for an effective civil society, largely takes on the onus of rebuilding Poland. One of the first acts of parliament after the fall of communism in 1989 was to pass the Law on Associations, which led to the establishment of thousands of civil society organizations within the first few years of independence. Further, the 1997 Polish Constitution empowered the growth of civil society by guaranteeing the right for associations to form, as well as the supporting role of the state. Finally, the year 2003 saw the Act on Public Benefit and Voluntary Activity renew the government’s commitment to developing the institutions of civil society (Makowski 2010).

Although the Act empowered civil society by giving it a legal framework, that power is derived from the state instead of letting this institution create its own mandate organize itself under its own auspices. The path of communication is top-down rather than horizontal, and it does not facilitate inter-organizational cooperation (Makowski 2010). There seems to be more of an emphasis on formulating goals and objectives than there is on methods to achieve them, and a 2013 study suggests that this emphasis derives from a heavy workload that shifts attention away from collaboration and therefore potential innovation that would assist in solving community problems (Kożuch & Sienkiewicz-Małyjurek 2013). Instead of a spirit of partnership, a clientist state of affairs is allowed to exist between the state and individual organizations. (Gliński 2011). These problems hinder civil society’s ability to channel social relations and foster grassroots community-building efforts (Makowski 2010), which in turn hurts the development and accruement of social capital. Because civic dialogue is absent among the political elite and authorities, any potentially new, progressive social dialogue is greatly weakened because those involved in Poland’s current social dialogue do not want to compete with a new voice (Gliński 2011).

THE CULTURAL VOID

National cultural policy has been beset by three characteristics that underscore an acute tone-deafness to voices in the cultural sphere (Hauff 2001). First, most of the money earmarked in the budget for cultural purposes goes to national staples such as state museums, the Warsaw Philharmonic, and other cultural institutions of that ilk. Funds also go toward promoting access to libraries and cultural centers. Only around four percent of cultural funds have been available to non-governmental organizations, and these are typically in the form of the aforementioned competitions. Second, a new model of patronage was not introduced after decades of the socialist state patronage model, and projects have developed within government circles with cultural leaders being excluded. Cultural ministers have, at times, been lawyers and politicians, and the ones with a cultural background have barely made an impact at all. Third, the MKiDN has been willing to repress art that would scandalize religious citizens at the expense of raising social awareness of issues. Further, administrative measures against smaller institutions,
such as the Center for Contemporary Art in Warsaw, which have threatened the existence and/or scope of operations have been linked to controversies over content (Hauff 2001).

In the late 1990s, Poland embarked on a series of decentralization reforms that created subnational levels of administration and devolved responsibilities to them in the area of culture, such as running local cultural centers. However, as Murzyn-Kupisz (2010) points out, the decentralization move has been more formal than substantial. Voivodship assemblies have also had a preference for focusing on cultural staples of national heritage, and local political leaders have had personal involvement with cultural matters, thus continuing a suppression of contemporary art that answers cultural needs. Culture has been instrumental, or a means, rather than an end, of achieving non-cultural goals such as economic development (78).

As my research is about community development, one of the means most relevant to my research is as a strategy for urban regeneration. Branding gives each locality a fresh face in order to attract investment in cultural activities for tourism as a trickle-down approach to urban regeneration. Though job creation can be achieved, as in the case of the culture-sparked urban regeneration initiative of Roubaix, France, other socio-economic problems remain. Urban regeneration through culture cannot work if there is not a commitment to proactive public and political intervention (Colomb 2011).

CONCLUSION: WHAT’S NEXT?

Cultural animation is a micro-process that has developed in Poland among a subset cultural practitioners who create projects with members of a local community, and focus on process and interaction. The process stands in contrast to many participatory and cultural functions funded and sponsored by the state, contrasts that I have framed as voids based on what I have found to be uneven development as a result of the state’s involvement. Cultural animation addresses the cultural void by actively encouraging others to create their own forms of culture that do not rely on state-promoted ones. It proposes to address the participatory void by making projects widely accessible to participants and provides a mode of education for those wanting to practice. Throughout this essay, I have largely kept animators and cultural/participatory authorities separate from each other, while still hinting at how past politically-charged cultural activities have interacted with authorities. An interaction between animators and authorities is brewing, however, as the Polish city of Wrocław prepares to host the ECOC celebrations for the year 2016. There, an institution created especially for ECOC (“Wrocław 2016”) is managing ECOC preparations, and reports directly to the mayor’s office. City mayor Rafał Dutkiewicz, in the city’s application for ECOC designation for 2016, invoked the era of Jerzy Grotowski as an outstanding cultural achievement, lauded the efforts of Orange Alternative, and committed to using the benefits of ECOC to improve the school system and develop “genuine civic attitudes” with cultural initiatives having “a special role to play in this effort”. From reading this, it would not be unfair to suppose that cultural animation activities would be at least one focus of the celebration. However, only one such activity – involving saving a decaying building by residential collaboration on
new ideas for its use – is on the program of public events. Revisions to the cultural program have been proposed and possibly accepted, but not yet documented.

Indeed, the city’s cultural animators have felt slighted because of being given minimal input into the preparations for the ECOC celebrations. A University of Wrocław-backed group composed of animators, artists and other activists, calling themselves “Citizens of ECOC” (2014) was formed out of this discontent. In their petition to the MKiDN, they protest the one-way nature of the communication between Wrocław 2016 and the general public, as well as the lack of transparency in spending on the planned activities. There is merit to their transparency worries; a recent exhibition of works by Picasso, Goya, and Dali, sponsored for Wrocław 2016, caused an uproar when it was found that the works on display, on which the committee spent upwards of PLN 5 million were low-grade reproductions (Jurgiel 2014). The Citizens demanded that the budget be subjected to public debate, and that funding be put aside to create possibilities for a lasting cultural contribution beyond 2016. They also equated the passive participation in culture to the lack of transparency and communication from Wrocław 2016. The petition went unheeded. As the celebration of ECOC does not begin until next year, it will be interesting to observe how the Citizens will further petition the organizational authorities between now and then.

I believe we are seeing the front end of a protracted entanglement between the sphere of animators and policymakers via the debate over ECOC cultural content in Wrocław. One thing that I hope has been clear throughout this thesis is that animators do not seek an adversarial relationship with the state. Their long-term plan is to continue to reach out to local and regional governments even as they acknowledge that these governments lack a strategy for the development of culture (“Współpraca z samorządami” 2014). The barriers on the cultural level are driving the response by the Citizens of ECOC on the civic level. The outcome of this debate, of course, has yet to be decided, but animators seem to have strength in numbers as they try to expand the definition of culture. On the other hand, any project that attempts to influence a group of people is inherently political, though it may not be partisan. Community engagement creates social capital that is available for members to use at an appropriate time. Using it for a future political goal is certainly not out of the question.

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104 Personal communication with Tadeusz Mincer, cultural animator.

105 Roughly USD $1.25 million (as of April 2015).


Social Movements in Central and Eastern Europe

One-Time Activism Curse: Latvian Anti-Austerity Activists’ Politization Trajectories

Artur Holavin106

1. Activism in Latvia: Nation’s Everyman Self-Identity

Common-place consensus among Latvians is that we are too cold-blooded for protests (unlike all these Southern guys flooding streets after having any minor dissatisfaction). It is believed that “average Latvian” had been ruled by foreign invaders for so long, that patience became his main characteristic. In contrast to stereotypes, historical data provide a different picture. To mention some of “cold-blooded” behaviour examples, there was turbulent First Republic civic activism (coined by Vladimir Mayakovsky in his “How Does Democratic Republic Function?”), opposition to Soviet rule, ecological and human rights movements in 1980th, Singing Revolution.

Dramatic reduction of quality of life, says scholars, leads to atomization of people, like it happened in Russia in 1990th. (Hahn 2001, Ziegler, Beichelt). Well, in Latvia in worked in different way. Since the restoration of independence Latvians were active too. We had anti-corruption “Umbrella Revolution” (attempt) in 2007 and mass Russian minority movement against educational reform in 2003-2004.

Despite the latter examples, needless to say, social issues dominated agenda. Lack of social security and poverty made teachers, doctors, farmers protesting actively (making “patient mentality” claim invalid). Elite even tried to restrict protests by adopting new law on freedom of assembly in 1995. Yet it had to stay democratic due to international and institutional pressure. Consequently, nothing stopped seniors’ from clashes with police in 1998. Nevertheless these movements never stopped or substantively slowed down liberalization of welfare state, or any other important policy implementation in other areas. Government socially-oriented populist rhetoric did not go hand-in-hand with hard-line liberalization intent. This had been the case until the global economic crisis of 2008 reached the state. Immediate collapse of the biggest local private bank, threat of devaluation of Lats and default, all of these, left government with no other choice than seeking external assistance. IMF and EU conditions outraged public and opposition.

For the first time since 1991 protests turned in to full-scale riot on 13th of January (the date symbolically connected it to “Bloody Sunday” of Riga in 1905, which happened

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exactly 104 years before). The government fell. People had been gathering for protests actively for the next couple of years. Despite of rise of opposition to governmental policies, no anti-austerity social movement was formed. In a while, many activists (better to say, ordinary people – everymen- who became *one-day activists*) had experienced depolitization. The goals of protests were not achieved, risky activism turned out to be, in broader terms, meaningless.

2. Research Design

The paper provides description of the three major political activities in recent Latvian history. These are 2009 Riga riot, 2009 Bauska clashes and 2009-2010 Camp of Unemployed (“Commune of Freedom Street”), which was organized in front of Cabinet of Ministers building. Neither of protests resulted in policy changes. In spite of popular demand for general welfare (SKDS 2011), shutting down regional hospitals and unemployment benefit reduction had never been revised. No major social movement emerged, most of people, who participated in activities, which were against the law, returned “back to their homes”. Depolitization of activists has happened despite grievances were still present (this follows the same pattern as Russian minority 2003-2004 protests (Commercio 2009)). In other words, anti-austerity protests are context for biographical trajectories of “one-day activists” return to their “normal” state of depolitization. The depiction of consequences of activists’ participation in collective action had been studied before (McAdam 1989; Filleule 2010). For example, all of activists under investigation fall in to category of “ordinary leave takers” (Filleule 2010). Even in case of Camp of Unemployed, which had clear leaders, withdrawal of one or another individual did not have fatal effect.

On the other hand, my focus is slightly different to previous depolitization studies, as they focus on long-standing activists leaving social movement mostly. As to me, I try to see what conditions prevented *formation* of such movement. Therefore, by depolitization I mean that, in principle, “everymen” (Clement, Demidov, Mirjasova 2010) did not participate in street protests, did not become professional activists (members of organized movement), or politicians, since their involvement in one of the three widely reported and risk-involving protests. On the one hand, “everymen” perspective reflects post-socialist context. On the other hand, it also refers to Thevenot (2014) engagement theory and Eliasoph studies on avoidance of politics (1997). Activists, who withdrew from politics, justify their participation and refer to their activism exactly in *engaging in familiarity* and empowering themselves by avoiding far-from-home politics, which can’t be changed.

In order to understand how depolitization functioned in Latvian case, I conduct review of biographical trajectories of the activists of three major protests actions. As a result, it will be possible to answer the second question of scientific interest: *what impact had participation in protests on biographical paths of Latvian anti-austerity activists?* The main source of data for the study is document analysis. It involves analysis web pages of civic organizations and political parties. But the main source of information is mass media articles. Interviews with activists in newspapers and on-line news portals provide the most important data. What I look at is information on how exactly events
happened, what was the context and immediate outcome of participation. Then I look at biographical paths of activists. I analyze how one-time activists evaluate their own participation in the event, how do they feel about it, did it make any impact on their engagement in politics and where they are now.

Naturally, such design helps to make a sketch, snap-shot, rather than in-depth understanding of motives and (de)politicization practices of the activists. The latter could be caught by biographical or semi-structured interviews. Despite limitation of the design, I argue that depiction of activists’ depolitization is possible and can be seen from the stories presented in mass media. One of the reasons for that is that mass media in Latvia work in very limited informational environment. As a result, coverage of the events and biographical paths of activists was extensive enough to provide data I needed to answer the research question.

There are 12 people I focus explicitly. 3 for Riga riots (leaders of post-factum organized „January, 13” Movement), 4 for Bauska clashes (all of them stood trial for fighting back riot police) and 5 for Camp of Unemployed (organizer and activists, who were the most active out of all commune at some point of its existence). All of them were “appointed” as “faces” of their protest. Some of these people were interested in politics, even before their involvement in the protest. This is what you can guess from their reasoning of engagement in storming Saeima (Parliament) building, blocking international highway Via Baltica (A7) and living for several months in tents in front of the Cabinet of Ministers building. Although it has to be said that 11 of 12 activists neither engaged in street gatherings often, nor they were members of activist group. Participation in misbehaviour and standing against police (all three cases were effectively linked to violation of law) were new ways of political participation for them. It was a radical shift, running their mostly depoliticized routine. After their short-term engagement, most of the activist became cynic everymen again. By reconstructing biographical trajectories of activists I try to figure out why so?

The other thing I am interested is that their separate stories united together with untold stories of other anonymous participants of the protests did not lead to changes in policy-making and social organization. Protests just popped-up for one day, received huge public, political and mass media attention and disappeared soon, as if they never happened. Of course, saying this is a bit of exaggeration: several minor protests followed 2009 Riga riots, Bauska residents gathered to protests couple of times again, while The Camp itself stayed for ten months. My point is that protests did not become starting point of revolution, or any major shifts in political and public domains.

To summarize, the analysis uncovers the issue of people’s short-term politicization. In other words, it helps to understand some features of unsustainable nature of politicization and rapid depoliticization of people, who otherwise could become social movements-engaged activists. All of the cases I study could have resulted in wider self-organization initiative. The issues people stood for concerned wider society; dissatisfaction with governmental policies, as well as distrust to state institutions was (as usual) high. Even more, “one-time activists” has labelled events “revolutionary” themselves. Yet nothing emerged from seemingly huge development. Demands and interests were put aside, people returned to their kitchens, while elite continued with the policies people disagree. The study depicts how exactly did this happen.

![Image of destroyed police cars near Parliament building](Kasjauns.lv)

Cold evening in snowy Old Riga on January, 13 in 2009 turned out to be the hottest in political term since protests against Soviet Union. The latter led to restoration of independence of Latvia. The first led the government to fall unable to stand public and presidential pressure over incapability to prevent violence in heart of the capital. The crisis was on its peak, as was public dissatisfaction. Yet this was the end of the story, as social insecurity was never fought back, temporary austerity measures turned out to be permanent changes in welfare state design, political elite consolidated itself around neoliberal reformers, while Latvians turned back to inter-ethnic tensions (in spite of the fact that during the riot Latvians and Russians attempted to storm Saeima together).

There was this feeling in the air: “something is going to happen!” Oppositional rally at the main square of the city in the very heart of Old town was not just another protest. I mean, it was, but something bigger had to happen. The major Latvian-owned private bank collapsed and had to be nationalized. International loan-givers held first negotiations with the government, which left Welfare Minister Iveta Purne (professional social worker), literary, in tears. First signs of crisis could have been seen throw all previous year. Yet the rhetoric of crisis management and crisis-as-a-threat frame (Hart and Tindall 2009) emerged in the late autumn. In his New Year speech, just two weeks before the rally, Prime-Minister Ivars Godmanis coined threatening situation by saying words, which now became classical:

“You know, when show storm happens in Antarctica, penguins live throw it by standing back-to-back in circle. If someone tries to leave, they keep him back.”
This was call for solidarity. But this was also call for personal responsibility. Furthermore, it was comparison of situation in Latvia with snow storm in Antarctica (after all, this definitely is not a thing someone would like to experience). Penguins were worried and angry. They knew whom to blame. For example, Minister of Finance, who caused public rage by giving poor-quality interview to Bloomberg. His explanation of how did Latvia come to the point of “snow storm” – “nothing special, just crisis” was perceived as a mixture of cynicism and unprofessionalism. Some of protesters on January, 13 were wearing t-shirts with the quote. People blamed Saeima – The Parliament too. It was elected in 2006, during so called “fat years”, as they were called by politicians. People were asking questions: “why politicians did not forecast consequences of poorly-grounded economic boom after all?” Furthermore, Latvia is Parliamentary Republic. Respectively, President does not have that much power. Government is formed and agreed by Parliamentary coalition: “these 100 men are the main actors then, aren’t they?” So The Rally of Penguins had to happen. “Society for Other Politics” (a newly established small centre-right party) was in charge of it, taking the leadership. They chose the date to organize rally.

Retrospectively, it seems as not a very wise idea to hold mass rally in a limited space of Dome square, at distance of just several hundred meters from Saeima building. Especially, on January, 13, the date, which has a huge symbolic meaning for Latvians (in remembrance of 1905 Revolution events, one of the central streets in Riga is called 13. Janvāra iela – The Street of 13th of January). Needless to add, the Saeima building situated on the crossroad of two unsecured Old town streets, could have been seen as a target. Self-confidence of leaders of small oppositional political parties to control people was also too high. To make things worse police was just not used to uncontrolled mob violence: Latvia is the country, where street fighting gets in to the news. As a result, Minister of Internal Affairs ignored worrying signals from security services and has decided to stay in his suburban private house to drink some wine. But as I said, the feeling of extraordinary nature of upcoming protest was not a classified knowledge. It was in public discourse and mouth-to-mouth communication. The rally was going on, some politicians were on the stage. But people hoped for something more. Youngsters, who climbed at scaffold and started to shout “Down with Parliament!” When the rally was proclaimed to be over, many decided to stay. Then group of several hundreds of protesters separated from the rally and rushed straight to nearby Jēkaba street (where Saeima is situated). There were no specific plans what to do. People were just angry enough to want to storm Parliament, despite it was late evening and the building was empty.

Dozen of policemen, poorly equipped and unprepared for the unfolding change in the mood of people, faced people armed with sticks and stones. Windows were broken in the Parliament and nearby buildings of National Library, as well as, Parliamentary Commissions. Despite all attempts people could not break up throw heavy doors of The Parliament. In revenge, they started to demolish police cars and other nearby buildings, as well as, making barricades. At this point (an hour since unrest has unfolded) riot police unit “Alfa” finally arrived at the spot. Together with Military police they dispersed people. As a

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107 Minister was not a good English-speaker. Therefore, Latvian-like spelling „nasing spešal, just crisis“ became popular too.
result, protesters had to move back to Dome square and to nearby Smilšu street (Ministry of Finances was hit this time). Clashes with police were accompanied by looting (e.g. Latvijas Balzāms store of alcoholic beverages). In the next several hours, some groups of protesters emerged in other spots around Old Town. But, in general, police took control over situation. The riot left more than 100 people arrested, and more than 50 taken to hospitals (including several policemen and at least one journalist). The next morning country woke up in a deep shock trying to comprehend something unseen before.

3.1. Biographical Trajectories of Riga Riot Participants

This chapter describes biographical paths and retrospective perception of the events by three activists charged and prosecuted for their participation in the riots. All of them – Andris Maziks, Ansis Ataols Bērziņš and Ingus Zaharčenoks – founded NGO called “January, 13”. Referring to 2009 events (not just Riga riots, but also “Bauska clashes and other protests”) as “revolutionary”. They claimed to take leadership of social movement to change politics in Latvia. The stated aims of the organization were “to consolidate participants and supporters of revolutionary events”, “to protect activists against the court” and “to state and to disseminate of consolidated public opinion”. With 10 posts on the wall last being from 2013 official web page of organization is effectively inactive by now. It was different five years ago.

3.1.1. Andris Maziks: From Everyman To Activist And Wayback

Around ten people joined an idea of riot participants to establish biedrība (“comradeship”, type of non-governmental organization, which can be compared to association or grass-roots initiative interest group). The main reason behind establishment of the organization was to counterweight and check state actions against rioters. Yet idealism and politization had soon melted down. By August organization was effectively non-active: “the idea to promote just state and society disappeared”. NGO became the place for irregular meetings to discuss politics. As Andris Maziks explained to journalist:

“There would be more people to join. But as long as it doesn’t hit you [personally], you will not act (...) In fact, riots are forgotten already. I think Latvia has an ideal environment and mentality of people for all, what is flourishing to flourish.

In other interview he was even shorter, saying: “society is ill”. Noteworthy, Maziks mentions some younger members of “January, 13”, who decided to run for
He is sceptical to their motives, saying ironically: “they say they want to work for the best of the country now. It is impossible to know, how it will turn out afterwards”.

“January, 13” became inactive for the next two years. The rebirth of activism was connected to first hearings of the cases of rioters in court. As a result, several press releases were written in the late 2011-early 2012. Maziks was mentioned as head of the organization at that point. Rhetoric of organization was radical, prosecuted fellows were called “politically repressed”. It might look like Maziks continued to be politicized. Yet one thing should be noted in this regard: as soon as court made a decision, the head of organization paid 1000 Lats ($2000) fine and disengaged from organization. This was the moment “January, 13” stopped its existence.

Journalists made a contact with Maziks in 2014. He was back to his usual life, living and working abroad. The only change was that before the riot it was Ireland, but now it was Germany. He was not the leader of oppositional, revolutionary organization, but just another Latvian, who left his country “protesting with his legs”. In other words, Maziks experienced depolitization, returning back to the level of interest in politics he had right before the riot. One possible explanation might be that there was no personal interest engagement anymore. Injustice and powerlessness in relations with the state had no practical (like court hearings) meaning again. Explaining the reasons, why he decided to participate in the rally that evening, he said:

“I was not there for a rally. I just wanted to share my emotions.”

As you can see, the former activist tried to avoid rational choice exaplanation behind his action. Now, being politically passive, he was referring to his politicization as an act of irrational behaviour. This fits “close-to-home” grammar described by Thevenot (2014) and Eliasoph (1997). “By chance” Maziks confronted the state. As a result, his personal domain, familiarity engagement was threatened. He had to switch to public regime, “engagement of justification” logic, in order to resolve threats to his personal well-being. As soon as, the threat was over, he returned back to his private, cynical position. Exaggerating powerlessness and joking over it became his tactics again:

“It was played out. It was controlled “letting off steam” to shift public attention from unpopular decisions to riots.”

115 It is unknown whereas these youngsters were among rioters, or not. Although, unlikely for people under investigation to participate in elections (criminaly convicted citizens are exempted from MP candidacy by law).
Now he did not believe (or rather made himself not to believe he does not believe) in January, 13 events as some revolutionary grass-root social activism. Instead, he refers to it, as top-down conspiracy, which means he was “a victim” of uncontrolled fights between politicians “out there”. Despite he was an actor, he did something political and riot did contribute to dismissal of Godmanis Second Government, all of it was dismissed. Instead of letting himself sour and think of reasons why social movement failed, he decided to perceive it as an elitist project, simultaneously making himself a passive object of political process.

3.1.2. Ingus Zaharčenoks: From Volunteering To Activism And Down To Everyman

Another founder of “January, 13”, Ingus Zaharčenoks, experienced a slightly different path than his fellow. First of all, he was civically active before riots. For example, he was a founder of “History Researchers’ Society” (HRS). As a member of this organization, he participated in cleaning of Daugavgrivas fortress and Litenes concentration camp territory. He had wife and baby-girl at the time of the riot (this was underlined by “HRS”, as a sign of a “good citizen” in an open statement in support of arrested Zaharčenoks). He came to Riga from Bauska (the town I will talk about a lot in the next chapter) together with several other acquaintances. He did not take part in demolishing anything, but participated in rally and was next to Saeima building at time of the riot. Nevertheless he was one of few taken to prison straight after the riot. Again, at time of criminal process and court hearings, he had been signing calls to support revolutionaries, who “tried to change Latvian society and politics”. The activist had been unemployed for over two years at that time. Later he will explain it by the presence of his name among those accused in looting “Latvijas balzāms” shop in mass media. He gave an interview in 2012, stating that court is not fair and decision is known before the end of the hearings. But Zaharčenoks’ suspicions turned out to be wrong. He was freed of charges fully next year:

“We were positively shocked with the fact that you can trust Latvian court, that fair court is possible in Latvia.”

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121 Ibid
122 Ibid
127 Youtube video portal, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JgCO9oyD2Rg (accessed 11.04.2015.)
Several months before his personal “conflict” with the state were over, he withdrew from “January, 13” organization. Long criminal process and unemployment contributed to dissolution of his family\textsuperscript{129}. As soon as it became possible, Zaharčenoks left the country to go working abroad\textsuperscript{130}. His grammar and engagement is slightly different from the one of Maziks’. Despite he is not active in politics too, the attitude towards Riga riot is different. He is not to blame state or top-down conspiracy in failure of formation of anti-austerity movement. Instead, he blames the people for lack of solidarity and passivity:

“Latvia had a chance to transform radically, but because of passive people... (...) there is the feeling of unfinished work [among activists] (...) what we lack – the people lack – is unity\textsuperscript{131}.”

In other words, Zaharčenoks did experience depolitization, but it happened in a slightly different manner than it was with Maziks. On the one hand, it was not a return to the pre-riot point, but rather falling even deeper. On the other hand, he did not become fully cynical. He consider his engagement and activism period as a truly attempt to influence politics. It is just that it was unsuccessful attempt. He switched to personal domain, in order to restore human and social capital losses he experienced as a consequence of risky activism. He might return to activism again. Probably, it can happen abroad, in a “friendlier” environment for civic activism.

3.2. Ansis Ataols Bērziņš: The Activist

The third activist – Ansis Ataols Bērziņš – represents an exceptional example of activism and politization trajectory. Bērziņš, native to Latgale region, have been involved in politics and social activism for a very long time. Representing Latgalian minority (officially, they are catholic Latvians living in the eastern part of Latvia and speaking a dialect), he speaks of himself as folklorist\textsuperscript{132} and “Eastern-like street” activist\textsuperscript{133}. To add, he is relatively popular folk band singer and musician. His activism goes back to several years before the riot. For example, he was advocating for Latgalian culture preservation\textsuperscript{134}\textsuperscript{135}. The records of his “social activism” go back to 2002 (“Riga Folk

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid
Music Society”). This is not mentioning his professional experience, which involves cooperation with Soros Foundation since 1998.

Bērziņš is considered radical activist. For example, the reason grass-root liberal intellectual “The Last Party” ousted him (despite Bērziņš was a co-founder) was a disagreement on electoral campaign strategies. As it was said by the party member: “Ansis is naturally aggressive. Many things he prefers to do violently. The activist’s answer was harsh too:

“The core of the Party consists of Western-like snobe people, who like to come together, have a glass of red wine and have a chat. I am more Easter European-like revolutionary minded. I prefer active and sharp action.

In contrast to his co-members of “January, 13” movement, he continues struggle with a court. The last long-written speech and open letter he published dates to January, this year. Another difference is that he does not regret his participation:

“I think, it is proportionally [action considering you would like] to say you opinion and raise awareness in a crisis situation.”

Furthermore, he continued with public good engagement type and activist frame, saying that the riot “ousted the government of Godmanis”. Respectively, the riot was meaningful, justified action by Latvians exercising their rights to stand against the government, which did not perform well. As he coins it, “civic society differs from non-civic society by going out and actively speaking out its opinion.” To add, his explanation of the reasons he participated in the riot is different from his fellows. In opposite to them, he states that it was a rational, free choice, rather than emotional mistake under influence of others.

To conclude, Ansis Ataols Bērziņš is the only long-lasting social activist among all 12 people under investigation. He had been active before the riot, came to the streets consciously, making a political act, which was consistent with his values and political views. The court against him just made him even more active, as personal issue became involved. Nevertheless, he continued to practice activism by referring to common good,

137 Ibid
139 Ibid
142 Ibid
143 Ibid
144 Ibid
civic, political and social rights and inequality. He is still active as a public person, addressing social issues. Respectively, his activism stays at the same level it had been always been.

4. **Bauska Hospital clashes: “All our guilt was holding hands of each other”**

![Image](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

*Pic. 2: Old lady seen throw the glass mask of riot police officer, stand-off at A7 highway in Bauska, 31.09.2009, snapshot from LTV Panorāma video from Youtube146.*

In short, the second case was a clash between anti-riot special unit “Alfa” and several hundreds of local residents in Bauska town. Protesters blocked the highway A7 for hours, demanding cancelling decision to close down the regional hospital.

The case has its similarities and differences with two other cases resent in the paper. The main difference is that events took place outside the capital, in Bauska, middle-sized town (approximate population is 10,000) near to the Lithuanian border. It is regional centre of Bauskas novads, which had population of 28,000 by the time of the conflict147. Furthermore, this was neither consequence of top-down organized protest, nor step-by-step development. Instead it was the case of self-organization by means of The Internet. As to similarities, they include involvement of riot police, harsh and aggressive criticism of activists by the governmental representatives, as well as trials over participants.

Latvian healthcare system was the context of the conflict and reasons Bauska inhabitants took the issue seriously enough to misbehave and violate the law. The system was inherited from the Soviets. One of the main features of it was the high number of hospitals and places-per-person. That approach comes from the idea of free and universal healthcare as a right of each citizen no matter his income or place of living is. By 2009 Latvia had higher number of hospitals per capita than in most of other European

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146 Youtube video portal, [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lsD_mV7unEA](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lsD_mV7unEA) (accessed 11.04.2015.)

countries. Accessibility of medical care was the core of the system. Obviously, plan economy never accounted market logic of efficiency. Therefore, huge hospitals were built in small towns. The system had never been revised significantly since the restoration of independence right until crisis hit the country.

By September 2009 implementation of austerity measures proposed by international loan-givers and adopted by technocratic neo-liberal government had been ongoing in the country. Pensions, childcare, education spending were reduced and reformed to market-oriented liberal model. Healthcare was not an exception. Although, reform of regional medicine (aimed at reducing number of hospitals) was adopted, there was huge debate within government and Ministry itself. Newly elected Healthcare Minister Baiba Rozentāle, known for her social-democratic views, tried to slow down reforms despite pressure of Ministry of Finances and Prime-Minister Valdis Dombrovskis (Holavins 2013). The government of Valdis Dombrovskis, who took the place of Riga riot time Prime-Minister Ivars Gormanis, had not received legitimacy throw elections yet (new Parliamentary elections were scheduled for 2010). Therefore, neither Prime-Minister nor his neo-liberal fellows could openly use crisis-as-an-opportunity frame (Hart and Tindall 2009).

Despite negative opinion of the Minister, the reform was initiated. Among the first hospitals to be closed (to be precise – reorganized from multitask full-scale hospital to minor emergency centre) was in Bauska. One of the biggest issues addressed by the population was that women had not to be taken to the hospital to give birth anymore. It happened on August, 27th. Since then all women were had to be taken to hospital in Jelgava (which is 50 kilometers from Bauska) or Riga (65 kilometers).

For couple of days comments at the online version of local newspaper became the place for worried people to share their dissatisfaction and disagreement with the reform. As a result of on-line discussions, the idea of the protest emerged. It was neither agreed with authorities, nor well-prepared, as it had to happen before hospital was closed down. As a result, several hundreds of people of all ages – from teenagers to old ladies, as well as middle-aged of both genders blocked two bridges – over river Mēmele and Mūsa, which are part of Tallinn-Riga-Vinious via Baltica highway. As one of protesters, middle-aged entrepreneur Valdis Vilks said: “We have to remind we are still alive here. Will we be alive, if taken to the hospital in Jelgava?" Extremely worried unemployed woman (former teacher and culture-related municipal worker, mother of two and grandmother) “said in tears": “How can you close down the hospital? At any moment any of us could have need for doctors! There were members of birth-giving department, who had been fired, as well as pregnant women, supporting their doctors and nurses. Noteworthy, local police department chief refused to give an order to disperse people, while Speaker of regional Parliament stayed with protesters for two hours to answer all questions and to

149a Ibid
151 Ibid
152 Ibid
explain that local authorities were refused in financing hospital by the state-level institutions.153

4.1. The Day Everymen Were Activists

Situation has changed dramatically, as state police special union “Alfa” arrived to Bauska from Riga. Anti-riot police had undergone huge training since Riga riot earlier this year. This time it was not surprised and confused (reports on miscommunication and inability to decide what to do emerged in mass media after January, 13). Instead it was well-organized special unit group. Policemen used steaks to push people from the highway. Several people were arrested. No governmental official arrived at the spot. In opposite, Minister of Internal Affairs Linda Mūrniece stayed in Riga announcing her support for actions of police, as they “were absolutely correct, and this was fault of people, who violated the law”. Despite the initial tone of the government has changed in the next few days, Mūrniece kept her hawk position: “I do not change my mind. We, guards of the law, will be harsh again, if it will be necessary! The organizers of unauthorized rally must be identified. It is likely they had different motives than to protect the hospital. They might represent some party.”

The reaction of Bauska inhabitants was quite negative towards such rhetoric. Opposing Minister’s opinion, the local resident said: “People have noone to share their pain, this is why they took the streets. It was not pre-planned. For example, I did not take part in the protest, because I did not know it is going to happen”. People took the streets again on September, 3 to meet Healthcare Minister Baiba Rozentāle. This time they did not block highway, peacefully protesting against hospital closure, as well as, reaction of the state authorities. Overall atmosphere was tense. Yet clashes did not happen, and Minister could leave safely. Since then no major actions were taken up until October, 1, the day court had hearings over four Bauskans - Igors Maiše, Edgars Zeltiņš, Gatis Stelps and Iveta Kalniņa - participants of clashes with “Alfa” riot police accused in violation of law. There were on-line calls to block road in front of the court building, which could lead to repetition of August events. In order to prevent it, 50 state policemen were present in Bauska day before and at the day of hearings. Some were sent from other region. This turned out to be disproportionally, as just around 30 local residents arrived to the spot.

Three activists (one did not arrive to court) were met with applause. The court building was crowded too. Up to ten policemen were convoying Zeltiņš, Stelps and Kalniņa. Crowd chanted supportive songs as a tribute to activists (fellow residents, called

153 Ibid
157 Ibid
159 Ibid
to court for “pushing policemen” and “sitting on the road”). Zeltiņš was in first line of protesters. He admitted confrontation with police, but said it was justified and limited\textsuperscript{160}. Court punished him with 5 Lats ($10) fine, he refused to pay. Stelps avoided immediate punishment, as he came drunk to the court “being nervous and unused to media attention\textsuperscript{161}”. Kalniņa refused to admit full blockade of the highway, mentioning protesters letting emergency drive by, as well as car of Lithuanians being late for ferry in Riga\textsuperscript{162}.

There are no records on Igors Maiše since he did not show up in a court October 15, 2009. His family still lives in Bauska. The daughter left to Riga for studies though. There is information on some Igors Maiše (which is not that common name) caught by Lithuanian police and charged by 12 month ban from driving\textsuperscript{163}. Yet it is unclear, whereas it is the same person or not. Anyway, there are no sign of his involvement in any social movement since August events in Bauska. As to retired long distance trucker Edgars Zeltiņš received 5 Lats ($10) fine, admitted he was a wrong-doers (“these are laws of out state, we should follow them\textsuperscript{164}”). Old man never appeared in social media, news, or any official state data since then. There is no information on political activism of the guy who arrived drunk to The Court - Gatis Stelps - either.

4.2. Iveta Kalniņa: The Woman Who Stayed The Activist

Different path took Iveta Kalniņa, as she became one of local activist leaders for a while. For example, she was the one to initiate sending handcuffs in parcel to Minister of Internal Affairs. She led people’s assembly on October, 17\textsuperscript{165}. In opposite to her fellow activists she continued with political activism. At some point she became one of the leaders of “Tautai pietiek!” (“Enough is enough for People!”) Movement, which was a prominent one in 2011, organizing protests against high electricity tariffs\textsuperscript{166}. Same year the movement tried to transform itself into grass-root based political party “The Free List”\textsuperscript{167}. The first attempt to register party happened in Bauska first. The next one happened in a week later in Riga. Both failed (no sufficient number of party members)\textsuperscript{168}. Nevertheless Kalniņa continued with political activism. For example, she was among Latvian antiglobalist movement supporters in Bauska Court in October, 2011\textsuperscript{169}.

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid
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pietiek!” twitter account has the latest twits back in 2011. Some social network activities date till 2012. In some news and press release references to Kalniņa includes mentioning her role in Bauska clashes (in other words, she used it as a political capital). Nevertheless, there is no information about Iveta Kalniņa political activism for the more than three years. It is unknown, whereas she really experienced depolitization, or just turned to mass media-blind types of it. At least, we know that radical grass-root activism was not successful in to bringing her in to professional politics.


This activism example was not a one-day protest, as Commune existed for ten months. Nevertheless patterns of people disengagement with politics are similar to those experienced by some of participants of Riga riot and Bauska clashes. All five leaders of long-lasting Commune withdrew from it and experienced depolitization.

It was November, 30 in 2009, when people were surprised to find lonely men sitting at the alley just in front of the Cabinet of Ministers building. Mass media rushed to learn what is going on. People started to come and ask unknown man about the reasons he decided to sleep on the street. Soon the country knew the name of the protester: Gints Gaiķēns, at that time unemployed worker. He started hunger-strike against governmental crisis management policies. It was the right time to do, as unemployment rates beat 22%, making Latvia the worst country in The EU by this criterion at that time.

The same day unknown „experienced political activist“ brought him a tent, which will become a symbol of the protest and the beginning of The Camp of Unemployed. Despite freezing cold December (temperature reached -20 C), several other people joined the action. It soon became a small community, which was supported with warm clothes, tea, toys and money by feeling for people. Even though Gints was taken to hospital in the mid-December, the Camp stayed until he returned. At that time Muslim-turned Latvian Nūrs Siders became the second informal leader of the camp. He took an opportunity to fight alcoholism among protesters, introduce clear social agenda The Camp stayed for and consolidate people for these ideals. An important challenge for activists was to defend their grass-root initiative against attempts of some political parties to take the lead of it. The most notable conflict happened between activists and „Children of Šlesers“ protest rally organizers (members of youth organization of Latvian First Party, the project of oppositional oligarch Ainārs Šlesers). Latvian First Party addressed difficulties of small and middle-sized businesses, while The Camp participants were standing for the poorest and the most disadvantaged social groups. Political party activists had to withdraw.

At the peak there were around 30 to 40 people at the spot. Few more dozens had been arriving each morning to stay until the evening. Effectively, Camp of Unemployed became „Commune of Freedom Street“ (after the name of the main street of the city – Brīvības iela - where The Camp had been settled). It might be that the name has reference to well-known graffiti slogan „there is the street, but there is no freedom“ too. Protesters were not at hunger-strike anymore. Neither were they just unemployed people. Instead there were reports about students, entrepreneurs, national minorities, beggars. There are noteworthy participant accounts on daily life of commune. For example, Gints Gaiķēns said that he had been using bathroom in the building of Cabinet of Ministers during the day and bathroom of porche „Reval Hotel Latvia“ restaurant: “Guards were helpful and even shared hot coffee with us“.

Activists stayed in the tents and occupied the main alley in order to remind politicians about unemployment and social inequality issue. Government representatives ignored Commune mostly (although Prime-Minister Valdis Dombrovskis made his midnight visit to Commune in the late January, 2010). The camp, eventually, survived withdrawal of Gints Gaiķēns from the Commune after he was offered the job at Riga Free Port by the decision of Riga Council Vice-Mayor Ainārs Šlesers (the oligarch mentioned above). At that time the founder of the Camp said that „parasites had waded Commune“. Nevertheless other activists stayed at the place for the next few months. Subsequent decline of number of the participant led government to order demolition of

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173 „Iela ir, Brīvības nav“
175 Ibid
the Camp by the police. It happened at night, in July, 2010. Next morning people came back and government decided not to escalate conflict, leaving protesters in peace.

Finally, the last three protesters – Juris Lapšinskis, Grigorijs Fedjkins and Aleksandrs Ozols - left Freedom Street empty in September, 5 in 2010\(^{177}\). Most of activist got jobs, or turned to other, non-political, activities by that time. Despite some activists achieved their personal goals, situation in the country was not much different from the one at the beginning of The Commune. Unemployment rates were around 19% (which was called a success by the state, as Spain became the worst country at that point)\(^{178}\). Austerity measures had been continued. Yet the potential – resources, such as public support, human and social capital did not lead to development of wider social movement.

If we look at every mentioned person’s politization trajectory, then we can see clear similarities. To start with, the founder of The Camp, Gints Gaiķēns, had never engaged in activism since he got a job. His demand had been satisfied. Personal interest engagement lost personal interest pillar. As a result, activism was not a rational option anymore. On the one hand, the logic behind depolitization leaves a space for repetition of politization scenario. Yet the action was extreme and unusual and involved so much media attention that it seems impossible to repeat. Gaiķēns lost credibility as a “common good” activist since his withdrawal from Commune. Respectively, the new attempt would be hard to capitalize in to positive outcome. Similar path undertook the last person living in tent in front of Government windows. Juris Lapšinskis had been working as a caretaker and a guard until he was fired. Then he had been struggling to get a job, learning about The Camp of Unemployed. The motivation to join was “to find a job”\(^{179}\). Living in The Camp was convenient, as he could avoid paying rent and communal bills. For a bad luck, Lapšinskis was unlucky not to find a job, as his activist fellows did. As a result, he stayed in The Camp for several months longer, than others. He was the only one to confront police at summer, when his tent had been taken away. He returned back to stay another two months. But finally the end of Commune came with Lapšinskis taken to hospital\(^{180}\). Since then he gave one interview to “Ir” magazine in the end of December, just disappear from media attention. No records of his activism since 2010 are available.

As to Nūrs Siders, he is still active in a sense of inspiration engagement. He is a member of Latvian Muslim community. As a member of it, Siders organized a tour throw The Baltic States to popularize Islam\(^{181}\). He also participated in several anti-governmental protests soon after his engagement in Commune of Freedom Street\(^{182}\). Since then there

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are no data on his activism, except for involvement in life of Latvian Muslim community. Respectively, his activism (better to say “volunteering”, using the concepts of Eliasoph studies (1997)) did not experience many changes because of participation in Commune. Finally, both Grigorijs Fedjkins and Aleksandrs Ozols experienced depolitization. Their participation was to a large extent motivated by media attention. Since then Fedjkins satisfies this need by publishing photos and articles at online news portals. Finally, there are neither media nor the Internet records on Aleksandrs Ozols since his withdrawal from The Camp.

6. Summary

With the help of mass media interviews, as well as, other available documents where activists share their biography and political views, I show that majority of one-day activists did not stay active. It is unknown whereas they are still interested in politics, have impact on relatives and friends, which is alternative way of politization. Yet all of them are not active in a sense of coherent, structural, organized engagement. Neither of these withdrawn participants, who received media attention and tried to get resources out of a new situation, ever gained any positive result, which would sustain their political activism. Most of their trajectories represent either „Л“ or „П“ shapes. The only person to continued with activism had been an activist for a long time before anti-austerity protests. The only everywoman politization lasted longer compare to other activists. Yet according to the data I have, she experienced depolitization as well (in all cases I speak about depolitization, it should be noted that I refer to publically known activism; interviews with the activists should verify data in further research).

To summarize, in all three cases protests did not lead to emergence of social movement. Most of one-day activists disengaged themselves to become everymen again. Mass media and politicians labelled protesters as radicals violating the law. As a result, despite the causes concerned majority of the population, support was limited and did not make people to join protesters. Activists’ politization continued until their personal interest was over (got a job, court made a decision on their participation). As soon as personal domain was left in peace by the state, 9 out of 12 returned back to their routine, apolitical life. 2 others continued with activism at the same level they had been involved before risk-taking protest. The only person to continue with activism (Kalnina) disengaged at some point as well. To add, some of former activist conducted a work on rationalizing and explaining to themselves politization period. Most of them turned to “close to home and “cynical” rhetoric. Subsequently, the study provides a first snapshot on the way everymen justified fluctuation in their biographical trajectories. Furthermore, it shows that one-time activism, even the risky one, do not necessarily lead to politization. The reasons for that is definitely worth to study further, as they might be as systemic (political culture and state policies), as micro-level (laco of motivation and attachment).

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Experiencing Gezi Movement between Imagined Futures and Different Memories

Lorenzo D’Orsi

In June 2013 Gezi Park became the core of a protest that for its practices, its refusal of traditional political language and its new imaginary became part of the new “movements of square” (Pleyers, Glasius 2013). Although Gezi protest presents global features, this paper is focused on some of its peculiarity that are linked to the local Turkish context. The refusal of the political language took its shape within the generational fracture derived from the 1980’s military coup, which was a sort of watershed in respect to the political radicalism of the seventies that led the youth to a lack of engagement in the traditional political forms. The youth was depicted in public discourses as “lost generations”, consumerists and not paying attention to the collective responsibility (Neyzi 2001 Lüküslü 2013). I will briefly analyse the mechanisms that allowed building a “collective thereness” (Butler 2013), that is a being together in a defined circumstance in space and time. I will also focus on the protest aftermath and its contradictions, that is on how the Gezi event has been codified and on the relationship between the imagined future it produced and the historical background of people involved in it. In the first paragraph, I will analyse the park as a liminal space, allowing people to overcome their historically rooted social boundaries. Then, I will focus on the breaking of expectations and the making of new imagined futures toward which people orient themselves. Finally, I will shed light on the role played by memory in taming a disrupting event and in the reconstruction of previous social boundaries.

1. The systematic use of violence by a common adversary (the police) forced the protesters to stand next to each other and to develop a shared emotional experience that worked as social-glue, by subverting the logic with which the repressive actions were conceived. The defence of the park didn’t only represent an exposure to State violence, but also an exposure to forms of otherness. The Gezi movement was characterized by the participation of different segments of society, which used to represent themselves as distant for political reasons, lifestyles, religious choices: leftist

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The analysis is based on ethnographic data collected during the protest and in the following year. I worked through the plurality of subjects involved, by focusing on young adults born in the eighties. Even if people involved in the demonstration belong to different age cohort, the core of protesters was made up of people between 20 and 35 years.
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militants, Islamic groups, LGBT associations, Kemalists\(^{185}\), nationalists, ethnic and religious minorities and the so-called “apolitical” youth. The external siege and the internal cohabitation transformed the park into a liminal space\(^{186}\) (Turner 1967), often described by protesters as a “place out of time”, that distinguished the park with respect to the adjacent Taksim Square (D’Orsi 2015b). Besides the cultural and political divergences, the park became a space for transgression of symbolic boundaries and codes, which brought about the disruption of the usual categorization of social reality. The new collective self was a “belonging in becoming”, not ensuing from a common political ideas but from an affective bond and a new way of “doing-together” (McDonald 2010) that created unexpected feelings of intimacy and a strong “emotional energy” (Collins 2001).

This doing-together was not only made up of practices of protest, but also of practices concerning everyday life: eating together, singing together, sleeping together, and practicing yoga together. It was at the roots of a possible new collective life based on mutual learning: leftist militants taught how to build barricades, doctors set up an area of rescue, parents brought food, other people organized libraries and gave lessons. These practices were so horizontal to allow an easy role-exchange between the actor and the audience: the being in the Park was already sufficient to become actor of this new collective experience. A good ethnographic case is represented by _yeriüzü sofraları_ [tables of the earth], the evening meal celebrating the breaking of fast during Ramadan that was organized by Anti-capitalist Muslims to overcome the polarization between religious and secular fractions. The eating together of people with different attitudes towards religion and lifestyles proved to be a skilful use of symbolic resources. It was a mutual learning of different cultural codes and a practice of reappropriation (de Certeau 1988) that showed the epistemological relevance of cultural policies in redefining social reality for movements of protest (Escobar 1997).

The resemantization of everyday practices allowed people to cross social boundaries, making the park a transformative space of the relationship between the self and the other. The actors in the park put aside the elements that built the historically rooted differences between social and cultural groups in Turkish society. The short coexistence was neither the vanishing of historical sedimentations at the basis of the social conflicts nor a mere tolerance of reified positions, rather a “cohabitation” characterized by the transformation of differences from reasons of conflict into cultural resources (D’Orsi 2015a). The Islamic groups parading next to LGBT communities, young nationalists declaring they finally understood Kurdish experiences, and leftist militants from strict minority becoming part of a huge movement show how the transformation of the park went along with the transformation of the self. By acting on the Self of the people, the Gezi liminality opened people to new social configurations, alternative to the

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\(^{185}\) The different Kemalist positions refer to the reforms introduced by Atatürk in 1923 and can be intended as a top-down process of secularization often understood in terms of Westernization or self-colonization.

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\(^{186}\) Liminality comes from the Latin _limen_ (threshold, edge). In Victor Turner’s perspective, it is an interruption in the ordinary time flow that allows people to reflectively distance themselves from a context taken for granted. This space allows subjects to disassemble the codes of ordinary life. The _limen_ is a zone of threshold where new social rules can be introduced and critical reflections on cultural elements are possible, by performing them with the body and practices of actors.
existing dominant codes. The collective history of which people became part enabled a
different self-awareness, where the actors simultaneously become the subjects and objects
of reflection. As Touraine wrote: “social movements are the movements through which a
person, a class or a group detach from the representations of themselves that social life
imposes on them” (2003:52).

2. According to a Melucci’s expression (1996), the protesters became “prophets”
of a life that was imagined in the same moment it was lived, transforming the park in
autopian but real space. We cannot well comprehend the collective dialogue in the park
with the Habermasian perspective (1989) focused on the logos, because it was made up
on the doing-together of practices. Indeed, the attempt to structure Gezi movement around
a discursive logic reintroduced micro-dynamics of differentiation and interrupted the
 circularity between actor and audience that the living-together had fostered.

Since Pierre Bourdieu (1997) the almost perfect coincidence between objective
tendencies and subject’s expectations makes the experience a set of already confirmed
 anticipations, Gezi Park can be understood as an “experiential shock” (Jasper 2011),
disrupting the categories that codifies social reality. Selen, a leftist girl, said:

“For the first time a Kurd, a nationalist, a Muslim and I are all together. You think you
know the reality very well and then suddenly ... boom! Gezi Park was one of the greatest
thrills of my life. It’s not something I can explain with all my previous world experience.

By breaking the circularity between the previous experience of world, the other’s
 behaviour (the behaviour people think the others should have) and the ability to imagine
the future, Gezi Park represented a “break of expectation”. It was a “disorder of the
thought”, that disrupted the way people are used to classify the others.

In the protest aftermath, people tried to carry what they lived in the park in their
ordinary practices, by creating urban gardens, talking with Kurdish neighbours, producing
documentaries, developing lifestyle inspired to the commonality of the park. Gezi
movement was structured around the denial of the traditional political language and its
impact was on the biographical level rather than on the political realm. This is the case of
Elcin a woman who always supported Kemalist values and who, before Gezi, neither
participated in political demonstrations nor spent time with religious people. By
talking, eating and practicing yoga together with veiled girls in the park, she realized she had
much more in common with them than she expected. In contrast to what she calls “the
previous Elcin”, she hired two veiled women in her company to carry her Gezi experience in
her life. Thus, Gezi experiential shock fostered a multiplication of subjects’ possibilities
with respect to the restrictions imposed by the normative power that makes certain things
not merely impossible but unthinkable. In the Park, the new ability to protest went together
with an increment in the “ability to aspire” (Appadurai 2013), namely the ability to change
the conditions for recognition (of the self and others) within which the subjects are
embedded. By assembling symbolic sources in an unpredictable way, protesters challenged
 dominant codes and announced to society and to themselves that other conceptions of
reality were thinkable. Therefore, Gezi movement can be intended as a process of
subjectivation (Touraine 2013) and as a practice of imagining alternative futures. Following
Appadurai (2013) the future here is not intended as a possible scenario, but as a cultural artefact, filled with emotions and expectations, namely as a horizon within which people can think of themselves and towards which they can mobilize.

Most protesters shared a feeling of future hopes, but this emotion was only partly the same for everybody, because people overburdened Gezi expectations with meanings related to their previous experience. Ayşegül, a young leftist said:

“I cannot describe what Gezi represented to me. For the first time I was no longer alone, no longer a minority! The left is a very small group and when we protest we are always alone in the streets. Gezi made real the collective protest I dreamed since I was a child. It gave me a lot of hope, because we were strong like in my parent’s past. I thought that we could do something for the future. And even in a funny way. What happened has its roots in the 1980 coup and people finally understood what kind of society we live in. We [young socialists] always thought our generation was a lost generation because it was a-political, but now we know that is not so…”

The young woman relates Gezi movement both to her political idea and to her familiar background. Her excitement stems from her being part, as militant of a minority party, of a mass movement and, as daughter of not-recognized victims, from her being in a conjuncture that broke the social construction of indifference she always experienced. As other young leftist, Ayşegül interpreted Gezi Park as a breaking point in the narratives representing the post-1980 youth as a “lost apolitical generations”. However, after the evacuation of the park, the leftists militants were again alone in theirprotests (i.e. May 1th) and, facing the new isolation, revived the previous narrative about the youth. These narratives can be understood as rhetoric through which young socialists define their groups and mark the distance from their peers. Their reproduction, interrupted in the park, is an example of the rebuilding of those boundaries marking the differences. As recalled by Fredrick Barth (1969) crossing social boundaries doesn’t lead to their dismantling, because discursive practices, habitus and the ways of staying in public space restore them. Although daily practices became the place to carry what people experienced in, they also restored those symbolic, social and political boundaries that the Gezi liminality had previously interrupted.

Moreover, in the Gezi “collective thereness” the others didn’t enter in the space of actions and ideas of one political self. Rather, each one partly contributed to a “collective rethinking”. Another example can clarify the point: Duygu, an “a-political” girl, said that in her family Gezi park was seen as the Kemalist revenge against Islam. After Gezi she argued with her mother because she no longer wanted the national flag in her room, and with her boyfriend, a leftist militant, who re-included Duygu in the “lost generations”. Therefore, individual and collective subjects felt part of a collective self, in respect of which they oriented their expectations, but their imagined futures were

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187 The leftist political organizations were the main target of the military repression of the 1980 coup and their memories are still often silenced. The violence, imprisonments and tortures suffered by former militants have never been recognized and the coup is often publicly represented as a necessity to restore the peace in a divided country.
characterized by deep aporias because the aspirations of each one only partly coincided with those of the others.

Following Affergan (1997), the meaning of an event is not only intrinsic to the facts themselves but also depends on the place it assumes within a narrative. Gezi Park became an “event” when social actors recognized it as an unexpected occurrence that produced a gap in the circularity between experience and expectation. Nevertheless, Gezi Park was embedded in a set of narratives not perfectly overlapping with each other. The different interpretation of Duygu, her family and Ayşegül shows how Gezi Park was wrapped in similar but different narratives. The analysis of Gezi memorialization stresses this point. For example, leftist militants turned the guys killed by the police into Şehitleri (martyrs), in the wake of the leftist martyrs of the seventies. If memory is a way to tame the past (Candau 1998), this memorialization should be seen as way of controlling a disrupting event. Although Gezi liminality put into question historical boundaries between groups (Kemalists-versus-Kurds, leftist-versus-apolitical), memory partially restored them, by embedding the protest into an interpretative grid conveyed by the past.

Therefore, Gezi movement provoked an over-investment of expectation that only partially coincided with the one of the others. The new expectations of the protest were connected to the future but also canalized by the past of subjects with different historical and social backgrounds (Bourdieu 1972). The different attributions of meaning to Gezi event, based on the history and symbols of the various subjects, produce different stories. Therefore, to facilitate the disappearing of this experience was not the low relevance of the event, but a surplus of meanings that fostered a proliferation of memory revivals, imagined futures and dissonant interpretations.

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A theoretical approach of the 15m.

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Abstract:

Citizenship was articulated as a social science concept by the differentiation between civil, politic and social rights that Marshall proposed in 1950. Nevertheless because of globalization, translational migrations, new social movements and the transformations of identities and their referents, Marshallian citizenship has been questioned. New claims, new demands of recognition and new social practices have transformed the classic references on which citizenship relays, such as time, space or nation. In this paper we explore the different academic proposals that aim to address the future of citizenship, social movements and political practices and systems of Western liberal democracies. We will focus our analysis in the Spanish context and the last well-known social movements as the 15M but always taking into account the complexity of the local-global realities.

Key Words: 15M, social rights, new social movements, politics and citizenship.

Introduction.

2011 was a significant year in many ways and at many places, but for Sociology, whose death or crisis was heralded by many since at least two decades ago (Pérez-Agote, 1995; Lamo de Espinosa, 1995; Santamaría, 2002, 1994; Wieviorka, 2007), it definitely is a special year.

That year, some of the predictions forecasted by several of the most relevant social scientists during the first decade of the millennium were confirmed and came into play through a series of social movements like the Arab Spring, the indignados 15M and different Occupy-movements, all of them unavoidably related and interwoven to each other, with different objectives and in different contexts, but with certain similarities that make us talk about, or at least think about, a change of historicity.

In this text, we will use the 15M or the indignados movement in Spain as a means of analyzing these changes, to characterize them, and to point out, from a theoretical approach, where do those moving actors spring from, and what are their potential future articulations, emphasizing the transformation of politics and citizenship. As a theoretical referential frame, we will approach three basic questions to analyze these new realities: new social post-2010 movements, the hyperglobalization and the new articulations of the citizenship.

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New social movements.

New social movements are not as new as they appear to be or, at least, to talk about new social movements has been a constant for Sociology since the 1970’s.

Michel Wieviorka (2008), in a book that was published before the new social movements, described two great theoretical approaches that had analyzed social movements during the second half of the 20th century. On the one hand, the so-called resource mobilization theory stated that different social organizations mobilized their resources to ensure that their interests and goals are introduced, maintained and spread inside the social and political agenda. The most significant authors of this trend are Charles Tilly (1978, 1984) and Tarrow (1997). The second analytical approach, that of social actors, embodied by Alain Touraine (1978), emphasizes the subjectivation practices of actors that are found in a dominant situation and fight to control their own historicity, their own definition of the collective sphere.

Besides these two analytical approaches, Michel Wieviorka (2008-117-137) points out three key moments within social movements: up to the 70’s, when labour movement established the foundations for the sociology of social movements; late 60’s and early 70’s, when new social movements are born with ethnic, cultural, and ecological nature, and global movements from the 1990’s onwards.

Labour movement arises because of the dominance relationship between working-class and the employers. Its framework for action is the nation state, and, albeit it has certain internationalizing ambitions, it is basically a local and national movement. Its political participation is put in concrete form through its relationship with different political parties at a national level. There is class-consciousness and, therefore, subjectivity, defined in social terms from a clear dominance relationship.

New social movements, term that was coined by Alain Touraine (1978), still have as a frame of reference the nation state, although they are starting to put forward a transnational dimension for movements such like the anti-nuclear or the ecologist ones. Their social opponent is no longer as easy to identify as it was for labour movement, and many times it is diffuse and hard to define. These new social movements have a greatly significant cultural constituent, since they are against culturally standardizing definitions, claiming this way their right to be different. Although they propose a new relationship with politics, they ended up being institutionalized inside the normalized political circuit, mainly in the leftist parties. Within these movements, the subjectivity both of the actors and the collective is significant.

In the third place, we can find the so-called global movements, born in the context of globalization and post-modernity. The nation state framework is no longer pivotal for these movements. According to Wieviorka (2008) what makes these movements really global ones is their actors’ consciousness. All mobilizations include recognition demands, their opponent is diffuse, neoliberal globalization, the markets, etc. These movements have a strong cultural weight. The most interesting thing about their relationship with politics is the construction of new spaces to do politics in them, especially at an international level; a good example of which are the international anti-
globalization forums of Seattle or Porto Alegre. If the subject of labour movement was a social one, that of the new social movements is a cultural one,

“in the mist of global actors, there is a wide space for individuals’ subjectivity. This subjectivity is personal, characteristic of each singular person, not reducible to a specific cultural or social anchor (...). This way, each one can choose their fight, their mobilization, their collective identity, but they can also manage their participation in the action in their own way, at their own pace, or even finish it if they wish to do so. In the past, participation and commitment might be dictated or modulated by the situation; currently, it is a personal decision. Then, the subject is not political, social or cultural, it is a virtual subject that will eventually transform itself into action, and by which the subjects, transformed into actors, have an influence on their trajectory, produce their experiences, define their options, create, and develop their creativity, while contributing to a collective mobilization (Wieviorka, 2008: 133).”

Besides these three moments or these three great groups of social movements, a large number of specialists (Pleyers and Glasius, 2013; Fuster, 2012) point out to a fourth type of social movements, in which Arab Spring, 15M and the different Occupy-movements might be included. The so-called post-2010 movements have a series of common characteristics. Besides more or less symbolic aspects, like the use of the V for Vendetta’s masks in demonstrations, common interests and a clear support of non-violence, according Glasius and Pleyers (2013), we can show three big shared features:

A resources’ infrastructure that is put in concrete form through networking, meetings and exchanges that happened in the last decade. The actors themselves feel mingled with each other or inspired by similar movements. This way, Spanish Indignados claimed that they felt inspired by the Icelandic revolution or the Arab Spring; #YoSoy132 movement and 15M Occupy-movements and demonstrations in Turkey, by the Arab Spring and 15M, and so on.

The impact that globalization had on them: a neat example of it is the global economic crisis. Activists belong to a precarious generation (Pleyer and Glasius, 2013), they grew up in a neoliberal environment of labour insecurity, cuts of public services and, eventually, a global financial crisis. They also belong to a global generation that uses the internet and social networks in a regular manner, for their mobilizations, too; besides, yet another one of their basic characteristics is that this generation is the so-called best prepared, since they have a significant intellectual training.

A series of common demands: democracy, social justice and dignity. During the Arab Spring, demonstrations asked just for democracy, while in Western countries, representative democracy was questioned and the need of the citizens’ participation was posed.

In these very demands, we can see the most significant differences with regard to the anti-globalization movements of several years ago. An important aspect is the emphasis on social justice at a local, national level. In these movements, nation state context is stronger than it was a decade ago (Pleysers, 2013), since they have an obvious local, national anchor, even though their demands have a similar international constituent or enemy, the triumph of neoliberalism, or common situations like corruption or the absence of a true democracy. Besides the demands of social justice and democracy, these
movements, in their practical actions, in their demonstrations and experiences, implement practices and actions of social justice and democracy.

In short, post-2010 movements have some traditional characteristics, but they have new articulations as well.

**Hyperglobalization**

Obviously, one of the central questions in all new social movements, especially in the West, has something to do with the economic crisis and the triumph of neoliberalism at the international level, what I described as the “neoliberalism’s self-fulfilling utopia” (Álvarez-Benavides, 2012).

The economic crisis has proved that neoliberal globalization reached its highest degree of domination. But a set of unexpected consequences also appeared.

A great number of studies, researches and theoretical reflections arose, mainly in the 1990s, dealing with a change of political, economic and cultural paradigm affecting all countries and all individuals, at both a global and a local level. Globalization took shape within a new historical moment in which mobility and global relationships -interconnections- of all kind prevail. From this approach, shared by authors like Jameson, Anderson or Beck, by spreading US cultural pattern, cultural differences are homogenized and individuals who obey the market’s demands and a globalized economy are created. Globalization implied to adopt cultural and economic guides, mainly from the USA, that have been gradually introduced into every Nation State through large international organizations and treaties, like IMF, the World Bank, WTO, GATT, etc. Neo-liberalism was and is the ideological trend that supports this new way of understanding the world, and it was put into practice since the financial markets’ deregulating politics carried out by the administrations of Reagan, Thatcher and Kohl. Thus, national economies began to accept the new globalizing push and replaced their traditional specific structures by the structures and standards imposed by international organizations. All of this involves damage to Democracy, since States have gradually withdrawn, especially the so-called Welfare State, to be able to take part in the globalized economy.

Global economic crisis has made visible all the negative consequences, at political and economic levels, of neo-liberal guides applied to international relations. Welfare State, which meant the culmination of the political design of the Nation States arisen in the Modern Age, is in crisis and is being replaced by a weaker State, which yields responsibilities to the market at the same time and cuts social rights to its citizens.

However, globalization has had unexpected consequences, as well, that neo-liberal ideologists and programmers, and a great deal of authors who criticize globalization too, didn’t foresee, while multiplicity of identities and demands of recognition took shape as one of the main aspects of the new global era. Pérez-Agote (1995), even though he shares many “postmodern” authors’ theories, has softened them since the 1990s, stating that, although the world tends to Westernization, homogenization is more an illustrated origin assumption than a reality. The globalizing and modern or post-modern rationality spreading process is not one-way and doesn’t always create homogenization. García Selgas (2002) states that globalization, besides being a whole set
of processes basically far from the individual, is a phenomenon much wider; it involves
the multiplication of crossing, mixing and friction spaces and sites between different
cultures, and the transformation of subjective references. Identity will no longer be
something static, but a building, interactive, narrative and political process. Multicultural,
multiethnic and plural contexts reshape the identities’ starting points. As Wieviorka
(2002: 278) states:

“formerly, each identity was understood as a relatively stable and defined whole looking
for reproducing itself and for being recognized in spite of adversities. However,
everything changed after the turn of the millennium.”

This is exactly the main characteristic of globalization, the multiplication of
identities, the multiplication of the anchors around which they are put together and the
gradual visibility of these differences within the public space, something that goes
beyond the homogenization attempt that the most radical Conservatism tries to spread all
over the planet, through economic, political and cultural peculiarities linked to a unique
way of understanding life. Mass communication, which for many authors was the channel
or the means through which the cultures, economies and politics of those countries
involved in globalization are homogenized, has facilitated as well the exponential
multiplication of the information we receive through those channels.

Therefore, we could talk about a second phase of globalization in which
standardization gives way to diversity in its wider sense, and above all, in which, mass
media are no longer controlled by the greater agencies, at least when it comes to the
production and broadcasting of information. Social actors become creators of information
and meaning, overcoming the debate between individualism and communitarianism,
because we express nuances and complexities every time, claiming our ways of being and
looking, but that didn’t keep us from building collective identities that foster the protest
and the political action.

This second phase of globalization is characterized by the fact that the global
dimension of the social, political and economic matters is now incontestable and doesn’t
take anybody by surprise; it is the environment, the context in which every one of us, or
almost, move in a certain comfort. Globalization is no longer new, neither a framework
for the action of financial and economic elites, nor a subject of discussion within Social
Sciences, but a place in which ordinary people, the citizens, and mainly the new
generations, those who were born in the Information society, in a global society, can live
with ease as the changing context in which they were born and live. They don’t
experience a break with the past, because post-modernity and globalization are part of
their lives from the beginning.

Definitely, globalization is hyperglobalizing, our whole life is global, virtual and
informational, but, surprisingly, it is local and material, too.

New ways of citizenship.

Social demands are common to every social movement, and, since the 70’s, when
cultural and identitarian elements begin to grow important, recognition takes shape as a
pivotal issue for Western democracies. This recognition is seen in the incorporation of differences to political and social institutions, and, therefore, to the citizenship.

We owe the first great definition of citizenship from Sociology to T. H. Marshall, who, in 1950, established that citizenship is made up of three elements or parts: the civil one, the political one and the social one. The civil element is made up of individual rights, like a person’s freedom of speech, thought, religion, property and justice -legal equality. The political element means the right to take part in the practice of political power. Finally, the social element includes the right to safety and a minimum economic welfare, but also to live the life of a civilized being according to the prevailing standards in the society (Marshall, 2007: 23). For Marshall, citizenship

“is the status granted to a community’s full members. Its beneficiaries are equal with regard to rights and obligations it implies. Although there is not an universal principle that determines which are the rights and obligations, societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create the image of an ideal citizenship that helps to evaluate the success and is the target of aspirations (Marshall, 2007: 37).”

The problem was that not all the individuals were considered as members of that community and, therefore, they hadn’t the rights, basically political and social ones, guaranteed by the condition of citizen, because they depended on the person’s social status, which determined the kind of justice and political participation he or she could develop. For these reasons, citizenship broadened its definition and incorporated political and civil rights for more and more groups and individuals, through social mobilizations and, basically, thanks to workers and trade unionists’ movement.

The incorporation of these differences and the transformation of liberal democracies -as this system is understood as guarantor of social rights- have been approached in different ways.

Authors like Bourdieu and Amin, from a structuralist approach, believe that the ethnocentric management of cultural and ethnic diversity comes from international Capitalism and Neo-liberalism, which, through the market’s logic, impose a global definition of what and who is good, of what and who is bad. Both authors see in internationalism and Socialism the symbolic and political contraction that should take shape as alternatives to Capitalism and ethnocentric democracies. For Samir Amin (1997), the new Socialism should be much more internationalist and, at the same time, it should actively contribute to rebuilding regional associations that are capable of opposing the peoples’ internationalism to that of capital. Internationalization, thus understood, would mean a moderation of global market’s excesses by regulating its development’s pace and by adapting it to the acceptance of migrations and to the building of political, democratic, multi-centric spaces. Bourdieu (1998, 1999, 2001) poses internationalism as an exit from the symbolic domination system through intellectuals’ work. Since a genuine Democracy cannot exist without a genuine critical counterpower, and since the intellectual forms part of this critical power, he or she must necessarily redefine his or her position and discourse; it is unavoidable for philosophers, authors and thinkers to take back their ability to act within public realm, impregnating it with the intellectual logic of argumentation and refutation under the cover of collective work conditions in which a
realistic ideals’ universe is rebuilt, being able of mobilizing wills, but not confusing consciences. Intellectuals, trade unions and workers alike must focus their critics and efforts around the State’s rebuilding, as a way to reestablish the social State.

The problem of these theoretical answers is that they didn’t take into consideration two basic factors. The first one is the fact that social movements’ internationalism is not a situation that must be looked for, but a reality that has already been confirmed by transnational studies. The second one is the fact that individualization processes are increasingly common and that these subjectivation processes have direct implications on collective matters. Regarding citizenship, globalization didn’t produce homogeneity, but it questioned Marshall’s notion of citizenship (Sassen, 2003: 92). These new citizen identities fuelled the debate around the distinction between legal citizenship and substantive citizenship, since legal equality is seldom based on substantive equality, that is, social and political rights’ equality (Sassen, 2003: 95), and, if these conditions don’t happen, we can’t talk about Welfare State (Morán, 2003).

Another option that is posed to further develop citizens’ rights is the representativity’s broadening or extension, which would mean basically broadening the citizenship inside the States. The difference between these theories and the more structuralism ones is that they highlight social actors more than the representation systems’ transformation itself. In this case, actors, and not intellectuals, are the ones that, from their demands of cultural and identitarian recognition to the society they belong to, claim for the rethinking of the citizenship’s anchors as the only possible foundations of contemporary Welfare State.

From a liberal approach, authors like Bauböck (2004, 2004a) or Kymlicka (1996), state that classical definitions of nationality are inadequate because they ignore the changes that took place due to globalization, supranational integration and international migrations. The nation suffers a political and cultural crisis, so that it can no longer be the main source of individual identification nor the only Welfare State’s anchor. The way in which Bauböck conceives citizenship must recognize four different interest’s types: that of the States to maximize their sovereignty, that of the international community to diminish inter-State conflicts, that of migrants and ethno-national minorities to increase their autonomy, and that of democracies to minimize exclusion. All of which are indispensable in order to talk about a social State.

Authors like Benjamín Tejerina (2005), also took part in the debate about the appearance of new cultural claims and their implications on the citizenship’s transformation as a factor that generates civil, political and social rights. Tejerina states that citizenship’s and political participation’s classic models have changed, as well as the political public space in which politics take place.

“Some forms of citizenship that are tested in contemporary social movements don’t focus on politics as a privileged field of recognition nor as a world of social production, but on a post-privatist or pre-political sphere as a privileged field for personal transformation -to be and not to represent, to know and not to recognize- and for a symbolic order of a face-to-face relationship. Thus, besides the traditional notion of separation between public-political matters and private-personal issues, new notions arise: a) when it is stated that the public sector doesn’t exist without the private sector’s participation, hence political
action involves necessarily “my” personal contribution; b) when it is stated that the political field is deeply personal, since the search of a personal coherence requires public action -becoming aware of one’s way of living facing a general problem-; c) when it is stated that political issues are what affects the intimate field, and so only the transformation of the intimate field is genuinely political -what everyone of us can do in our private life as a part of a day-to-day struggle. These notions lead to the participation in the social mobilization, to the appearance of new notions of citizenship under the conditions of individualization and collective identity’s production that characterize contemporary society, in a perpetual rethinking of public domain’s limits (Tejerina, 2005: 94-95).”

The interesting thing in Tejerina’s approach is that it doesn’t pose the necessity for a representativity’s change nor the management of identitarian differences, but, on the contrary, it highlights how actors themselves transformed places and ways in which politics are made. This could be a way of putting recognition forward, a way that is different from the former two, since transformations don’t take place within the intellectual or institutional domains, but in the own citizenship’s field, where the rights of the so-called Welfare State itself reside.

Mari Luz Morán (2005) shows a good example of these transformations analyzing the demonstrations against the Iraq war staged in Madrid in 2003.. The first thing that was transformed was the space itself, and a proof of this is the deterritorialization of the conflict, which occurred against a country with which we hadn’t relations and which hadn’t attacked us, the decision of invading it was made outside our borders because of issues that seemed to affect global security, the public opinion that refused it was also global, but it had a national dimension in each one of countries that supported those decisions, etc. The way in which demonstrations are held is transformed too, since demonstrations were staged so that they coincided with other ones in many Spanish cities and all over Europe under similar mottos. Communication gained a pivotal role in these new demonstrations, since they involved the mobilization of lots of people in very different places at the same time, while there was a desire for social visibility based on the knowledge of mass media’s broadcasting and impacting ability.

2010 Arab Spring and the Spanish Indignados -Indignant- movement were the confirmation of the transformations heralded by some of this autors, but, above all, a proof, almost unimaginable a few years ago, of the birth of a new kind of citizenship. A basic factor in the transformation of citizenship’s anchors is the transformation of mass media. Postmodern authors described the mass media’s homogenizing effects and social control ability, but, with the development of technology, specifically the Internet and social networks, the way of communicating has changed. If, as Morán mentioned, in the anti-Iraq war demonstrations people returned home and watched themselves on television after few minutes, now it’s the demonstrators themselves who produce their own information.

In the Arab Spring, the use of instant messaging and social networks via cellular phones allowed the world to know repression and mobilizations in Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Yemen, etc. On one hand, military and police repression was reported, making aggressions and murders visible and creating a global public opinion which became involved in the mobilization in different ways, while, on the other hand, it was an
immediate communication channel between the demonstrators themselves, who convened
the demonstrations or reported where repression was taking place. Arab Spring became a
global matter and the participation in the mobilizations didn’t limit itself to the concerned
countries, but there were demonstrations all over Europe, and even more, a direct
involvement of those countries’ migrants, including the second and third generations, but
also of European natives, who, somehow, felt as if those claims were theirs. A sort of
identification with the individuals involved in the demonstrations took place.

Where was 15M born?

Spanish 15M movement means as well an unheard-of evidence of the total
transformation of space, identities, politics and, therefore, citizenship. These
demonstrations have an obvious local and national dimension, since they arose because of
the lack of political alternatives in 2011 Spanish municipal elections due to our country’s
electoral system, but, above all, to the concomitant and numerous corruption cases that
came to light during those months and the gradual cuts of social rights. But it was, and it
is, a movement with the characteristics of the global society itself, because it spread to a
global level with demonstrations all over the planet, and it claimed to be the brother of
the Arab world’s and Iceland’s demonstrations, among others. Mass media broadcasted
the events globally, but citizenship had, without a doubt, a pivotal role in the broadcasting
and “control” of the information, as a large number of studies have shown (Vallespin,
2011; Romero, 2011; Pleyers, 2013; Postill, 2014)

This movement is included in a new type of citizenship of actors, a citizenship
with a strong national anchorage, but at the same time, with global practices, imaginaries
and ambitions. The 15M movement has obviously a past and a present, whose framework
is Spain, because it was born out of the lack of political alternatives, the institutional
corruption, the job precariousness, the banks corruption, the evictions, etc., but it is a
movement with a past too.

Social movements in Spain have a different framework than the rest of Western
social movements, since Franco’s dictatorship didn’t allow any kind of protest or
alternative to the national-catholic dogma. This way, the first social movements that were
born during the Transition, in the mid-70’s, have a strong local, neighbourhood-based
constituent, in order to demand political rights, but mainly goods and services (Alberich,
2007: 76).

With democracy and the first elections, these movements stop sharing a
standardizing and neighbourhood-based nature, many of them become institutions within
the new structures of the State, within the new political parties, under the umbrella of the
new democracy. From the associacionist point of view, this fact doesn’t mean that social
mobilizations disappear, but they shatter, and many more associations arise, albeit always
with a strong institutional relationship.

A third scene could be the 1990’s, a period that, according to Alberich (2007:
81), is characterised by the presence of strongly institutionalized social movements, the
so-called subsidized associationism, and the continuity of certain radical movements, like
the squatters or extreme-left and extreme-right movements. But, at the same time, new
social movements with a cultural and identitarian nature are born, having clear political
and recognitional ambitions, as part of the citizenship. Some examples are the gay and lesbian movement, countercultural movements, first ethnic demands (Muslims, gypsies), and ecological movements. Moreover, the first Spanish NGOs are founded and volunteering experiences a significant development. The way in which citizenship is questioned or analyzed within these movements has something to do with the liberal perspective, a break with the State or national politics is not put forward, but they demand recognition and an egalitarian participation in public matters.

One decade later, and in tune with what happened in the rest of our surrounding countries, global movements arise. National context changes, diversifies and new issues appear in demonstrations. In the global context, new social movements mobilize against neoliberal globalization, taking part actively in world forums and in demonstrations in front of G-7 international meetings, like Davos, or in the alterglobalization forums, like Porto Alegre (Pleyers, 2007). Demonstrations against the Iraq war were another crucial event, as María Luz Morán pointed out, with a clear international constituent, but with a national one, too. This twofold dimension, local-global, national-international, begins to be present in every mobilization. There are obviously demands and movements that have a clear national reference, such as Vivienda Digna (Decent Housing), V de Vivienda (H for Housing), PAH (Platform of the Affected by the Mortgage), or Juventud Sin Futuro (Youth Without a Future), which are born in a period of economic growth in Spain that doesn’t generate an improvement of the quality of life of the majority of the citizens, especially the young. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that these movements have a clear national reference and they talk about local politics, they are obviously influenced by protest movements against neoliberalism globalization.

In these movements, we can recognize the kind of citizenship that is proposed from a structural perspective, that pays attention to national matters, but, especially with an international nature, as the symbolic and real counterbalance to the planetary spread of neoliberalism.

It is interesting that these social movements are born in a period of remarkable economic growth, a period of development of the service sector, thanks to, among different factors, the increase of immigration, in which Spanish real estate market becomes the most important in Europe, in which Spain becomes the seventh world economy. In this context of seeming prosperity, there are some citizens, several sectors, that are excluded, like working-classes, which, in spite of lower unemployment rates, live in an unregulated, precarious and flexible job market, in which trained young people experience a great deal of hardship to become economically emancipated and independent from their families. Wages are low, but housing prices soar, and for the young people to own their own home becomes impossible or only feasible through outrageous mortgages that banks happily grant, but that restrict the future of this new generation with mortgages up to 40 years.

This is the 15M’s breeding ground. Starting from the Transition, Spain has lived an increasing process in regard to social rights and economic development. But, although there was a significant economic crisis during the 1990’s, the truth is that neither unemployment rates nor the social rights setback were experienced in such a pronounced way like they currently are. The lost generation, the generation without a future, the neoliberal generation, didn’t have neither the opportunities nor the expectations that their
parents had. This new movement answers to new forms of alienation in a new globalized world controlled by the financial capital (Perugorría and Tejerina, 2013: 425).

The 15M movement shows that neoliberalism remains unquestionable at an international level, but above all at a national level, and the lack of internal political alternatives is undeniably the starting signal for the Indignants movement. If Spanish anti-globalization movements wanted to be a counterbalance to the neoliberal international influence, the 15M proves that that neoliberalism succeeded globally, and that the crisis was the culmination of the neoconservative revolution.

In the first part of this text, we saw how the 15M had its own characteristics and also some shared ones, common to social movements born after 2010. The coming back to the national framework (Pleyers, 2013), even with clear global references in the context of this movement, such as different issues like social justice, dignity and democracy, are basic aspects that articulate the demands that a precarious generation, without a future but fearless, is making through their everyday practices.

According to Perugorría and Tejerina (2013: 435), Pleyers (2013), Díaz García (2014) it’s no longer the ideology or the identity what creates the membership to the 15M, but to share problems, regardless of each one’s past, although they relate to politics in a way that is different from the traditional manners.

“Most 15M members do not portray themselves as activists or militants. In their viewpoint, these terms are associated to the ‘old way of doing politics’ (‘la vieja política’), based on ideological or partisan affiliations. 15M members reject these ‘acronyms and flags, because they divide’ (interview with Miguel Arana). In turn, they think of themselves as members of a community of persons; they thus encouraged the development of individual messages and personalized hand-made placards (Perugorría and Tejerina, 2013: 433)”

These movements are born in a context in which form and places to do politics are different and plural, but, at the same time, there are traditional elements in their ways of doing politics.

“The 15M encounter thus combines online activism with more ‘traditional’ forms of militancy. On the one hand, it embraces the digital age sociability, where ‘everybody is getting together’ in social media and can ‘organize without organizations’ in order to ‘change the world without taking power’ (Holloway, 2002). This form of activism is inspired by the idea that grassroots organizing no longer needs an organizer, a mediator; it follows the ‘do-it-yourself-with-others’ spirit. On the other hand, the 15M is based on traditional repertoires: camps, assemblies, and demonstrations are characterized by the physicality of bodies being present in a spatial meeting place (Gladwell, 2010). 15M members create group commonality through face-to-face, ‘strong-tie’ offline activism, but also through online ‘weak-tie’ association. Their territorialized way of doing politics from-the-bottom-up through the occupation of the public space, and the disembodied political praxis mediated by the possibilities and constraints offered by the Internet and online social networks seem to be complementary, and not mutually exclusive. The two flanks strengthen one another; adding speed, a new dimension (Merrifield, 2011). We contend that this mutual reinforcement is facilitated by the structural affinity of their
methods: assemblies and online networks are both characterized by direct participation, horizontality, and open deliberation (Perugorría and Tejerina, 2013: 433)"

New elements coexist with some traditional ones inside the 15M, but in all their mobilizations, ambitions and demands, there definitely is a new relationship with politics, with the political matter, both at the internal level and the external one. One of the questions that have been posed both from the inside of the 15M and from the outside of the movement, is how these mobilizations could transform, change, and have an influence on institutional politics. It seems that traditional political parties didn’t know how to, or were unable to, attract the activists of the new movements, so, as it happened in some of the surrounding countries, new political parties or initiatives arose, with some kind of relationship with the 15M, more or less intense, among which Podemos (We Can) stands out.

The institutionalization of the 15M: Podemos.

The first question that anyone could make to oneself is whether Podemos really is the political embodiment of the 15M or not. For most international mass media and traditional political parties, it is (RadioCable.com 26/4/14). In fact, for traditional politics, that is, for specialized political parties and journalists, neither 15M nor Podemos have been understood as a true political actor. This way, during the first few days, the 15M had even the support of the People’s Party of Madrid (Qué, 20/5/11), because they thought that they were demonstrating against the PSOE, in the government at that time.

The interesting thing is that the options around the social movement and their eventual political transformation into parties like Podemos has always been moving between acquiescence and, subsequently, fear. When Podemos run for the European elections of 2014, it run like a friendly party of dissatisfied college students, but, once it obtained four seats in the European Parliament, the discourse changed drastically and Podemos started to be called a populist movement, born in the presidential offices of Venezuela, with a clear totalitarian nature, etc. All of this increased when, in the following months, Podemos made it to the CIS’s polls as the first political group in voting intentions.

It seems that all this criticism had an effect on the potential voters, since the voting prospects dropped, but above all inside the party itself. Trying to spread the movement to different population groups and with an obvious interest in knocking down the main two political groups and putting an end to the established power, Podemos ended up being institutionalised. Its political platform, both economically and socially, has been gradually softened, reducing its transformation’s aspirations. Its discourse has become smoother and smoother, and governance pacts with both big Spanish political parties or, at least, with PSOE, seem more than likely. Its practices, too, the way in which they made their lists or political platforms are far from the new democracy inside the 15M, choosing to do whatever it took, and cutting significantly their own internal democracy and the identity of the new social movements.

The Secretary-General of Podemos, Pablo Iglesias himself, explained the relationship between the 15M and his party in an interview:
“What does Podemos inherit from the 15M’s legacy? A crucial political lesson to anyone who wants to understand how social processes work, and who wants to do politics in the 21st century. The 15M movement taught us that the strength doesn’t lie in asking someone for their ID, you can’t go out there asking for certificates of ideological purity. The 15M is not a movement, it is the society in motion, and from there it moved to the PAH and the “floods” aftershocks. The 15M is, so to speak, the way of sowing a new common sense that breaks with the absence of democracy. We just want to become yet another tool of that active society, but nobody can take over mobilized society (La Marea, 20/5/14).”

This gap between the 15M and Podemos is more and more remarkable, and the lack of ideological purity mentioned by Pablo Iglesias has become in the last months an ambiguous political message to please, or not to annoy, the potential number of voters.

Podemos is a good example of how it seems that in a party’s politics the important thing is how it looks, more than the essence, and there is an excessive mistrust about the aesthetical aspects, but very little ideological content. Not just because of the contents themselves, but for the absence of spaces in which discussing, proposing and planning those political platforms. If sometimes the 15M was recognized as being excessively deliberative and assembleary, Podemos chose to close itself gradually both to members and to internal debates and creative proposals of real initiatives.

15M’s transition, from a basically youth movement into a political party that aspires to national government and, for this reason, tries to get along with different kind of voters, has undergone the use of traditional forms and principles of doing politics, but, above all, its institutionalization. The political practices of public squares, of the Occupy-movements, are showing themselves very slowly and very inconspicuously in conventional politics. It is true that there is a new way of doing public politics that is present in social actors, in public squares, in social movements, but those practices stay in the apparent for the political parties that were born after the 15M.

A sentence by the party’s number two, Juan Carlos Monedero, explains the meaning of this last paragraph of the text quite well: We come from the 15M, but we are not the 15M, we are the politicization of their arguments (Europapress, 14/12/14). That is, even though the new social movements post-2010 like the 15M are a reflection of a new citizenship and new ways of doing politics, their transformation into a group that is able to compete in the traditional political channels, in the representative democracy, unavoidably requires their institutionalization. New political parties, either by necessity or cadence, end up acquiring conventional structures, ways of internal government and political platforms, with nuances, with differences, but that the majority of the citizenship is able to recognize and that may be far from these new ways of doing and understanding politics of the new social movements.

Thus, we could assert that there are two arenas, two separate fields whose connections are still unclear, diffuse and intermittent. In both of them, politics are done, but the influence of the conventional politics, the politics of parties, is still much more powerful than the politics that are done within the new social movements. Even so, it is important to note that, although these communications are diffuse, the 15M, “the citizens’ floods”, or related movements, obtained visible political and social goals, with a
remarkable and huge significance, such as stopping a great deal of evictions, making the judges paralyze the privatization of public health services, investigating and presenting charges against several corrupt politicians and bankers, including the former minister and former IMF director Rodrigo Rato, etc.

Conclusions

Social movements’ sociology is a complex discipline and finding nuances and differences between some movements and others is very difficult, but the truth is that, during the last decades, we have seen several shared characteristics in some of these movements, and that there is an increasing trend within these mobilizations towards the appreciation and demands of cultural issues, that eventually become subjective, in an international context at first and finally transnational.

The 15M and the so called post-2010 movements show a set of shared features that are related to globalization, to the planetary triumph of neoliberal economy and to the subsequent privatization or their lives. It is a pacifist movement that puts forward new ways of doing politics both inside the movement itself and outside it. It is a movement that demands more democracy, dignity and social justice, with a significant symbolic constituent and a strong relationship with other transnational movements, but that poses specific demands in the international arena as well.

The new social movements ask for, and answer to a new concept of citizenship, a new way of doing and understanding politics, but this is not shown in political parties with the same symbolic component and this new way of understanding these new politics. The most significant party born out of the 15M was Podemos, that gradually moved its practices and proposals away from the 15M’s content or identity. The institutionalization of Podemos is going through the adoption of the traditional parties’ procedures and structures.

All this makes us consider that there are two different fields where politics are done, the conventional one and that of the new social movements. It seems that this is made evident through different ways of thinking about citizenship and the participation in the public matters, socially and politically. Traditional ways of politics and citizenship coexist with new citizenships and new ways of doing politics, and these two realities don’t necessarily have to exist in a dichotomy situation, but the transfers between each field are still infrequent and intermittent, and the supremacy of the traditional, conventional ways is still unquestionable at an institutional level.

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Chapter 2

Re-thinking democracy
Is it reasonably to talk about the revolt in 1968 in terms of the counterculture? Assuming aesthetic or semiotic concept of culture to be true, we could say that the counterculture is a political or civil undermining of exclusive status of pointlessness of culture. Revolt in 1968 can therefore be described as a counterculture, if only because of the interest in the working class, putting the emphasis on individual commitment and creativity, emphasizing the importance of political issues, etc. However, the most important is, we can define a revolt in 1968 as a counterculture for another reason. I propose to put the counterculture as a critical redefinition of the dominant culture and the process of emerging a critical acceptance of alternative counter-cultures. Counterculture in this sense would be a committed criticism and transformation of existing relationships and social structures. According to this concept, activists of 1968 are changing culture with full awareness of the consequences of their own actions (ie, in a practical sense) and at the same time they are able to work out their own theory of resistance to the social, cultural and political mainstream (ie, in a theoretical sense). This ability to self-questioning is, according to Leszek Kolakowski, a constitutive feature of European culture. And if it is actually true, then we can try to capture the counterculture as a kind of new ideology and narration, allowing to re-reading of the intellectual history of Europe in a critical way, but not appealing at the same time or to the heritage of Marxist thought, nor to the classical critical theory of the Frankfurt School.

In the proposed approach counterculture is a kind of “transcendental category”, outlining the conditions for the possibility of re-writing a new critical intellectual history of Europe. The core of this history is an anti-authoritarian humanism. While social changes are possible as institutional changes, which explains the failure of the counterculture in the political sphere, as a social movement seeking to transform the existing social order, historical changes may have their cultural roots. The revolution in the sphere of social imagination, or more simply, a transformation of consciousness, can be translated into historical changes, including the transformation of cultural models, and thus the ways of perceiving and experiencing the world. Counterculture slogans: "Revolution of imagination" (rebellion and utopia in one), although, as we know, have not changed nor disproved the existing social order, but they have contributed to the historical changes. Europe did not remain the same Europe after countercultural revolt in

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1968 and the contestation itself has become a kind of "foundational myth" in the new social imagination. Counterculture remains, in my opinion, the prototype event for all types of thinking about contestation and liberation movements, which emphasize individual and collective autonomy, as well as refer to the emancipatory interest (characteristically, it is just counterculture, not a tradition of the European Enlightenment). All this does not change the fact that the context of the revolt is the concrete historical situation, not an abstract "at one time". I would like to focus on the analysis of this particular historical coincidence and consequently, on the organizational and social structure of the protest movements in Europe. I would rather show the general specificity of the countercultural movements in Central – Eastern Europe than focus on the analysis of specific protest movements. The understanding of history of European protest movements facilitates comparative perspective (underling transnational aspects of the protest movements to capture the similarities between the various national movements, common narratives and cultures of memory and also to figure out the consequences and relevance of domestic resistance in Eastern Europe as well as in Europe as a whole.)

The subject of my scrutiny are the countercultural movements in Central and Eastern Europe - Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany. At first glance, it might seem that the Parisian May and Polish March ’68 were deeply historically, and most of all culturally divided. It seems that the tales about the revolt, but also about the political and cultural evolution of generation of ’68, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, do not combine into any coherent narration. The works of some historians may lead to such a conclusion (see. Fraser 1998; Marwick 1998; Glicher - Holtey 1998; Horn 2008) In Western Europe, as is widely known, criticism was directed towards the norms of traditional nuclear family, moral conformism, or superficiality of liberal democracy. On the other hand, in Eastern Europe, young activists, (such as, for example Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski in Poland), were looking for new social space for the reform projects of radical changes. [for example attitude towards the USA: whereas activists in Western Europe attacked the US for its imperialistic policy, mainly for intervention in Vietnam, dissenters in Eastern Europe used American commodities such as music or clothing to express their dissatisfaction with life under the communist regime]

Then, the following questions arise: can activists on both sides of the Iron Curtain be considered as a part of the same cultural and political revolt, revolt exceeding the limits of narrowly defined social groups, countries or regions? Can we talk about the anti - totalitarian (also in the cultural sense of this term) or anti - imperialist face of contestation in general? Should we treat 1968 as a common “foundation myth” or event, unifying European memory? Could the revolt of 1968 become a part of the collective memory of the whole united Europe after decades of divisions of the Cold War? Is it possible to perceive the counterculture as a part of a new European integrationist ideology?

In recent years, however, the works of historians, emphasizing the transnational nature of social change, that analyze the interrelationship on a deeper level, moving away from a purely chronological similarities, have been published. These authors, however, focus more on the political aspects than on cultural (Gildea, Mark, Warring 2013; Klimke, Scharloth 2008). Bearing in mind the “transnational turn” in the historical sciences, I
want to concentrate on showing the structural similarities and not only those that arise from the fact that these events were happening at the same time in history. Such analyses would require a broader cultural perspective and not only comparative historical analysis. In my proposal I would like to take advantage of the perspectives of cultural sociology, so-called “Strong program of cultural sociology” coined by Jeffrey Alexander (Alexander 2003: 11 – 26) and the historical sociology forged by Alain Touraine, especially his concept of “historicity” and “self - producing society” (Touraine 1973). These two overlapping approaches would also go beyond the dominant sociological analysis of the counterculture as a conglomerate of social movements (macro-sociological perspective).

The perspective of historical sociology enables us to treat the protest movements not in terms of macro-sociological convention, i.e. either in terms of mobilization of human resources (the old social movements), or in terms of the network social movements, operating in “flexible framework of action” (the new social movements), but in terms of the ability of society to create its own history (via individual and cultural emancipation). In turn, the perspective of cultural sociology allows to show that the year 1968 is also a construct and narration. By analogy with the well - known cultural trauma studies and the research into social construction of the Holocaust as moral universals, conducted by Jeffrey Alexander, we could say that the counterculture is also subject to a process of social construction of meaning (Alexander 2003: 27 – 84). Moreover, it seems that the sociological analysis enables us to set a specific “mental formation” in a broader historical framework. This analysis puts the emphasis on the cultural dimension of social change rather than political, suggesting that the counterculture was more universal phenomenon, which goes beyond the local historical circumstances.

There are works of historians, who are using oral history approach to make a sort of “decentering” the 1968 protest narration, showing that it is not only the narration of Western Europe (Gildea, Mark, Warring 2013). Rewriting the history of contestation of 1968 and the history of countercultural movements consist in, in my opinion, including the history of Eastern European countercultural movements into the main narration, that has been carried out (almost exclusively) from the central position - Paris or West Berlin - so far. The process of constructing social meanings (Alexander 2003) has been held in this manner, apart from the peripheral European history. The relevance of this proposal is first of all based on an analysis of the contestation in Eastern Europe, and then on reflection: whether it is possible to create a coherent view of the counterculture as a consistent meta-narration, or ideology, emerging in the aftermath of the breakdown of meaningful meta-narrations, including primarily Marxism. Attempts to revise and later a total refutation of Marxism, which has been the key reference point for the countercultural generation (both in Western and Eastern Europe) are recognized not as a rejection of certain political beliefs, but as the collapse of faith in the organizing power of this ideology and its ability to give meaning to human activities. However, this does not necessarily mean the continuation of the "triumphalist narration," which says that the impulse of the contestation was liberated in 1968 and has materialized in the fall of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989. According to this vision, re-democratization processes and the political unification of Europe after 1989 could be treated as a natural consequence of the revolt of 1968. On the contrary, the case of Eastern Europe seems to be more nuanced, because the memory of the 1968 (e.g. Polish March) is largely the
memory of eyewitnesses, absent from the public sphere ("confiscated memory") (Baczko: 1984). Communist authorities in Eastern Europe deprived participants of events of the year 1968 of rights to vote and it was tantamount to question a sense of their rebellion, or even more, it brought the presence of these events in history into question. Hence, countercultural movements in Eastern Europe were not so much a reaction to landmark in political history, as resistance to the "dead time and the lack of history". This must be emphasized, because the collective consciousness of young French and Germans in West Germany was quite different from the consciousness of young Czechs in Czechoslovakia or Poles. The latter was not a collective consciousness of an entire generation, but rather the awareness of the excluded minority. As a result, the category of 1968 generation itself, in Eastern Europe seems to be very limited. Being generation is an effective way "to install in the symbolic sphere", rather than characteristic of historical change. Therefore, the category of generation gap (useful in the case of Western Europe) becomes at least problematic in the case of Eastern Europe.

In my article I intended to contextualize the protest movements within broader cultural and political processes and transformations of postwar European history. We could certainly speak about some specific strategies and features which are common components of European counter-cultural movements: happenings, subversive anti-r ritualism, numerous references to the avangardist and neo-avangardist movements from Europe such as surrealism, Situacionism or Provo. It's not about symbolic expression of dissent addressed to the public, but the point was to change activists themselves. Exposing hostile response of society and the authorities, protests were designed to raise the awareness of the society’s repressive character. These protest strategies were obviously adopted selectively, depending on regional protest movements, according to different political, ideological and cultural structures of particular countries. The most transnational aspect of protest movements (shared in Western as well as in Eastern Europe) was probably alternative countercultural lifestyle, inspired by global popular culture, music, or new aesthetic emerging in international art. It was combined with hippie ideology into a cluster of symbolic forms that became an source of mobilization all over Europe. Given very limited space of freedom in dictatorships in Eastern Europe, young activists exploited these aspects of Western European culture to express their discontent. Communist authorities treated long hair, unconventional clothing or rock music as a manifestation of Western decadence and dangerous ideology (for the system).

The second unifying factor was an identity crisis and most of all, fundamental dissatisfaction with the existing political system. As it was outlined in the report of the Bonn Conference in 1969: “Armed with a sophisticated knowledge of society’s ills at an earlier age than ever before, more and more European young people are becoming actively hostile towards the prevailing values of their elders and towards the official government ideology in both East and West Europe. Evidence in several countries — notably France, Germany and Eastern Europe—indicates that radicalism has taken root in secondary schools where it was never known before. This is an important indication of what can be expected from future student generations.” In conclusion, nobody nowadays doubts that Eastern and Western societies were profoundly transformed as a result of activity of protest movements of 1968. Today this activity are slowly passing into the
European socio-cultural memory. The legacy of 1968 is to some extent ambiguous, because is blamed for destruction of traditional family structures and values or even for atomization of society, but on the other hand is perceived as foundational date for liberalization and democratization processes and consequently for the fall of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989.

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The movements in searching of a new democracy:
going beyond liberal thinking

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After a decade of the “newest” social movements of new century as titled “anti/alter-globalization” or “global justice movement” which had the biggest structure in World Social Forums, now new cycle of movements creates new spaces to express the grievances, to solve or respond to them, and so the approaches to movements are also needed to renewal. It can be argued that with the changing of the social movements, the concept of “political” becomes more important than the concepts of politics and policies. Because the institutional and formal dimensions of the established process are criticized by the movements and these movements create new margins to shape the border of politics. Movements in CEE region and also middle-east are based on the rejection of limited liberal democracies which run for neoliberal hegemony and these movements make a new political debate that focusing on what democracy means today. The main of the paper is to make sense the efforts of movements in changing of democracy debate.

This study tries to make a conceptual framework of these movements in searching for a new politics. In order to this, the study focuses on the similarities and differences to make a general comparison between these movements. The main argument of the study is that new movements as new cycle of anti/alter globalization movement criticize the liberal democracy and create new spaces for the citizens in political debates before policy process of the decision-makers or professionals. The study will not analyze the movements in details especially their sociological aspects but much more it will look for the potentials for to renew political way of doing. So it must be said that this is a conceptual attempt in exploring the newness of the movements which are seeking of a new democracy.

The Potential of the Movements

The movements that occurred in last decade have some similarities and also differences. The main similarity is the criticism to liberal democracy and its neoliberal economic vision. The level of economical crises is different around the regions but people are under the risk of potential crises because of the global financial ebb and flows. The markets and the principles of the financial domination rule every region of the world. So the decision-makers are not people but the markets. So the latest movements are the direct actions of the ordinary people to make a change in this up-to-down decision-making process. These efforts can be titled as to go beyond of liberal thinking of political way. Movements carry on a potential on their own to make a new political framework. In

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general framework they have a constitutive role in making new democratic debates. Their common points are the indignation to public authorities, a different democratic discourse, political debates in open space and the closure of economic and political demands. The movements in the CEE are also against the domination of financial rules and legitimation crisis of liberal democracies.

When we look the past, the anti/alter globalization movements of first decade of 2000s indicate the importance of horizontal relationship and now mobilizations depend on much more daily-life relations, streets and sporadic events. The different locations of the world are witnessing of the raising voice of the ordinary people and they are making new political base of the new century through social movements. Despite of their difference on socio-economic levels, a kind of connections or common points can be seen their demands and struggles. This study tries to analyze these points of the latest movements that are needed to understand outside the old concepts of political science. It is hard to conceptualize these new struggles because of their actuality, this an ongoing process and they still under the effect of new situations but the core of this study is that these movements have a potential to change making politics in the new century.

Then, the route of the changing could be seen in Occupy and 15M/Indignados movements and Arab uprisings, anti-austerity protests in Greece, student movements in UK and Gezi Parkı resistance in Turkey. These movements are the only way of ordinary people to give attention to the decision making process. In other words, people speak with social movements because of the crisis of economical and political system. This is the essence of the movement concept historically but nowadays people who mobilize in a movement do not wait for a call of institution or something else in formal. While they mobilize to protest something concrete they also create a new political relationship outside of the ongoing system. They indicate the space of doing politics outside of the institutional bodies. It makes a political renewal against the narrow view of state-based politics. Their non-violent and civic character strengthens the link with the bottom. In this way they figure, or at least search for, new discourses, identity and solutions outside the established and current democratic system. Different groups attended these movements and there was not only one demand or requisition. So there was no one discourse or opposition wing which command the movement. So this process can be seen as to constitute a new ‘common’ that constitute social life. These movements had also created a new way of opposition that mobilize the people at public spaces. They create their own language, mostly in an ironic manner, and make new networks that have not connected to each other before. So they do not use specific vocabulary of an organization and rank-file membership system to mobilize together. The given options to take political positions are rejected and they try to create a new one. Their plural and multi-cultural manner has a potential to create a newness to change the established system. So the latest movements which born in more complex bodies today, require to reconsider the classical –European or American- approaches to the movements that appear in more structural and fixed situations of 20th century.

I argue that these movements can be titled as the “second wave of anti/alter-globalization movement” with the raising outrage against the neoliberalism. The first wave ended with Social Forum process that has a descending effect on movements. Gill (2000, 2009) had been entitled the new global movements as “postmodern prince” because of their unity in differences, multidimensional manners. And also Hardt and Negri (2004) name this new subject as “multitude” who creates their own
“commonwealth” with their own potential against the “empire”. The latest movements of 2011-2013-era can be analyzed in this new framework. This is an ongoing process that search for to go beyond of institutional bodies.

So grass-root movements do not resist just specific policies or units but in general they uncover the failure of the institutional politics and representative democracy. But the demand was not a reconsidering the liberal democracy but much more redefine or reconstruct it. So the democracy is needed a new adjective or descriptive title except liberal, deliberative or consensus.

These movements have constructed a discourse to renew the established democracy. This is the first and main common point of these latest movements. Arab uprisings, Occupy movements and other radical actions constitute a new politics “that shifts away from the goals of state control toward the construction of alternative visions for a more socially just society” (Basok, 2014:2). In other words, they demanded a new politics outside of the decision making process of representative democracy. Against the legal procedures, privileged experts, lobbies or vertical hierarchies, they have wanted to represent themselves. The crisis of liberal democracy has been well-known debate since 1970s and “new” social movements focus on democratic deficit in decision making process of the political system in general. While they challenge the policies of specific areas newest movements of the new century have the contradictions the democratic political system as a whole.

The Places and the Demands

Because of searching of new democratic practical, they have upraised their voices in open spaces. The concepts of space, street, city are reconsidered in the struggles of these movements. So the public space in general is tried to redefine outside the liberal theory. Because open spaces gather the differences and make a new whole beyond the legality. The open spaces of cities turned political places with debates, forums and critical voices. And also they became the symbols of the struggles like Gezi Park, Tahrir Square, Zucotti Park, Puerta Del Sol.

The appearance of authoritarianism was changing but the essence was the same all around the world. The new movements are against the mechanisms of command by the financial experts, representatives or one-man power. New kind of authoritarianism is not related with just a person or a political party but the unquestionable ruling of the financial principles. Politics of social movements create a new subject who says their own word outside of the rationality of the markets. In neoliberal system the freedom of consumer is not parallel with the freedom of politics. Lots of Arab countries which are under the pressure of the one man or family or party authority is articulated with free market. But movements demand not just free market but also free thinking and political debates.

So, the articulations of global and local movements can be seen in the new liberation concept. This is related with to interfere to their own lives of people. In the global level the number of ordinary people who do not participate these movements under a title of any institution are raising obviously. The movements have participants from different classes or groups of the society but increase their voices to say something for
their own lives and to make a change in decision-making process. If a social movement could connect the demands of daily-life, it may create an effect in political process. Because of the crisis of representative democracy and the democratic deficit, the social movements are becoming more crucial in the political debates. Social movements in global level try to constitute new public areas where make political debates to discuss against the established ones. The street also is one of these public areas.

**Conclusion**

To sum up, the latest movements of last decade including CEE-mobilizations focus on the renewal of political concept, before the politics. They open new political demands and visions beyond the liberal one. This has not a new title, they are not renewal of socialism. But they are inspired by anarchist tendencies, like down-to-top process, anti-hierarchical perspective and to claim their own words outside any institutional bodies. The newest movements constitute new politics through their own efforts.

In the beginning of 20th century the organized power of the people had constituted the nation-state and representative democracies but now after a century unorganized power of social movements are changing these organizational structure. The constitutions, assemblies, parties are losing their importance; instead of them the contingent power of social movements carries on the demands of people. Social movements in the last terms appear much more in daily-life concerns and conflicts and so the streets, open and public spaces are used more frequently. In short, these movements exposed the failure of making old-school politics in a vertical hierarchy and structural obstacles and they are heading to make new politics in open spaces.
Dignity, militant democracy, and defending the democratic order

Miles Maftean

Introduction

What does it mean for a democratic state to defend itself? Threats to democratic regimes come in various forms. Of these challenges, one of the more difficult to justify, from a liberal standpoint, is how to combat internal threats coming from groups and organizations that use democratic norms, procedures, and institutions to affirm values and achieve goals that are incompatible with democracy (including the goal of doing away with democracy and establishing an alternative political order). Today, many democratic regimes have institutionalized mechanisms that constrain or fully forbid the room for such political action, and remove these agents from the democratic playground. A democratic regime that institutionalizes and utilizes such mechanisms, and is authorized to protect civil and political freedom by preemptively restricting antidemocratic action, is called a ‘militant democracy’.

The standard claim in support of militant democracy may be straightforward: in order to stabilize the democratic order, a constitutional democracy should be equipped with the authority to interfere with the exercise of some of the basic constitutional rights, such as the freedom of association, expression, religion, and opinion. Equally straightforward seems to be the tension brought by this institution: to safeguard democracy, and the values associated with it, a regime deprives some actors of those same fundamental liberal values and constitutional rights that it is explicitly trying to defend. It seems that principles of individual autonomy, equality before law, or political neutrality are either threatened under this institutional arrangement, or at least they receive a new meaning.

Assessing the legitimacy of militant democracy leads to two opposing claims: one is either in favor of implementing the preemptive measures to safeguard democracy’s existence, or one finds them unjustifiable on the grounds that it is incompatible to the values constitutional democracy upholds. To justify militant democracy, there are two avenues by which to defend it – instrumentally or intrinsically. What can be seen in the vast amount of literature on the subject is the attempt of both constitutional and political theorists defending militant democracy instrumentally – there is no need to justify militant democracy on any other grounds than simply practical ones – it is a necessary institution that must be set in place to combat extremist and other threats to its existence.

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I find many problems with this approach. In the first section of this paper, I will explicate the problems with these views by showing how the paradox of militant democracy is deeper than these theorists envision and requires a stronger justification. I will conceptualize the paradox differently, not as one that sees as the tension between security and liberty, but something much deeper. For this reason, I defend militant democracy with an intrinsic justification. I believe that militant democracy can be defended from the standpoint of its intrinsic benefit – that it protects the underlying values of democracy. In section two, I point out how militant democracy can be used to protect a fundamental value underlying many democratic regimes – that of human dignity. Here, I will explicate exactly what the role of dignity is in militant democracy. In the third section, I explore the German case with my reading in mind, by showing how dignity is the fundamental core of all basic rights. In the last section, I reintroduce the paradox of militant democracy to see whether an argument can be made to defend this institution by means of dignity. I will also highlight some German cases dealing with militant democracy can be better justified with reference to upholding human dignity. The hope is to explore more deeply an avenue which militant democracy can be justified from a liberal standpoint.

SECTION ONE: THE PARADOX OF MILITANT DEMOCRACY

Democracies are faced with internal threats – they come from groups, organizations, or individuals who use democratic norms – procedures and institutions – to affirm values and achieve goals that are incompatible with democracy. To combat this, democratic regimes implement militant measures, by adopting pre-emptive, prima facie illiberal measures to prevent those labeled as anti-democracies to subvert democracy through democratic means.¹⁹² The first to develop the argument for militant democracy, and specify the expression itself, was Karl Loewenstein in the mid 1930’s. His approach utilized the following methods: normative, analytical-legal, and empirical. Empirically, his thoughts were developed through a reaction to the political developments in Weimar Germany and other European countries during the inter-war period. He understood that many constitutional democracies were unable to prevent anti-democratic movements from seizing power democratically. His legal analysis pointed out several shortfalls and weaknesses in the democratic system as a whole. In turn, this led him to his normative stance that he envisioned could best justify why democracy should be defended against its enemies.

He believed that a constitutional democracy must be institutionally empowered to fight these anti-democratic abuses to the system. He referenced many empirical examples to justify this institutional response. He pointed to the danger of extremist ‘emotionalism’ apparent in the period of the grave democracy crisis in the inter-war period, with the movements and parties that had authoritarian motives, yet slowly were taking power through democratic means. The goal of these anti-democrats was, according to Loewenstein, to seize power by operating within the democratic institutional

infrastructure. For Loewenstein, these “enemies of democracy” did not fall into the category of those whose interests that democracy could tolerate, for their end goal was the total destruction of the democratic system. For this reason, democracy should identify such enemies and take aggressive action against them. What is interesting for us is how Loewenstein’s contribution highlighted some interesting paradoxes surrounding the concept known as militant democracy. He pointed to the core of the problem inherent within the paradox of democracy: “Democracy stands for fundamental rights. How could it address itself to curtailing these without destroying the very basis of its existence and justification?”

He argued in favor of militant democracy by using an instrumental argument – democracy is worthy of protection from its enemies because it is a preferable regime to other types. Thus, it is a necessary institution. Despite the fact that this approach is practical, it does not try to solve the apparent paradox at hand. There is a tension that exists between the principled primacy of individual autonomy and the imperative of the political stability of the democratic regime. Stability cannot be the only justification on this account, because then militant democracy can be used and abused extensively. Furthermore, I do not believe it resolves any of the tension of the paradox of militant democracy that I have envisioned. It would merely say that this is a necessity without giving any proper justification on the tension that needs to be resolved.

Within the literature on militant democracy, I can see that the institution has been argued in favor for, or against, with these two values in tension with one another. But I believe it is necessary to rise above this tension in order to come up with a more sound normative argument in favor of militant democracy. What is necessary to understand with militant democracy is that it should not just be argued that it helps the imperative of the free democratic basic order. Political stability should not be seen as the ultimate goal of militant democracy. I believe there is a better avenue by which to argue in favor of militant democracy that seems more promising. This argument I will label as the intrinsic justification of militant democracy. This account relies on defending militant democracy on the grounds of certain values being threatened. So, one does not argue for stability, but for the underlying values of the regime. This is precisely the route taken by Alexander Kirshner. His intrinsic argument is centered on political participation, and he focuses on the right to participate, due to the fact that it “lies at the core of the ethical dilemmas...

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196 A vast amount of the literature on militant democracy ignores the normative question on whether militant democracy, as a whole, can be justified. Rather, theorists, lawyers, and political scientists tend to deal with specific aspects of militant democracy, whether it be party bans, or specific case studies.
raised by popular challenges to democracy". Following Kirshner, I develop my own intrinsic argument centered on human dignity.

Within the debate on militant democracy, the problem of dealing with an unstable order is intuitive. For, without stability, there is no political community. Therefore, the argument goes, there is a necessity for a stable community in order for individuals to have a meaningful life together. But I would not argue with this premise. I question whether it is an unqualified stability which is a value in itself, or is it stability which is in function of certain reasons why we are together. For me, dignity can make the connection – stability, then, is instrumental to dignity. I would argue that stability and order is fine, but it is of instrumental value, and here is where dignity matters. Stability, itself, is not of instrumental value. If, within the order, there are values of importance for why it will survive, then it is a different story. The order needs to demonstrate that the reason it applies coercion against individuals is exactly because it protects these very substantive values. What justifies stability is exactly the substantive value. Reformulating the paradox in these terms, I can now ask the same question: what tension would remain if curtailing liberties upheld dignity? I would argue that the tension is not as profound. It is possible to rise above this apparent paradox of militant democracy, which emphasizes the tension between individual autonomy and the imperative of the stable order. Rather, I posit that what should be seen is simply upholding dignity, and thus, the limitation of certain rights in order for this to happen.

In the next section, I will attempt to draw out the significance of using dignity as a means of justifying militant democracy. The first difficulty that I will address is the identification of dignity in a constitutional order. I will then explore the German case with these readings in mind, since the Basic Law’s foundational principle is that of dignity.

SECTION TWO: THE TERRAINS OF DIGNITY – MORAL PRINCIPLE AND LEGAL CONCEPT

“Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority”. These are the opening words of Germany’s Basic Law of 1949. Dignity stands as one of the most fundamental basic rights in Germany – it is paramount to the moral status of individuals, and serves as a foundational right, one that cannot seemingly be intruded upon. Foundational rights “may mean no more than that they are rights which are properly attributed on a universal basis to all human beings”. The importance that I place on dignity points to the principled primacy of individual autonomy. When I refer to the primacy of individual autonomy, I am simply stating that autonomous individuals “define their nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives, and take responsibility for the kind of person they are”. This implies that autonomous people have controlled the formation of their character, values and beliefs – have ‘defined

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198 Ibid., p. 5.
199 Grundgesetz [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I] at 1, art. 1 § 1.
their nature’ and then structure their life in accordance with them. Thus, they are self-governing, because what motivates them and justifies the particular content of their life is their own creation. While dignity is explicitly stated as one of the most fundamental rights in Germany, there is an overwhelming amount of literature\textsuperscript{202} that contests the value and usage dignity does have in law.

But there is one specific problem surrounding the concept of dignity that I will readily address in this paper: how is dignity, as a moral principle, transferred to the constitutional order? If dignity is transferred to the constitutional order, what place does it hold? Does it merely serve as a background principle, or is it more explicitly expressed as a right? In order for me to defend the claim that dignity can be used to justify militant democracy, it is necessary to go through several steps of clarification as to where dignity fits in the constitutional order.

**Dignity in moral and political theory**

In moral and political theory, human dignity can be seen as a kind of “unconditioned and incomparable worth”, and those individuals with dignity are “uniquely valuable and worthy of respect”.\textsuperscript{203} As Ronald Dworkin has noted, the very idea of human rights depends upon the ‘vague but powerful idea of human dignity’.\textsuperscript{204} Dignity is an intrinsic value that depicts individuals as capable of exercising moral agency. There are many different theories of dignity that make reference to this definition by way of Immanuel Kant. The history of political and moral theory on dignity has given many different definitions. Daniel P. Sulmasy has classified dignity into three different conceptions that I find useful for the purposes of clarifying what moral or theoretical reading I take on dignity. The first conception is “attributed dignity” – it is defined as “the worth or value that humans beings confer upon others by act of attribution”.\textsuperscript{205} The second conception is “inflorescent dignity”, in that a process or state of affairs is


\textsuperscript{206} This is a type of dignity that can be seen in the thoughts of Roman stoics. It is a conventional form of value, given to others due to rank, talents, skills, or powers. Sulmasy claims that this is a type of Hobbesian notion of dignity.
congruent with the intrinsic value of the human. The last conception is “intrinsic dignity”, in that people have worth or value simply because they are human.

I take the intrinsic dignity conception as my reading for the purposes of this article. But I do understand that there are a wide variety of readings within this conception as well. For this reason, it is necessary for me to go back and read how the concept of dignity is further explicated in moral and political theory.

For now, it suffices to show that this moral reading of dignity has many consequences and imposes a type of duty. The primary duty is to recognize and respect that each individual has dignity regardless of their status in society or other characteristics of individuals that are irrelevant. It is common to use human dignity as a way to condemn certain actions, whether it is torture and so forth. An individual with human dignity is wronged when he or she is not treated as ends in themselves, but used in some instrumental way. Thus, dignity is absolute and an incomparable worth – it cannot be compared with, or exchanged for by any other value.

**Dignity as a background moral principle in a constitution**

Despite the fact that dignity can be treated as a moral conception in the first instance, others disagree, such as Jeremy Waldron. Waldron believes that a philosophical explication of dignity does not need to begin as moral philosophy. Rather, Waldron believes that it would be better to look firstly at how dignity works as a legal concept, and then model what “we would want to do morally with it on that”. Thus, it is legal in origin, a “juridical” one. But how is it that dignity is first legal and then moral? This follows logically from Waldron’s proceduralism. He is, first and foremost, a proceduralist. So, when he looks at the concept of dignity, there is an “intimate connection with it and the idea of rights – as the grounds of rights, and the content of certain rights, and perhaps even the form and structural character of rights”. Waldron explicitly believes that political morality is about law, and when it comes to dignity (in political morality), it orients its place in the legal system. So, Waldron’s views stem directly from the consequences of his proceduralism. I believe that this is an interesting take on how to understand dignity in the constitutional order. But it is more important to clarify my reading of dignity – as a background moral principle.

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207 Sulmasy claims that dignity is sometimes used to refer to a virtue. It is not attributed, since it depends upon some objective conception of the human. This is famous by way of Aristotle.
209 This is a type of dignity that is best attributed to Kant. It does not link dignity to human choices or outcomes, but is prior to human attribution.
210 For the purposes of this paper, I do not believe that it is necessary for me to go very deep into these moral concerns. Since I am dealing with finding the exact constitutional location of dignity, I am simply trying to show awareness that there are many discussions on dignity in a more theoretical and moral sense.
213 Ibid., p. 251.
Ronald Dworkin is one of the major proponents who believe that rights flow from moral principles in jurisprudential thought. The Dworkinian perspective begins with the fundamental concept of the “principle”, which are a set of standards that do not necessarily advance or secure some type of social situation (such as economic, political), but rather, because justice, fairness, or some other dimension of morality requires them.\textsuperscript{214} The moral content is the most important aspect of the Dworkinian concept of the principle.\textsuperscript{215} What is necessary, in a constitutional order, is that provisions are ultimately informed by principles. But principles only make up one part of Dworkinian jurisprudence, with the second important concept being known of as a right. As I have previously stated, rights flow from principles - principles inform the judiciary on the rights of individuals. When faced with the assertion of two rights in conflict, judges will also examine the principles underlying both. Yet even though morality can be seen as evolving for Dworkin, moral principles are foundational. For Dworkin, equality and human dignity are foundational principles; therefore, judges should consider them in all decisions they make. Combined with Dworkin’s “one right answer” thesis, I posit that by evaluating principles, one references the political morality of the community. What this means is that dignity is foundational, but “the nature of the principles depends upon the political morality of the society which embraces them”.\textsuperscript{216}

Now, this raises an important question: what exactly is dignity? Is it a legal norm, or is it just a background moral principle? My interpretation is that Dworkin would say that it is a moral principle. This is largely due to the fact that Dworkin emphasizes the necessity of judges to analyze and decide cases with the caveat that they always uphold the two principles of dignity and equality. But what I find more important here is that Dworkin does not see any problem with saying that dignity is a principle. Indeed, it is the embodiment of political morality. Let me assume that Dworkin’s argument is sound. There is still another issue surrounding this clarification that is important. Some others would still ask the question: how exactly can this pre-legal concept become legal?

This is precisely the type of question that serves as the basis of Jürgen Habermas critique of the Dworkinian approach. Habermas claims, “All [legal] norms are inherently indeterminate”\textsuperscript{217}. Dworkin would agree with this point – he also believes in the openness of norms. Dworkin believes that all law is interpretation and that there is a criterion by which to interpret it, whereas Habermas disagrees on the statue of moral principles. The problem for Habermas is that these norms require additional specifications in individual cases, since these norms are “only prima facie candidates for application”, and the fact that different norms may lead to different results.\textsuperscript{218} Habermas emphasizes that legal and moral norms differ in their modes of justification. In this sense, moral arguments are

\textsuperscript{214} Dworkin, \textit{supra note} 9, 22.
\textsuperscript{215} This contrast one of the fundamental tenets of traditional positivism, Kelsen famously argued that a law’s validity could only be judged according to the criterion through which it was created. Rather, Dworkin purports that there is a moral component in the law, i.e. “principles”.
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid., p. 217.
relevant to the justification of legal norms, but they do not exhaust the range of possible arguments.\textsuperscript{219} Legal norms govern a particular legal community, which is different from moral norms that govern humanity as such. That is why Habermas rightly points out that the justification of legal norms must be open to the “ethical-political” concerns. Legal norms are much more concrete than moral norms, since they only respond to the need for legal certainty.

Another way that Habermas explicates the difference between legal norms and moral norms is to point to the special character of legal justification. Legal validity is much different from moral validity. The validity claims relevant to legal norms is “legitimacy” while in moral norms it is “rightness”. Thus, there is a major difference between the modes of justification and what this requires.

\textit{Dignity as a right – its place as a legal concept}

What is the place of dignity as a legal concept? There are two avenues to take regarding this question. One avenue is to argue that it is a background moral principle that is introduced in the constitution to serve as what is a foundational right. This is the view taken by Dworkin. Another avenue would be to say that it is seen more as a right. I will defend the former view.

In my first phase of inquiry, the nature and order of institutions did not surface. I was discussing the place of dignity in moral and political theory on a more theoretical level. Now, as I begin to try and understand dignity, institutions are being confronted with the concept. Whichever moral value we take when discussing the constitutional order, there is something different being attached due to the fact that it has become political. It went from being moral to political, which has consequences. Since I am trying to understand dignity through an institutional world, such as law, then I need to see how it functions in that setting. Even though dignity is a legal concept, it works as a background moral principle in practice. It is not only the fact that it is accrued as the highest value in the German constitution, but it seen in other facets of the constitutional order as well. Jurists at all levels (including U.S. and European Courts) – state, federal, trial and appellate – are referencing the right to dignity in resolving disputes and announcing legal rules.\textsuperscript{220} These references to the right to dignity arise in specific disputes and are tangibly adhered to, but often times it is used by reference to other rights.

Another reason that I read dignity as a background moral principle is due largely to the fact that it plays a role in arguments made by governments that limit democratic action. In essence, it is the basic threshold, or human right, that can never be impeded upon. When I try to analyze the institution known as militant democracy, it can be done by using dignity as the one principle that stands as the mark of legitimacy or illegitimacy of certain militant practices. Thus, it is useful for my project to view it as a background moral principle that serves as a guide to analyzing the institution.

\textsuperscript{219} Ibid. p. 214.
\textsuperscript{220} I would go as far as to say that despite the fact that human dignity is not incorporated within the framework of American legal rules, many different court cases on all different levels make reference to dignity as a right. Indeed, jurists and lawyers on all levels reference it. This reference cannot be left unnoticed.
But before I move on and analyze this reading in reference to the German case, I want to make one brief summarization, or unifying theme, that seems quite explicit in defining what human dignity is. Despite the three readings that I have mentioned, a unifying thought emerges when defining dignity: “any definition of dignity (and dignity “rights”) acknowledge that every individual has protected specific inner attributes, such as thoughts and feelings, and possessed the independence to choose his own course in life, unfettered by interference from the state or other people”. Due to the fact that there are a variety of ways that human dignity can manifest itself, especially in a coherent jurisprudence, it is necessary to try and understand that it reflects a “consistent value judgment that will be based on certain normative choices”. So, it is possible to understand how different legal doctrines are derivative of the philosophical underpinnings of the right to dignity. That is why I will now embark on an exploration of the German case and its dignity jurisprudence.

SECTION THREE: DIGNITY IN GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

The first principle of the German Basic Law lists human dignity as the primary inviolable right. This constitutional explication of dignity is further advanced through the dignity jurisprudence that is expounded through the opinions of the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC). As I presented, Dworkin argues that morality of a given society can be traced to such foundational principles like dignity (and equality). He uses the case of the United States to show that the founding principles of the constitutional order are equality and human dignity, and that judges should consider these principles in any decision they make. The same can be said in the German case. Jeffrey B. Hall has tried to analyze the similarities between U.S. and German jurisprudence through the lens of Dworkin’s philosophy of law. Like myself, he is incorporating dignity into the discussion of the German case by examining many different decisions that the court has taken in dignity jurisprudence. For example, in the Abortion Reform Law case, the court stated:

The Basic Law contains principles [...] which can only be explained by the historical experience and by the moral-ethical recollection of the past system of National Socialism. The almighty totalitarian state demanded limitless authority over all aspects of social life and, in pursuing its goals, had no regard for individual life. In contrast to this, the Basic Law established a value-oriented order which puts the individual and his dignity into the very center of all its provisions.

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222 Basic Law, supra note 3.
223 Dworkin, supra note 9, p. 272.
224 Ibid., pp. 118-123.
225 Hall, supra note 12, p. 785.
The FCC went as far as saying that “the Basic Law is not value neutral”\(^{227}\), and would resolve cases “according to the value established in the Basic Law and the unity of its fundamental system of values”.\(^{228}\) This unity is an important concept that has theoretical and jurisprudential weight. But how does the court understand this “unity”? I believe that it is a type of hierarchical unity that places dignity on top. Of course, this is a concept that would need to be further analyzed. But I would like to make one point regarding this hierarchical unity.

Although dignity is fundamental to the system of values, what is not clearly seen in many cases, such as those dealing with militant democracy, is that dignity serves as the predominant value. When analyzing the practices of the constitutional court, I have found that it is not very clear on whether the predominant value they should be upholding is dignity. In fact, when dealing with militant democracy cases, the predominant approach is to discuss the tension between stability and liberty. For the German Constitutional Court, democratic stability is of normative value. This is clear when dealing with militant democracy cases – it does not adhere to the value of human dignity. Stability serves as the predominant value that comes into conflict with the liberties of others. Thus, the court justifies militant measures by upholding that democratic stability is substantively good, so good that it can limit the rights of individuals. I find this type of justification troubling. I believe that the reason some might be against militant measures is due to the fact that one may question whether democratic stability does serve a normative value. At the very least, some may question whether certain limits on rights may go too far in defending the democratic order. This type of critique of militant democracy may be sound, but I believe that it does not hit at the core of why militant democracy should be set in place. I would argue that the predominant value that should be upheld is human dignity, not democratic stability. This type of thinking transpires in some decisions in the German constitutional court. I will highlight these cases later, but I just want to posit here that human dignity is what should hold the normative value in all militant democracy cases. What would this type of argument entail?

In essence, dignity may act as a trump over other competing liberties or collective policies. What can be seen is that the German constitution embraces a value-oriented, substantive vision of democracy (which contrasts quite sharply to the workings and understanding of procedural democracy). There is a core foundational value that seems to be outside of the reach of the democratic process. That value, dignity, must be guarded in every way possible. This is an interesting point that seems to coincide with my argument in favor of militant democracy. What I see is that the German constitution is home to both human dignity and militant democracy. The standard problem with militant democracy is that it upholds stability over individual autonomy. I argue that this is the wrong value to attribute the justification of this institution. I believe that human dignity serves as a better justification. This offers a new interpretation on the problems surrounding militant democracy. It will rise above the tension that has been in the militant democracy literature to this date. But first, I must explain in more detail what I see as a substantive democracy

\(^{227}\) Luth, BVerfGE 7, 198 (1958).
\(^{228}\) Mephisto, BVerfGE 30, 173 (1971).
and show it differs from a procedural democracy, while showing what will be some of the consequences.

**Substantive democracy, procedural democracy, and militant democracy**

As I have previously stated, I am defending militant democracy by focusing on the concept of human dignity. The centrality of this concept requires that I redefine my understanding of liberal democracy, which is in itself procedural. One can read procedural democracy the following way: liberal principles have second order rules that must be set in place (i.e. how lawmakers are elected, how they make laws, electoral democracy, majority rule, etc.). Jeremy Waldron is one author that defends this view. He believes that the normative point of democracy is equal respect.229 Democratic decision-making respects each person’s point of view on collective matters. That is why he insists that the procedural manifestation of equal respect is legislative supremacy. Still, equal respect is partly a matter of how you are treated, not just what procedures are used to make decisions.230 Lawmakers can make any law that is procedurally correct, but then they have the possibility to do whatever they wish with the procedures. That is why there are procedural mechanisms, such as checks and balances, which limit this type of action. I would argue that these procedural mechanisms are not enough, because I believe that there are substantive values that should be protected against majority rule. These values are far too important to be guarded simply with procedural mechanisms. Therefore, I see that a democracy could be wrong because it can violate these values, more specifically, the value of human dignity, even if it is procedurally correct. The question, then, is how to limit democracy.

Proceduralists are often not happy with the different types of constitutional constraints that those theorists under the umbrella of substantive democracy embrace. Constitutionalists, on the other hand, would argue that they offer a compromise between proceduralism and substantive constraints. This is due to the fact that constraints are necessary in order to protect substantive values. I believe that it is necessary to go beyond this simple distinction between proceduralists and constitutionalists.

I would argue more in favor of a substantive vision of democracy. I understand that there are procedures set in place, and I do not question any of these procedures, but procedural rules themselves need some type of justification that comes from the outside of the procedures. There are values that are guided by human dignity. And this is something that no procedurally correct democratic decision can ever violate. In this sense, my vision of democracy is substantive, following the German court, which says there are objective moral values that cannot be trumped by any democratic decisions. Democracy is then constrained by those values. That is how I understand substantive democracy. It is an integrated reading that does not dispense with procedures, but that procedures are based on these values.

Liberal democrats would purport that values do have a foundational role (such as individual rights, political equality, etc.). And I would posit the same, with the caveat that

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I am looking specifically at dignity in the case of militant democracy. And in these militant democracy cases, I posit, contrary to the German court, that the value that best justifies these measures is dignity (not democratic stability).

Following Janos Kis, I agree with the following: “Democracy is a set of procedural requirements. It states the way the rules of the polity should be made, amended, and repealed so that no one could reasonably object to their enforcement. It says nothing about the content of the rules”. However, I agree with the following claim—that democracy and its procedural requirements are derivative of the substantive criteria that liberalism provides. Liberalism makes the claim of offering the best justification for constitutional democracy because it removes obstacles from the course of realizing this substantive criterion (such as liberty, equality, collective self-government, etc.) than its rivals. In conclusion, my view of substantive democracy, expressive of basic political values (with dignity at its highest) incorporates democratic values, such as political equality, equality before the law, free speech, and so on, as derivative.

This type of reading is important for me for the following two reasons: I can now ask whether procedurally correct decisions are legitimate. The criterion for asking this is dignity. I am not claiming disregard to procedures. Instead, I am using an integrated reading, stating that these procedures are derivative of the value. Another reason that I take this type of reading is due to the fact that it is not as extreme an argument as others. Dworkin’s argument is that majority rule, representative democracy, and other procedures of democracy are not necessary as long as moral rights are upheld. My idea here is to use dignity as a baseline criterion to judge state actions, as well as specific institutions, such as militant democracy. I believe that militant democracy can be introduced and defended as legitimate in any state, provided it is introduced in the right manner. It is justifiable in any liberal context, provided that certain conditions are met.

Now that my view is more defined, let me return back to the German case. What I see is a broad protective dimension of human dignity. But it serves as a background moral principle that is used in practice. The Court is informed by this principle and tries to explicate its decisions based on this. It does not necessarily serve as a legal right, because the concept is so vague. Dignity issues may come to a court in the guise of liberty or personal autonomy. This can raise other issues or questions in regard to the concept to the degree that it cannot be deciphered or defined relationally due to the fact that it shares so many similarities with other rights (such as liberty, autonomy, etc.). I see two concerns here that should be readily addressed. I will try to clarify these points now before I go more into detail as to what actions may infringe upon human dignity. The first concern here is how does dignity differ from personal autonomy. The second concern would be why am I actually choosing dignity.

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232 What happens with neutrality? In the German example, militant democracy is an exclusionary mechanism. If it is exclusionary, then there is a neutrality problem. The concern would be the following: how can a state exclude someone from enjoying these constitutional given rights, and still claim constitutional neutrality? Due to length constraints, I simply cannot address this concern. I would simply posit that neutrality should not be seen as a core principle, but that it is also derived. It follows from the logic of rights. Yet this is a question I must go back to.
I see autonomy as a more general concept that is institutionalized and legalized through a range of rights. When individuals have autonomy-enabling capacities, these capacities can be seen in many different settings. The embodiment of autonomy in the institutional setting is formulated through the catalogues of rights. Thus, it is a type of general moral concept that has its expression through these different rights. Dignity is similar, but still stands apart from autonomy. One cannot understand autonomy as a “right”. Dignity is explicated as the baseline that is hierarchical to other rights. One cannot say the same about autonomy. Dignity is a special, legal right with moral undertones.

Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth. Thus, it is harmed by unfair treatment premised on personal traits or circumstances that do not relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits. But it is also harmed when these groups or individuals are marginalized, ignored, or devalued. With this in mind, it is easy to see how the legitimacy of nearly every law or court’s decision can be understood in simple way: does it adhere to human dignity? Since dignity is the paramount right, it entails that other values cannot trump it. In actuality, other rights are adjusted or interpreted in a manner that would bring them in harmony with human dignity.

There have been arguments in the FCC and other courts, such as the European Court of Justice that deal with the “balancing” of rights. The question regarding this balancing is the following: what to do when two rights are in conflict? German judges, as well as other European judges, administer a proportionality test. This test provides a checklist of “individually necessary and collectively sufficient criteria that need to be met for behavior by public authorities to be justified in terms of public reason”, as well as depicting which interests enjoy prima facie protection, and finally, what act infringes on these interests and requires to be justified in terms of public reason. To put it more succinctly, the proportionality test “provides the criteria to determine which concerns take precedence under the circumstances” and “whether [these] limits…are justified”. So what can be seen in the proportionality test “cases” are questions dealing with first order political morality – it assesses which conditions are necessary and sufficient for one right to take precedence over another. In these cases, no one is wrong, and no one has done anything necessarily illegal, but it just so happens that upholding one right means downplaying another right.

What I find in these proportionality test cases is the rationalist argumentation as to which rights deserve to be upheld against other rights. Within many of these cases, the rights in question are the following: freedom of speech, assembly, liberty, equality, and so on. While these are interesting cases, I do not believe that proportionality is necessarily needed in defending cases where human dignity is harmed. Dignity is the inviolable right. There is a difference between what is required to do in order to uphold dignity in

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233 Election in North Rhine Westphalia, BVerfGE, 3 (1954); Pharmacy Case BVerfGE 7 (1958); Principle of Constitutional Law, BVerfGE 95 (1996); Cannabis Case BVerfGE 90 (1994); Falcon Hunting Law, BVerfGE 55 (1980); Codetermination Case BVerfGE (1979); Transsexual Case, BVerfGE 88 (1993). Etc.


236 Ibid., p. 8.
comparative terms with other rights. I would like to make this distinction much more explicit by referencing Dworkin once again.

Dworkin uses the term “strong rights” to refer to the balance that a judge makes between competing moral principles within society. An example of such a “strong” right would be freedom of speech. Free speech is a right against the government that it cannot stop one from speaking, even if the government thinks stopping the speaker would have great benefits to society. Now, I believe that dignity is in another distinguishably different category. Dignity cannot be trumped no matter the circumstances. Dworkin calls these rights “human rights”. Yet strong rights may be trumped, in the sense that there are other matters that must be considered and judged on a case-by-case basis. Dworkin believes that there can be times in which it is justified to infringe on these rights. For example, Dworkin allows for collective goals to override strong rights only when some grave threat to society is present.

This infringement of rights for the purpose of adverting grave effects upon the community as a whole is just the type of logic that underlies those theorists who argue in favor of a “militant democracy”. While Dworkin does not necessarily address the institution of militant democracy, Hall’s interesting reading of Dworkin assumes that Dworkin would logically argue that grave threats could be met through the limitation on certain rights. On a case-by-case basis, it seems easy to justify militant measures, as far as there is some “grave harm” threat, as Dworkin noted himself. The reason that I am introducing this is to check whether it can be used to help explain more aspects of militant democracy.

But what remain at stake in the debate for militant democracy are not just those “grave” threats. There is a normative reading of democracy that transpires in an interesting way in the German constitutional court. But it is difficult to argue why this institution is a necessary component for a liberal democracy, outside of the necessity from ‘grave threats’. This conceptualization of militant democracy, as an institution that saves the community from grave threats, does not solve the entire problem. It is not simply about grave threats to the collectivity, but also on the individual level as well. The burden here is not to merely understand whether there is a grave threat to society, but to understand whether certain individuals, groups, or associational actions are detrimental to others’ human dignity. Then, there becomes a turn in conceptualizing militant democracy – not as an instrument combating “grave threats”, but as a necessary institution that upholds human dignity. This is the argument I will make in the next section, and I will look specifically to the German case, since dignity is the inviolable right that cannot be trumped.

237 Dworkin, supra note 5, at 200-201.
238 Dworkin, supra note 5, at 201-203.
239 Ibid., p. 201.
240 Militant democracy, it has been strongly argued, restricts rights for the purpose of adverting grave effects upon the community as a whole. Thus, a large portion of the literature has focused on defining these “grave threats”, giving them substance and defining their conditions. But this does not readily address the paradox of militant democracy. I turn my attention to arguments in defense of this institution that go beyond these “grave threats”.

SECTION FOUR: UPHOLDING DIGNITY THROUGH MILITANT DEMOCRACY

How is dignity protected in the German case? First, any assault upon human dignity is a human rights violation, according to the Basic Law. This follows that no collective justification, such as security (as the argument goes for militant democracy), into this realm is possible. Furthermore, the “objective order of values” in FCC jurisprudence is a distinct characteristic that places dignity as the top value. The concept was first announced in the Lüth decision:

[The Basic Law’s] section on basic rights establishes an objective order of values, and this order strongly reinforces the effective power of basic rights. This value system which centers upon dignity of the human personality developing freely within the social community, must be looked upon as a fundamental constitutional decision affecting all spheres of law.\(^\text{241}\)

Some theorists, such as Hall, do not believe that values are hierarchically ordered. Rather, he depends a great deal on the factual context to which they are applied. For instance, the FCC may trump free speech rights while the opposite may be true in other cases. What matters most is the context, and then the values that can be trumped are derived from them. At the very least, context matters just as much as the rights in question, for the context may highlight the comparative harm that comes from the limitation of one person’s right to the other. I posit that this view is wrong, and that it is precisely this logic that judges use when hearing cases that implement “militant” measures and thus, there is no overarching normative defense for militant democracy to be applied in all cases. I believe that if dignity is the highest order value, and thus can never be trumped, an argument can be made in the sense that militant measures are justified on the grounds that they uphold dignity, not just the democratic order itself.

As I previously mentioned, even Dworkin noted that “grave threat” allowed for the curtailment of “strong rights” for collective goals. The argument for German militant democracy is in the same vein. There are restrictions of rights for the purpose of adverting grave effects upon the community as a whole. The imperative of political stability is advanced here, as opposed to the autonomy of individuals. This came about for many reasons, but one notable reason is the fact that the Weimar Republic’s constitutional democracy made the grave mistake of not having appropriate mechanisms to combat antidemocratic action.\(^\text{242}\) As a response, the Basic Law’s drafters wanted to correct such deficiencies and incorporated the power to restrict actions and speech that

\(^{241}\) Lüth, BVerfGE 7, 198 (1958).

threaten the basic democratic order. So, for example, Article 9 of the German Basic Law guarantees freedom of association, but not for those associations “whose purposes or activities are directed against the constitutional order”.

In the Socialist Reich Party Ban Case, the FCC ruled that any political party can be banned if it has a “fixed purpose constantly and resolutely to combat the free democratic basic order”. This is due to the fact that the Court reasoned that the “state could no longer afford to maintain an attitude of neutrality toward political parties”. What the FCC saw was a threat from a totalitarian party, therefore it was justified to restrict freedom of expression and association (the “strong rights” Dworkin was referring to).

Similarly, article 21, paragraph 2 of the constitution also accounts for the way that German democracy is “militant”. As it states, “Parties that, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional”. Recently, the FCC debated on the attempt to outlaw the neo-Nazi party (National Democratic Party of Germany) that eventually failed. The case is interesting for several reasons. To begin with, the militant measure failed. The party was not banned. But what I find the most interesting in the case, and what I believe can account for another way to normatively justify militant measures, is the way the court discussed article 21.

Article 21 was intended to protect the Germany constitutional system against the “abstract” danger of parties seeking “to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order”. This is a preemptive strike that limits access to the democratic playground, so to say, as a way to prevent the rise of any anti-democratic movement that might do away with democratic foundations. The majority of those who were debating the case believed that it was necessary to make this link between an “abstract” danger and any actual danger posed to the free democratic basic order. It is an intuitively good logic – they simply stated that if there is a case of an actual threat to dignity or life, then the Basic Law requires an additional legal obligation on the FCC to provide protection against such threats. This is key in understanding my argument.

Militant democracy has always been argued in favor for, or against, with two values in tension with one another – the autonomy of individuals and the imperative of political stability. I believe that it is necessary to rise above this tension in order to come up with a more sound normative argument in favor of militant democracy. What is necessary to understand with militant democracy is that it should not just be argued that it helps the imperative of the free democratic basic order. Political stability should not be seen as the ultimate goal of militant democracy. Rather, it can be used to foreclose attacks

244 Basic Law, Article 9.
245 Socialist Reich Party Ban, BVerfGE 2, 1.
246 Ibid.
247 Grundgesetz, Basic Law or Constitution, Article 21, paragraph 2.
249 Ibid., paragraph 171.
on human dignity by means of some specific organization structure, or political party. If a political party, group, organization, or individual acts in such a way that harms the dignity of an individual, then the use of militant measures can be better justified in this way, as opposed to appealing to the democratic order itself.

For this reason, I am looking at many other cases in the FCC. I want to first ask whether the courts are using arguments from dignity to justify militant measures. If the courts are not, then it is possible to show that one can defend the claim to use militant measures, from a liberal standpoint, by introducing the dignity argument. Let me be as clear as possible and show what this analysis would look like through a close reading of the FCC’s 2003 case on whether it should ban the NDP party.

**Dignity in the NDP Party Ban Case**

Let me begin by stating that this case is about militant democracy. Many of the discussions within the case are typical to that of a militant case, in the sense that they are arguing whether there is a possible threat to society. Thus, the prosecution stated that the party’s “struggle” was to the system and makes the “national community” again. They went as far as to say that human dignity and fundamental rights were being targeted in an aggressively combative way, that the party wanted to do away with parliamentary democracy and the multi-party system.\(^{250}\) The FCC then went on to discuss how the Basic Law purports that all should be in conjunction with constitutional principles and the rule of law, even those who disagree with these principles.

Since there are those who are “enemies of freedom”, or to put it less drastically, those opposed to the current constitutional order and want to combat it, the state has at its disposal Article 21, paragraph 2 that can be used as an effective tool that will protect the liberal order. Thus, they believe that it can be used as a way to ward off dangers in time where rights are being threatened. The majority opinion put a special emphasis on trying to take into account not only the “abstract” danger required to hold a political party unconstitutional, but also any actual danger posed by the respondent to the “free democratic basic order”.\(^{251}\) What this meant is that the Court had a specific preventive mandate to counter any actual danger to the basic tenets of the Constitution caused by political parties.\(^{252}\) Now, this discussion is, again, typical of militant democracy cases. They are trying to find a way to come to terms with what to do with the facts of the case and see where militant democracy may fit into the constitutional scheme. And they are quite apparent on when the Basic Law imposes an additional legal obligation on the FCC to provide this type of prevention – it is when there is an actual threat to dignity, life and physical integrity of individuals. Thus, if the court were able to establish all necessary facts to come to the conclusion that there is an actual danger to the “free democratic basic order”, then they would have been under a legal obligation to ban the party.

At this point in the case, the court seems to be discussing aspects of stability, and the threat to stability, and whether there should be a limitation of liberties through the application of militant measures. But just prior to discussing the apparent threats, and

\(^{250}\)BVerfG, *supra* note 38, at § 8.


\(^{252}\)BVerfG, *supra* note 38, at § 137.
applying different readings to whether there is a threat, the court said something that is very important for my analysis. When introducing the discussion on threats, the majority (in essence, all of the judges) emphasized that Article 21, paragraph 2 was not only designed to prevent dangers to the existence of the “free democratic basic order” but to also foreclose attacks on human dignity by means of the specific organizational structure of a political party. What would this imply? First, it shows that there is no disagreement on whether dignity should be protected as a legal right. Secondly, there is agreement that dignity can, and should, be protected by militant measures. Logically, it follows that there is no tension between dignity and militant democracy, since militant democracy is derivative of the need to secure dignity. As the court stated: “Clarity is required in this respect also, whether the part, in a typically organized manner, carried attacks out on the dignity of man, without thereby already the free democratic basic order should be as such endangered”. So the court believes that threats to human dignity are also threats to the democratic basic order. But they insist upon posting that dignity comes first, and this is important for me for the following reason: it provides a legitimate basis for militant democracy. My interpretation is that this agreement with the judges on Article 21, paragraph 2 is that it changes the legitimacy basis on the whole discussion of what to do with a threat. The legitimacy, in fact, came from the relevance of dignity.

This logic is on par with the “objective order of values” that I mentioned in the beginning of this section. It would follow that the only value to justify such measures by would be that of dignity. Thus, it may act as a trump over other competing liberties or collective policies. It is not enough to say that militant democracy can limit freedoms in order to defend itself. But when it is argued from the dignity view, the notion is intuitively simple – human dignity is foundational for all of political morality and any notion or rights must be founded upon it. But being foundational does not mean that it is used as just a background principle, as I explicitly showed in the first section of this paper. Indeed, the court agrees, as does so by stating that “[We are] responsible especially [for] the protection of individual legal interests such as dignity, life and health...Article 21, paragraph 2 of the Basic Law [is] used therefore to consider the legal options and powers of public authorities, through which they can effectively fulfill their mission to the constitutional protection only”.

Now, this 2003 NDP case is one that is quite important for my argument that dignity is the threshold by which to judge the legitimacy of militant practices. But I believe that the same analysis can be applied to many others cases. I argue that better arguments can be made on the limitation of rights through militant measures with a dignity reading, as I tried to show in the previous section. What would this reading look like in other cases? Let me briefly revisit one other.

When revisiting cases of the FCC that deal with limitations on “strong rights”, it is easier to justify their decisions by viewing it as a potential threat to dignity (or real threat to dignity). The FCC, in the Holocaust Denial Case, found that a speech denying the existence of the Holocaust would qualify as an insult to Jews as a group. What the

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253 BVerfG, supra note 38, at § 141.
254 BVerfG, supra note 38, at § 147.
255 The Holocaust Denial, BVerfGE 90, 241.
FCC did was examine the history of the Republic and found that the nation required overturning the apparent existence of a rule that would allow for such action. What was the reason for this?

The historical fact itself, that human beings were singled out according to the criteria of the so-called “Nuremberg Laws” and robbed of their individuality for the purpose of extermination, puts Jews living in the Federal Republic in a special, personal relationship vis a vis their fellow citizens.\footnote{Ibid. (Federal Court of Justice).}

The phrase “robbed of their individuality” is one that refers to dignity. These individuals were robbed of their dignity, and now, they are in a type of relationship with others that accounts for their past. Although this is not a case that justifies any militant measures, such as a party ban, the logic underlying it is one and the same – appealing to dignity creates a well-rounded normative justification for the curtailment of certain fundamental principles.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

My goal in this short period of time was to address the contours of an alternative argument that may be used to justify militant democracy – my argument is one from dignity. But the project at hand is much deeper. I have begun to conceptualize the paradox of militant democracy in a different light – not as the tension between security and liberty, but something fundamentally deeper. The current argument in favor of militant democracy (i.e. securing against “grave threats”) is addressing only a portion of the paradox of this institution. In this paper, I tried to move away from this reading of militant democracy and begin to open up an avenue by which to explore the institution further. The next step is to clarify the normative justification of using dignity, and then to clarify what threatens dignity. In turn, I will argue that how militant democracy helps address these deficiencies of human dignity in democratic societies.

Bibliography


The Facebook Generation, Elections, and Political Tribes.
The case of Romania

Vasile Dâncu

Facebook is often referred to as a ‘continent state’, with a population larger than China’s. It is one the main technological utopias that have aspired towards freedom, unlimited communication, participation, information, a world of no constraints and no borders. In the meantime, dozens of critiques against this aspirational and utopian ensemble have been raised. Rebecca MacKinnon, in a recent work, names this territory Facebookistan, a state regulated in an authoritarian and paternalistic manner by its founders and legislators, its judges, juries, and police.

Postmodernity is defined as a “synergy between the archaic and technological advance, between progress and the primitive” Michel Maffesoli often says when describing our present world. The myth of progress is defunct. In a world deprived of magic, the future no longer makes us dream. Instead, it is distant and uncertain. Magic is reintroduced into our world through the mystical, the fantastic, through a re-mystification of the market, and it is within this horizon that the Facebook generation dwells.

Recent studies in cognitive psychology indicate an increased influence of emotion over political rationality. Emotions not only influence the rational decision-making process, they manage to occupy an important place in processes of thought and decision-making. Antonio Damasio’s researched, most often carried out with patients who have suffered some form of brain damage, have shown that emotion is involved in rational thought, especially when it comes to planning action or decision making, and that a weakening in the capacity of emotional reaction can often lead to irrational behaviour. A theory that comes close to the study of reactions and political behaviour is the theory of Gray, which identifies three emotional systems of the brain. The theory of affective intelligence (Marcus, Neuman and Mackuen, 2000), based on Gray’s theory, is another theory that explains how “emotions and reason interact to produce a thoughtful and attentive citizenry”. Fact is, emotional reactions most often precede conscious perception, and emotional data can be coded according to two basic emotions: anxiety for the negative and enthusiasm for the positive. The first emotional system, according to Gray, is the dispositional system, the one that tackles normal situations. This system influences decision-making as emotional responses are saved in the area of dispositional

257 University of Bucharest and Director IRES
259 George E. Marcus; W. Russell Neuman; Michael MacKuen, Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment, 2000, University of Chicago Press
Social Movements in Central and Eastern Europe

memory, where they remain ready to be utilised in similar circumstances. These emotional responses become habits and are thus employed in normal situations with relatively similar circumstances, and if events unfold as expected, then the individual feels content, or what the authors describe as enthusiasm. The second system is the system of supervision, and has the role of identifying new and potentially dangerous circumstances. This system searches for new information and is generally associated with anxiety. When an unexpected situation arises, such as was the obstruction of the diaspora vote during the presidential elections of 2014, it may generate a destabilisation of habit, an interruption of routine (abstinence from vote, individual passiveness, or lack of interest regarding the vote of close ones), which triggers the search for new information or support by integrating into a new wave of opinion. The anxiety caused by the denial of an important right, the right to vote, and the implicit frustration, impacted on normal behaviour, and inflicted a change in the routine of political behaviour.

Recent theories of sociology and social philosophy regarding postmodern societal mutations most accurately explain the new protest waves generated by young Facebookers. The world seems to become increasingly tribal, and postmodern tribes are groups easily identifiable in our daily lives, in most fields. Three characteristics of the tribal phenomenon are obvious in the case of generation Facebook: the prevalence of territoriality, the sharing of emotions and intentions, and a return to perpetual childhood. Territory constructs an identity, locality being the most important characteristic. In the case of the presidential elections, solidarity with the diaspora was spontaneously born, not only because nearly half of voters have relatives abroad, but also because many aspire to permanent immigration or simply to working abroad, while many others feel like strangers in their own country. M Maffesoli\(^{260}\) writes that “the social state no longer functions” because of the rise of new forms of solidarity, alternative means of expressing generosity. As such, we are no longer witnessing a static form of social rooting, but a dynamic one. From here stems the myth of puer aeternus, through recourse to story telling, myth and fantastic. There is a feeling of saturation with the social contract and rationality, with the idea of the adult bound by formal obligations; the Promethean personality is replaced by the Dionysian one, the perpetual adolescent. A new type of community ideal is born, along with a new public space that is fragmented and created through dissemination. Tribes are dynamic, versatile; each person belongs simultaneously to several tribes - ideals of a postmodern sociality, and areas of “temporary autonomy”.

Social bonding is based on a shared emotion, and consent is materialized in a collective feeling- consent being defined etymologically as cum-sensualis, meaning shared sentiment, common feeling. New tribalism is an apology for the Now, a return to carpe diem and hedonism. In this era we have a primacy of image, and instead of an apology for reason, we praise sensitive reasoning. In this postmodern neo-tribal era, we observe a rejection of traditional institutions: classic family, political parties, patronages, syndicates, those institutions that used to ensure that society evolved in line with traditional values. At present, what matters more is the emotional ambiance and the

sentiment of drowning into an impersonal *Us-* neutral and stripped of any form of contract, obligations or sanctions.

**A Re-Thinking of Politics**

We are witnessing a decline of modernity which is apparent in the decline of ideology, a failure of the idea that humankind is headed towards emancipation and progress, towards a higher standard of living, or even towards a convergence of all systems into one single one, which could bring about absolute victory for capitalism and an end to all ideologies. The legitimacy of our modern social contract is falling apart, and with it the entire regulatory foundation of social life. The system of principles and rules that articulate the rationale of modern politics is losing its legitimacy as its promises lose touch with reality. As long as socio-administrative policies continue to restrict the space of expression for citizenship and to deteriorate the mechanisms of representation and political mediation, an organic solidarity - based either on the conquering of spaces of interaction or on the revolt against institutions and institutional practices - will keep growing as a replacement for a mechanic, traditional form of solidarity.

**A Shift in the Democratic Convention**

The democratic game of today is rejected by society for it has been blocked by political parties and monopolised by media instruments and economic actors, who seek to preserve a classic socio-economic order. Citizens are passive, stuck in pessimism, mistrust and alienation, and it is only the logic of seduction that is at the basis of social networking and mass media that can pull them out of their condition. Social networks facilitate the fabrication of a new identity, the formation of unconstricting groups, where one can pick friends, log off whenever one pleases, and relate to emotion as expressed by emoticons or other symbols. Citizens seek refuge in this “brave new world”, as Huxley put it. It is not a political crisis, as political crises are easily solved through elections, new people, and new ideas. It is a systemic crisis, stemming from the need for recreating the political system on new exigencies: transparency through continuous mediation, fragmentation and respect for heterogeneity and diversity. Politics should learn new ways of handling the social system without domination and without instilling alienation or isolation for those who are unrepresented. In the urban jungle, flash mobs and street mobs create new ways of togetherness.

**Facebook - A New Political Generation?**

Those whom we call “digital natives” are usually between 15 and 30 years old. They have grown up in a climate of social pessimism, transition without hope, in a system of education that deteriorates their chances of employment, whose diplomas have been devalued due to a lack of competition, and who, in a proportion higher than 80%, surf the world wide web.

In the political climate dominated by scepticism and mistrust, youngsters have an occasional participation, assertive and pragmatic. Each generation reinvents methods of
political participation. We have a negotiation between a new and an old political culture. Despite the fact that many present themselves with great campaign strategies, in the recent presidential elections of November 2014, none of the candidates targeted this segment, unless only passively, as an endorser through numbers of “likes” accumulated. The Facebook generation has no models. They have no idols. At one point, Steve Jobbs became an idol, but shortly the Facebook generation took an ironizing distance from its own enthusiasm. Research has shown that this “generation Y”, as they are called, do not believe in an imposed social order or in structural mechanisms of political order, and they especially reject the following element: top down social control. An individual’s daily experience blends with his militant or social activity, and he is therefore constantly connected to the web of webs, which for an internaut represents society. In reality, though, an internauthas the option to disconnect from society at any point, and as such, some analysts have called this phase of evolution a society of singularities (Leo Scheer), a series of separate autisms, containing the following paradox: we do not construct a society in which we communicate from the distance, but instead we institutionalize distant communication.

This new democracy is based more and more on increasingly individualized techniques of expression. The vote remains important, but is perceived less and less as a panacea. A democracy of opinion and protest is promoted, the political class is rejected, and we observe a cynicism and a rejection of ideology. This does not mean that the Facebook generation is de-politicized; just that it is politicized differently, and as such rejects discourse and attachment to parties or political leaders, and all this without having discovered an applicable alternative. They interact politically in a different manner, with a sentiment of fragility of existence, of fear and insecurity for the future. A part of the generation Y or the ‘digital natives’ have either interacted with a continuous inflow of negative information about politicians, political parties or have been brought up in total ignorance towards the political scene. WWW is a medium oriented towards interaction, communion (in the traditional sense of sharing emotions and mirroring images), and, at first sight, contains all the conditions necessary for a higher political participation of a vocal, expression, conversation-driven democracy.

In the past few decades, parties and political actors have deviated towards political marketing and towards a hunt for votes. They are increasingly using Facebook, but only as a publicity stage or as a posting battlefield. Lately, in fact, politics has been failing to put forth a message that could function as a project for the future or as a principle of promise, and when politics fails, emotion takes over.

**The Transformations of Public Space into Emotional Space**

Social networks transform public space into a virtual space, and channel emotion influencinga society that is increasingly more sensitive, fragile and scared. More and more contemporary research, realized also in Romania,261, is revealing a sentiment of fear that dominates the tone of discussion groups on social networks. A contemporary author,

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Daniel Innerarity\textsuperscript{262} launched the concept of \textit{emotional space} to define the climate in which new generations socialize and political decisions are taken.

Today public space is increasingly lacking in substance, is increasingly restricted, and as such - it becomes clear - it can no longer sustain the political idea of living together in harmony. Private space, especially by means of virtual, uncensored communication, is becoming a place for exhibiting intimacy, is invaded, monopolised even, by individual emotion, shared socially through mechanisms of contagion. The Wikileaks phenomenon has proven how sometimes the state can end up losing the battle against a private space that advocates for new entitlements and shares new ideas and images about undisclosed activities of government or about national security.

In campaigns, what matters more in this new space of public debate is not programme, but private life, intimacies and emotional elements. As I am writing these lines, Victor Ponta’s pay bill (or not?) from Dubai after losing the elections seem to be more important than any other strategic information. Politics becomes a sensitive soap opera; the main element of political action is emotion, simulated authenticity, and the personal feelings that we share. This emotional space bruises important aspects that used to employ not long ago when defining politics or when distinguishing political space.

\textbf{WutBurger (the Angry Citizen)}

In 2010 in Germany, the designated word of the year was \textit{WUTBURGER} (angry citizen)- a word produced by Facebook reality. This new emotional space replaces public space, and as a result we observe a dramatization of the political experience, Innerarity writes, and an emotional proliferation especially of elements of conflict. The communication of Romanian diaspora with the country in-between the two rounds of voting very clearly demonstrates this thesis put forth by the Spanish sociologist, has transformed the an emotional realm into indignant communities (\textit{communidades de indignacion}). Such emotional proliferation was apparent in the case of the Arab Spring, but also in the case of other recent phenomena. There are no boundaries in a society of emotion, and distances disappear even if intense emotion is short-lived.

One aspect which explains the possibility of a rapid surge of emotion is the phenomenon of \textit{media conversion}\textsuperscript{263}. Different media amplify each other, television becomes a resonance box for Facebook and vice versa. We believe that in the absence of television and mobile telephony, Facebook would have had a much less powerful contribution to the emotional surge against Victor Ponta, who was perceived as responsible for the unprofessional handling of elections, a denial of the diaspora’s right to vote. Recent research indicates that electronic solidarity is quick, but has no long-term impact on politics, which becomes obvious if we simply study the Arab uprisings. Emotional currents, if not captured and constructed into an institutional framework, are prone to dissipate, and the great promises and expectations of these mighty emotional peaks are quickly forgotten by their members.

\textsuperscript{262} Innerarity, D., \textit{El nuevo espacio público}, Espasa, 2006
\textsuperscript{263} Mc Chesney, R. W., \textit{Corporate Media and the Threat to Democracy}, New York, 1997
One of Innerarity’s theses states that politics should civilize the emotional before passing to a manipulation of passion. It is difficult to say how this could be possible, as long as the media best absorbs insecurity through the production of social acts and myths, while stories reduce fear and make uncertainty bearable.

The media plays an important role here because, as Paulo Virilio notes, it amplifies the sentiment of fear, as millions of people live the same emotion simultaneously. The “informational bomb” is stronger than a nuclear one as it propagates emotion on a global scale and can thus instil panic into an emotionally stricken community. We therefore pass from a democracy of opinion to a democracy of emotion, and this can very well explain the waves of intolerance, the violent behaviour and speech that have taken over social media during the campaign for presidential elections in Romania. Virilio also notes, democracy is a fragile regime that needs time, reflection and a common deliberation, and these processes are strongly affected by the victory of emotion over reason. Romanian voters of 2014 went to the ballots with the indignant thought: “a democracy is not a democracy is one can’t even vote”.

The Facebook Generation and Underground Politics. The Case of Romania in Numbers

An international research project led by Mary Kaldor of the LSE has been investigating since 2013 a variety of social mobilisations and collective activities in Europe that we call “underground politics”. The first results already indicate: we are talking about politics at its purest, through different types of protests, actions campaigns, and civic initiatives, including those in virtual space; it is a politics of contestation, and protests are not generated by the crisis or austerity in itself, but by the failures of the type of democracy practiced today. The initial results show that all we see in public displays of underground politics are collective projects for the re-imagining of democracy, for the reinvention of democratic practices. Subjects of Kaldor’s research reveal the subjective experience of participation in political life in other forms than traditional ones, such as methods of consensus building in public market and referendum campaigns where they experience a form of direct democracy. We observe that the Internet already has a profound influence on political culture.

In the presidential elections of 2014, the candidate Klaus Iohannis shattered the calculations of sociologists and politicians by winning through a real revolution of the ballots. The press said that Ponta was defeated by the “Facebook party” or the “Diaspora Party”. Subsequent research by IRES have demonstrated that one quarter of voters decided between the ballots, and 32% said they were influenced by the situation in the diaspora. Most respondents decided who they would vote for in the second round of presidential elections (69%), 24% decided about this aspect in the period in-between the two rounds, and 6% decided during the campaigning phase before the first round. 2% of those surveyed could not answer this question. Television channels that broadcasted the protests were a main catalyst. Of the 42% who had a family member abroad during voting, 53% declared to have

264 Virilio, P., L’administration de la peur, Paris, Textuel, 2010
spoken to them about the vote, and 12% admit to have received advice about it. Of the 12% who claim to have been advised on voting for a certain candidate, 28% claim to have followed the advice. Only 6% of respondents claim not to have seen the protests of Romanians abroad on television, and 94% of those interviewed admit to have seen them.

The Internet - an important catalyst of protest and contagion. 54% of those surveyed admitted to using the Internet, and 46% of them have followed the messages of presidential candidates and their online campaigns. Of the 54% of respondents who use the Internet, 58%, so nearly 25% of all voters, have an account on a social network. Only 13% of respondents who admitted to using the Internet have send or redirected electoral messages or campaign messages over the Internet. As well, 24% of the 54% who use the internet have „liked“ images or messages of candidates during presidential elections, while 76% have not.

The voters of Klaus Iohannis, declared in nearly double proportion (40.4%) compared to the voters of Victor Ponta (22.6%) that the unfolding of diaspora vote influenced their own voting behaviour. Women admitted in a higher proportion than men to having discussed voting with a family member from abroad during the time of the second ballot. Moreover, respondents over the age of 50 claimed this in a higher proportion than those under this age limit.

Lastly, respondents from Transylvania and Banat proved more likely to having debated voting with their relatives from abroad than those residing in other regions of Romania.

Grandparents took advice from their children and grandchildren

Respondents under the age of 35 admitted to having received advice regarding the vote in a significantly higher proportion than those over this age. Moreover, the higher their level of education, the more likely they were to admit having received such advice.

Among those who have received advice on voting, respondents over the age of 65 tended to follow the advice in a significantly higher proportion than other age groups (55.6%). Individuals between the ages of 35 and 64 took advice in a lower proportion than those under or above this age limit.

Respondents with higher education, who have received advice regarding the vote, were less likely to follow it (2%), as compared with those respondents with medium or elementary studies (60% and 33% respectively).

Respondents residing in rural areas have tended to take into account any advice received on voting in a higher proportion than those residing in urban areas. This same comparison holds for Transilvania and Banat as compared to Moldova and the South of Romania.

Voters for Iohannis more likely to be connected to the Internet and more prone to a “negative vote”

The voters of Klaus Iohannis declared to have taken advice on voting into consideration in a double proportion that the voters of Victor Ponta (31.9% versus 14.8%). The voters of Klaus Iohannis admitted to using the Internet in proportion of 58.3%, while those of Victor Ponta 16% less. Furthermore, the internauts who voted for Klaus Iohannis had followed the Internet messages and online campaign of the two candidates in a significantly higher proportion than the internauts who voted for Victor Ponta. The proportion of Ponta voters who declared their main motivation behind voting was to exercise their right to vote in favour of a certain candidate is significantly higher than in the case of Iohannis voters (71.6% versus 66.1%). The latter declared in a much higher proportion that their motivation was to vote against the other candidate, Victor Ponta (16% versus 5.2%).
Tribes are Looking to the Past, not the Future

One quarter of a century of Romanian political evolution equals change, at least considering the speed that society is evolving at. Political tribes share emotion and feed from their own history, a powerful emotional history where the preservation of memories and purity are important goals. As such, celebrations are interesting, those events that keep emotion alive. In Romania, the revolution that took place 25 years ago was a moment of initiation, a birth of new tribes, that has since been annually celebrated and turned into a simulacrum and a simulation, to use Baudrillard’s terminology.

We are here talking of celebrations as elements of social interaction, a “Everywhere socialization is measured by the exposure to media messages. Whoever is underexposed to the media is desocialized or virtually asocial. Everywhere information is thought to produce an accelerated circulation of meaning, a plus value of meaning homologous to the economic one that results from the accelerated rotation of capital. (...) Information devours its own content. It devours communication and the social. (...) Rather than creating communication, it exhausts itself in the act of staging communication. Rather than producing meaning, it exhausts itself in the staging of meaning. It is useless to ask if it is the loss of communication that produces this escalation in the simulacrum, or whether it is the simulacrum that is there first for dissuasive ends, to short-circuit in advance any possibility of communication (precession of the model that calls an end to the real). Useless to ask which is the first term, there is none, it is a circular process - that of simulation, that of the hyperreal. The hyperreality of communication and of meaning. More real than the real, that is how the real is abolished. Thus not only communication but the social functions in a closed circuit, as a lure - to which the force of myth is attached. Belief, faith in information attach themselves to this tautological proof that the system gives of itself by doubling the signs of an unlocatable reality.”

We are living what Jean Baudrillard calls as an “ecstasy of communication”, where, in the world of hyperreality, it becomes difficult to distinguish imaginary from real, referent from sign, and truth from falsity.

The latest election campaign excelled in terms of showmanship. Politics is par excellence hit by this second game; there is a fusion of copy with original, the copy being in fact more convincing than the original. Here appears what another French author, Guy Debord terms spectacle-society, in which artistic resources representative of communication are practically inexhaustive, and where politics has tuned into a politics of spectacle. Our world follows the prototype of the universe created by Disneyland- an imaginary universe that imposes itself through by means of its apparently and convincingly real nature. The irony of faith for our politics is the meta-referential theme that internauts have widely referred to when debating the results of the second presidential ballot between Mikey Mouse (Victor Ponta) and Santa Klaus (Klaus Iohannis).

Second only to elections, motions of no confidence are also extremely interesting types of spectacle. In fact, motions of no confidence are tele-motions. Everything has been thought and planned out to go well on television: the triumphant march of the

opposition, the circuit for population signatures, the cameras placed so that people appear to be either more or less numerous depending on the TV station. The balcony cheerers are balanced according to a political algorithm, the discourse of politicians with eyes on the camera, the themes and rhetoric devised especially for television. Politicians of power and opposition have turned into directors on a set.

Baudrillard writes that a man faced with such substitution of reality is deeply affected, he feels powerless, disoriented and suffering from an informational myopia. As such, media has radically impacted the structure of human relations. Contemporary media are messages leaving no option for an answer, and as such power relations are formed, without feedback, representing a unilateral transfer in which people are isolated from the message. Human relations are reduced to electronic bonds, whereby the media not only transforms, but annihilates them. Media reality and electoral communications reveal how often an answer is excluded, since mass media is defined by intransitivity, an anti-communication character, despite the fact that television and Facebook are based increasingly on interaction and user-created content.

The Effect of Spectacle Politics and Political Tribalism is Stagnation, Going in Circles.

As I write these lines, we are approaching the celebration of 25 years since the 1989 Revolution. There will be a big debate on how much has changed, either for or against, focusing on either positives or negatives, depending on who’s doing the talking. But if we look closely, we see that many things have stayed the same, like heavy rocks that opposed evolution and development of our country.

One quarter of a century means change, at least at the speed for which society is evolving today. So what has not changed? I shall attempt a list, without too many examples or explanations.

After 25 years we still don’t know whether we had a revolution or a coup d’etat, we are unsure who shot at us on the 21st and 22nd, or afterwards when most people died. No one answered for the crimes of the Revolution, but investigators had fulminating careers in the Justice department. We have several thousands revolutionaries who receive veteran benefits, land and are exempt from tax, while the widows and orphans of the dead have been forgotten since there is no one to fight for them.

Fear remains, along with a fearful politics, especially during electoral years, the years of change. There is a fear to govern, a fear to take brave decisions even when backed by majority support. Politicians rule minimally, dominated by fear of losing power, and it is exactly because of this attitude that they did lose it every single time. Fear of incorporating political values and fear of having a clear identity turns politics into a surrogate: permanent political war between leaders becomes a rationale for being pro-competition, and even becoming a surrogate for a political programme. A fear of isolation takes over the landscape from left to right. For 25 years, politicians have been coming and going, but fear remains, like a fog, like a memento of uncertainty and emptiness, of chaos and death of the system.

We have also not escaped the need for a “daddy”, stemming from an acute presidentialisation of power. People do not trust in rules, Constitution or institutions, they
always desire a president who brings salaries, pensions, peace and everything else. Finally, Romania has elected a president with a name that seems predestined to her: Santa Klaus. And the new president, even if he does not seem happy about it, will be assaulted with homage, letters, kisses and other forms of massaging to his presidential Ego — a centuries old habit practiced on the shores of Dâmboviţa. People are still joyful for “getting their country back”, and will soon start slaughtering pigs for Christmas without a care on their minds, they will start having fun and warming up to the dream that the country will go in a good direction without them, and that they can simply watch salaries and pensions grow. Even after a quarter of a century, Laszlo Tokes still encourages a revolt of Hungarians, and Vadim Tudor still write pamphlets against everyone who has something to give in return for his silence.

The discourse of hatred has remained in public space, even if it is now more visible in virtual public space. The elderly are under attack for requesting pensions, the rural dwellers for not voting progressively, people on benefits of all sorts, rural communities that need gas, sewerage or roads. The new diaspora is condemned not for eating something other than soya salami, but for voting without contributing to the GDP, without working side by side with us. Diversions on water poisoning and lines of armoured tanks are part of the Facebook revolution along with Russian tanks, unless we stop them with our army of “likes”.

After 25 years, anticommunism that brings people out in the street has returned, although now it is an anticommunism lacking a real object. George Soros’ dictum remains relevant: “It is always easier to mobilize people against rather than for something.” Autonomy for Hungarians and Szekelys is still at project level, waiting for more generous times to draw a small border around the ancient land of Szekelyfold.

We still have schools, even though their numbers dropped from 30,000 to 7200, and is continuously dropping, while in a quarter of a century of freedom we managed to build 5 churches for every one school. Our GDP is still small, somewhere at the end of the list for Europe, even though it has increased 5 fold as compared with 1989. We still have publisher houses, even though the sale of books has decreased by 85%. After 25 years of democracy, our public intellectuals still write poetic appeals calling the masses to the streets to erase governments off the face of the earth.

Romanian entrepreneurs are still treated as thieves, bandits, and punks, but in a higher proportion than during the first year of freedom: back then 80% of Romanians thought so, now the proportion is 93%. Foreign investors are seen as heroes and receive government support. Romanian investors are arrested for corruption, or else thieves from the central or local administration ask them for money or bribes in order to release their documents.

Generally, political myths still function at the cost of strategies for economic development: the myth of the foreign investor who comes only to create jobs on Mioritic planes, the market economy that brings prosperity, the flat income tax – the only way towards wellbeing and economic growth. The IMF and the World Bank give us health certificates and plan our budget for the year to come, as the myth of prosperity seems to refer to a period of time further away than we initially hoped and imagined back in 1989.

The state has remained the only source of power, the only form of legitimacy for authority. Local administration is oppressed by the centralised state-that construct we
have been struggling for in the past two centuries. As such, we only have a simulation of local and county level authority, these being mere continuations of central organisms in the territory. The power of the centre makes local barons babies of central barons. Such politics does not represent the community, neither the people, but simply reproduces an abstract scheme created by the centre: social democrats versus liberals, pro-Europeans versus conservatives, the corrupt versus the innocents etc. As such, after 25 years, central power rejects any projects that might be truly relevant to real people and real communities.

Same as in the beginning of this quarter of a century, we have a political Left obsessed with maintaining power and domination, and a political Right that cries pathetically in open letters and public appeals, while thinking that giving out state property to overnight capitalists is the only true revolution (but they have not read Marx who thought the same, only referring to the working class). The leaders of the Right are still employees of the state, even if they have developed a small Romanian capitalism. Civil society is still absent from public space, but from time to time, some of its representatives awaken, either ex-ministers or actual member of parties, and invoke it, speak in its defunct memory. Thousands of organizations founded mainly by youngsters that fight for social assistance, community solidarity or other purposes that have slipped the government’s mind are not paid any attention. Instead we are still preoccupied with lists of support for intellectuals or open letters to some leader who is running for office.

Today we praise the youngsters who went out voting or fought on Facebook for a new world, in the same manner that we once praised those who went out to die in front of tanks, but shortly everyone will forget about them, about their jobs and education conditions or about the fact that they must build a career and raise children and then give us fat pensions from their work.

We still don’t have a social project, a roadmap for the future. Government is hasty and communicational. After one quarter of a century we have not made a big plan, we lead the country like accountants and closed eyes. Our national resources are being robbed on a daily basis, and we harass one another as part of the personal wars of our leaders. We have lost more of our population than in any of our most devastating wars, last year less than 180,000 children were born, and the birth rate is constantly on the decrease. No one is panicking; no one is frightened that the unscheduled future has nothing to offer. A shocking naivety for a people that is proud to have resisted two thousand years of empire invasions - empires that have died, but us, Romanians, endured, awaiting the next empires to come and trample us. An intrinsic inconsistency of a nation that keeps waiting for nearly a century for the Nobel prize in literature and is constantly frustrated not to have received it.

After 25 years of liberty, “history still takes its revenge on us by repeating itself” as Nicolae Iorga wrote nearly a century ago. The explosions of politics as spectacle and Facebook are innovating, but at the same time taking us back to embryonic forms of political tribalism.
Towards *vita democratica*:
Urban Soundscapes and the Ruptures of Subjectivity

*Srdan Atanasovski*²⁶⁷

When speaking of democracy, the language of Jacques Rancière becomes strangely physical. “Real democracy”, states Rancière in his paper delivered in 1986, “would presuppose that the *demos* be constituted as a subject present to itself across the whole surface of the social body”.²⁶⁸ In other words, Rancière links life in democracy to the existence of the political subject (in its strong sense) and to its “presence to itself”, to its possibility to appear as materially immanent to itself in the reality of the social space.

In this paper I explore the urban sonic ecologies of Belgrade in order to answer a question if there is a potential in the everyday embodied existence for establishing *vita democratica*. Starting off with critical analysis of postmodern philosophy of immanence, I try to resituate subject as an actor in the everyday. Not only is this subject a “rare” rupture in the fabric of language-body (as in Alain Badiou’s writings), but it would also be “unstable”, intuitive (in Bergsonian sense) and carnal. I then analyse how hegemonic discourses of capitalism-nationalism establish themselves through the means of urban soundscape in Belgrade and discuss two events where I locate these ruptures of subjectivity on the plain of immanence which have the potential not only to destabilize the social machine of captivation, but also to transform the body of the individual into a thinking agent which acts as a political subject.

I take the clue from Rancière’s paper as an invitation to explore whether we can revitalize the concept of subject while conceptualizing the society on the plane of radical immanence, as advocated by the Deleuzian philosophical lineage. I would argue that radical immanence is not an empty philosophical concept, but a necessary ontological vantage point if we wish to theorize *vita democratica* in practice, if the *demos* is to inscribe itself on the surface of the social body. However, in postmodern philosophy of immanence the subject is usually left absent or incapacitated to act. The critique of modernist concept of subject as a discursive mirage was poignantly formulated through the concept of subjectification, used both by Michel Foucault and Deleuze and Félix Guattari. These authors questioned the modern, enlightened subject, understood as an independent agent whose political agency is based on his capacity to perform the act of free will. Not only does the concept of subjectification teach us that most of the choices which appear as free are predetermined by the discursive apparatuses, but also that individual as such, reduced to bare life, remains invisible to the society unless accepting

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this predetermined set of label. In other words, the realm of politics, as understood by Rancière, is impossible to form as in order to enter the political struggle individual is always already captured by the “police”, that is, by the systems of identification and categorization through which the society operates. Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari speak about the realm of materiality which escapes the social apparatuses – the body without organs which is the generator of unmediated desire, the potential of deterritorialization, the source of cuts which disturb the flows of capital. However, the body without organs as such is inadmissible in the realm of political; it always remains outside the processes of negotiation. Thus, the ideal of freedom from the social apparatuses offered by Deleuze and Guattari is the model of schizophrenic – person who negates the captivity, whose actions are not predetermined, the body where the flows of desire remain unregulated.269

Albeit, in all its freedom, the schizophrenic remains politically fundamentally incapacitated.

The rise of new philosophy of subject, truth and emancipation can be construed precisely as a reaction to this dead-end which postmodernism presented to the thinkers of the new left – how is one supposed to question the hegemonic discourses and politics of inequality if his own position as an independent political subject acting out of his own free will is brought in question? If all subjectivity arises only through process of subjectification, how can we defend the merits of our own choices? As thinkers such as Rancière refute the current systems of “representative democracy” – or “democratic materialism” as dubbed by Alain Badiou – describing them as forms of oligarchy, how are they supposed to defend their own position when demanding restructuring of existing systems of societal life? In certain extent, both Badiou and Rancière resort to the notions of transcendent or universal laws in order to resuscitate the post-postmodern subject, or to bring back the “sincerity” of the political subject. When Badiou affirms that “there are only bodies and languages, except that there are truths”, the mode of existence of “truths” is deliberately pushed outside of the “normal” existence. Likewise, for Rancière, the truthfulness of fundamental equality which is the basis of the processes of emancipation stands out of the discussion as the given. My goal in this paper is to show that the existence of the sincere political subject can be based in the realm of pure radical immanence in order to perform a philosophical exercise, and out of belief that the potentiality of change is real only if it is omnipresent even in the everyday life, immanent “across the whole surface of the social body”. Overturning the model of schizophrenic, I propose the model of “resilient body”. In this model I start with the presupposition that the carnality of one’s body provides one with both existential continuity (where I draw on Guattari’s concept of individual as an “existential monad”, and contrary to Deleuzian haecceity, a mere thinness by which the individual is reduced to interpolation of various acts of social machines and flows of desire), and political agency, as being present and acting on the surface of the social body. In other words, the while the existential


reducibility of carnal body provides it with a sense of oneself, its immanent presence on
the surface of the social body endows it with the political agency. Rephrasing Badiou’s
maxim, I propose that “there are only somatic bodies and discursive social apparatuses,
except that there are carnal bodies”. By performing the distinction between “somatic
body” and “carnal body” I wish to emphasize that there the capacity of the discourse to
capture the body is always limited and never all-encapsulating. However, there is an
existential continuum of the body as an organic entity, and in this rephrasing the “there
are – except that” signal does not imply the transcendent existence – carnal body
remaining a purely immanent entity – but the existence outside of discourse.

The field of my exploration is the urban soundscape of Belgrade. The urban sonic
experience seemingly cuts across social and physical barriers, which makes it one of the
most potent vehicles of imposing and replicating patterns of cultural hegemonies of
capitalism-nationalism. However, at the same time, it forms the somatic plane of the
social body where politics can occur and where subject can inscribe itself and contest the
policing hegemonies. In order to explore the resistance to the capitalism-nationalism
machine I start with two particular aspects of today’s Belgrade soundscape: the sonic
reliquioscape and the sonic policescape. Contemporary Serbian society can be construed as
a post-secular, where the narrative of a secular nation based on values of enlightenment
has collapsed and the religion is drawn back into the political arena and openly and
actively participates in producing and representing the nation. Moreover, the political and
historical conjecture contributes to the emphasized role of the church: Serbian Orthodox
Christianity has been acting as a defining criterion for being a member of Serbian nation
since its inception, and its importance has been on the rise since the fall of state socialism
and the outbreak of civil and religious war in the former Yugoslavia. Thus, it is possible
to speak of “Serbian religious nationalism” as a dominant paradigm in the Serbian society
which influence the daily life and embodied practices of individuals. The architectural
space and the soundscape of Belgrade is likewise dominated by the religious nationalism
– in the public spaces, such as the Vraćar plateau markedly influenced by the newly build
St Sava temple, the monuments and the imagery of the Orthodox is interconnected with
the symbolic of national commemoration, and while the Orthodox churches face no
restriction on the sound level they are allowed to exercise, the sounds of all the other
religions are markedly absent. The importance of the sonic reliquioscape as the mechanism
of regulating one’s behavior is even more pronounced due to Orthodox custom of
performing the sign of cross as the church bells ring. Finally, Serbian Orthodox Church
customarily uses the bells to intervene in the public space – e.g., supporting nationalistic
rallies – thus transforming the sound of bells into a clear ideological statement. The sonic
reliquioscape of Belgrade has been particularly reinforced in the last years by the
installment of a new monumental set of bells at the St Sava temple, which are now the
single loudest everyday event in the Belgrade soundscape, audible in a vast swath of
central Belgrade. By sonic policescape I understand not only the obvious sounds of
policing (understood in Rancière’s sense), such as the sounds of police sirens, sound
events accompanying security traffic diverting, etc., but also privately produced sound
events which are directed towards property protection (such as personal car alarms, etc.).
Policescape is here understood as a class-structured social space regulated through the
paradigm of “security”, thus maintaining the relations of inequality and protecting the
property, both private and public. As such, I argue that both religioscape and policescape function as regulators of the hegemonic paradigm of capitalism-nationalism, performing the acts of classification and identification.

In order to analyze how subject as a “resilient body” – the carnal body which is irreducible to semiotic models, the residue which is not (or not yet) subjugated to mechanisms of discursive social control – exercise its agency in the sphere of the sonic politics and opens avenues of dissent and opposition, I will trace the potentiality of the body to actively produce resistance towards the social machines of capitalism-nationalism – embodied through sonic religioscape and policescape – by being “present to itself” in the field of sound. I explore how individuals react to the sounds of religioscape and policescape and how their bodies constitute resistance in two particular events which have provoked ruptures of subjectivity: the Belgrade 2014 Gay Pride and the October 2014 military parade. The Gay Pride, the third in Belgrade’s history and the first which was held without rampant violence in the streets, was accompanied by the public discussion to what extent sexuality should be kept private, with religious and right-wing groups demanding that “gays should parade within their four walls”. On the surface, the event proved to be surprisingly unproblematic, as it did not provoke simultaneous violent counter-rallies as in previous years. However, the city was heavily policed, with majority of citizens occupying central public space were diverted away and kept on a respectable distance from the course of the pride march. Besides the obvious visual presence of the policing force, their omnipresence in the city was also sonically accentuated through the presence of police helicopters flying over the central Belgrade. The short march was organized through two Belgrade central streets, mostly surrounded by public buildings housing the state and the municipality government, and it was accompanied by the international mainstream pop music played by the organizers. The moment that drew my attention occurred as the protesters were passing by the Church of the Ascension (Vaznesenjska crkva) located in Admirala Geprata Street, when the church bells (operated through electronic system) started to chime continuously. This sound event was spontaneously interpreted by the protesters as directed towards them, and they used their voices to express their dissatisfaction and to enter into the open sonic battle for the public space. Although recognized as an important event and even reported by the media, this vocal protest was surprisingly silenced by the organizers themselves, who stopped the march and asked the crowd for a minute of silence. In other words, the organizers acted as part of the policing apparatus par excellence – they silenced the political protest in its inception and demanded that each actor in the event (or, widely spoken, in the society) plays out her or his predetermined role. The event thus turned into a complex sonic conflict between the crowd, the organisers, the state apparatus (which demonstrated its surveillance power with the helicopters flying over) and the Serbian Orthodox Church. From my point of view, this opens important questions in regard to the nature of subjectivity, potentiality for democracy and the role which resilient bodies play in this process:

– What triggers the rupture of subjectivity? – Interestingly, the vocal protests of the participants were not triggered until the appearance of the sonic punctum – in reference to Roland Barthes’s twin concepts of studium and punctum developed in connection to the effects of photography on the spectator. While studium encapsulates the
effects which can be construed through semiotic methods, the cultural, linguistic, and political message of the photography, *punctum* stands for the direct relationship which occurs between the object and the beholder which cannot be grasped linguistically. Furthermore, Barthes portrays this encounter as deeply visceral, describing *punctum* almost as a physical wounding of the spectator.\(^\text{271}\) In other words, my argument would be that the rupture of subjectivity appears only when the carnal body of the subject is “pushed”, physically “wounded” by the materiality of the discursive apparatus itself. One can even argue that the discursive apparatus is not as endangered when silent, as when it tests its ability to inscribe its code in the social reality, by producing excessive intensities.

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*Can we subvert the sonic hegemony?* – The participants of this “vocal protest” have reported their visceral enjoyment in the resulting sonic and performative event. In other words, through their action of vocalising their protest, they have managed to de-signify the sound of the bells, to reduce them to the innocuous object of enjoyment. Again, this draws us back to the question of excessive intensities produced by the apparatuses, as I would argue that this excessive intensity is precisely what destabilizes the process of encoding the social meaning and opens the window through which the resilient body can subvert, deconstruct or destroy the coded message.

Just nineteenth days later, the government in Belgrade organized a vast military parade, the biggest of its kind since the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia, to honour First and Second World War anniversaries. Parade should have been scheduled for 20\(^\text{th}\) of October, the day of liberation of Belgrade in the Second World War, but it was moved in order to coincide with the state visit of Russian president Vladimir Putin whose presence at the parade was highly appreciated by the authorities. However, due to contested legacy of the antifascism struggle of the Second World War and current political elites’ reluctance to embrace this legacy, the parade was also said to commemorate the centennial anniversary of the beginning of the First World War, the historical event which is today unambiguously appropriated by the Serbian nationalist discourse. However, it is not the parade itself that I wish to discuss, but the week long preparations and rehearsals of the military aviation for the parade which disrupted the everyday soundscape of Belgrade. These rehearsals, pre-announced in the television news programmes and on internet news portals, again opened the question who has the right over the public (sonic) space. I analyze citizens’ responses to these rehearsals both through content available on the internet (user-created content on particular news announcements and on twitter) and through semi-structured interviews. Citizens used the internet space to protest against the week long rehearsals of the military aircrafts’ performance and to give voice to their struggle to cope with these rehearsals. Categorizing the discourse used by the internet users and by interlocutors, I have divided them into three categories: the first one, which exhibit clear (representative-)political position, formulated in opposition to the current regime, the second one, connected to the trauma of NATO bombing of 1999, and the third one, which problematizes the moment of the noise itself, without either representative-political position, nor articulated importance of sonic memory. In the first case, the sound of the parade rehearsals

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provokes response not only out of its sheer intensity, but as a material signifier of a unwanted regime, and the negative attitude towards the sound is not generated because it disrupts one’s everyday life in its materiality but because the individuals have had premeditated opinions towards the parade itself, as a project of the ruling party. I construe these individuals as actors in the semiotic production of space, which are already interpellated by ideological apparatuses. Thus, their agency is already pre-determined, not acting out of the resilience of the body but as a part of the ideological semiotic production. In the second case, individuals linked the experience of the parade rehearsals with the experience of NATO bombing 1999. Sonic experience of this historical event is very important for understanding its mnemonic legacy. Namely, while the NATO bombing wrought havoc on Kosovo, in the capital of Belgrade the major source of traumatization was, in fact, the sonic experience of the campaign. In the transfigured soundscape of the city relentless sirens announced imminent danger followed by the sound of heavy bombardment of military facilities and headquarters, political and governmental buildings in the city center and on its outskirts. Thus, while the “message” of the two sound events (1999 NATO bombing and 2014 Military Parade) is dramatically different (threat to nation-state sovereignty and citizens’ security on one hand, vs. demonstration of nation-state military capacity, purportedly aimed at defending its sovereignty and citizens’ security), the likeness and the memory of the materiality of the sonic experience links these two events in a way that overrides the differences in discursively produced meaning. Finally, in the third case, the individuals protested against the sound of the parade rehearsals as such, commenting on the ways it invades their private space, or disturbs their bodies. I construe these latter categories of reactions as an indicator that a resilient body can produce resistance towards the materiality of the hegemonic social apparatus. I particularly try to answer three questions:

– *What is the potential of carnal body as the place of memory?* – In the second category of reactions it was the body itself as served as the locus of the mnemonic processes, and these mnemonic processes proved germinal in subverting and distorting the “message”, or the purport of the 2014 Military Parade. When analysing the production of social meaning, we usually assume the locus of intertextuality, the space where social texts are linked and intertwined, as a given, the one which almost needs no material bearing. However, if we place the body (and more specifically, the human body) as the locus of memory, then we also need to rethink the potential of social resistance, as the one which can rise out of the embodied mnemonic processes and not only through discursive practice.

– *Can a resilient body embody the thought and initiate a discourse production?* – The second and particularly the third category of reactions did not rely on firmly pre-established discursive formations, and there we can observe how discourse of resistance can arise through the agency of the resilient body, the body which is affected by and resists/obstructs the materialization or enactment of the hegemonic social apparatus.

– *What is the emancipatory potential of the embodied resilience?*

By discussing these questions I will investigate how these ruptures challenge the system of cultural hegemony and I will analyse how they open ground for the modern political subjectivity to arise. Concerning the last example, I will particularly delve on the issue of the public–private divide as the space where these ruptures arise. Rancière insists
that negotiating between individual and community, public and private, is one of the crucial conundrums of *vita democratica*. The public-private divide is also one of the most fundamental borders which structure everyday urbanity. One can argue that the ultimate position of power in society is the one which allows the oligarch to draw a line between what is public, and thus purportedly open to democratic procedures, and what is private and remains in the purview of the individual itself. Due to the nature of the sonic experience itself, studying soundscape provides ample opportunity to delve precisely into this opposition between public and private, both in matters how the borderline between private and public is being discursively produced and replicated, and how it is sonically negotiated, challenged and violated. Both through examining the case studies and through participant observation and focus groups I will investigate how the policing apparatus, on one hand, and individuals as political subjects on the other try to articulate, implement and impose their views on this matter.
A Clash of Generations? Cohort Effects on Protest Participation in Postcommunist Europe

Philippe Joly

Abstract

This paper shows that a reconceptualization of protest along two dimensions – situational and generic – allows a better assessment of trends in unconventional political participation. Age-period-cohort analysis, in turn, constitutes a well-fitted method to disentangle these two aspects empirically. Situational protest can be observed through period effects whereas generic protest is captured by cohort effects. Applied in the context of postcommunist Europe, this strategy offers another tool to move beyond the “paradox” of mass mobilization in the region. Based on data from East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia, the analysis demonstrates that there was no common period effect on protest during the last 10 years. Cohort trends do not signal a radical shift in protest practices – hence, no “generational clash.” However, in all four cases, the 1970 cohort stands out as a particularly active one. This phenomenon can be traced back to the context of the early socialization of this group which was hit more directly by the political effervescence of the transition from communism.

Keywords: protest, age-period-cohort (APC) analysis, political generations, democracy.

Two narratives have been competing to describe mass participation in Central and Eastern Europe. On the one hand, highly politicized and mobilized societies, it is argued, have defeated authoritarian leaders since 1989, exemplifying the idea of democratization from the ground-up. This “regional tradition” has found a recent expression in the diffusion of electoral turnovers in the so-called color revolutions (V. Bunce and Wolchik 2010). Since 1998, no less than six authoritarian or semi-authoritarian national governments have been replaced in postcommunist Europe following mass mobilization and popular campaigns in hardly disputed elections (presidential and legislative): Slovakia 1998, Croatia 2000, Serbia 2000, Georgia 2003, Ukraine 2004 and 2014 (Beissinger 2007; V. J. Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Kuzio 2006).

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On the other hand, many authors affirm that communist regimes have left a weak civil society and a disillusioned, apathetic electorate (e.g. Howard 2003; Sztompka 1996). For Howard, “the weakness of civil society constitutes a distinctive element of postcommunist democracy, a pattern that points to a qualitatively different relationship between citizens and the state, and one that may well persist throughout the region for at least several decades” (2002, 164).

Scholars interested in political participation and social movements in Central and Eastern Europe are thus faced with two irreconcilable stories. How is it that supposedly weak civil societies take the streets and oppose – sometimes quite effectively – those in position of power? This apparent puzzle is the starting point of this study. Focusing on protest activities, that is, extra-institutional political participation such as demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts, this paper offers two contributions. Theoretically, I argue that, in order to really capture trends in protest participation and go beyond the paradox of mass mobilization in the postcommunist region, one has to understand protest as combining two dimensions: a short-term situational dimension and a long-term generic dimension. Empirically, I propose a research strategy based on age-period-cohort analysis which allows to disentangle the effects of these two dimensions. Situational protest, I suggest, can be observed through period effects whereas generic protest is captured by cohort effects. This naturally opens up the question of whether Central and East European societies are faced with a generational shift in protest practices.

The text is structured as follows. The first section situates protest activities in the broader theoretical framework of political participation. Then, the “paradox” of protest participation in the postcommunist region is introduced. In the third section, I propose to refocus the discussion on protest participation around two sub-components: situational and generic protest. Finally, I expose an empirical strategy based on age-period-cohort-analysis and apply it to four cases: East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. The paper concludes with a summary of findings.

Protest in Theoretical Context

Protest activities can be subsumed under the broader category of mass participation which, by definition, includes all forms of political actions performed by ordinary citizens. In contrast to representation or election campaigning which are the sole domain of elites, mass participation refers to political actions whose execution – in theory – does not depend on one’s position in the political apparatus. These activities range from the simple act of voting to more “demanding” – even illegal – activities such as striking or occupying buildings. While these actions are not necessarily altruistic in nature, more and more authors agree that they contribute to the development of a “strong democracy” (Barber 1984). As Norris puts it, they are “essential to the lifeblood of representative democracy [and] intrinsically valuable in themselves” (Norris 2002, 215). Furthermore, beyond improving the quality of existing democracies, some studies argue that a high level of mass participation can contribute to the emergence and the stabilization of new democracies (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Ekiert and Kubik 1999). Having experienced more than 40 years of a regime whose central feature was to repress
“autonomous pluralism” (Howard 2002, 161), postcommunist countries offer a unique perspective on mass participation in democratic transitions.

Protest as Unconventional Political Participation
The Oxford English Dictionary defines protest as “any action, act, or statement expressing (emphatic) objection to or dissent from something.” It therefore combines a cognitive orientation (dissent or objection) with a medium of expression. While virtually any form of political action could be used to express a protest (for example, voting), some activities are almost exclusively performed in order to oppose somebody or something. For empirical reasons (it is very difficult to trace back the intention behind an action), traditional survey research usually frames protest activities as this more restricted set of actions.

This repertoire has been labeled “unconventional” political participation. It is distinguished from conventional participation which refers to activities related to the electoral process and party politics (e.g. Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). Contrary to some early alarming reports (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975), the growing consensus is that unconventional political actions – far from destabilizing democracy – serve as an important complement to traditional participation (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Dalton 2004; Dalton, Scarrow, and Cain 2004; Norris 2002). Peaceful unconventional activities such as signing petitions, boycotts and public demonstrations allow citizens to bypass elite-controlled channels to express their political preferences (Dalton and Welzel 2014; Inglehart and Welzel 2005), thereby reinforcing civil society’s role as both a watchdog of the state and a sphere of public deliberation (Winuk-Lipiński 2007; see also Merkel 1999). As Kaase points out, “these participatory acts, at least the non-violent ones, [indicate] an extension of the citizen's political action repertory within the realm of democratic engagement, but [do] not signal a turn away from liberal pluralist democracies” (2007, 793).

The Normalization of Protest
Many authors recognize indeed that, in established democracies, protest has lost some of its disruptive character. Unconventional actions tend to “normalize” (Fuchs 1991); protest activities are more frequent and the population of protesters increasingly resembles the population at large (Norris 2006, 8; Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2005, 200). This is part of a larger process of rebalancing between conventional and unconventional participation, coined by Kaase as the “participatory revolution” (1984). As summarized by Inglehart and Catterberg, “the bureaucratized and elite-directed forms of participation such as voting and party membership have declined, while the individually-motivated and elite-challenging forms of participation have risen” (2002, 301).

How this tendency is reflected outside western democracies remains however unclear. On the one hand, Norris affirms that “the rise of protest politics is by no means confined to postindustrial societies and established democracies” (2002, 198). Using data from the World Values Survey, she finds that, in terms of political participation, “semdemocracies and even non-democracies were far less different than might have been expected, based on the limited political rights and civil liberties in these countries” (2002, 195–196). On the other hand, Inglehart and Catterberg observe a “significant decline in political action
Social Movements in Central and Eastern Europe

[...] in both the ex-communist world and the developing countries,” which they attribute to “a post-honeymoon period of disillusionment” in the aftermath of the third wave of democratization (2002, 306).

The Paradox of Protest in the Postcommunist World

While postcommunist societies had intense episodes of mass mobilization, protest has not reached a level of “normalization” comparable to what is observed in Western Europe. Since the early days of the collapse of state socialism, postcommunist populations have demonstrated their capacity to timely oppose power abuses and electoral frauds, using a rich repertoire of political actions (e.g. Tucker 2007). Images of hundreds of thousands of citizens descending the streets of Belgrade (2000) or Kiev (2004), eventually forcing authoritarian leaders to step down, are there to recall us of the political engagement of ordinary citizens of the region. Yet, survey research tells a different story. Most authors agree that postcommunist countries – on average – exhibit a distinctively low level of political participation (Bernhagen and Marsh 2007; Bernhard and Karakoç 2007; Greskovits 1998; Kostelka 2014). That is, postcommunist societies may take part on certain occasions in protests – sometimes massively – but protest as a day-to-day practice is still not very developed. Contrary to the affirmation of Ekiert and Kubik, protest did not become “one of the routine modes of interaction between the state and the society” (1998, 578); at least, not in the same way as on the other side of the Elbe.

One hypothesis to explain this particularity is that postcommunist countries share a common heritage of totalitarianism. As correctly presented by Howard, “communist regimes not only sought to repress all forms of autonomous nonstate activity but also supplanted and subverted such activity by forcing their citizens to join and participate in mandatory, state-controlled organizations” (2002, 160). This systematic suppression of pluralism has led some authors to consider whether postcommunist societies had “a unique legacy to overcome in democratization” (Bernhard and Karakoç 2007, 542; see also Linz and Stepan 1996a).

Table 1 and Table 2 provide an overview of protest participation in Western Europe and in postcommunist countries. Based on the results of the last five waves of the World Values Survey (WVS), they report the percentage of people having ever signed a petition or taken part in a lawful public demonstration, in 35 different countries. At first sight, postcommunist citizens seem to participate less in protest activities than in Western Europe. This is especially striking for petition signing, where the difference is in the order of 20% to 30%. Long-term trends are more difficult to interpret, considering the high number of missing values and the high intra-group variance.

Although illustrative, a general problem with aggregate measures such as these is that they conflate period effects and more profound cultural changes. For societies in rapidly

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273 Following the structure of the data provided by the WVS, the results for Serbia and Montenegro are displayed separately for the 1995-98 and 1999-04 waves and together for the 2005-2009 wave.
changing political environments, period effects are obviously pronounced, leading to a misinterpretation of the actual trends in protest participation. This highlights the necessity of developing new conceptual and methodological tools to explore the double nature of protest, as a routinized, but sometimes also exceptional, phenomenon.

Table 1. Trends in Protest Activities: Petitions (percentage of people having ever signed a petition)

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Note: This column displays the difference between the first and the last observed percentage of participation. Results are rounded, which explains why sometimes numbers do not add up as expected.
Table 2. Trends in Protest Activities: Demonstrations (percentage of people having ever participated in a lawful demonstration)

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Source: WVS 1990-2014
Distinguishing Situational and Generic Protest

A useful distinction to make here is between protest as a “situational” and as a “generic” phenomenon. As noted by Pippa Norris, in the first case, protest is a reaction to “specific events and particular circumstances”; while, in the second, it reflects “distinctive social or attitudinal profiles of citizens” (2002, 194). Situational protest is a phenomenon rooted in the short term and triggered by specific grievances or a sudden change in the opportunity structure. Generic protest, in contrast, is a long-term process anchored in a more profound change in political culture (Table 3).

When we talk of the “normalization” of protest, we then refer to a deep redefinition of the way ordinary citizens voice their dissent. Understood in the broader context of the development of civic skills and the evolution of mass values, the expansion of generic protest is a symptom of the move “from allegiant to assertive citizens” (R. J. Dalton and Welzel 2014). A transition which, Dalton and Welzel suggest, leads to better-functioning democracies. One would indeed expect that a steady rise in generic protest would have very different democratic consequences than a series of “peaks” of situational protest triggered by a succession of political crises.

We have traditionally lacked the methodological tools to disentangle the two dimensions of protest. At least in quantitative research, fluctuations in the levels of

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**Table 3. Situational and Generic Protest**

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<tr>
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<th>Generic protest</th>
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<td>Temporal perspective</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Long</td>
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<td>Factors of change</td>
<td>Triggered by specific grievances or a sudden change in the opportunity structure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observed as</td>
<td>Period effects</td>
<td>Cohort effects</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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Source: WVS 1990-2014
protest appear mainly as peaks and troughs measured at different points in time. They say little about the short and long-term dynamics unfolding through these variations. Recently, however, Caren and his colleagues and Quaranta have demonstrated that new approaches to age-period-cohort (APC) analysis offer convenient instruments to tackle this problem (Caren, Ghoshal, and Ribas 2011; Quaranta 2015). When properly used, APC analysis has the capacity to isolate period effects from cohort effects, effectively disaggregating situational from generic protest. This is because period effects are assumed to be felt by all individuals in a given society, independent of their year of birth, while cohort effects are carried over time by a group of citizens who shared common historical experiences at similar ages. According to this approach, a profound change in protest practices — generic protest — would be perceived through generational replacement, whereas situational protest would be captured by period effects.

In the next section, I follow this research path and explore period and cohort effect on protest participation in East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia.

**Empirical Strategy**

**Data**

This paper benefits from the large amount of data collected over the years by the European Social Survey (ESS). The dataset used for the analysis groups information about respondents in East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. These four cases were selected on the basis the data availability, as they are the only postcommunist countries/region systematically included in all six waves of the ESS (2002-2012). Limiting the geographical scope of the research to these cases maximizes the time-span covered (period effects) and insures greater comparability across cases. Table 4 displays the number of respondents per survey-round and country/region:

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<td>1.751</td>
<td>1.898</td>
<td>10.815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1.519</td>
<td>1.442</td>
<td>1.476</td>
<td>1.286</td>
<td>1.403</td>
<td>1.257</td>
<td>8.385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6.412</td>
<td>5.675</td>
<td>5.755</td>
<td>5.416</td>
<td>5.771</td>
<td>6.179</td>
<td>35.208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In each of the six survey waves, respondents were asked if they had done different political actions during the last 12 months. As we shall see, although the number of

---

275 Source: ESS Round 1 to 6: European Social Survey Round 1 to 6 Data (2002-2012). Data file editions round 1 (6.4), round 2 (3.5), round 3 (3.5), round 4 (5.3), round 5 (3.2), round 6 (2.1). Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data.

276 The exact framing of the question for the ESS2 to ESS6 was: “There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12
rounds and the temporal scope are small for an age-period-cohort analysis, this deficiency is partially compensated by the very consistent methodology applied by the ESS across time. This avoids some problems such as having to control for different wordings of questions or for different survey organizations in the case of pooled data (e.g., Caren, Ghoshal, and Ribas 2011).

**Dependent variable**

To measure protest behavior, different forms of non-conventional participation are aggregated in a dichotomous variable. Respondents were given the score of “1” if they had taken part in any of the following three protest activities during the last year: signing a petition, legally demonstrating, or boycotting certain products. Although three separate measures would have been preferable from an analytical perspective, this choice is justified by the structure of the data. In Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia, only 10 to 15% of the population takes part in at least one of these activities every year. Approaching these political actions separately would have resulted in a heavily skewed distribution, with little variance to examine. Combining these three forms of participation also makes sense from a theoretical perspective. Although protest activities have tended to “normalize,” especially in established democracies, they are still differentiated from conventional forms of participation. Indeed, when submitted to principal component analysis, the three forms of protest studied consistently aligned on a distinct dimension, contrasting with other activities such as voting, contacting politicians, and working for a political party (see Table 5).

**Table 5: Factor loadings of conventional and non-conventional political actions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Factor I</th>
<th>Factor II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voted in last national election</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted politician or government official</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked in political party or action group</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed petition</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taken part in lawful public demonstration</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boycotted certain products</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Varimax orthogonal rotated factor matrix based on data from DE (East), HU, PL, and SI in ESS survey rounds 2002 to 2012.

The way the ESS frames questions of political participation – with reference to the last 12 months – has important consequences for the analysis. Many other national or international surveys, including the World Values Survey, typically ask respondents if they have ever done or might do a certain political action. They are mostly interested in protest experience or potential. Here, the ESS rather focuses on protest as a routinized way of expressing dissent. In an age-period-cohort analysis, we can therefore effectively...
contrast situational from generic protest. When controlling for period effects, we can have a higher assurance that cohort differences reflect day-to-day practices rather than the residual effect of periods which are not covered by the six waves of the survey. Despite their advantages, ESS questions remain nonetheless subject to social desirability and memory biases.

Age, periods, and cohort

When doing an age-period-cohort analysis, we are basically trying to extract three types of explanations for a given social phenomenon. The first explanation, age, is said to reflect different life cycles, in which individuals have varying resources and aptitudes. In our case, we would expect young people to have more time to protest than middle-aged people and more physical capacities than elderly people. The second explanation, periods, accounts for specific grievances or sudden change in the opportunity structure. Here, incentives and constraints on participation probably varied across time. Finally, the third explanation, cohorts, mirrors more profound changes in culture, which result from different experiences of socialization.

In the following analysis, age is coded in three groups: (1) under 35, (2) 35 to 64, and (3) more than 65 years old. Periods correspond to each survey round. The ESS has conducted six waves every two years since 2002, covering a total of 12 years. Finally, respondents are classified in nine 10-year birth cohorts, from 1910 to 1990. More fine-grained cohorts (e.g. 5-year cohorts) would have led to excessively small cohort by period cells.

Method

Separating the effects of these three components has long been considered a perilous task, as age, period, and cohort are in a situation of perfect multicollinearity. That is, \( \text{Period} = \text{Age} + \text{Cohort} \). This creates an identification problem which renders classical linear cross-sectional analysis impracticable. Recently, however, Yang and Land (2006; 2008) developed a new approach to bypass this problem. Using the tools of multilevel modeling, they suggested to conceptualize “time periods and cohort memberships as social historical contexts within which individuals are embedded and ordered by age” (2013, 69). Instead of regarding period and cohort effects as fixed and additive, they modelled them as random in a cross-classified random design, effectively avoiding the identification problem (2013, 69–70). Beyond its obvious methodological advantages, this approach also appears to reflect the social reality more closely. Hierarchical APC with cross-classified random effects models (HAPC-CREM) can be used with data from repeated cross-sectional sample surveys such as the ESS. This has led to a recent regain of interest for APC models in the social sciences, including in studies on political participation (Caren, Ghoshal, and Ribas 2011; Quaranta 2015).

Inspired by these new developments in APC analysis, this paper proposes the following model of protest participation:

\[
(1) \quad \text{Level 1 or "within-cell" model:}
\]

\[277\] QUARANTA (2015) uses a very similar coding to capture life-cycle effects.

\[278\] The presentation of the model mirrors Yang and Land’s (2013, 216).
Logit \( \text{Pr}(\text{PROTEST}_{ijk} = 1) = \beta_{0jk} + \beta_1 \text{AGE(<35)}_{ijk} + \beta_2 \text{AGE(≥65)}_{ijk} \)

(2) Level 2 or “between-cell” model:
\[
\beta_{0jk} = \gamma_0 + u_{0j} + \nu_{0k}, \ u_{0j} \sim N(0, \tau_u), \ \nu_{0k} \sim N(0, \tau_v)
\]

(3) Combined model:
Logit \( \text{Pr}(\text{PROTEST}_{ijk} = 1) = \gamma_0 + \beta_1 \text{AGE(<35)}_{ijk} + \beta_2 \text{AGE(≥65)}_{ijk} + u_{0j} + \nu_{0k} \)

for
- \( i = 1, 2, \ldots, n_{jk} \) individuals within cohort \( j \) and period \( k \);
- \( j = 1, \ldots, 9 \) birth cohorts;
- \( k = 1, \ldots, 6 \) survey years.

where the logit of the probability of taking part in a protest activity is the combination of a model intercept \( \gamma_0 \) (grand-mean for all individuals), \( \beta_1 \) and \( \beta_2 \) are the coefficients of age effects (fixed for all individuals),\(^{279} \) \( u_{0j} \) is the cohort effect (residual random effect) and \( \nu_{0k} \) is the period effect (residual random effect).

**Results**

The model was tested separately for East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Results revealed interesting similarities and differences between cases. As presented in Table 6, the overall probability of having taken part in a protest activity during the last 12 months (intercept) was fairly low in three out of four cases. In East Germany, respondents in the reference age-group (35-64) had a probability of about \( 0.47 \)\(^{280} \) of having protested during the year preceding the interview, while in Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia, the probabilities were respectively 0.09, 0.12, and 0.11. For these three countries, protest is still a rare form of political participation, especially when recalling that signing a petition or boycotting certain products demand very little time and resources. The effect of being aged less than 35 was inconsistent across cases: only in Slovenia were younger people significantly more involved in protest activities. In contrast, people aged 65 and more appear to participate less in all four cases.

**Table 6. HAPC-CCREM of Protest Participation in DE (East), HU, PL, and SI**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>East Germany</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.131</td>
<td>-2.303***</td>
<td>-1.976***</td>
<td>-2.077***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0947)</td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (under 35)</td>
<td>-0.127</td>
<td>-0.0865</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.340**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0907)</td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td>(0.0860)</td>
<td>(0.130)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{279} \) The reference category comprises the people aged 35 to 64.

\(^{280} \) Based on the inverse logit function, \( e^{\gamma_0}/(1 + e^{\gamma_0}) \); \( e^{-0.131}/(1 + e^{-0.131}) = 0.47 \)
Social Movements in Central and Eastern Europe

As presented in the variance components bloc, period and cohort effects were generally weak in all four countries or region. The average contribution of belonging to a certain generation or of the timing of survey do not influence strongly the probability of taking part in a protest activity. However, a closer look at the predicted effect of individual periods or cohorts could reveal that some of these stand out of the distribution. This is what we explore in Figure 1.1 to 4.2.

Figure 1.1. Cohort Effects on Protest Participation in East Germany

Figure 1.2. Period Effects on Protest Participation in East Germany

All graphs display cohort and period predicted effects for the reference age-group, 35-64 years old. The grey zone indicates the 95% confidence interval. The dashed line reports the average probability of taking part in a protest activity in a given country. To be significant, a cohort or period effect should have a confidence interval which does not overlap with the average probability.
Figure 2.1. Cohort Effects on Protest Participation in Hungary

Figure 2.2. Period Effects on Protest Participation in Hungary

Figure 3.1. Cohort Effects on Protest Participation in Poland

Figure 3.2. Period Effects on Protest Participation in Poland

Figure 4.1. Cohort Effects on Protest Participation in Slovenia

Figure 4.2. Period Effects on Protest Participation in Slovenia
Patterns in Protest Participation

Different observations can be made from the eight graphs previously presented. Period effects – that is, situational protest – appear to be mostly grounded in national contexts: at first glance, there was no common Central or East European periodical effect on protest. Cohorts, however, exhibit similar patterns:

1. In all four cases, protest participation peaked with the 1960 or 1970 cohort.
2. This peak is preceded by a plateau for the 1930 to 1950 cohorts.
3. The 1960-70 peak is followed by a decline in protest participation, with 1980 or 1990 cohorts having a protest participation under average.

There is no evidence of a profound shift in generic protest in the four countries under study, yet we notice a disruption around the 1970 cohort. It would be reasonable to assume that this effect is the consequence of the unique historical circumstances which characterized the transitional period and which affected primarily young people at that time. Starting with Mannheim (1952), many authors affirm that early socialization, including the experience of exceptional historical circumstances, has lasting effects on political attitudes and behavior. For the 1970 cohort, this early socialization coincided with the transition from communism, a period which, needless to say, was characterized by a political effervescence and a deep reconfiguration of power. That we can still observe a distinctive cohort effect using data collected in the last ten years is a demonstration that the exceptional events around the 1989 period imprinted protest practices. It is also plausible that the 1980 and 1990 cohorts in return experienced a form of disillusionment which could explain their (sometimes sharp) decline in protest participation.

Contrasting East and West Germany provides additional insight into the observed generational dynamics. Figure 5 reports the results of an age-period-cohort analysis comparing protest participation in West Germany and in the Ländern of the former GDR. Cohorts are categorized according to whether they experienced early socialization – that is, they were aged 15 before the two-state system, during it, or in unified Germany.

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282 People born in the 1970 cohort would have been aged 10 to 19 years old in 1989.
283 Most authors place early political socialization between 7 and 25 years old. This delimitation seems a decent middle point, as suggested by Mishler and Rose (2007).
In comparison to West Germany, East Germany’s cohort effects on protest participation seem surprisingly stable. Cohort effects in the West follow a sharp inverted U pattern, with the 1910, 1920 and 1990 cohorts clearly under the level of their respective cohorts in the East. To be sure, these cohorts are situated at the extremities of the distribution and, therefore, have a larger measurement error, but the difference remains striking. For cohorts having experienced an early socialization under two separate states, the trend is opposite, with the 1940, 1950, and 1960 cohorts more active in the former FRG. It would be difficult to conclude without further investigation that some generations in the East experienced a “protest penalty” due to socialization under communism: generational patterns are in fact relatively stable (except for the 1970 disruption). In the end, if there was ever a “clash of generations” in Germany, it was felt harder in the West than in the East.

Conclusion

This paper has shown that a reconceptualization of protest along two dimensions – situational and generic – allows a better assessment of trends in unconventional political participation. Age-period-cohort analysis, in turn, constitutes a well-fitted method to disentangle these two aspects empirically. Situational protest can be observed through period effects whereas generic protest is captured by cohort effects. Applied in the context of postcommunist Europe, this strategy offers another tool to move beyond the “paradox” of mass mobilization in the region. Based on data from East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia, the analysis has demonstrated that there was no common period effect on protest during the last 10 years. Cohort trends do not signal a radical shift.

284 Age effects diverged slightly between East and West Germany and affect the two curves differently. Constraining them to be equal for both countries does not change the general pattern.
in protest practices – hence, no “generational clash.” However, in all four cases, the 1970 cohort stood out as a particularly active one. This phenomenon can be traced back to the context of the early socialization of this group which was hit more directly by the political effervescence of the transition from communism.

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References


Chapter 3

The city renegotiated: Urban grassroots mobilization
Protest tool, social movement or politicized lifestyle? 
On the nature of squatting in Poland.

Grzegorz Piotrowski

Abstract:
Squatting is often mentioned in connection with radical left-libertarian social movements (Guzman-Concha 2015, Katsiaficas 1997) but recently the far-right groups also occupy buildings in Italy (the case of Casa Pounds). However in the academic literature it is operationalized as a social movement, protest repertoire, lifestyle choice etc. according to the needs of the research. At the same time it is stressed that squatting in Poland (and in general in Central and Eastern Europe) is a new phenomenon strongly connected to the heritage of Western European squatting experiences (Żuk 2001).
The aim of this paper is threefold: (1) to make a typology of approaches to squatting to indicate strengths and weaknesses of each of them and also to cross-reference it with the self-image of the squatters themselves as observed during intensive fieldwork. The other (2) aim is to analyze squatting from the perspective of Polish social movement studies, in particular to examine the strong connection between subcultural music scenes and social movements that are much stronger than in Western Europe (Piotrowski 2013). The last (3) goal is to see how the recent attempts to open legally-functioning social centers affect the squatting movement / scene.

Introduction.
Social squatted centers are an integral part of alternative social movements (mostly autonomous, but also anarchist or radical environmentalist) for the last few decades. They have been providing a place for the activists to meet up, to organize themselves and to find shelter. For many of the activists they have became an end for itself, free spaces, where introducing ideals into everyday practice (of consensus-based decision making processes, environmental stability, autonomy and so forth). Squatting has emerged in Central and Eastern Europe in the beginning of 1990s and since then has gained different level of appreciation over the region. Poland stands out among other post-socialist countries as the one with quite rooted squatting movement (Piotrowski 2011a, 2014; Polanska 2014; Polanska and Piotrowski 2015) with squatting initiatives
represented in most Polish cities (Poznań, Warsaw, Wrocław, Opole, Gdynia, Lublin, Łódź, Gdańsk, Gliwice, Białystok, Częstochowa, Kraków, Grudziądz, Ruda Śląska, Biała Podlaska, and Sosnowiec). In the recent year Polish squatters became involved not only in activities directed towards the squatting environment, but also in numerous local initiatives and campaigns. The cooperation between squatters and tenants’ associations regarding evictions from privatized municipal houses and other campaigns has not only made new openings to the squatting activists incorporating them into more mainstream civil society activism and bringing their radical critique into the mainstream discourse. These developments, in my opinion, have changed the squatting activists into a more open direction of their activism (less focused on their subcultural identities). At the same time it aggravated the emergence of new kinds of activism, namely legalized social centers as well as other forms (such as social cooperatives) that are less costly for the activists to sustain as they have less fears of being evicted at any moment.

**What is squatting?**

Squatting is an important faction of the scene, which has developed in Western Europe in the late 1960s, being basically the occupation of an abandoned / unused land or building. Besides its pragmatic functions – such as providing shelter for people and their political and cultural activities –, it has symbolic value: it renegotiates property rights (as a result of a quote from Proudhon, to the effect of 'every property possession is a theft'); as well as redefines the concept of public space. The idea behind squatting as a political activity (because of the rather small scale of the scene and the constant threat of attack from right-wing extremist groups, all squats in the region are either places for living or a mix between the two kinds, social centres per se do not exist in Central and Eastern Europe) was formulated into the concept of Temporary Autonomous Zones by an anarchist poet Hakim Bay. For him, TAZs are the places ruled by internally negotiated principles that are the basis for a broader social revolution, a kind of blueprint for outsiders, portraying what it pertains to. Furthermore, squatting apartments, warehouses, or old factories, became the manifestation of a lifestyle in which people rejected the ‘rat race’ and run for goods that was performed by the rest of the society. Ever since squatting became popular, some thinkers - like Laura Portwood-Stacer (2013) - trend to use the term 'lifestyle activists for people who amused themselves with the everyday rebellion, but lacked deeper, intellectual reflection on society and the revolution. Due to the illegality of squats, temporality became their essential part. The ‘lifespan’ of squats became shorter after gentrification programs were introduced in many cities, especially in their centres.

Currently researchers (Prujit 2013, Owens 2013) recognize six different kinds of squatting. The deprivation-based squatting is close to the roots of squatting and is performed by poor people who lack other options for housing. Although popular, it is often not considered in analysis of squatting. Secondly, there are alternative housing strategies and alternative living arrangements. For instance the German Wohnprojekte (when people manage their houses in which they have their flats that derived from squatting projects) and popular Wohngemeinschaft (when people rent a large flat to live together) fall into this category. Third type are entrepreneurial initiatives that involve squatting, in particular the more popular ‘pop-up shops’ but also bars, cafes, info-shops
and alike. Squatting is not always an end – it becomes a tool for other campaigns, for instance as it is with conservational squatting when buildings are occupied in order to preserve them from demolishing and change of development plans. Prujit distinguishes also ‘tourism squatting’ when buildings or areas are occupied for short periods of time to provide housing for travellers. Finally, the most recognized – political – squatting aims at building up counter-power to the state.

In the US some characteristics of the social centers are performed by community centers, however they are different in their political meaning. This might be disrupting the perception of the role of squatted social centres within the broader urban social movements setting, in particular when one looks at the functions such places perform and in the context of the ‘radical flank’. As one can read: “while "community centre" is a term used to describe any center of "public" activity, occasionally sanctioned by the state or private interests such as a corporation, social centres are characterized by their quasi-legal and sometimes illegal existence, their direct subsistence on the community that supports it and their political vision vis-a-vis the state”. This confrontational attitude of the social centers (in particular the ones that are in squatted buildings) is at the core of the definition of the squatted social centers.

Squatting in CEE

In Central and Eastern Europe, the squatting movement was not as successful, but visible enough to become a substantial part of the movement and the alternative scene, revolving around many political and cultural initiatives. Although there are only few squats remaining in the Czech Republic and in Poland (in Hungary, attempts to establish a squat failed, but were successfully ‘framed’ and introduced into the mainstream discourse), they seem to be islands of activism. Squatters also form social networks that are later used by other kinds of activists, and the concepts of mutual support; solidarity protests; and joint actions, seem to be important issues within that group (as could be seen in the 2007 Copenhagen riots after the eviction of Ungdomshuset, or the campaign to defend Keopi in Berlin). What is interesting is that there is far more cooperation between groups of squatters than political activists, regarding regional cooperation (within Central and Eastern Europe), and contacts with Western Europe; bilateral invitations; solidarity support actions; media campaigning; and so forth. From a functional viewpoint, squats also provide space for gatherings and cultural activities, therefore the term 'Social Centres' (coming from the Italian tradition of activism and the 'Centro Sociale') was adopted. However, for some activists, the foreign origins of the phenomenon is occasionally a problem, since they feel that the blueprint developed in other circumstances and environments is not fully applicable to post-socialist reality. Piotr Żuk (2001) - in his study of Polish squatters, feminists and ecologists - pointed out that most of them refer to Western European traditions rather than to local ones.

On the other hand, squatting is a relatively new concept in Central and Eastern Europe, which dates back to the early 1990s (the first long-term squatting took place in

\[286\] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_center

\[287\] Examples of campaigns taken from localindymedia websites and squat.net.
Poland in 1994), and there are no other traditions to refer to. In a constant debate between openness to the outside world on the one hand, and the provision of a safe space for the movement on the other hand (in Poletta’s terms: between transmovement and prefigurative spaces), one of the critical points is that what is relatively successful in Italy (Centro Sociale) does not work in Poland or the Czech Republic. Becoming an important part of many cities’ cultural maps, the style of the squats (rugged, recycled furniture from dumpsters, many D.I.Y. posters on the walls, graffiti, and a sense of chaos and disorganization) were copied by more commercial venues.

Different analytical approaches to squatting can result in different outcomes of the analysis. Surprisingly, there is little theoretical reflection on the nature of squatting and the ways to analyze it. In the literature the approaches vary from depicting squatting as a social movement or at times a radical social movement, a tool or repertoire of action used by other movements; part of politicized subcultures or part of the social movement scenes.

**Squatting as a social movement** (della Porta and Diani), as a radical social movement, as a tactic of a radical left-libertarian social movement. Using the definition developed by Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani. Della Porta and Diani list four characteristics of social movements (1999: 14-15):

- Social movements are informal interaction networks. They are never formed by an organization, but always by a plurality of organizations, groups, and individuals. Interactions among them form a movement.
- Social movements are kept together by shared beliefs and solidarity. In other words, social movement is cemented by collective identity that is shared across its constituent parts.
- Social movements engage in collective action focused on conflict. They take part in political and/or cultural conflicts, and strive to promote or prevent a social change.
- Social movements use a protest action repertoire. Although this criterion is not accepted by all scholars, social movements are often understood as actors engaged in non-institutional protest tactics.

This approach, which stresses the presence and importance of networks and the meaning of practices (as direct action), is significantly different from classic approaches and definitions which state that: "Social movements can be thought of as collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are a part." (Snow et.al. 2007: 11). Other scholars, using more cognitive-based approaches, claim that: "[social movements are] those sequences of contentious politics that are based on underlying social networks and resonant collective action frames, and which develop the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents." (Tarrow 2006: 2). However, I think that the approach that does not only concentrate on the political outcomes of actions and the roles of the agents in political games, suits the purpose of studying a movement like the squatting movement much better.
On occasions, such an identity is the outcome of contentious interactions between these groups, authorities and opponents/counter-movements.

Guzman-Concha (2015) suggests that in order to define radical groups one should: "(1) establish historical and geographical parameters, against which similar instances of this type can be reasonably compared and (2) define the components that constitute the concept." He later claims that radical groups: "(a) pursue an agenda of drastic changes that concerns a broad range of issues, especially the political and economic organization of society, whose implementation would affect elite interests and social positions. In order to implement their agenda, they (b) perform a repertoire of contention characterized by the employment of unconventional means, specifically civil disobedience. In addition, these groups adopt (c) countercultural identities that frame and justify unconventional objectives and methods, although this identity might not be present at early stages."

**Squatting as a tool:** in many cases squatting is not an end for itself but a tool for social movements (usually radical-leftist libertarian, in Polish case mostly connected to anarchism) in their attempts to raise awareness about a certain issue or make a case stronger. This is observed from time to time in Poland and such squatting attempts are connected to some other protest events. In Poznań a building was squatted in March 21st 2009 during the demonstration in defense of Rozbrat squat (when a court auction of the squat was scheduled) a group left the protest march and began to occupy a vacant building close to the Old Town Market. The strong presence of police forces in this case benefited the group as they were evicted in front of the journalists. This allowed the activists to make their claims about the endangerment of the squatted centre and to the issues of vacant buildings, in particular in the city centre. Later this evolved into a campaign during which the activists counted empty buildings (dwellings, the campaign information was not precise about this), 800 of them belonging to the municipality and the total number resulting in around 30000.

[quote from the campaign ‘Policzmy Pustostany’]

The second analyzed event took place at the recent (April 18 2015) European Economic Congress in Katowice. This recurring event is usually accompanied by a counter protest organized by anarchist milieus (www.antykongres.pl). This year, after the first major protest frequented by around 250 people, a group of 21 masked people got into an empty building owned by the municipality located at Mariacka Street 32, in the exact city center of Katowice. After they got in, they released a 4-story tall banner saying ‘human capital resists’ [kapitał społeczny stawia opór] and firing emergency flares. The activists were evicted by the anti-terror group the following morning at 5AM and later faced charges of trespassing. The eviction resulted in solidarity actions in Poznań, Warsaw, Wrocław and smaller actions in Lublin, Szczycno and Łódź, and – which is not uncommon for the described environment – heated internal discussions. The core aim of the squatting action was to draw attention and create publicity to the Antykongres event (that was supposed to go on for two more days) and to the existence of empty buildings in the city, including the city center.

The third case of using squatting as a tool was during the eviction of Elba squat in Warsaw in 2012. As a measure to defend the place a protest (of claimed 2500 people) was organized. One group decided to occupy a building in the very city center of Warsaw, at Skorupki street, an old and unused ambulatory point for people with
Social Movements in Central and Eastern Europe

tuberculosis. The building belongs to the municipality and its occupation was intended to involve local authorities into a dialogue with the squatters in Warsaw, as Elba was located on grounds that belonged to a private Swedish company and the squatters were evicted by a private security company. Squatters had an experience of contacting the authorities, in particular in the context of tenants’ struggles in which they participated (for more, see: Polanska and Piotrowski 2015). What is interesting in that case is that the occupation was not temporary and that the authorities agreed not to evict squatters (from the squat that was named Przychodnia) until they will clear the complicated legal issues with the rights to the plot of the land on which the buildings stand and find a new purpose for the building. Such approach opened space for establishing a legalized social center that took over the vacant buildings formerly used by Teatr Nowy at Puławska Street 37. The place was named Autonomiczny Dom Aktywny (ADA) Puławska and its collective was joined by many former squatters from Elba.

In December 2013 a group of Warsaw squatters also entered an empty Smyk commercial building in the very city center of Warsaw at Aleje Jerozolimskie. The iconic piece of abandoned architecture is perceived by some as a symbol of gentrification of Polish city centers. The activists used masking tape to write in the shopping windows across three floors ‘Capitalism: Game Over’. This action, close to Christmas, attracted lots of media attention, although some activists complained that the journalists confused, who organized the action (it was associated with the anarchists), which is not unheard of in Poland.

Occupation is rarely used as a tool by the activists because of the costs connected to it: forced eviction (involving squatters’ property destroyed, physical injuries – in Katowice 3 people ended in hospital) and trespassing and policemen assault charges. With the limited resources the radical left libertarian movement has, such costly initiatives are too much of a burden for the activists. On the other hand, in an environment that is very unfavorable to illegal property occupation and anti-capitalist claims, squatting as a tool

**Politicized subculture? Connections between squatters and counterculture.**

One of the key features of subcultures is the purity of the groups and their members and any sign of diversion from the imagined model of the subculture member is regarded as treason. Such practices are reinforcing the groups and the members’ feeling of belonging, which might be surprising, considering the fact how much individualism, is stressed in their statements. Subcultures are more oriented on actions towards inside of the groups (Muggleton and Weinzierl 2003), focused on building the groups’ strength and unity. Politically oriented groups are at the same time focused on the outcomes of their actions (Tilly 2004, Tilly and Tarrow 2006), on policy change and alike. Therefore their actions are concentrating on possible recipients of the claims, on decision-makers and the activists are more flexible in negotiating their claims. When one advocates a certain policy change (for example defends a local playground or some political dissidents in some country), the way in which one looks is far less important for potential allies. Also claims are more easily modified if demands are to be met. In the case of subcultures, there is an (idealized) image of the group and its participants and if one does not meet
such image, is excluded from (or not allowed into) a particular group (Marcus 1990). In other words, if one wants to become a punk, but still feel more comfortable in suits and a tie, he or she will not be recognized as a punk by other punks and therefore not allowed to enter their group.

Greg Martin writes: “Focusing on the relationship of social movements to the state and polity thus tend to ignore the hidden cultural dimension of social movements, which is significant because, among other things, it is the culture of movements – submerged in pre-existing networks of everyday life – that makes mobilization possible. In this way, the network of groups that constitutes a social movement serves as a platform for mobilization, since the movement network shares a culture and collective identity” (Martin 2013). The groups that are analysed in this paper put a lot of stress on prefigurative politics. Such zones can be observed during protests (Graeber 2009), in squatted social centres and other movement’s spaces. This suggests that the movement’s identity (or identities) is constructed in a different way compared to the classical theory of social movements. As Martin continues: “For Melucci (1989, 1996), contemporary movements mount symbolic challenges to dominant homogenizing cultural codes by communicating to the rest of society the message of difference. They do that by living out alternative lifestyles. In this sense, the “medium is the message.” In order to communicate a clear and coherent message, movements must generate a collective identity” (Martin 2013). When looking at the alterglobalist movement, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, that is a rather hostile environment for grassroots social activism and for leftist ideas and mobilizations, analyzing the movement’s identity building through the perspective of subcultural studies, can provide interesting examples.

Recent developments

One of the most recently observed developments within the squatting environment in Poland, besides few evictions, is the legalization of some social centers. One of them is Autonomiczny Dom Aktywny[ADA] that can be interpreted as an example of responsiveness of local authorities from Wrocław. Other cases include the long lasting Centrum Reanimacji Kultury [CRK] from Wrocław and Tektura from Lublin. Many of the participants of these centers are former squatters and the legal way of their functioning sparks a number of controversies within the squatting community. The main reason for some activists to try to legalize their places are checks and balances. There are a number of repressions of the police towards ‘regular’ squatting, official and not performed by both authorities and private security companies. For instance a Wrocław-based squat Rejon 69 experienced a violent eviction in June 1997, despite the consent of the owner of the property for their stay. The brutal police intervention as well as the rest of the police station had its sequel in court - in 2009 the European Court of Human Rights upheld the two complainants of squatters that the police intervention was unjustified, unnecessarily brutal and awarded them compensation (see Żytnicki 2012). This shows that the squatters not only are more skilled in litigation and legal practices, but are also open to use emerging Political Opportunity Structures and to work within the system and not only outside / against it. At the same time constrains for the movement (financial but
also resulting from dependency from local authorities) that might be problematic for maintaining the ‘purity’ of the movement.

Such developments are not only particular to the Polish case. In Berlin during the early 1990s there were around 100 squats, many of which later turned into Wohnprojekte (‘housing projects’ – a legalized form with self-governing decision bodies, but with a symbolic payment of rent). Nowadays, in 2009, there are only a few ‘real’ squats left in the city, and the former ‘alternative’ districts - such as Friedrichshein, Prenzlauerberg, and Kreuzberg - became the trendiest districts of the city. However, for most of the activists (especially squatters), any cooperation with the authorities is a betrayal of their principles and of the scene.

Legalization as a tool of the authorities to exaggerate cleavages within the squatting community.

After the turbulent development of Berlin’s squatting scene during the 1980s that resulted in numerous occupations and evictions the authorities began to seek a compromise with the squatters. One of the developments was the establishment of an electoral committee to the city council elections that represented squatters that in the end managed to get into the city council. By the end of the decade the authorities began to offer to transform occupied places into legalized living collectives (Wohnprojekte) that paid lower rent to the city and former squatting collectives were in charge of the project’s management still having a collective form of administration and organization.

In Wrocław, Poland there is a CRK centre, which is an alternative space functioning in a legal way, was considered a ‘sell-out’. The CRK (Centrum Reanimacji Kultury – Center for Re-Animation of Culture) social center is located in Wrocław in Jagiellończyka street (sometimes it is called Jagiellończyka, as the current policies of the center raise some controversies). Its history dates back to 2001, when the first concert took place and initiated the activities of the place, but there are (mostly personal) links to the people occupying the Wagenburg (squating area with a sort of campers). As the founders of the place say: “we are part of global alternative movement. CRK is a platform of cooperation of artists and pro-social activists. We trying to create atmosphere to inspire and promote ideas what We share. We prefer methods than specific esthetics or taste, so we can’t be called one genre name. One for sure is a common: DIY”. CRK is a complex of two buildings in closed backyard in city center of Wrocław. As the activists continue: “we are trying to arrange our place proper and still have some space for new people with their ideas”. Until now they run a record studio, silk-screen printing workshop, utopia café, concert room, rehearsal room for bands, bike workshop, internet radio, and guest room for bands and travellers. The activists are planning to start a gallery and big kitchen to cook big meals in the framework of the initiative Food Not Bombs.

Unlike the other social centers, the CRK participates in several Wroclawian festivals like Wrocław Industrial Festival; 16 Days Against Domestic Violence; Lesbians, Gays and Friends Festival; Graffiti festivals. This is the most controversial issue for activists from other Polish cities (and for some activists from Wrocław), since for some

of them participating in ‘official’ city events means to legitimize them and their
organizers, in this case the city officials. One of my informants was involved in that
project at the beginning, and later got involved in an alternative coffee shop, which
causèd many controversies. He told me:

This is only one other place possibly, the CRK, but it operates on slightly different
principles [...]. So I think those are two lines of analysis, is an ideological environment,
the second is a lack of dialogue and cooperation on the part of certain individuals or
groups from the so-called scene. And the second point is related to something else, no
search some more moderate approach to come up to people outside.

All this suggests, that one of the main threats for the squatted social centers that
can affect their identity, which is based on opposing the local authorities and the state is
institutionalization. It means that a movement is channelled into a stable pattern based on
formalized rules and laws. Expected behavior becomes clearly defined; sanctions are in
place. The institutionalization of a movement means that it loses its identity (Castells
1983: 328). Institutionalization is also followed by a changed movement action
repertoire: conventional methods take the place of disruption (Kriesi, et al., 1995). This
results in the loss of creativity, which attracts many people to squatting and social centers.
And since for the anarchist-based groups that usually are behind squatting and
occupation, practices are as important as the ideals (or even more, see for example
Graeber 2009 where he claims that the decision-making process based on consensus is a
fundamental part of the group’s identity), this is also a starting point for many fierce
debates.

The involvement of the squatters in tenants’ activism allows them to participate
in broader social conflicts, amplify them and politicize according to their political lines.
As the activists self-assessment of such cooperation says: ‘thanks to our publishing of
violations of tenants’ rights, a large part of public opinion today perceives tenant issues
differently, especially when it comes to forced displacement and ‘cleaning’ of houses.
This practice is now massively condemned and rarely justified with the right to freely
dispose one’s property’. But the Polish activists also provided examples of specific
political proposals that have entered the public debate and later been picked up by
politicians or officials. One long-time anarchist activist, sees “participatory budgets” as
such an example:

Today you can find many things that anarchists have been propagating for many years.
Look at the recent discussion about participatory budgets. We were talking about such
things ten years ago or more. Rafał Gorski wrote a book about it [...]. But this is some
kind of weird mutation of this concept, you only have 10 million złoty [approximately
0.35 per cent of the city budget] to spend and the projects proposed are some kind of a
joke [...]. So on the one hand it is our victory, but on the other that’s not what we wanted
to achieve, so I have mixed feelings about it and it convinces me to keep doing my work
and not looking at how the authorities are using our ideas.

18.10.2014]
This seems to be in line with the Polish anarchists’ strategy characterized by one of the activists as “getting involved into local conflicts, amplifying them and using them to show broader, more ideological conflicts and issues” (quote from an interview). Therefore the squatters used the conflict between the tenants and the house owners to involve the city authorities and in particular the city’s agency responsible for management of public housing – Zarząd Komunalnych Zasobów Lokalowych (the Board of Municipal Stock of Units, hence ZKZL) and protests were staged in front of the ZKZL office. The struggle was a continuation of a previous conflict with ZKZL and its head, Jarosław Pucek, known for promoting neoliberal policies in Poznań. One of the previous conflicts was the plan to evict the ‘difficult’ tenants of communal houses into housing containers located in a remote part of the city. The containers were soon dubbed (by the anarchists) as the ‘poverty ghetto’.

Interpreting the housing and communal relations in Poznań is not so fucking easy because suddenly it turns out, no one has interpreted, the journalist did not sit down and say this guy is part of the system with this guy […] and that he cleans these buildings and that they’re renovating the buildings, and this one has 10 of these houses, the other one 20. This is a gigantic farce of what has been done in the context of housing.

In the case of Poznań, the cooperation between squatters and tenants was initiated quite recently, in 2011 with the foundation of Wielkopolskie Stowarzyszenie Lokatorów, and by securing the dominant position of squatters in the founded tenants’ association, and thus avoiding internal conflict. When understanding the role of personal networks in the alliance formation between squatters and tenants’ activists in both cities, it is evident that these networks of acquaintances were important in the very beginning of the contacts between these environments, and were over time broadened to more general trust shared by both groups.

We sometimes influence the politicians […]. We meet directly with councilors, we have a kind of tactical alliance with them […] They are only part of our broader strategy to produce a specific result. So if we want to have someone speak to the city council, for example, such as about tenants in a particular case, you must have a councilor to cast a vote. He or she then puts pressure on that person, usually with success, and then the councilor casts a vote on the city council.

One of the developments within the alternative social movements scene, besides the legalized social centers, are social cooperatives. One of the examples comes from Poznań. In early 2013 a group of squatting activists from Poznań have bought a place in the city center and opened an anarchist bookstore and café named Zemsta (Revenge). Organized as a social cooperative it involves people from both squats and has taken over the role of the ‘open’ place hosting numerous art exhibitions, talks, book presentations, film screenings etc. Zemsta is financed through selling books, fairtrade coffee and also recently vegan lunches. As one of the founders described it: “This is a social cooperative. We established it as a political response, but in economic context and we are using it for particular goals […], but still many things, majority of things are happening beyond it and

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not all participants of the collective belong to it [cooperative] (…) the only front that suited us was a cooperative. We created a place – a bookstore and we are selling tea and coffee there [since early 2015 also vegan lunches G.P.]. And at the same time we are employing people there. We want to create such economy that will allow us to put something in the pot. People are going protesting, putting posters but between activities you also need to live somehow and for some of us we are giving such opportunity” (Herbst 2013: 36). The opening of Zemsta is significant for the development of activist-connected places all over Poland organized in the form of a social cooperative. Although cooperatives have a long history in Poland and were usually connected to leftist-libertarian groups (the founder of Polish cooperativism, Edward Abramowski, has been also the father of Polish anarchism). After World War II it was also a supported and desired way or organizing entrepreneurship and businesses that was supposed to eradicate ‘private initiative’ in the economy. Many of the ‘old’ cooperatives vanished after the post-1989 transition not being able to compete with other forms of business organization models, but numerous remained successful. These include often the ‘milk bars’ (Piotrowski 2010), food production companies (SM Mlekovita is the biggest milk producer and supplier in Poland at the moment) and in housing. With the recent (2012) changes in regulations that introduced the category ‘social cooperative’ this model of organization became more accessible to small groups of activists with new ideas. The ‘social cooperative’ category has simplified the accounting and bureaucracy required to administer the cooperative (there is no more need for having a separate board, auditing office etc.). Zemsta is only one of the examples; other one is ‘Granda’ in Łódź being a bar (with a stage for concerts), vegan food place and a hostel. For the anarchist activists from Łódź, who had troubles in maintaining a large group, not to mention sustaining a squat, it became an opportunity to have a ‘movement space’ (Polletta 1999) they can organize their activism around. Similarly to the case of legalized social centers, social cooperatives are less cost demanding for the activists, as the threat of eviction is more remote than with a squat and less controversial to the public opinion as illegal occupation of private or municipal property. More legalized forms also allow the activists to invest more time, energy and other resources in the places. In comparison, after the building occupied by the Od:żyśk Kolektyw was auctioned, the activists dropped some of the initiatives (such as libertarian library and some renovations) as they are afraid of losing the place and their work invested into it. At the same time, such places become dependent on the local authorities as they often introduce restrictions into rent contracts with the activists.

Conclusions

First, if one considers the squatted social centers as a part of a broader scene, it shows, that the latter is not fully developed. Fears of becoming ‘sell-outs’ or of institutionalization reflect the weakness of the scene itself, because keeping purity of the scene and fighting for orthodoxy are the crucial points for the activists. It shows their insecurity and a constant threat to the ideals behind group’s identity.

Secondly, the external factors that shape the whole scene are not conducive. In the region, where one can see more or less, a consensus towards neoliberal politics, property occupation and promotion of alternative culture (not for profit, but for the ideals)
is unlikely to find broad support. A brief observation of the number of protest events and
the turnout at these demonstrations reveals the weak support of the rest of the population.
Despite of sympathetic attitude towards the activists from the side of the alternative
media and occasional public support (as it was in the case of the “Rozbrat stays!”
campaign), such places cannot count on many followers. That leads to two other
consequences: such places in the end lack popular support, on the other hand there are not
enough ‘consumers of alternative culture’ for them to sustain themselves economically.
Especially when they have to compete with strictly commercial places that refer
themselves to a similar, alternative charm.

Lastly, the whole concept of squatting and what comes hand in hand with it, the
identity based movement with strong counter-cultural background are a new phenomenon
in the area. There are no traditions of such groups and activities that the activists could
refer to and that would be older than 15 years. This not only results in lack of roots of
such groups, but also the relative novelty of such activities might put it outside the main
social, political or cultural discourse.

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The urban movement as a challenger in the Polish urban policy field

Anna Domaradzka

Abstract

With a number of international actors on global level promoting the ideas of “placemaking” and people’s “right to the city” (Lefebvre 1968, Harvey 2012), all major Polish cities become the primary sites where a new and dynamic urban movement emerges, inspired by specific local problems fused with external influence. This vibrant social movement is shaped in a meeting between the engagement of local leaders and neighborhood activists around “concrete narrative” of particular space and everyday needs (Mergler 2008), and the inspiration of internationally connected “norm entrepreneurs” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998), linking local issues to the global dispute over right to the city. Although very diverse in nature, this process and the involved actors can be described and explained using the recently developed framework of Strategic Action Fields (Fligstein & McAdam 2011, 2012). In the light of theory of fields it can be stated that grassroots movement enters the strategic action field of urban policy as a challenger to existing relations of power, as a result of municipal inability to deal with the problems of urban residents. Therefore, I will illustrate how this special network of civil society actors became important in the “game of the city”, re-negotiating the urban politics field in-between a retreating city-level public sector and the entrance of corporate actors, thus taking an active part in re-drawing of the symbolic as well as concrete border between the public and the private.

1. Introduction

Polish society, which for decades used to be rural, is now becoming highly urbanized. With two thirds of Poles living nowadays in the urban areas, cities became important centers for establishing social and economic policies, and also play a key role influencing the wellbeing of the citizens. In recent years this fact started to be recognized by both local and central government, which organized specialized agencies to articulate and implement the so-called urban policy.

Until recently Poland did not have any law regulating the development of the cities, and as critics argue, Polish cities are devoid of political identity (Billert 2012). However, in 2012, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Development initiated the process of

291 Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw, Poland. Please direct any communication regarding the paper at: anna.domaradzka@gmail.com. Full empirical material included in this paper is to be published in a Nomos volume “Civil Society and Innovative Public Administration” edited by Matthias Freise, Friedrich Paulsen and Andrea Walter. Qualitative data was gathered in the framework of the project “Tamed City? Warsaw enclaves of social activism and their origins” financed from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education research grant N N116 283838.
formulating National Urban Policy document (Ministry of Infrastructure and Development 2014), which aims to create the basis for an overhaul of both social and financial policies concerned with urban growth. The strategic goal of the urban policy is to strengthen the ability of cities to generate economic growth, create new employment opportunities and, last but not least, improve the standard of living. This goal is to be realized mainly by strengthening metropolitan functions of city central districts as well as increasing civil participation in decision-making processes concerning city development.

The development of urban policy in Poland coincides with strong activism of grassroots organizations, many of which are members of the wide national urban movements network. These local organizations, expressing vital interests of urban residents, quickly became important players on the local level, addressing the everyday needs of this specific group of citizens. However, when it became clear that some challenges cannot be addressed locally and need systemic solutions, many of these movements joined together to propose national policy changes. This trend started with first meeting of the Congress of Urban Movements in 2011, which resulted in formulation of “Nine City Theses”, including postulates for democratization and decommercialization of cities development strategies. Soon after, the government presented the outline of National Urban Policy (NUP), criticized during the second Congress in 2012, which prepared its own proposition of the document tenets. Between the Congresses, the urban movement representatives were lobbying for its cause through publications, social media and events focusing on the problems of the cities and democratic representation at the local level. As a result, at the third Congress in 2013, the head of the Department of Spatial Development Policy presented the state of affairs in respect to the works around NUP and invited the participants to take part in the series of workshops discussing main topics on which the document is touching upon. It was in accord with the third Congress focus on the issues of further lobbing for legal solutions that would strengthen the citizens’ voice at the local level.

Rapid development of the urban grassroots movement exemplifies the fact that the issues connected with urban development gain real importance in Polish cities. This is especially true in the context of ongoing demographic changes, as well as migration patterns that affect social fabrics of the cities as well as personal embeddedness in neighborhood communities. Those demographic as well as socio-economical factors determine the variety of resident’s needs that public bodies fail to satisfy. In this context, the inadequacy of the solutions offered by local administration leads to growing social dissatisfaction and grassroots mobilization.

Residents’ struggle for more influence over urban environment is sometimes referred to as “the game of the city”, in which different actors – representing public sphere (city officials), civil society (urban activists) and private sector (developers, developers,

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292 It’s important to note that a rationale behind creating a special unit (Department of Spatial Development Policy) in the Ministry, and giving it a task of formulating NUP was to prepare Poland for the new period of structural funds coming from EU. In the new financial framework, between 2014 and 2020, EU funding strategy will concentrate on developing the metropolitan regions, so it was a strategic decision to come up with structure and legal framework that would fit new EU funding priorities.
business representatives) take active part. In this context, the cities in Poland turn into a social laboratory, a space in which local communities become active and may use its potential to solve local problems.

In this context, analysis presented here aims at answering the question of possible influence of grassroots urban movement on local as well as central administration in terms of both practices and discourse. Using the qualitative data from interviews with urban activists as well as existing documents on the topic, I will show how emergence of strong grassroots movement stimulates faster policy changes as well as influences local administration policies and strategies.

It’s important to note, that this chapter focuses only on the overall positive influence of urban movement on the public administration and therefore does not take into account the “dark side” of the urban activism (as defined by Putnam, 2000), which can manifest itself in form of initiatives focused on very narrowly defined local interests of certain neighborhoods or residents groups. Grassroots activism undoubtedly have its weaknesses and dark sides that only prove that neither actor is infallible and therefore both sides should have a possibility for cooperation as well as control over each other.

2. Theory Frame

In their most recent work, Fligstein and McAdam (2011, 2012) introduce the dynamic theory of what they define as Strategic Action Fields that allows for systematic description of dynamics of interactions between social players in a given sphere of collaborative action. Fligstein and McAdam define Strategic Action Fields (SAF) as general building blocks of political and economic life, both civil society and the state. By their very nature, SAF are constantly interacting and overlapping, and the change in one often triggers change in another, neighboring field. In the specific case studied here, we can perceive urban policy as one of the fields connected to, and therefore dependent on, a number of other policy fields. Moreover, we can state that it is governed by several different logics introduced by local administration as well as corporate actors active in the field. The field dynamic is based on individual actors behaving in specific ways, using their resources and social skills, to cooperate or engage in competition with other actors within the SAF.

Using Fligstein’s and McAdam’s idea of a Strategic Action Field we can analyze the different groups within the new urban grassroots movement as a new actor entering the scene, that not only pushes the boundaries of the urban policy field managed by local administration, but also tries to establish new boundaries between different types of civil society actors in the field, trying to distinguish itself from those civil society organization, which are not “fighting for the urban cause”. In the light of theory of fields, it can be stated, grassroots movement enters the strategic action field of urban policy as a challenger to existing relations of power (Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 2012), as a result of municipal inability to deal with the problems of urban residents.

According to the theory, a field is composed of incumbents, challengers and internal governance units (IGUs). Incumbents are defined as actors who “wield disproportionate influence within a field and whose interests and views tend to be heavily reflected in the dominance organization of the strategic action field. Thus, the purposes
and structure of the field are adapted to their interests” (Fligstein, McAdam 2012:13). In practice, it means that the rules of the field tend to favor incumbent actors, and the shared frames or meanings legitimate their privileged position within the field. In case of the Polish urban policy field, local governments and existing public institutions play the role of incumbents defining and managing the realization of city development strategies. Challengers, on the other hand, can be found in “less privileged niches within the field and ordinarily wield little influence over its operation. While they recognize the nature of the field and the dominant logic of incumbent actors, they can usually articulate an alternative vision of the field and their position in it” (Fligstein, McAdam 202:13). Challengers often represent different set of norms and values than incumbents, but most of the time conform to the prevailing order, although, as Fligstein and McAdam noted “they often do so grudgingly, taking what the system gives them and awaiting new opportunities to challenge the structures and logic of the system” (Fligstein, McAdam 2012:13). As I will argue here, active residents’ groups, belonging to the wider urban grassroots movement, now play the role of challenger in the urban policy field.

The idea of social movement actors as challengers was introduced by Gamson, who explained the distinction between „members” and „challengers” as „being inside or outside of the polity. Those who are inside are members whose interest is vested – that is, recognized as valid by other members. Those who are outside are challengers. They lack the basic prerogative of members – routine access to decisions that affect them” (Gamson 1990:140). Therefore, the challengers’ main mode of existence is contention of an existing order and resistance to mainstream rules, in search of an opportunity to reshape existing power structures. As Tilly (1978) stresses, the „opportunity” and „threat” are distinct catalysts of challengers’ mobilization and what is of critical importance in shaping the dynamics of contention is the state facilitation and repression. Along the same lines, McAdam argued that the „structural potential” for a movement is defined by favorable political opportunities and access to mobilizing structures (established groups or networks) independent of elite control (McAdam 1982:48).

The different ideas of Gamson, Tilly and McAdam used in the framework of theory of fields allows for a development and critical description of contesting roles of civil society actors in a given Strategic Action Field. While the idea of challengers is not highly developed in the present theory frame by Fligstein and McAdam, the analysis of urban movement as an important new actor in the urban policy field should allow for deeper reflection on the nature of challengers and their possible influence on the field itself.

3. Development of Polish urban movement

For the purpose of this analysis I define the new urban movement as the recently growing activism of different forms of civic engagement in the cities and about the cities, focused on representing the rights and needs of residents. Its main distinctive feature is that the individual initiatives are very local and focused on specific problems or needs of local communities. Mergler (2008: 15) refers to it as the “cities residents’ involvement promoting their own essential needs and interests, as belonging to the residents of the city, carried out in the city and through the city”.
Another characteristic for urban initiatives is their hybridity (Kurnicki 2013) in terms of both different organizational forms they represent (formal associations and foundations, informal grassroots initiatives and neighborhood groups, electoral committees etc.) and the mixture of topics they specialize in (eg. transport & ecology, education & social services, culture & democratization etc.).

Although local grassroots activity has longer history (some of it dating pre war, other emerging soon after the fall of the communism) many of the local initiatives in Poland started to mushroom in the last decade. For example, one of the more established and known neighborhood initiatives is Smolna Street Residents Association, which was established in Warsaw in 2001 and became a role model for many similar movements. Another important organization was Association My-Poznaniacy, established in 2007 in Poznań, and the first organization to engage in legal struggles with the city hall as well as systematic monitoring of the city planning activities. The Right to the City Association that emerged from My-Poznaniacy Association in 2013, still works on the local level, but is also the main co-organizer of Urban Movements Congress as well as a leading actor in building the movement know-how and network potential.

Various urban initiatives emerged as a reaction to the “investment boom” of the last decade, on the wave of city development that violated the “urban tissue” and existing social relations. A new type of grassroots organizations was set off by these processes, bringing people together around new problems and issues and doing it in a new way, since they were neither political parties nor highly formalized NGOs (Mergler, Pobłocki, Wudarski 2013). Although its postulates are sometimes of a very general nature, this movement mainly grows from the need to protect material interests of cities’ residents, whose quality of life is threatened by the growing dominance of developers’ interests and lack of solutions that would guarantee a long-term development of the cities.

According to Mergler (2008) movements and organizations of urban residents began to have reasons for existence and development during the phase of Poland’s accession to the European Union. It was a period of revival of the investment process, including private housing developments that dominated the housing market. As Merger argues, it led to commercialization of thinking about the city (“city as a company”), which coincided with the lack of long-term planning, and resulted in growing chaos in city development. At this stage, it became visible that the local authorities are practically unable to solve the problems of urban development, given the available resources and legal tools. As a result, the urban movements emerged, to express the political interests of the urban population, seeing that no one else would take care of it.

These movements first started as sporadic and very local initiatives, usually limited to a single neighborhood, street or even building. They progressively became more numerous and more global in their scope. However, only in the recent years, scholars as well as politicians have begun paying attention to the increased activity of urban movement. The big change came around 2008, when the self-organization and consolidation of local urban actions into a one social movement begun, creating a nationwide interest group, acting not only on the city level, but also visible and recognized on the national level. The main symptom of this consolidation were afore mentioned Urban Movements Congresses.
As the study by Kowalewski (2013) indicates, the Congress was a tool for building a common urban movement ideology. The main aim of the Congress was to achieve a real change in urban policy, through lobbying for more democracy in cities decision-making processes. The Congress helped strengthening the lobbying abilities of urban activists in different cities, through building a wide support network of activists as well as experts on different urban issues. Overcoming the dispersion of the urban initiatives and organizations, created the opportunity for organized effort to press for a real change in legislation as well as practices of municipalities. It was, in a way, a show of strength of urban activists, which made them visible to both local and central government.

An important quality of the urban movement initiatives and organizations comes from their independence from public funds. As many critics of Polish civil society observed, Poland experiences growing NGO-ization and co-optation of civic sector (Korolczyk 2011, Jacobsson & Saxonberg 2013). High level of dependence on (very limited) public funds is one of the major weaknesses of the Polish third sector, which not only silences the potential whistle-blowers, but also creates fierce rivalry among civil society organizations, which have to compete for the limited resources. Lack of alternative to public funding (with public institutions also being the most important intermediaries in EU funding programs) gives public bodies a strong control mechanism over potential “trouble-makers”.

However, one can now talk about NGO-ization backlash, when the growing number of neighborhood groups and initiatives illustrate the shift from representative democracy toward direct democracy, based on the growing engagement of individuals and informal groups. Many of the urban initiatives are very critical toward so-called NGOs, defined as formal organizations with clientelistic approach toward public institutions and serving mostly as a subcontractor of various social services for municipalities. The distinction is fuzzy, because both NGOs and urban movement organizations share the same legal status. From the urban activists’ point of view, however, there seem to be an important distinction between new urban movement organizations and informal groups, that maintain their grassroots character and are very much focused on solving the local issues and the growing number of NGOs localized in the same cities, but focusing on service-provision and fund-raising rather than direct representation of residents’ needs. Therefore different types of organizations, that are a result of residents’ sense of responsibility for their city, remain at the core of the urban movement:

“...for some reason, in a given time and in case of certain issue, some residents, motivated by a sense of responsibility for their city become engaged in a dispute with the city administration in the name of the future of the city. Starting point being their critical evaluation of the substantial part of the administration’s concept about how the city should be organized, and the fact that the administration didn’t try to consult their ideas with residents to a satisfactory degree.” (Mergler 2008: 15).

To summarize, social activity at the local or neighborhood level visibly increased in Polish cities in the last ten years, as a result of changing and unfulfilled residents’
needs as well as threats to their quality of life. It is also a symptom of growing willingness of residents to engage in creating the future of the city instead of remaining passive consumers of the city offer (or as some activists would put it – passive victims of the lack of it). The initiatives themselves positively affect the quality of life of residents and increase their interest in local affairs, which generates social capital, visibly strengthening local communities. As I argue here, the synergy of all the mushrooming neighborhood activity results in an emergence of a broader social movement (new urban movement), which quickly became an important actor in “the game of the city”.

4. Warsaw cases as examples of interplay between urban initiatives and local administration

4.1. Research framework

To better illustrate the complicated relations between the urban initiatives and local administration and the possible wider effect of the urban movement on the public sector, I will use qualitative data from Warsaw-based study focused on neighborhood initiatives.Individual interviews with representatives of neighborhood groups and various publications in the press and on the Internet made it possible to describe in detail the history of the initiatives, including their origins, course and current state, and to characterize a group of people involved in their implementation. Therefore, I will concentrate on describing the reactions of the local authorities, institutions and organizations to some of those initiatives.

To give the analysis a wider context it is important to mention the diversity of neighborhood activities in Warsaw, which was reflected in the sample design. One can find among them both formal associations (e.g. Smolna Street Residents’ Association, The Michałów Society Association) and informal initiatives (e.g. “Our Park” initiative in Kabaty). The third hybrid type of neighborly activities are partnerships between the local government and representatives of neighborhood associations (e.g. Tarczynska 11 “Us for Us” Neighbor Club). Less common forms are the local councils (e.g. Oleandrow Association) and local election committees.

The usual mobilizing factors were changes in the immediate physical environment (e.g. planned investments or demolition), common enemy or problem, like in case of Smolna Street’s residents who united to fight against an illegal nightclub, or residents of Kabaty, who were unhappy about the low quality of their immediate environment. In some cases this mobilization turned into an active protest (Smolna, Michałów, Oleandów), in other – a constructive effort to improve the quality of life (Kabaty, Tarczyńska). In other words, taking responsibility of the place or fighting for its

293 Qualitative part of the research was conducted in 2012 and 2013 as a part of the project “Tamed City? Warsaw enclaves of social activism and their origins” financed from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education research grant N N116 283838.

294 The research included eight cases of Warsaw neighborhood initiatives, with approximately three interviews per case. For the purpose of this chapter five most relevant cases are used, including the data from 15 individual interviews with local activists and three interviews with urban movement leaders from Poznań and Warsaw.
protection, as well as an attempt to improve the aesthetics of the area, are the primary impulses for the neighborhood actions in Warsaw.

Another important issue differentiating local initiatives is the primary area of activity around which the efforts of the local community focus. As mentioned above, some of the initiatives emerge as protest in defense of the common good. Often the protest lies only in the origins of the initiative, which then transforms into something else, opposing changes through different political actions, petitions and letter-writing, collecting signatures, meetings with representatives of local government or investors, demonstrations or direct intervention (an example might be squatting of Prasowy milk bar near Oleandrów).

Below, five of Warsaw initiatives will be described in more detail, pointing out to their relations with public administration on the local level and potential influence on administration practices. I will refer to the most grassroots level relations, which, in my view, prove to be the foundation of the ongoing change of the “city game” rules – both on the local as well national level.

4.2. Warsaw cases

The Michałów Society (Praskie Stowarzyszenie Mieszkańców “Michałów”) was founded in 2008 by a group of residents and supporters of Praga, mainly from neighborhoods of Michałów and Szmulowizna. Association tries to continue the work of Friends of Michałów Society acting before World War II in this area. The main objective of the Association is to improve the quality of life by supporting the revitalization and development of North Praga (north-east run-down district of Warsaw), cooperation with local government in terms of public consultation and supporting the Praga’s revitalization program. Association’s aim is also to improve the quality of life of the people living in the area through cooperation with local authorities and other CSOs.

The organization has a broad profile and scope of operations, usually focused on forcing the local government to intervene in some social or infrastructural issue influencing the quality of life of local residents. The effects of the organization's activities are clearly visible in the public space, reflected in both its raising aesthetics and functionality. The association plays a very effective role of “public space watch”, monitoring all investments planned or implemented in the area and trying to correct all the possible shortcomings. At the same time, the association is lobbying for a provision of demands and needs of the residents in the local plans through public consultation mechanism.

For a long time the association efforts met with a rather hostile reception from representatives of local authorities as well as some journalists. It was accused of delaying or hindering the implementation of public investments. In time, however, the association begun to be recognized as an important partner, cooperating in revitalization projects and in planning the future of the district. This change was mostly due to the activists’ persistence as well as professional approach to participation in decision-making processes on the district level. The Association often seeks to influence official decisions, usually through writing petitions and preparing own versions to local projects. This requires good knowledge of the principles of planning and implementation of projects by the city, as well as about provisions related to these investments. In time, an intense activity on the
internet via blog and Facebook profile became an important virtual extension of the association’s activity, visibly strengthening its impact on the decision-making bodies.

Still, it can be stated that the attitudes of local authorities towards the association seems to be ambivalent. Part of the district level officials remains critical of the initiative, some of them started to perceive the association as a good partner to work with. As the leader said:

“On the one hand, we are sometimes perceived as a partner with whom you can fix something, for example, during the consultations concerning the revitalization of the Kawęczyńska street, which were practically enforced by us. Formally, we are also social partners in the district Social Dialogue Committee, where we press the municipality to create a wide program of revitalization and development of Prague. With this they were generally reluctant. Meetings were nice, sometimes there were people representing various departments of the district office, but the specific effects were not satisfactory. More often we are perceived, and I know that from some officials who sympathize with us, just as troublemakers, disturbing the peace of mind and wellbeing of public officials. We are supposedly the ones who molest them, do not know what we want, all we do is criticize and complain and block the investments, and they need to reply to our letters all the time. So I guess sometimes we create a hassle for them, and sometimes we compromise and shame them. I think that’s why we may be perceived as a kind of institutional enemy.” [interview with the association leader]

Those problems are associated also with public opinion primarily negative attitude, reflected in the press and in the internet:

“We are largely perceived as a classic NIMBY, an association, which blocks large and important investments, guided by narrow, vested interests – ’not in our backyard’, ’not in our neighborhood’. And we are permanently stuck with this label.” [interview with the association leader]

According to the activists, one of the main successes of the association, was the fact that they managed to convince the policy makers to take a wider look at local problems and needs and to think strategically about the future of Praga district, and then to include this vision in the revitalization program. As the association leader points out:

“Many of our ideas, this perspective thinking about this area as a part of the bigger picture, I think there is a positive response from the city council. Our project concerning calming of the road traffic and designating the cycling lanes at Okrzei Street met with a very warm welcome from the Warsaw Plenipotentiary for bicycles and Urban Transport Management office. Our project to design overpasses across the Targowa, Ząbkowska and Okrzei streets met with a favorable response of traffic engineers and urban planners responsible for the local development plan. Our project of Trasa Świętokrzyska met with a favorable response of representatives of Office of Architecture and Urban Planning as well as Warsaw Planning Council, and so on.” [interview with the association leader]

Despite the controversies, the association had a visible impact on district as well as city government behavior, through holding them accountable for implemented investments as well as created strategic documents.
Another case is the Association of Smolna Street Residents (situated in the central district of Śródmieście), which was created in 2001 by the group of locals protesting against illegal nightclub opened in the neighborhood. The club was noisy and changed this quiet street into an unsafe area, plagued by drunks and leaflets advertising escort agencies. The founders started their activity as informal group through lobbing with authorities, writing letters of protest etc. After the long battle, the club was closed and the leaflets disappeared completely. This success led to high integration of neighbors, who then started to work on esthetics of their surroundings. The residents of one of the oldest and most representative house on the street decided to turn one of the flats into a neighbors’ meeting place. They started to organize concerts and meetings there and – to be able to pay the rent – decided to organize a hostel in the rest of the rooms. One of the recent developments was creating a little vegetable garden on the roof overlooking the inner yard. Several graffiti cleaning actions were also organized, that spread from Smolna to neighboring streets and (most recently) a local train station. The association initiated a series of cultural events in the vicinity, in cooperation with Music University and the Chopin Museum, creating what is now called the Musical Quarter. The activists also organize annual Smolna Street Festival and engage in other activities concerning local issues and problems.

Smolna initiative has grown from protests against night-club and porno-leaflets, to the association that became one of the most known and visible neighborhood associations in Poland, organizing up-scale cultural events, experimenting with urban gardening and fighting with graffiti. The primary barrier for their actions, as reported by local activists, was the reluctant attitude of the local authorities. Not only the association couldn’t count on the support from the district and the city office for their actions, but to the contrary, several officials were effectively hindering their actions. However, there are indications that the actions of Smolna Association are after all this time recognized by officials, although, as the activists claim, their positive reactions sometimes seems to be rather superficial:

"Different people come here, to our events, district mayors, city council head, etc. They shake hands, smile and all that. [...] But if there is any problem, something we would like to do, as long as it does not appear in 'Gazeta Wyborcza', sometimes there is simply no response. One can knock and knock, but only when some social pressure appears in media, then these authorities are beginning to work." [interview with the association member]

As the interviewees suggest, the relations with civil servants, although seemingly friendly, are often based on some type of power struggle. However, as one of the activists stated, the present situation can be considered better than a few years ago:

"Today authority must take care of the public relations dimension and is more pro-social. Those ten years ago it was all so very stiff and it was just impossible to settle anything with any city office." [interview with the association member]

Still, the representatives of the Smolna declared that because of the lack of consistent support for their actions, the potential of social engagement, which could be
used for the common good is still being wasted. An example can be the graffiti-cleaning action at the representative central street of Nowy Świat, which gathered 300 volunteers, but didn’t receive any support from the municipality, despite all sorts of suggestions and requests. Activists interpret this reluctance as a proof that their activity is treated as competition to city’s projects and therefore rejected or ignored:

“[…] because if there is an official responsible for cultural affairs, then culture in the city should be institutionalized. Since there is an official responsible for the issue of cleanliness, then why the hell somebody else should take care of the issue? And so on and so forth.” [interview with the association leader]

As the association leader pointed out, the stronger the position of the organization and the higher visibility of its actions, the less chance there is to receive some help from the municipality:

“In my experience, when the organization is in its infancy, when it is in generally unknown, when it is ‘toothless’, the officials are very willing to help, because they do not really know who they are helping. But when the organization becomes recognizable and has something to say and in addition demands something, because it feels that it has the title to demand, well, then it is seen as the main competitor.” [interview with the association leader]

Ironically, this lack of support can be therefore interpreted as a measure of success of activists from Smolna. After thirteen years since it was established, the position (also international) of the Association is well established, and one can see that the city institutions started to copy its projects and ideas, as well a treat them as serious partners and experts, especially in the field of culture.

In comparison, the Oleandrów Association initiatives are low-key, however also well known by the local authorities. In 2003 the group of activists from former neighborhood council started with mobilization of residents in defense of the green square between the buildings where one of the developers planned to put a new building. The plan was successfully blocked and the square is now officially recognized and named Skwer Oleandrów. Since then, the Association was formed, that works actively on organization of neighbors’ meetings (Christmas, Neighbor Day), as well as represents the interests of the neighborhood at the district council meetings. One of the activists has the ambition of changing the square into a Warsaw’s Champs-Élysées, planting flowers, giving away flower seeds to local businesses and organizing garden work on the square with other residents.

From defending the square the Association moved to defending the “Prasowy” milk bar that is located in the neighborhood. Since 1954 the bar was a local affordable eating and meeting place, closed in 2011 after many years of service because of high rent. Locals (including seniors who dined in the bar regularly) along with squatters and young urban activists took over the closed bar and started to cook meals and give them away to protest against commercialization of the place. Due to the pressure and protests of activists and media alike, district authorities decided not to put the place on the market, but rent it on preferential terms to replace the old milk bar with a new one. The bar is now a known meeting place for urban activists and a very popular and cheap eating joint.
The Oleandrów Association has a history of good relations with some district representatives, also because it has direct access to them through involvement in the local council. It mainly represents the group of active senior residents, who push for making their environment safer and better looking as well as integrate the neighbors around the issues and problems of the neighborhood. The history of the milk bar as well as square defense illustrates how through the coordinated efforts of local residents and urban activists, the city dwellers had a potential to persuade the district authorities to change the rules for the sake of neighborhood wellbeing.

Another prominent case is the “Our Park” initiative organized in 2006 by the group of residents living around Kabaty metro station. It started with one of the new residents being fed up with the state of the metro station surroundings (his windows overlooked the neglected dirt area, that was left after the construction works ended) and decided to take care of it himself. He bought a number of trees and bushes, and started to plant them illegally on the land belonging to the district. He also set a web page and invited other people to join in creating the self-made local park. The initiative was strongly opposed by district administration as illegal takeover of the city land, but with support of press and local celebrities it was allowed to stay. After some time, the leader came up with the idea of creating the tree alley where people could plant their own tree, and dedicate it to somebody they love. The dedications are visible on little plates stating the name of an intended recipient.

As a result, the area became green and inviting so neighbors started to meet there for open-air cinema nights and yoga classes. The initiative has a loose structure concentrated around the leader, who, because of all the media attention, become a kind of celebrity and started to advise other groups who wanted to set illegal parks in other places in Poland.

According to the leader, the attitude of local authorities toward the initiative of planting a neighborhood park was negative from the very beginning:

“I called them at the beginning, and I said that I wanted to plant a tree. I asked what is the formal status of the area and the lady – before she hung up on me – said I was crazy, because you cannot just plant trees and that she will not talk to me.” [interview with the association leader]

As a result, the leader was formally accused for violation of public land, but the legal threats haven’t discouraged him. The conflict with the municipality was predominantly on paper – as a result of wide mobilization of residents more than 500 letters concerning the development of the project were sent to the district office – each from a different person, with a different return address, and different content. Since all of the letters required official confirmation of acceptance, soon the officials were flooded with formal paperwork. Media engagement was also crucial in sustaining the public interest and pressure on the municipality. As the leader recalls:

“[…] public opinion is the most important asset of any social organization. Journalists pay attention to the social enterprises like that and comment on them, because they know that the organizer does not do it for money.” [interview with the association leader]
The history of “Our Park” initiative is one of the best-known in Poland, as it was the first widely discussed constructive take-over of the space by the residents. It still serves as a model for other similar projects, which meet with less controversy from the local authorities, who have no real way to punish this type of actions. It can be said that what happened in Kabaty convinced both the residents and local authorities that neighborhood community is a valuable source of positive change and – in a way – take some of the responsibility off the shoulders of local authority.

One of the proofs that municipalities are now becoming more and more pro-active in this type of neighborhood initiatives is the case of Tarczyńska Street. Tarczyńska is where neighbors club “Us for us” was established in 2011 as a result of a partnership between local community club “Surma” and Ochota district office. Activists from Surma came up with idea of social revitalization of Tarczyńska Street area through creating a meeting place for children and teenagers (many of them from dysfunctional families) as well as seniors. With some help from local district office, one of the flats at Tarczyńska was turned into a self-help Center for residents in a form of neighbors club, a place open for the local community and CSOs.

To summarize, similar patterns can be observed in all the described Warsaw grassroots cases. The development of the neighborhood initiatives usually started with protest against some type of threat to the neighborhood. As a result of the conflict or a common problem, local integration increased and some type of activities aimed at strengthening of the local identity usually started to develop. In a symbolic way, the active residents often “took over” the space, through different type of signs and actions, as well as through organization of meetings promoting local history and strengthening the ties between the neighbors. Through wide mobilization and thanks to social capital built during common actions, residents often become active lobbyists, pressuring local authorities to introduce needed changes in their environment.

The longer the engagement in this type of activities is, the more professional the initiatives become. Their growing experience in solving local problems, means that they became experts on urban issues, even more willing to participate both in district and city-level decision-making processes as well as open to sharing their experience with other active neighborhoods. Some of the initiatives came together as a part of Urban Movements Congress, but most of them focus on local problems and conflicts, entering more and more boldly the realm of local politics. As I will argue further, the growing intensity of interaction between the urban movement and both local and central governmental bodies, results in several innovative changes in the public administration practices, often initiated at the grassroots’ level.

5. Urban movement impact

As it was showed before, one of the main symptoms of changing relations between the city officials and the residents is the raising engagement of urban movements in local politics as well as social and urban planning issues. Another important and related symptom is the growing popularity of public referenda aiming at dismissing the ruling mayor from his or her office. In the recent two years, several cities in Poland became an
arena of direct fight against the ruling city establishment, lead not only by the political opposition but more importantly by the wide groups of residents, willing to put effort to get rid of the elected city head. What illustrates the scale of the dissatisfaction is the fact that since last elections of local government (2010) as much as eighty-four local referendums to dismiss the city mayor were organized all over Poland (Szułdrzyński 2013). Many of them were unsuccessful, but were a clear sign of widespread lack of trust toward ruling mayors as well as low local government legitimacy.

The slow change in the local administration behavior was commenced already in 2001, when the new legal regulations established the obligatory Social Dialog Commissions on the local level. The Commissions have to include CSOs representatives and have an advisory role to the municipality, grouping civic sector actors working on specific topics like health, social services, culture etc. Through these Commissions many CSOs’ activists gained a direct access to the city hall and were able to establish more personal relationships with the city officials. This also resulted in hiring some of those activists in the city's institutions, where they introduced different mindsets and experience to the bureaucratic structures.

What seems to be characteristic for urban activists is that they rarely stop at finding or defining problems concerning urban space, but usually also work on solving them in real terms. One of the good examples is the participatory budgeting. The idea of involving citizens in decisions about what should be financed from the tax money mirrors the shift from the residents defined as “consumers of city’s offer” to co-creators of this offer as well as decision-makers. While the notion of including the CSOs in the co-production (Pestoff, Brandsen 2009) of city’s cultural as well as social support services seems to be well under way, the real inclusion into decision-making processes for a long time met with the opposition from the traditional bureaucratic administration structures. The argument here being that the management of the city involves a great deal of resources, coordination and professional expertise, which is seldom found in case of civil society actors. This stance can be identified with a pressure for professionalization of the civil society from the side of the municipalities, who are not willing to open the most crucial decision-making processes to “unprepared citizens”. Therefore, to be treated as an important partner, urban movement had to come up with sufficient expertise as well as numbers to be included.

The fact that some of the city officials have experience working in CSOs created natural bridges between those institutions and the new generation of activists from urban movement. As one of the urban activists said:

“What I learned at that moment, was that there are many of the city officials, who work in those institutions because they simply love this city. And it's not only the Warsaw's Centre for Social Communication that has people with NGOs’ experience, but also the City Transport Office, vice-president office, many consultants. So you can just talk to them, and slowly the distinction blurs. What was obvious till then, that there is an opposition between the ‘good’ urban movements and the ‘bad’ city officials, suddenly there is none of it anymore.” [interview with urban activist from Warsaw]

One of the surprisingly important factors of narrowing the gap between the activists and city official was the growing use of Facebook. After the first Urban Movement
Congress, it became a convenient and widely used mode of communication allowing for spreading the information as well as sharing experiences between urban activists from different cities. However, at least in case of Warsaw, it soon became apparent that Facebook can also serve as a new medium of building relations between the municipality and urban activists. Thanks to this interactive tool, activists and city officials started to have more direct and less formal modes of contact and got to know each other better.

One can also identify different levels of the influence of the urban movement on the public sector. At the very bottom, urban activists interact with city district offices, which in Warsaw have a high level of autonomy. These offices are the main recipients of the movement complaints, protests as well as advice or expertise. Next is the city level at which activists target the mayor office and the city government as the one responsible for the long-term urban planning, biggest investments, organization of the public transport, etc. This seems to be the most important level in terms of influencing major decisions, and also the one at which urban activists are now most visible. Another level is the province (one of the 16 voivodships in Poland), which is a high-level administrative subdivision, with the voivode appointed by the Prime Minister and a regional representative of the central government. The highest level of interaction is the central government and the ministries, which are addressed by urban activists with propositions of reforms, legal documents as well as comments concerning legal provisions regarding cities. Most recently, this communication became two-way, with government officials inviting activists (as residents’ representatives) to participate in consultations or discussions around important matters concerning the future of the urban policies. At the same time, cities like Poznań (Zaradnik 2012) as well as academia related think-tanks (ABC konsultacji 2010, Gójska, et al. 2012) introduced different types of guides to public consultations, focusing on explaining the possibilities and rules of participation in local decision-making processes.

Taking it all into account, I argue that grassroots urban movement has a potential of changing the organizational culture of public administration on the local as well as central level. The constant pressure for greater involvement of citizens in decision-making results in two key types of changes:

- Change of rhetoric – with local administration starting to use the language of civic participation, consultations, sustainable development, green solutions etc. One of the main successes of urban movement in that respect was to bring those new ideas into the spotlight, while media attention as well as European Union policies helped this cause immensely. Growing number of municipalities intercept this new language and are now using it to prove that they are open to the postulates and needs of the citizens. However, as urban leaders underline, in some cases the slogans aren’t yet supported by any real action and the rhetoric of urban democracy remains an empty shell.

- Change in behavior – opening up of decision-making processes around new investments and urban planning through organization of public consultations, presentations of plans followed by discussions. Also, the introduction of new communication mechanism (e-communication as well as different roundtables, polls and debates) and giving more access to public information through web pages makes local
governments actions a bit more transparent. Different participatory mechanisms are being introduced to allow for active involvement of residents in shaping the future of their environment. One of the main weaknesses of those processes, however, is the lack of obligation to implement results of public consultations or debates in the final decisions. Also, as both activists and officials underline, there is also a big need for citizens’ education, so that residents are well informed and can make better decisions. On the other hand, the administration must learn to communicate better and clearer with the various stakeholders.

Both types of changes show, that despite the growing cooperation between urban activists and officials, the pressure from the grassroots still meets with the certain reluctance. In extreme cases, local politicians and administrators are trying to “blunt the edge” of the local activists stance and incorporate it into the formal agenda to protect the status quo. What makes it hard to accomplish, however, is that the power of urban movement comes from many different sources. On the one hand, the motivation of the urban activists is usually high as it very much concerns the everyday reality they are living in. On the other hand, they managed to create a strong national network, grouping people with different expertise and willingness to help each other in local as well as national endeavors. Also, their postulates mostly concern the quality of life of residents of a certain city or district, which makes it easy to mobilize a wider community support despite the usual differences or conflicts.

At this stage, we can therefore say that urban movements are well equipped to play the city game more as partners, then suppliants. The extensive amount of legal as well as practical know-how is easily available through the Urban Movement Congress structure and networks. Effective dissemination of ideas by the urban leaders gives those issues visibility and focuses media attention, creating another pressure mechanism. All this knowledge as well as social capital is now used to shift the boundaries between what can be discussed and decided together and what type of decisions only the appointed officials can make.

According to Mergler, from this perspective, the situation in most of the Polish cities is evolving in the right direction. The discourse describing the local politics as a party fight looses popularity and is being replaced by a new way of discussing city politics, more substantive and focused on the social dimension of political processes. The new discourse is based on the language of urban democracy, spatial policy, social participation, and the right to the city. However, main problems that remain are described by the activists in terms of “opportunistic planning” and city acting as “limited liability company”.

As Mergler and many other movement’s activists after him argue, a remedy to that is “concrete narrative” (Mergler 2012) – bottom-up as well as top-down efforts focused around specific, concrete issues and problems instead of ideological disputes and struggles. Despite its highly critical stance, urban movement remains open to discussion and cooperation with the cities representatives. Government side also seems to realize that grassroots’ experience and involvement can be an important asset for creating better legal solutions and preventing further deterioration of the Polish cities. This helps to

295 Interview with Lech Mergler, urban activist from Poznań (Right to the City Association), one of the leaders of the polish urban movement, April 2014.
overcome the stereotypical thinking on both sides, with politicians and local bureaucrats perceived as corrupted and uncooperative, or civil society actors defined as short-sighted, egoistic and ignorant.

Pobłocki (2013) and Nawratek (2012) both argue that in the context of global capitalism, cities are drifting and local governments have a very restricted control over their course. In this difficult context the officials are more willing to give away some of the responsibility over the cities to the residents. Miessen (2013) calls it “out-sourcing of responsibility” serving more effective management of the cities in crisis. However, from the point of view of urban activists, this reluctant and strategic opening of the political as well as administrative structures, was a good starting point for introducing more participative mechanism in the city management.

6. Conclusions

Urban development concentrating on economical growth and infrastructural investments brought in new problems as well as perpetuated the old ones, like social exclusion, inequity and precariousness of urban life. In this context, the new urban movement is the result of the reality faced by the growing number of citizens of Polish cities, who discovered that they are caught in the turmoil of urban growth, with not much voice over the matters of their own environment. Although the idea of engaging the citizens in the city planning processes is still controversial, it can be argued that the lack of residents’ involvement in the city planning in the past was one of the reasons for increase of negative processes such as gentrification and depopulation of the city centers.

Urban movements entered the scene with new postulates, answering the burning question posed also by theorists of globalization (Sassen 1996): whose city is it? The first Congress of Urban Movements announced those postulates in the form of “Nine Urban Theses”. Two years later, in 2013, the second thesis about participative budget was already being implemented in many cities across Poland. Thus, what for a long time was considered as an extravagant and exotic Brazilian idea has recently become a widely discussed and implemented instrument of urban governance. Although critics like Bendyk (2013) or Miessen (2013) often point out that this idea may still be not so much a tool of democratization as a safety valve protecting the status quo, this new tool of voicing the needs and preferences of citizens is nevertheless entering into force. It will be an important test not only of the willingness of the local authorities to work with the citizens, but also of the real strength of urban movement and its ability to mobilize people to engage in decisions concerning their own space.

This strength is already illustrated in the recent book published by urban movement activists (Mergler, Pobłocki, Wudarski 2013), which lists several more or less successful “battles for space”, describing legal tools available for citizens who want to influence the decision making process or protest against unwanted investments in their

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296 The first full participatory budgeting process was developed in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre, starting in 1989. Participatory budgeting was part of a number of innovative reforms targeting the severe inequality in living standards among city residents. Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre occurs annually, with a series of assemblies at neighborhood, regional, and city levels, where spending priorities are identified and voted on by residents and elected budget delegates.
city. This know-how book is in itself a tangible proof of growing organization and professionalization of the movement. It’s now widely read and discussed not only by the urban activists, but also architects, city planners and local administration.

The question of how far the influence of the urban movement goes and should go in terms of real access to decision-making remains open. Despite critical perception of the municipalities’ motives and willingness to build stronger urban democracy, it’s hard to deny the emergence of new language as well as organizational culture and mode of action on the side of municipalities. From public administration’s perspective, those changing rules present a challenge, no doubt, but also have a potential for creating stronger legitimacy as well as more effective solutions to the problems of the urban population. At the same time, urban activists learn how to play the game of the city with increasing effectiveness, cutting their way through the reluctance of power elites and pushing for more transparency, democracy and focus on residents’ needs. Some of them are guided by the idea of the common good; some are more particular in their actions and serve specific groups’ interests or needs.

However, it seems that even the failed battles, only help strengthen the movement resolve and consolidation, resulting in its growing expertise as well as direct political engagement. All data indicates that in the 2014 local elections urban activists will become a visible group of contra-candidates, openly challenging the political status quo in Polish cities. At the same time, social experts engaged in the movement – architects, planners, and researchers – successfully apply for jobs in the city halls, entering the bureaucratic world with new vision of building the better and more democratic city. As some of the observers remark (Pluciński 2013, Wybieralski 2014) those recent changes are more evolutionary than revolutionary:

“A civic revolution is crawling through the cities. Several years ago, residents could submit written comments in the box office and wait statutory month for a response. Today, here you go, nearly every day public consultations take place, as well as debates, deliberative polls and local referendums are organized, urban public opinion is studied. The authority also allowed the residents into the money-sharing process. From small towns to the metropolis hundreds of people submit projects to “civic budget” (...) Tens of thousands of voters choose among them.” (Wybieralski 2014)

Although positive in principle, those innovative notions have to be observed critically, to avoid the situation when new participatory and democratic mechanisms will remain “rituals”, instead of marking the deeper change in the urban game.

In case of the urban grassroots movement actors analyzed in this paper the resistance has different facets, which makes it an interesting case to be analyzed in terms of “challenger” in the Strategic Action Field. One of the main characteristics of urban movement is opposition toward existing political and administrative practices that negatively influences the public space as well as quality of life of urban residents. While in many of Polish cities local political elites were holding power for several terms (in case of Poznań, president Lech Grobelny remained in power for sixteen years), the conflicts between grassroots activists and local establishment have a long history.
The rebellious nature of the new urban grassroots movement, as described in Harvey (2012) or Nawratek (2012) analyses, stems mostly from the reflection that residents and their needs are marginalized in the process of city transformation, driven mostly by the economic interests of international investors and real estate agencies. The fact that resistance is a part of the urban grassroots movement mission is reflected in the language used to frame the conflict, where urban movements define themselves as a side in “battle over space” or a player in the “game of the city”.

It can be said that the agency of the current urban grassroots movement is both political – as resistance to or change of existing power relations on the local level – and “down to earth” practical – resolving around specific shared urban space, it’s accessibility, safety, aesthetics or in broad sense “ownership”. Up to now, it seems that an important part of the movement success resolves around the change of rhetoric, visible in cooptation of the main postulates of the movement in official political programs. Urban initiatives quickly adopted a shared set of self-defining mottoes, defining their values as well as qualities separating them from other civil society groups active in urban environment (among them charities and organizations working in the field of sport, culture, education, ecology etc.).

At this point, after the partial success of introducing urban grassroots movement representatives into local government structures in four major Polish cities, the movement faces an important challenge of redefining its role. One of the possible developments is a shift from direct opposition to the more cooperative approach, involving compromises on the political level in exchange for bigger influence in the field. From the theoretical point of view it would mean a shift from challengers toward incumbent positions, which might be at odds with the watchdog role that some of the urban activists define themselves through. Many of the activists fear that they independence as well as legitimacy would be lost through cooptation, while the power elites would use and “spit them out” or discard as soon as possible (as it seems to be the case with “The City is Ours” election committee in Warsaw). On the other hand, urban movement representatives always defined their own agenda in very practical terms of introducing a real urban change, and for this reason wanted to be involved in decision-making on local and national level. The question remains, if given the different logics of public and civil sphere it is possible that the local administration will be able to “swallow the bitter pill” of revolutionary postulates and incorporate them in city management (as seems to be the case with “Right to the City” election committee in Poznań).

However, to agree with Kurnicki (2013:24), it’s no the taking over of the administration of the city institutions by civil society actors that is crucial, nor the threat of cooptation of activists and their organizations by government, but the notion of establishing and developing new “bridging relations” between the actors within the city game, as well as revealing and laying bare the existing conflicts of interests, to be dealt with in a more public process. As the paper describes, actors from a new urban movement managed to undermine and destabilize the previous rhetorical as well as political and institutional status quo, opening up parts of the public administration to innovative practices in the field of city management. Through such efforts, the rules of the game can change, possibly also for the benefit of the increasingly urbanized Polish society.
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Urban Mobilizations in Lithuania: Scope, Reasons and Non-Participation

Jolanta Aidukaite

Abstract

This paper explores urban mobilizations in the post-soviet context. The analysis seeks to highlight the scope and reasons for urban community mobilizations in Lithuania. In doing so, the paper also seeks to explore the reasons behind the non-participation, which have not been yet addressed in any study before. The discussion is placed within a broader debate on the ‘weak’ civil society in Central and Eastern Europe, increasing liberalization and marketization of housing and urban policy. Drawing on 30 in-depth interviews with local activists, community leaders, state officials and urban developers in Vilnius, this paper shows that in order to understand social movements, the collective actions have to be studied if as embedded into unique historical experiences of the post-socialist societies, their political and economic settings, taking also into account viewpoints of the collective and individual actors for their social involvement around urban issues. The major explanations for non-participation can be found in the structural socioeconomic conditions of Lithuanian society, which do not support participation, including housing privatization and marketization; individualization; and increasing income and social inequalities.

Keywords: urban mobilization, community organization, housing self-management partnership, Lithuania, housing policy

Introduction

Lithuania is one of the new EU countries, which went through dramatic economic, political and social changes since the fall of the socialist regime in 1990. It has been a part of the Soviet Union for 50 years and this has left scars on its future development trajectories. One of the most significant ‘marks’, which often referred as post-socialist legacies, has been a weak civil society. However, a number of studies have already challenged the perception of weak civil society by exploring various social movements in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (see Jacobsson and Saxonberg, 2013)

297 The paper has been funded by the Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies (grant 753/42/2012).
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and particularly the urban grassroots mobilizations (see Jacobsson, forthcoming). Previous studies on urban community movements in Lithuania have also demonstrated a significant activity at the local community level (Aidukaitė, 2013; Aidukaite and Jacobsson, forthcoming; Aidukaitė and Fröhlich, forthcoming), which do not fit into a stereotype of the weak civil society. The aim of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, this paper seeks to highlight the scope and reasons for urban mobilizations in Lithuania. The discussion is placed within a broader debate on the ‘weak’ civil society in CEE, increasing liberalization and marketization of housing and urban policy. On the other hand, this study seeks to explore the reasons behind the non-participation, which have not been yet addressed in any study before. It is believed that addressing the non-participation, scholars could provide a better understanding of a civil society and urban activism in the CEE.

Specifically, it explores mobilizations at the community level, which involve environmental issues, but also strives for community’s improvement and development, and mobilizations around housing self-management issues, especially mobilizations of apartment block owners in order to improve their housing efficiency. Previous studies (Aidukaite, 2013; Aidukaite et al., 2014) have shown that the most vivid mobilizations around housing and urban issues in Lithuania are community organizations and housing self-management partnerships, both of which are institutionalized forms of organization, as they are officially registered with the authorities and therefore have legal status. While housing self-management partnerships unite apartment block owners, community organizations bring together the inhabitants of the residential area. They are founded by local residents, who are also members of the organization, for the purpose of implementing local initiatives related to the common interest of the neighbourhood (LR Socialines apsaugos ir darbo ministerija, 2011).

**Data and method.** The paper employs qualitative approach to study urban grassroots mobilizations. The empirical study was conducted in the city capital of Lithuania: Vilnius. Thirty semi-structured interviews were conducted with the activists of community organizations, the leaders of the home owners’ organizations, and decision makers. The total 30 interviews provide a rich material to understand urban mobilizations and their problems.

The paper begins with the short overview of a number of factors which involve mobilization, especially community mobilization, delineated in the theoretical literature. Then, the paper develops debate on civil society and housing policy in contemporary Lithuania. This will be followed by the analysis of the urban grassroots mobilizations. Concluding remarks offer some possible explanations behind the development of urban activism in Lithuania.

**Theoretical background**

In previous research the scope and depth of social movements in Central and Eastern Europe are often explained by two major factors: economic opportunities and historical legacies (Jacobsson and Saxonberg, 2013). The economic opportunities are understood as availability of local or external donor’s funds, which help to promote civil activism and achieve results. The historical legacies are understood as destructive
influences of the socialist state on the relationship between the state and its people, which were totalitarian, paternalistic and repressive in its nature, leaving little initiative from the grass-roots levels to influence the state’s decisions. These legacies help to explain the current state of civil society in many post-communist countries up to now. The institutional structures which help to support and promote civil initiatives at the grass-roots level are still not in place in some Central and East European countries or not sufficiently developed, which impede the expansion of civil society.

Others state (see Pickvance, 1994) that political context and the degree of the democratization in the Central and Eastern Europe is the most important keys in understanding success and failure of social movements among the countries. The differences in political context influence the resource availability opportunities and the degree of media support, which in turn can explain the success and failure of the movements in achieving their goals and surviving their successes.

The development of various grassroots mobilizations and associations in Lithuania, as in many post-communist countries, is shaped by two factors. On the one hand, the negative experience of the totalitarian communist regime hinders the expansion of civil society, since any democratic movements were forbidden in the Soviet era. There was no possibility during Soviet time to use citizenship rights to influence the public sphere (decisions of the Communist Party and government) as it was in the democratic countries, but instead people formed kinship and friendship networks in a private sphere to form mutual self-help communities. On the other hand, the transition that followed by the rapid globalization and Europeanization has opened wide opportunities for the development of various social movements and interest groups.

A few recent studies carried on urban grassroots mobilization in Lithuania confirm the debate above, but also offers additional explanations for community mobilizations. After Lithuania joining the EU in 2004, resource opportunities provided by the European Structural Fund (ESF) have been favourable for a mushrooming of community organizations in Lithuania, especially in rural but also in urban areas (Aidukaite and Jacobsson, forthcoming). Europeanization has stimulated the development of grassroots initiatives. Nevertheless, the need to defend the local interest and changes in housing policy have been also important reasons for taking urban initiatives. A study (Aidukaite, 2014) points out that the availability of leaders and previous organizational structures has been very important in mobilizing urban communities.

The multiple explanations for urban grassroots mobilizations in Lithuania are no surprise. Mobilization does not exist in a vacuum, all affect the rise, preservation, and results of social movements. Mobilizations involve a number of factors, as stated by Staggenborg (2012: 31), „including large-scale socioeconomic and political changes; opportunities and threats; critical events; pre-existing or emerging organizations; leaders; and frames“. In a similar mode, Fisher and Kling (1993) pointed out that „both the macro and the mezzo levels influence and are influenced by the people involved at the grass-roots“ (xviii). They propose a conceptual synthesis of the three factors of global political economy, local politics, and activist responses which conjoin in explaining the community mobilizations.

In response to the studies above, this paper takes a multidimensional view on the development of urban grassroots movements in the Lithuanian cities. The explanations
for urban mobilizations are sought in the overall socioeconomic and political context, with an emphasis on civil society and structural changes in housing and urban policy. The impact of Europeanization and micro level variables such as leadership and motivation of urban activists has been already discussed in the previous studies (see Aidukaitė, 2013, 2014; Aidukaite and Jacobsson, forthcoming).

**Previous studies on civil society in Lithuania**

Studies indicate that, in Lithuania, civil society has been weak and people have a low level of trust in the main state institutions (Blom et al., 1996; Paluckiene, 2000; Pettai, Auers, Ramoniene, 2011). Social capital, which can be measured by the level of social trust in the society and by the density of formal and informal networks, is lower in Lithuania, not only compared to Western Europe, but also compared to other new EU member states of CEE (Pettai, Auers, Ramoniene, 2011; Žiliukaitė et al., 2006). The most comprehensive study (Žiliukaitė et al., 2006) which examined the potential of Lithuanian civil society and its impediments concludes:

‘Lithuanian society suffers from the syndrome of helplessness. This is to say, that the most severe civil disability which hinders the development of civil initiatives in Lithuania is the society’s prevailing disbelief in that citizens’ collective action can make a difference or help achieve significant outcomes’ (Ibid: 275).

To illustrate the statements above, let us review some of the previous research data and some surveys in more detail. A recent survey, carried out by the Market and Opinion Research Centre “Vilmorus” (see www.vilmorus.lt) on the 10-14 of April 2013, shows that, only 5.3 percent of the respondents trust in political parties, 7.7 – in the Parliament (the Seimas), 23 percent – in the government and 25.4 – in municipalities. The majority of Lithuanians trust of firefighters (91.2 %), the army (56.7%), the president (53.1%) and the church (51.2 %). These figures demonstrate loud about low social dialogue between the state and its people. The overwhelming majorities do not trust the major institutions of the state, whereas the majorities trust in the army, president and church.

The level of interpersonal trust in Lithuania has also been low. Pettai, Auers and Ramoniene (2011, Figure 6.5.3: 161) have provided data for the dynamics (measured as the percentage of people agreeing with the statement ‘most people can be trusted’) of interpersonal trust in the three Baltic states. In Lithuania, the level of interpersonal trust in 1990 amounted to about 17 percent, in 1996 it went up to almost 24 percent, but in 1999, the trust went down to 8 percent. In 2008, the interpersonal trust experienced its revival and amounted to 26 percent299. Nevertheless, these figures are still low compared, for instance, to Scandinavia, where social trust is between 60-80 percent (Pettai, Auers and Ramoniene, 2011, Figure 6.5.2: 160).

It is assumed that a high level of citizen participation in various voluntary organizations is a sign of strong civil society. As Pettai, Auers and Ramoniene (2011, Figure 6.5.1: 159) have shown, after 1990, membership in voluntary organizations in

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Lithuania has decreased dramatically. It went down from 60 percent in 1990 to about 17 percent in 1999. However, in 2008, it went up again – to 26 percent. These figures are still very low compared to other countries of the EU. Another study (Žiliukaitė et al., 2006) has demonstrated that the number of non-governmental organizations in Lithuania has been constantly rising. In 1990-1994 there were 1487 registered non-governmental organizations, but in 2005, the number exceeded 16260 (Žiliukaitė et al., 2006: 22). Nevertheless, the proportion of the population involved in the activities of non-governmental organizations was nearly stable. Voluntary involvement of the population, without being a part of a certain organization, is a particularly rare phenomenon which supports the fact that the tradition of devoting time or money to a specific activity have been weak to date (Žiliukaitė et al., 2006: 277).

Lithuanian society is also characterized by low levels of conventional and unconventional political participation. General interest in politics decreased from about 74 percent in 1990 to 32 percent in 2008 (Pettai, Auers, Ramoniene, 2011, Figure 6.5.4: 161). The proportion of citizens who, for instance, recently signed a petition, according to European Value Survey 2008, was 15 percent in Lithuania and the proportion of individuals attending demonstrations was only 8 percent. This is lower if compared to CEE and Western European averages. Only 9 % of the inhabitants of CEE countries reported having participated in a legal demonstration as compared to 26 percent in the Western countries. Likewise, the proportion of citizens who signed a petition was 22 % in CEE and 55 % in Western Europe (Pettai, Auers, Ramoniene, 2011: 161).

Studies (Bartuškaitė and Žilys, 2011; Imbrasaitė, 2011; Matonytė, 2004; Žiliukaitė et al., 2006) that examined social capital in Lithuania have come to the conclusion that Lithuanian society is characterized by a low level of social capital. This is because of the low level of political and interpersonal trust, low trust in the major institutions of the state and low membership in voluntary and non-governmental organizations. The majority of Lithuanians spend most of their time socializing with relatives; then it comes to close and more distant friends. As emphasized by Žiliukaitė et al. (2006), in order to achieve a broader scale of mobilization, socializing with relatives and closest friends is insufficient.

To sum up, the Lithuanian society is characterized by low civil society and social capital. This can be explained by the negative experience of the totalitarian communist regime which hindered the expansion of the civil society as in the Soviet era, any democratic movements were forbidden. During the Soviet times, different from the democratic countries, using citizenship rights to influence the public sphere was impossible as the decisions were taken exclusively by the Communist Party and the government. Therefore, in order to form mutual self-help communities, people formed kinship and friendship networks in the private sphere. The transition that followed and was caused by rapid globalization and Europeanization has opened wide opportunities for the development of various social movements and interest groups. However, civil activism in Lithuania has been lower than in Western Europe (see Pettai, Auers, Ramoniene, 2011). Up to now, Lithuanian society has not developed norms which could encourage and facilitate civil or political activities. As Žiliukaitė’s et al. (2006: 277) study has shown, in Lithuania, ‘non-participation is the ‘norm’, while involvement in some kind of civil activity is considered unusual and deviant behavior’.


**Housing and urban policy in Lithuania**

Lithuanian case displays all issues of post-communist urban development. One of the most important changes in Lithuania was the massive privatization of the housing stocks, which brought new problems into the progression of urban policies and housing systems. At present, for almost 97 percent of the dwellings in Lithuania are occupied by their owners, only 3 percent accounted for public and municipal property (Lietuvos Statistikos Departamentas, 2011; Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybė, 2004). This figure is highest not only if Lithuania is compared to the other EU countries, but also if compared to countries of Eastern Europe (Jurevičienė, 2007). In no other EU country, except the post-communists, the percentage of home ownership is above 80 percent (van Kempen, Vermeulen and Blaan, 2005: 12). The majority of Lithuanian residents (66 percent) live in apartment blocks built in 1961-1990. The publicly owned rental housing stock was quickly privatized. However, the legal and institutional system of taking care of maintenance and repair of the private apartment blocks was not sufficiently created. At present, the Lithuanian housing policy suffers from a shortage of affordable housing for low-income families, low quality of housing estates, especially those of the built in before 1989, lack of sustainable housing management system and housing policy institutions (Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybė, 2004). Nevertheless, in all the major cities the significant physical problems concern energy: inefficient apartment blocks, old and un-renovated public buildings. In many cases, the heating costs of such public buildings during the winter season are at least twice as high as in Western Europe. As a result, one of the key priorities in the Lithuania Single Programming Document for the EU structural funds is the provision of funds for the renovation of public buildings in order to improve their heating efficiency (Petkevicius, 2005: 191).

All these problems mentioned above brought the necessity for mobilizations of the house/dwelling owner’s at the community and federal levels. The absents of coherent and sustainable state urban planning, which leaves the major responsibility for the private agents, creates the situation when buildings, factories, but also the objects of public infrastructure (such as roads) are built up against the will of the people living near these objects, putting at risk the ecological environment and people’s health. This has spawned the sporadic protests and mobilizations among residents against the development of factories, waste plant constructions, and other objects of infrastructure near their place of residents.

**Community and housing self-management organizations in Vilnius**

The discussion in the previous sections provides strong evidence of the state’s withdrawal from the housing and urban policy. Then the state fails to protect citizens’ rights, the new informal and formal organizations/associations take/replace the state’s role. The most visible mobilizations around housing and urban issues in Lithuania are community organizations (in Lithuanian “bendruomeninė asociacija”) and housing self-management societies (in Lithuanian “bendrija”). At present, there are 26 active community associations in Vilnius that have become important agents in promoting self-governance schemes at the grass-roots (community) level; and encourage taking initiative to bring various community issues to the decision-making level. In 2010, there was...
established the Lithuanian Union of local community organizations, which within one year of existence has achieved significant results: the cooperation agreement was signed with the Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labour, a national community development program was approved, and an opportunity to communicate directly with the Parliament (Seimas) and the Government representatives was established. The community organizations perform various social, cultural activities. However, many of them were established in order to fight against unwanted or sometimes illegal constructions, to solve environmental issues or preserve green zones in the city, to reduce crime rate in the neighbourhood, to improve infrastructure or to defend architectural monuments from demolition. Community organizations in Vilnius and Kaunas often initiate neighbourhood campaigns for roads to be asphalted, parking lots to be built, street lights to be put up in walkways, children’s playgrounds to be built, etc., although these matters fall under the responsibility of the municipality. Nevertheless, community organizations make their own efforts to address the need for infrastructural development, negotiating with the municipality and also turning to other possible sponsors to find possible financial and political means to solve problems. The activists believe that by uniting they will achieve better communication with the local authorities and their claims will be taken more seriously (Aidukaite, 2013; Aidukaite and Jacobsson, 2015; Nefas and Narkevičiūtė, 2013).

Mobilizations around housing management questions, especially mobilizations of the apartment’s block owners in order to improve their housing conditions – another important feature of urban Lithuanian environment. House owners form the housing self-management partnership in order to protect their rights and perform house maintenance duties in the sustainable city’s revitalization process. This also includes renovation of the apartment blocks in order to improve their heating efficiency. There are 1147 housing self-management partnerships registered in Vilnius, however, only 16 percent of them are active. The Lithuanian Chamber of Housing Management and Maintenance unifying about 5000 housing self-management partnerships, including also companies managing community housing services, public properties, owner’s right associations etc. was established on 12 of November in 2004. The main activities performed by Lithuanian Chamber of Housing Management and Maintenance are: coordination of the activities of their members, representation of their interests on international and national levels, protection of consumer rights and legal interests, education of consumers, promotion of owners economical and social interests as the top priority. However, the Lithuanian Chamber of Housing Management and Maintenance association encounters various issues such as low membership, problems with financing its activities, neglect from government and resistance to collaborate from municipalities.

Flat owners form housing self-management partnership in order to perform house maintenance duties in the sustainable city’s revitalization process, such as improvements in heating efficiency. From 1995 and onwards, the state has encouraged them within a general strategy to transfer all responsibilities for housing maintenance and repair to home owners. In Vilnius and Kaunas flat owners form a housing partnership for reasons

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301 For more see http://www.bustorumai.lt/.
of self-determination, such as managing one’s apartment block affairs, reducing heating costs, improving the living environment (infrastructure, playgrounds, street and outdoor lighting, increase security), and carrying out partial renovation (to repair the staircase and roof of the house, and other common facilities, etc.) (Aidukaite et al., 2014).

Overall, studies show that urban mobilizations have been supported by the government through legislation (especially housing self-management organizations) (see Lipnevič, 2013), encouraged by the EU financial resources through the European Structural Funds (see Aidukaitė and Jacobsson, forthcoming), and most importantly they have emerged as a response towards a liberalization and privatization of housing and urban policies in Lithuania.

Explaining non-participation in community organizations: the outcome of communist legacies or the impact of economic liberalization and individualization?

With a few exceptions, all the interviewed community activists mentioned a problem of low or non-participation of members of the community in organized activities (with an exception of group activists). Although it was emphasized by the interviewees, passivity and indifference were not blamed on the legacy of the Soviet past alone, but also explained by the liberalization and individualization of the Lithuanian economy and society, and by rapidly increasing social and class differences.

Almost all interviewees agreed that during Soviet time, people were taking more active part in various collective activities, which were often promoted by the Soviet state and the Communist Party. The collective participation and informal gatherings were promoted at the workplace and in neighbourhoods. The housing was distributed through the working place mainly. Therefore, people who lived in the same neighbourhood or in the same block were familiar with each other in one or another way. They had similar professional background or worked for the same institution. During the Soviet time people had more or less similar standards of living and therefore more common interests. They were also able to afford similar recreational and leisure activities. The Soviet nomenclature was allocated special type of housing and lived in a separate area of the city.

It has been documented by numerous studies that the collapse of the Soviet regime was followed by the rapid increase in the income differentiation amongst its population. People had to put more efforts in securing the standard of living. Therefore, there were much less time and recourses left for the participation in various groups and associations. People started joining associations and groups only if it could benefit them in one or another way. People have become consumption oriented and the major question that bothers them is – what’s in it for me?

Thus, non-participation could be best explained by “the public choice theory, which emphasises rational economic character of participation and suggests that a rational individual will “free-ride” on efforts of others and enjoy benefits of collective good without participating in the group, unless selective incentives are available to group members” (Lang-Pickvance, Manning and Pickvance 1997, p.6). The “free-ride” culture can be better explained by economic difficulties than by the direct impact of the Soviet legacy.
“I think the major reason for no-participation is not influence of Sovietism but economic difficulties at the beginning of 1990s. My parents worked in a huge factory, which later went bankrupt, of course. They did not receive any salary for months, but still went to work. They worked the whole week and during the weekend they took a train to go to another city to buy something and then they resold the goods that they purchased in some other place and this way they were able to earn money to survive. And again, on Monday they went to work. Having such a difficult life, there is not much time left and no desire to communicate with others or get involved in other activities” (activist of the Justiniškės community organization).

The increasing income differentiation makes it difficult for people of different background to mobilize. The age difference was also emphasised by one community leader who stated that pensioners are reluctant to join movements. This could be true to some extent. With a low birth rate and increasing emigration from Lithuania, when mostly young people (up to 40) leave the country, the proportion of the population of retirement age has been increasing. The majority of those who live in the apartment blocks are pensioners; some of them are active; however, the majority of them do not easily get involved in the activities of the community.

However, in such case, serious problems arise (such as illegal construction, environmental issues), people become more active and join campaigns organized by the activists. However, in general, they are not keen on forming long-term movements and alliances.

“People unite for collective action only when some serious problems arise. Then they take action..... Otherwise, people are only looking for self-benefit. In Soviet times, people were more in contact; sense of community has been encouraged and promoted. People would often gather to celebrate and neighbours communicated with each other. Today community is only strong if it has a charismatic, strong leader” (activist of the Šnipiškės community organization).

A typical reaction of an ordinary citizen towards the activities of the community association is, as stated by the majority of the leaders, that they are happy to approve the actions, but are reluctant to get involved.

*Explaining non-participation in housing self-management organizations*

Contrary to the community associations, the housing self-management partnerships perform only house maintenance and repair functions. However, their goals often overlap with community association activities and they have to deal with the common state authorities.

The first housing self-management partnerships appeared soon after 1991 and they were mainly established by the owners of the co-operative housing. In order to unite their efforts in a common goal - the maintenance and renovation of dwellings – the partnerships have consolidated, and in December 1995, housing self-management

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302 Based on the interview with Vilnius Municipality official.
partnership associations were established in Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipeda, Šiauliai, Panevėžys, Ukmergė, Druskininkai and other cities.303

One major priority of the Lithuanian Housing Strategy is the renovation of old apartment blocks with very low energy efficiency built in before 1989. However, the renovation is possible only if all residents living in the same apartment block agree to pursue it and are able to allocate their own financial resources to it. In order to carry out renovation the housing self-management partnership in the apartment block has to be established. The owners have to cover 75 percent of the expenses of the renovation while the rest is covered by the municipality through the provision of the European Structural Funds.

People are still reluctant to establish partnerships for several important reasons. First, before the collapse of the Soviet Union house maintenance used to be carried out by state authorities and today people still believe that this should be done the same old way. At the present time, about 80 percent of houses are taken care by the administrators assigned by the municipality. However, their major function is to take care of heating efficiency and to ensure its operation. It is hard for people to understand that they not only bought an apartment, but also other facilities of the house: ground floor, basement, corridor and roof and they have to take care of these facilities. However, in newly build apartment blocks, housing partnerships are formed automatically. These newly build houses are usually occupied by young families or people of the middle class who can afford to move from old house built in the early 60s. However, many of retirement age people live in old apartment blocks. They neither have the material, nor human resources to take care of the maintenance of the house themselves and form partnerships. In some cases, partnerships are not established because old apartment blocks are inhabited by people of different social background. Some of them are very interested in improving their living conditions and have resources for that. Others have financial difficulties and are not interested in their surroundings. Therefore, it is very difficult to form a partnership under such conditions since not less than 50 percent of all owners should agree to that.

Conclusions

Drawing on 30 in-depth interviews conducted in 2012-13 with local activists, community leaders, state officials and urban developers, this paper shows that urban mobilizations while provoked by the state’s withdrawal from the housing and urban policy, have taken an institutionalized form and successfully adopted frames and strategies that challenge the boundaries of the national and/or local urban realm. Their claims involve environmental concerns, a right to the safe environment and to social welfare and security. They demand (and have to various degrees achieved) partnership with the local authorities, while often carry activities, which were envisaged to the municipality. The urban mobilizations also reflect the erosion of public services and the disinvestment in public infrastructure in post-socialist Lithuania. In many cases, for instance, community organizations are called upon to make up for public policy failures (Aidukaite and Jacobsson, forthcoming).

303 http://www.bustorumai.lt/
All in all, urban movements in Lithuania function in a neoliberal environment and it matters a great deal for their opportunities. Neoliberal environment favours the privatization of public services, praises the free market and supports deregulation of the economy. The outcome of neoliberal policies - the erosion of national and local welfare state, which consequently triggers public protests and initiatives to overcompensate for the lack of public provisions. The local authorities in many cases are faced with the dilemma, how to align the interests of private investors, urban inhabitants, city developers and planners.

The major explanations for non-participation can be found in the ‘free-ride’ problem, but difficult economic conditions for some part of the population, housing privatization and marketization, individualization of Lithuanian society, and increasing income and social inequalities offer also valuable explanations for non-participation.

This paper shows that in order to understand social movements, the collective actions have to be studied if as embedded into unique historical experiences of the post-socialist societies, their political and economic settings, taking also into account viewpoints of the collective and individual actors for their social involvement around urban issues. In such an open economy as Lithuania is, the impact of globalization and Europeanization becomes an inevitable part of the urban realm, creating space for movements with public interest concerns and uniting different social groups for collective action.

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If the contribution of any one individual makes no difference to the outcome of the collective action, and because the collective good will be received – or not received – regardless of personal participation in efforts to secure it, the rational individual will be a ‘free rider’ and allow others to pay the cost of obtaining the collective good (Staggenborg, 2012: 34).


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Chapter 4

Social movements in Russia
and the former Soviet countries
Social Justice in Post-Socialist Protests: Comparing Anti-Regime Mobilizations in Russia and Ukraine

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Introduction

Many contemporary protests in Post-Soviet countries share one common feature: their social agenda is desynchronized with political one. Contemporary Russian and Ukrainian protests are not an exception. On the one hand, social protests in Russia and Ukraine sometimes become political. For instance, the protests against monetization of social benefits in Russia in 2005 emerged as purely social protest, but quickly acquired political tone and, finally, proposed the demand of the government resignation. On the other hand, political protests, and huge anti-regime mobilizations in particular, are often motivated by the experience of social inequality, but do not articulate social demands explicitly. 2013-2014 Maidan appears to be an illustrative example here: according to the Centre For Society Research’s insightful data, Maidan increased the overall amount of protests around the country, but decreased the overall amount of social protests among them (Centre For Society Research 2014).

In our presentation, we will address the dynamics lying behind this resynchronization. Using the examples of 2011-2013 Russian post-electoral protests and 2013-2014 Maidan mobilization, we will reveal various, sometimes paradoxical and contradictory strategies of dealing with social in political protest.

Post-Socialist Protests: What is Wrong With Social Agenda?

The disavowal of social agenda in Post-Socialist protest politics seems strange, especially against the background of the recent waves of protests shaking the world time and again. The Occupy Wall Street, the Indignados, Podemos emerged out the Indignados, mass mobilization in Greece backed up Syriza – all these examples demonstrate that people in various countries are concerned with social justice and have no problems with social agenda as a part of political protest. However, this picture drastically contrasts with Post-Socialist and especially Post-Soviet protests. In them social agenda is rare and not dominant even if social issues directly determine a protest.

1. Public Sociology Laboratory, Moscow
There are various models explaining this peculiar situation. Some researchers refer to the absence of frame resonance with social agenda because it is perceived as a part of the old, communist, world. For instance, Chiara Milan in her study of Bosnian protests shows that protesters were very concerned with social justice, but ignored anti-capitalist agenda because it was associated with socialist legacy (Milan 2015). The same is true for Bulgarian 2012 protests: Mariya Ivancheva demonstrates that, being a part of all-European anti-austerity protests and even adopting the OWS’s slogans and ideas, the protesters refused to frame the protest as anti-neoliberal because it referred to the past, corrupted, socialist regime (Ivancheva 2013).

There are more fundamental, structural, explanations putting the question of social agenda in protests in the context of class structure of post-socialist society. For example, in his analysis of 2011-2013 Russian protest Alexander Bikbov argues that among other factors “the uncertainty of the feeling of social belonging provided not problematized social hierarchy transformed the protesters into the people without definite political and social features” (Bikbov 2012). This uncertainty leads to the problems with class solidarity, the understanding of class differences and, therefore, the articulation of social demands. People can have social problems, but they cannot express them without proper intellectual toolkit. This insight is confirmed by our study of Maidan. Notwithstanding that both Maidan and Anti-Maidan participants deemed low wages and pensions, badly working medicine, and corruption in education as important, they did not include them into agenda partly due to problems with class identification and class consciousness. Being asked to identify social groups they belong to, they replied: “ordinary, good man”, “activist”, “patriot”, “homo sapiens”. In this case the transformation of social problems into social demands were hindered by the absence of clear understanding of social structure, their place in this structure and, consequently, by problems with solidarity based upon class and social criteria (Public Sociology Laboratory 2015b).

Finally, it has to be mentioned that there are explanations based on specific features of Post-Soviet societies and Post-Soviets social imaginary. In our article on 2011-2012 protests in Russia we show that the refusal to articulate specific social identities and demands emerged out of what we call “depoliticization”. This term includes various dimensions, but one of its cornerstones is the idea that after the dissolution of the USSR people made an exodus into private life, but this life lacked fullness and meaningless without politics. As a result, provided sudden burst of politicization in 2011, they valued the very experience of mobilization more, than any specific demands or agenda. Thus, the fear to split the protest by particularistic, specific, demands outweighed the necessity to build positive social agenda (Zhuravlev, Savelyeva, Aluykov 2015). In the following sections we will show how some of these structural explanations work along with contingent factors underlined the disavowal of social agenda.

Cases, Data, Method

The analysis is based on two cases. The first one is Bolotnaya Movement in Russia. In December 2011 the wave of huge rallies, marches, and “Occupy” camps began to emerge in Russia. The protests were triggered by the fraud during the State Duma elections of December 4th, 2011. There were no strong opposition parties either within or
outside the Parliament that could organize the protest. But suddenly, after Facebook and Vkontakte.ru had been flooded by the evidence of frauds provided by independent observers, and the ruling party “United Russia” had showed historically low results even after the unfair boost, thousands of people — many of them youngsters participating in protest actions for the first time — flooded the streets. On Sunday to follow, about 100000 people gathered for the sanctioned rally in the center of Moscow (with much smaller but relatively considerable rallies in other big cities). Protesters mainly opposed the authoritarian corrupt regime in power and wanted political change (namely, Putin personally became a target of discursive attack, particularly after he had violently offended the participants of the demonstrations, comparing their insignia, white ribbon, with condoms, and accused them of getting “cookies” from the West). But, as in the US and Western Europe, the movement quickly started showing its limitations, both in the width of the protests (which were mostly concentrated in Moscow and, to a much lesser extent, in St. Petersburg), and in the radicalism of the agenda. The main slogans of the protesters included fair election (and the replay of the December vote) and the denunciation of corruption. Honesty and dignity were the main values involved. The objective statistics shows that the protesters were quite heterogeneous, but represented on the average a richer and more educated strata of population (Volkov 2012).

The second one is Euromaidan, 2013-2014 anti-regime mobilization in Ukraine. Euromaidan, a wave of demonstrations and civil unrest in Ukraine, began in the night of 21 November 2013 with public protests on Maidan-Nezalezhnosti (“Independence Square”) in Kiev demanding closer European integration. The most part of the participants joined the movement after the violent dispersal of protesters camp on 30 November. After this date the main demand of the movement has changed as well: the demands for Euro-integration paled into insignificance and gave place to open critics of the Yanukovych’s and current political regime. The protests reached a climax during mid-February. On the 18th of February the most brutal clashes of Euromaidan broke out. The fights were continuing throughout the following days in which the vast majority of casualties took place. After the 21th of February, when Yanukovych and many other high government officials fled the country, protesters gained control of the presidential administration. In Spring Crimean crisis began and after it — the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine.

The analysis is based on two datasets. First, it is 47 interviews with the participants of Bolotnaya – newcomers who did not take part in contentious politics before — which were collected during 2012. Second, it is approx. 80 interviews with the participants of Maidan rallies in Kiev, Kharkiv and Odessa collected in summer 2014. In both Russian and Ukrainian interviews we asked three different questions concerning social agenda and social issues. First, we asked our informants to tell what does the whole movement advocate and oppose. At that, we tried to understand do they include social demands to the agenda of the movement. Secondly, we asked what problems according to their view should be solved in the country at first. According to narratives we received as a feedback to this question, we were estimating if our respondents catch social problems at all. Finally, we explicitly asked if they were ready to place social demands into the agenda of protest movement. As we presume that social status could be related to
sensitivity towards social agenda, we analyzed the answers by dividing our respondents into those of the well-to-do and those of the lower-bracket.

Disavowing Social: Social Justice and Political Agenda in 2011-2013 Russian Post-Electoral Protests

First, it should be noted that social demands were thinly represented in the agenda of Bolotnaya. Almost none of our respondents pointed out the importance of social issues while answering the question of the ends of the movement. Moreover, the statistical inference of the Bolotnaya slogans, held by our colleagues, has shown that social demands were poorly presented in the protest movement (Zavadskaya, Savelyeva, 2015). However, the analysis of the answers to the questions that were put above helps to reveal certain shades in the tendencies towards social issues in the agenda of Bolotnaya as well as make a few hypotheses that could explain the reasons of non-articulation of social demands.

First, we have discovered considerable differences in the perception and attitudes towards social issues among high-income as well as lower-income people. Thus, almost all protesters of lower income that were surveyed in our research believed that social demands should be or already are included into the agenda of the protest movement and almost all informants of higher income thought that social demands don’t belong to Bolotnaya. Moreover, the better-off participants of the movement unlike those of lower income never indicated social issues among other issues without the assistance of interviewer. At that, we can presume that non-articulation of social demands in Bolotnaya movement is caused not only by the specific rhetoric of the leaders, but is also related to overrepresentation of well-to-do people in the protest. And for these people social issues were less significant (contrary to, as we will see further, Maidan, where social issues have become everyday reality for the majority of the protesters).

Indeed, according to several surveys, e.g. conducted by Levada-center, 73% of participants of the December 24th rally earned average to higher income (40% cold afford themselves to buy household appliances, 28% - a car and 5% could deny themselves nothing. (Levada-center 2011). Finally, even those higher-income participants who did not see proper to include social demands into the agenda of the movement did not imply that these demands were alien or inappropriate. Rather these demands were considered as secondary in comparison with demands for fair elections:

“I think this is somewhat wrong [to include social demands into the agenda of the movement]... not in the sense that there is no need for social demands, rather that social demands are secondary in relation to political ones. That’s because until political demands won’t be fulfilled there is nothing to be said” (Moscow, March 5th, 2012, male, higher education, lawyer, 1500-3000 USD per month).

“I think, that at least honesty, to be going on with. Then, if we are going to elect those who are really worth of it, then there will be other demands to them. To the authorities elected by the people” (St.-Petersburg, February 26th, 2012, female, about 40 y.o., higher education, electrical engineer, 2000 USD per month).

On the other hand, some of the better-off participants of the movement considered social demands not common but particular, those that are important only for
specific social groups. According to them these demands could divide and weaken the movement:

“These are like scanty demands that apply to separate groups. That means, this is the problem, where something is coming from. We need to pose the problem clearly. If there are villains, idiots, crooks, thieves and murderers in the head of the country, there is nothing to discuss!” (Moscow, June 12th, 2012 male, 45 y.o., higher education, senior position in banking, 4300 USD per month).

“No, I think this would be out of place. “For fair elections” movement is good in uniting many people. But if it will be modified, and will put any social or political demands, different form “fair elections” this will merely divide people. Some social demands that are supported by some people and not supported by others, someone is the right and someone is the left, someone is against private property and someone is for something else… This will be the division of people, and there will be no powerful movement and everything will fade out then” (Moscow, February 26th, 2012, male, 24 y.o., higher education, dealing with software, 2500-3000 USD per month).

Second, another factor explaining Bolotnaya’s indifference toward social agenda is the absence of propel conceptual toolkit, which would allow to frame participant’s personal problems as a part of more broad social system. Not only well-to-do, but also low-income participants did not point out social issues by themselves; still they claimed that they were ready to include these demands after the direct question of the interviewer. It can be assumed that their inattention to social issues was caused by the influence of the rhetoric of the opposition leaders and media. The majority of Bolotnaya protesters do not conceive of any other way of political expression than the language of their liberal leaders; and the latter ones speak a lot about corruption an unfair elections, but rarely – about social issues. Let us draw our attention to the following piece:

Question: What issues would you solve in our country in the first instance?
Answer: Well… Resting on the slogans… I would begin with re-elections. In addition, the people should be instilled into some maturity of thinking, so that they could see whom do they elect.
Q: And what about some concrete issues, corruption and stuff?
A: Of course, the corruption is in the first place. I mean the exposure of all these corruption things.
Q: But could this movement include other demands, other than merely fair elections, for instance social demands like free education and other?
A: It includes indeed! Absolutely! (St.-Petersburg, 2012, female, higher education, pensioner, income rate: 500 USD per month)

Here we can see, that while answering the question about the most crucial issues in the country, this informant repeats the buzzwords of the movement. Actually, she puts it directly by saying: “resting on the slogans” which could mean – “I only grasp the slogans”, “I can explain only by slogans”. However, once the interviewer asks her about social demands, it appears that she implicitly feels the necessity of these demands and she says that the movement already includes them. At that from the perspective of those with higher income, the incorporation of social demands into the broader agenda of the protest
movement could get some new and unrepresented layers of the population to take part in the protest. However, from the perspective of low-income people, such as our informant, protests already contain this kind of demands. Thus, one can presume that non-articulation of social demands by ordinary protesters is related to the fact that their own novice political language is dominated by the rhetoric of their leaders and major journalists; rather than that social demands are perceived as socially extraneous, unnecessary or inappropriate.

Thus, on the one hand, a significant part of Bolotnaya protesters were more or less better-off people and for many of them social issues were simply less crucial than, say, issue of corruption. However, even these people denied social demands not because they defined those demands as “class alien”. Rather they considered these demands to be secondary or particular and, therefore, potentially dangerous for the integrity of the movement. Class conflict was presented in the Bolotnaya movement in a transformed manner: the apolitical language of the leaders influenced equally on all participants of the movement, and no one has detected social issues as the matter of “own” or “alien” class or strata. At the same time it’s worth noticing that while lower-income participants of the movement considered social issues as “general”, those with higher income treated these issues as specific interests of particular groups.

On the other hand, the underrepresentation of social demands in the agenda of the movement was influenced by rhetoric of its liberal leaders and media. As the majority of ordinary participants of Bolotnaya were novices in politics, the language of the leaders and media was the only language they could use to conceptualize “problems in the society”. This rhetoric was built around the idea of unfair elections and corruption and lacked for social agenda.

**Absorbing Social:**

**Social Justice and Political Agenda in 2013-2014 Maidan Mobilization**

Social demands in the case of Maidan were rare, as in the case of Bolotnaya. According to available statistics, the demand for “general raising of standards of living” constituted only 11.5% of all Maidan demands (Khutkyy 2014). As a rule, scholars and journalists refer to Yanukovitch’s dictatorship, violence toward the protesters, closed character of elites’ groups, the refusal to sign EU-Ukraine association agreement, but not the issues of wages and pensions as demands and the driving engine of the movement. Due to the annexation of Crimea and armed conflict in the Easter Ukraine, these issues receded into the background at all. When asked what Maidan stands for, our respondents also addressed Yanukovitch’s dictatorship, corruption, lustration, but rarely mentioned social demands.

However, this façade is deceptive. According to Centre For Society Research’s data, social guarantees traditionally worried Ukrainians, and social protest was the most frequent type of collective action before Maidan (Centre For Society Research 2012). Just like Bolotnaya participants, our respondents from Maidan did not mention social problems of Ukrainian society by themselves, but thought that they would organically fit into the movement’s agenda. We can assume that for Maidan participants, just like for Bolotnaya, the rhetoric determining their view of society was the rhetoric of the movement’s leaders.
For instance, they frequently mentioned the “necessity of lustration” as an important problem of Ukrainian society, which was not even a problem, but rather a solution:

“Q: Lets assume that ATO (“Anti-Terrorist Operation”) is finished. What problems in Ukraine would you solve in the first place? A: Well, it is lustration of police, of judicial system…it is necessary…I think that limitation…well, all state apparatus should be reorganized, reformatted, because there a lot of them” (Odessa, July, 24 2014, female, higher education, 50 years old, unemployed).

However, unlike Bolotnaya, the majority of Maidan participants were not well to do, for them social problems were the fact they experienced in everyday life. Probably, that is why in most interviews Maidan participants talked about social problems passionately and emotionally. Discussing corruption, they usually turned to social problems:

“Money stolen by his [Yanukovitch’s] father from the country gives him…he doesn’t need to earn it. They have their own business, that infuriated people (…) Today a loaf bread costs 5 hryvnas in Ukraine, this is equivalent of one dollar. That is, two loafs of bread cost 1 dollar. An ordinary pensioner has even not 100, 90 dollars. Communal services prices now raised on 55% (…) That is, to pay for accommodation, a pensioner needs 50 dollars, 550 hryvna” (Kiev, July 2014, male, higher education, unemployed).

Whether they were able to identify social problems or not, the majority deemed social demands as already included in Maidan’s agenda “in folded way”:

“Of course, they [social demands] are important [for Maidan’s agenda]. Of course, people protested against, I think, unjust system in general, against arbitrary rule, wrong political course. Initially students protested because they refused…because the goal was [EU-Ukraine] Association. Because the association gives jobs and visa-free regime. In any case, there are some advantages in terms of social issues (Kiev, July 12, 2014, male, 24 years, higher education, transport company worker).

Like Bolotnaya, Maidan participants supposed that the key demands (regime change, the struggle with corruption, lustration) would lead in turn to the resolution of other problems, social problems in particular. However, if for Bolotnaya participants social problems were the step which should be made one day in indefinite future after the movement’s victory, for Maidan participants the very fact of victory, realization of the main demands, automatically meant the resolution of social problems:

“One of the demands was lustration, it implies the changes in the constitution, and changes in social benefits in particular. When you sight [EU-Ukraine association] agreement, Europe demands to fit all these requirements (…) social standards, social benefits, all these communal [services prices](…) of course, they have higher pensions and social benefits” (Kiev, July 2014. Male, 35 years old, secondary education).
In this sense “Europe”, “European way of life” was understood as the metaphor of social and economic well-being of the society – social guarantees were perceived as a part of abstract movement of Ukraine toward Europe which thrilled Maidan participants:

“You know, this protest included everything. In included the most important implying everything: pensions and education and normal job. All of these were included into “European way of life” (Kiev, July 9, 2014, female, student, freelance).

Thus, Maidan participants were concerned with social issues far more strongly than Bolotnaya participants. In certain sense 2013-2014 Maidan can be called the protest for social guarantees. This fact can be explained not only through the specificity of Maidan as such, but through its social composition. Unlike Bolotnaya, the majority of protesters in Maidan movement was not well to do and experienced social problems in everyday life. Nevertheless, social problems in the movement were not articulated as demands. On the one hand, being newcomers, Maidan activists used the only available political language – the language of the leaders and the media – to describe problems of Ukrainian society. That is why corruption and lustration were assigned special importance. On the other hand, Maidan activists considered social demands as already included in the movement’s agenda. “European way” they stood for was rather a metaphor of social justice and better society, than the demand to sigh concrete document. Metaphoric language replaced political language, which would make articulation of social demands possible.

Disavowing and Absorbing Social in Maidan and Bolotnaya Protests: What is the Heart of the Matter?

What can be drawn from this analysis? As we can see, social issues were important for both Maidan and Bolotnaya movements to a considerable degree, but in both cases social agenda was marginal. In this presentation we showed that it happened neither because people did not have such concerns, nor due to the fact that they did not have a chance to voice them. Of course, this situation can also be explained by contingent, current and short-term, political factors. This mainly concerns Ukrainian case. First, as it can be seen, Maidan’s agenda absorbed the issue of social justice, making people believe that it is already implied. Second, Maidan was significantly changed by external factors. Open confrontation with Russian, and the annexation of Crimea and armed conflict in the Eastern Ukraine shortly after, forced the movement to focus on international relations instead of inner problems. As a result, social agenda, which was not articulated as clear social demands in the first months of the protests, lost its last chances to survive. In fact, Russian aggressive foreign policy gave Ukrainian authorities a chance to postpone the resolution of social and economical problems. Indeed, the chronic defects of Ukrainian state also could contribute to the absence of social agenda. The majority of Ukrainians traditionally deemed the state as the main agent regulating social inequality (BBC 2009), but at the same time they have been seeing its inability to address social problems for decades (Eurequal 2009). Yanukovitch frequently did not fulfill his
promises, and his apparatus was so much corrupted and dysfunctional that the protesters perceived any social demands addressed to the state as meaningless.

However, these factors can explain only Ukrainian case. Indeed, the analysis shows that there are more fundamental factors underlying the refusal to deal with social agenda in both cases. We argue that two factors were in charge of disavowing and absorbing of social agenda in both movements. These factors are clearly seen through the comparison.

What are the differences between Maidan and Bolotnaya movements regarding social agenda? Only part of Bolotnaya participants thought that social demands would organically fit into the movement’s agenda, and as we showed, they were unprivileged. Another part did not agree, and they were quite well to do people. At the same time, almost all Maidan participants were very concerned with social problems and thought that social demands were already included in movement agenda because. Regardless profession and education, they were far more unprivileged than their Russian counterparts, it comes as no surprise that Maidan movement was more sensitive to social agenda. Generally speaking, the tendency characterizing both movements is simple: social demands were perceived as important and universal by more unprivileged participants experiencing social problems in everyday life. More well to do protesters rather saw social demands as representing the interests of particular social groups, which had nothing to do with the movements in general. As a result, they refused to include these demands in the agenda because, in their view, it would split the movements.

What do Maidan and Bolotnaya have in common regarding social agenda? The most striking feature in both movements is that regardless class position activists often did not consider particular social problems as a part of more broad social system. The problems they face on the daily bases were rather perceived as their own problems, not flaws of political and social institutions. Regardless sincere interest in these problems, they did not have proper optics and conceptual apparatus to recognize their personal vicissitudes as a part of more general tendencies. The important factor playing role in this process was the fact that the majority of them were novices who had never had any political experience before. As a result, without having political lenses framing social issues, it comes as no surprise that the participants of both movements used the only available means to label and makes sense of current developments – the language imposed by movements’ leaders and the media. This language, however, had nothing to do with social agenda and focused on corruption, fair elections etc., leaving their immediate concerns aside.

However, the fact that both Maidan and Bolotnaya participants were mostly novices and, consequently, did not have proper intellectual toolkit is only one side of the puzzle. On the other hand, it is a part of more general pattern considered by Laboratory elsewhere. First, traditional for post-soviet countries weakness of civic association and trade unions, the most important institutions in charge of the formation of public debate about social problems, played its role [Public Sociology Laboratory 2015a]. Second, it is a result of unclear class structure of post-soviet societies. Participants of both movements shared inability to identify social group they belong to, and this, consequently, led to problems with solidarity based on social and class criteria. People didn’t feel themselves a part of a social group; as a result, they didn’t deem it necessary to express demands of
this group[Public Sociology Laboratory 2015b]. This inability to articulate ideology and political differences contributed to the domination of elites’ and leaders’ interests over participants: if you don’t have clear ideology and articulated interest, it is easy to accept imposed ideology and interests. All these factors formed vicious circle with protest leaders actions: to involve class-diverse and apolitical publics into protest leaders used exaggeratedly universal agenda avoiding any social tones.

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Local Maidans and Local Governments in Ukraine’s Maidan Contention

Olga Zelinska

Abstract

In Ukraine, contentious politics involving mass protest began in November 2013 and lasted until February 2014. Whereas most scholarly attention has been on Kyiv, my focus is on the local Maidan in the cities and towns across the country. I use a contentious politics perspective to analyze the claims made by local Maidan protesters toward local, regional and national government. The empirical basis is a qualitative analysis of 94 resolutions, decisions and addresses issued by the local Maidan rallies in 57 localities across 20 regions of Ukraine. To grasp the impact of local Maidans I have examined 208 documents, adopted by 68 local authorities of various levels during Maidan events in 20 oblasts where local Maidan protests took place. My analysis suggests that local protests indeed had a substantial impact on local politics, yet it cannot be perceived as straightforward. Instead, the position of local governments has to be granted a close attention.

Key words: Maidan, Euromaidan, contentious politics, local Maidans, local self-government

In Ukraine, contentious politics involving mass protest began in November 2013 and lasted until February 2014, with a change in the executive government. During this time, the center of claims making was the Maidan, which is both the name of a square in downtown Kyiv and a catchword of the protest movement as a whole. In the international press, Maidan became synonymous with the protests in the Maidan of Kyiv (“Ukraine crisis: Police storm main Kiev ‘Maidan’ protest camp,” 2014, “Ukraine’s protests: A new revolution on Maidan Square,” 2013; Walker and Grytsenko, 2013). In the social sciences, interest in Maidan has been on protest development patterns, the implications for Ukrainian democracy and civil society, and the triggers of the Kyiv Maidan (Aslund, 2014; Diuk, 2014; Onuch, 2014; Way, 2014).

Whereas most attention has been on Kyiv Maidan, I examine the local Maidan in the cities and towns across Ukraine. I use a contentious politics perspective (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007) to analyze the claims made by local Maidan protesters toward local,
national and international governments. I then grasp the impact of local Maidans on local politics and analyze the reaction of various local governments in the localities where Maidans occurred. Here I ask two key questions: What did participants of local Maidans demand? And What was the impact of their demands on local politics?

Investigating local Maidans and classifying them as contentious politics enhances our understanding of a momentous event in Ukraine’s post-Soviet history. There is a debate as to the nature of the 2013-2014 Ukrainian events. Some scholars define it as revolution (Tyushka, 2014) while others as something smaller, such as a protest (Balynska, 2014) within a social movement framework (Khmelko and Pereguda, 2014). Gomza suggested viewing Ukrainian events as an episode of contention (Gomza, 2014), comparing Maidan with previous episodes of Ukrainian contention. Olga Onuch and Gwendolyn Sasse also analyze Maidan contention following the logic of Tarrow’s cycle of contention (Onuch and Sasse, 2014). As such, I refer to Maidan as claims making, with the performance as protest.

The empirical basis of claimants demands examination is a the qualitative analysis of 94 resolutions issued by the local Maidan rallies in 57 localities across 20 regions (oblasts) of Ukraine that contain the demands addressed to national and local authorities. These documents are expressions of political protest: they are the people’s demands and their plans for future action.

To grasp the impact of local protesters I also analyze 208 addresses adopted by 68 local authorities of various levels (I focused on legislative bodies, starting from village and city council, through rayon to oblast council) during Maidan events in 20 oblasts where local Maidan protests occurred and where resolutions were voted.

Classifying Maidans

Today, most scholars refer to the Ukrainian 2013-2014 protest events as Euromaidan (Pishchikova and Ogrzyko, 2014; Way, 2014). For my analysis, there are problems with using this term. First, the prefix ‘euro’ suggests that all Maidan protests were about Ukraine’s relationship with Europe as a whole. Yet, there was great differentiation in the target of Maidan protests that often dealt with local, rather than Europe-wide claims. Second, the ‘euro’ prefix disguises the anti-Maidan protests which, in the larger scheme, are part of the broader protest picture. For these reasons, I will use Maidan as the general name of the protest. Moreover, as the following research details, the majority of the protests happened outside Kyiv in the cities and towns across Ukraine. Thus, the remaining article will focus on the local Maidans.

Theoretical Perspective

Contentious politics are defined as interactions involving claim-making, collective coordinated action and government targeting (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007, p. 4). From this viewpoint, the Maidan can be identified as contentious politics, with local non-governmental actors targeting a set of national, regional and local governments. Maidan participants create a political identity of people who see the Ukrainian government at all levels as something that can, and should change. They staged political performances such

Timing

This article focuses on Ukrainian contention that started on November 24, 2013, the day of the first mass protest in the capital Kyiv, to February 27, 2014, a week after Ukraine’s President fled to Russia. A short history of the Ukrainian protests and government response contextualizes this article. On November 24, the Ukrainian government suspended the signing of the Association agreement with the European Union, with the effect of blocking the process of Ukraine’s European integration. This triggered major contentious events: violence against protesters, mainly students, in attempt to dismantle the pro-European tent camp in the central Kyiv on November 30; creation of ‘All-Ukrainian Union ‘Maidan’ in Kyiv on December 22; adoption of anti-protest laws in Ukrainian parliament on January 16, 2014; the subsequent escalation of violence by radically-oriented demonstrators in Kyiv on January 19; police opening fire on demonstrators on February 20; President Yanukovych’s escape from Ukraine on February 22, and appointment of the new executive government on Maidan. Russia’s incursion into Ukraine officially began on March 1, 2014, when the Russian Federal Assembly granted President Vladimir Putin with the right to deploy the army to Crimea (“Путін оголосив Україні війну [Putin Declared War on Ukraine],” 2014). This caused

a qualitatively new phase in Ukrainian contention, characterized by another set of actors and claims they made.

**Data Description**

I examine the claims made by local Maidan protestors by analyzing the protest data produced by the Maidans, including manifestos and statements\(^{307}\). The empirical data for this investigation consist of 94 resolutions texts voted by local Maidan protests in towns and cities across 20 regions of Ukraine, from Nov 24, 2013 to Feb 27, 2014. These are the resolutions, declarations, addresses and decisions of Maidan protests that for convenience will be further referred to as *resolutions*. Most of the Maidan resolutions in the collection are in Ukrainian and six texts are in Russian\(^{308}\). A typical Maidan resolution is a one-page document, containing protesters claims, including identity statements, the reasons for protest and the demands to the authorities of national and local level, and the declarations of support or condemnation. Thus they provide the rich grounds for analysing protesters grievances and programs, and contribute to better understanding of Maidan contention.

To grasp the impact of local protesters on local politics I also analyzed 208 topical addresses and statements, adopted by 68 local authorities of various levels\(^{309}\) (I focused on legislative bodies, starting from village and city council, through rayon to oblast council) from Nov 24, 2013 to Feb 27, 2014 in 20 oblasts where local Maidan protests occurred and where resolutions were voted on. Most often these are the addresses of local-level councils to higher-level (national) authorities, or the addresses to the residents, with regards to the socio-political situation in Ukraine and in the region.

**Local Maidan Demands**

The qualitative analysis of local Maidan resolutions suggests the protestors issued claims to local, national and even international governments. In Tilly and Tarrow’s terms (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007) the resolutions contain identity (‘we-they’ divide), standing (claiming certain place within the existing system) and program claims (demanding specific actions). The remaining analysis will focus on the third category, namely protesters’ demands.

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\(^{307}\) While media reports are often used as a primary data source in analyzing contention, this kind of data poses several methodological problems. The media’s image of the protest and the protestors is subject to journalistic bias (Koopmans and Statham, 1999; Wada, 2004) and skewedness towards certain actors, e.g. the government vs the small activist groups (Leifeld and Haunss, 2010).

\(^{308}\) The author is fluent in both Ukrainian and Russian and performed the entire analysis.

\(^{309}\) Taken the locality of Maidan resolution as a basis, I performed the further search for the decisions of local-level legislative institutions, the area of jurisdiction of which included the locality. For example, for the city of Chernivtsi, the oblast center, I would check both Chernivtsi city council and Chernivtsi oblast council; for the city Bohorodchany, which is the center of rayon in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, I would check Bohorodchany city council, Bohorodchany rayon council and Ivano-Frankivsk oblast council; for Ladyzhyn, which is a town in Vinnitsya oblast, nor the oblast center, neither rayon center, I would check Ladyzhyn city council, Trostyanets rayon council and Vinnitsya oblast council.
International-level claims occupied a minor share of the entire body of demands issued by local Maidan participants, and included requests of the sanctions against Ukrainian leadership (e.g. ‘block the accounts in the EU and the US, of president Yanukovych, his family and supporters, and those of Communist party and the Party of Regions members’, ‘we urge the EU governments to impose personal sanctions on president Yanukovych’) and even boycott the Olympic Games in Sochi.

Most of the Maidan protesters claims were focused at the national level. These covered the following spheres:

National politics. Here the demands of resignation of top national officials, including President Yanukovych, Prime Minister Azarov and minister of interior Zakharchenko prevailed (e.g. ‘the person holding the post of the President today is no longer legitimate and has no moral authority to be called the head of the state’, ‘we demand the resignation of Azarov’s cabinet for the treason of national interests and reversing the course on EU integration’, ‘we demand resignation and criminal liability of the minister Zakharchenko for cooperation with bandit groups ‘titushki’’). These were followed by the demands of snap elections of the President and Parliament. One of the important claimant’s demands was the return of 2004 Constitution, providing parliamentary-presidential form of governance, e.g. ‘restore parliamentarism and democracy through return to 2004 Constitution’.

Justice. The key demands in this sphere concerned rehabilitation of political prisoners (e.g. ‘release Yuliya Tymoshenko’; ‘release and rehabilitate all political prisoners, Maidan activists, public figures and journalists’) and proper investigation and punishment of those guilty in wrongdoings (e.g. ‘impose criminal liability for all those guilty for beating peaceful protesters on Maidan Nezalezhnosti’, ‘punish the real implementers of outrageous beating of peaceful protesters’).

Foreign policy. The key demand here was the restoration of the pro-European foreign policy course and signing the Association Agreement with the European Union (e.g. ‘immediately sign the Association Agreement with the European Union on the bases beneficial for Ukraine’, ‘make European integration irreversible’).

The other spheres included civil society (e.g. ‘demanding Party of Regions members to leave the party’), economy and social guarantees (e.g. create equal opportunities for personal development’), security (e.g. ‘stop deploying ‘titushki’ to Kyiv’).

About one third of the total body of demands was focused at the local level. These were focused on the multiple spheres:

Local politics. Most of claimants demanded resignation of local officials, including the mayor, local councils, and heads of local state administration. Maidan protesters called for snap elections. Additionally, they demanded local authorities to hold extraordinary meetings or hearings to decide on the issues of local importance. Another group of claims covered reforming of local politics, including transparent actions of local authorities, introduction of city referenda, appointment of the officials directly by ‘viche’ (popular assembly) and other mechanisms of direct people’s governance (e.g. ‘Local Maidan coordination headquarters have to approve the candidates for the managerial positions at regional level’).

Local law enforcement. The claimants demanded local law enforcers to ensure law and order at the territory of the local community, to disobey illegal orders, and stop
political prosecution (e.g. ‘we address the rayon police department asking not to cause problems, but support local people traveling to Kyiv Maidan’).

Civil society. The protesters demands here concerned political parties (the dissolution of the local Party of Regions branches), the media (broadcast time for local Maidan protesters), as well as other civil society groups and organizations (requests to hold viche on weekly basis).

Social guarantees. Socio-economic block included demands of revision of local tariffs, improvement of transportation system, opening of the local factory and creation of job places (e.g. ‘ensure jobs, salary, proper tariffs, timely pensions, and social securities’).

Culture. Some participants focused on the issues of cultural heritage, demanding to build a church, a museum, a new monument, rename the streets and squares after the protestors who died on Kyiv Maidan (e.g. ‘rename Gorkii street into the street of The Heavenly Hundred’).

Local Councils Role in Maidan Contention

Considering local Maidan resolutions were issued at the home localities of the protesters, and the substantial share of the overall claimant’s demands targeted specifically local governments, it is important to examine the impact of these claims on the local politics. Moreover, local councils’ addresses often stressed being the only truly legitimate, freely elected (vs appointed), ‘closest to the local needs’ authorities, and thus bearing the full responsibility for the functioning of local community (e.g. ‘local councils stand the closest to the requests and strives of Ukrainian citizens to live in safe and democratic country’; ‘city head and city council are freely elected, not appointed from above, bodies of city self-government’; ‘local authorities, supported by local communities, are the only legitimate source of power in Ukraine’).

Contentious politics actors

The qualitative analysis of local council’s declarations suggests they were indeed involved in the contention process. They bared the consequences of protest as an institution (local councils who were criticizing the pro-governmental policies reported increased scrutiny on behalf of state prosecution and opening of ‘politically-motivated’ criminal proceedings on the employees) and personally (local council members reported killed in clashes with special police on Kyiv Maidan). In their addresses they certainly issued the claims to higher level (national) authorities – the government, the President, the cabinet and law-enforcement agencies, as well as the international community.

This made them political actors, and they assumed political identity. In early stages of Maidan the formation of local councils’ collectively perceived identity was especially evident – ‘we’ is referred to the protesters and the local councils, whereas ‘they’ concerns the national authorities (e.g. ‘we do not support the government which does not hear its own people. Such government cannot be legitimate’; ‘we declare support to the demands of All-Ukrainian Euromaidan in Kyiv. Consider Ivano-Frankivsk oblast council indispensable part of all-Ukrainian Euromaidan’).

They maneuvered successfully in the political opportunity structures, sensing the shifts in moods and employing inventive approaches to reach out for potential allies,
including MPs elected by their constituency, media, law enforcers, judges, pro-presidential Party of Regions members and councils in other oblasts (e.g. ‘we draw the attention of MPs elected in Volyn on inadmissibility to make any agreements with the [national] authorities […] Stop hesitating and stand aside of local people in fight against the criminal regime. Volynians will never forgive you one more treason!’; ‘The members of the Party of Regions bear the full amount of responsibility […] You entered this party to protect your business. Today we call you to make your choice in favor of Ukrainian people as the only source of power’; ‘resist the unlawful pressure of the government, which tries to make you [the law-enforcers] look like the animal pack and acting against own people’). On the other hand, local councils also impacted the political opportunity structures for protest at the local level by supporting/condemning Maidan events (e.g. ‘we call those indifferent to Ukraine’s future to join the Kyiv protest […] If you can, be there for New Year and Christmas’ vs ‘Come back home [from Maidan]! Come back to your families and children!’). Local councils often felt in position to reach out to the international community, asking for fair assessment of the situation, thus seeking certification of the contentious politics in Ukraine (e.g. ‘we address the […] international community to immediately provide assessment of what is going on in Ukraine’).

That said, in their addresses local councils rarely referred to the actual claims of local Maidans and demands expressed during assemblies or mentioned in the resolutions (e.g. ‘support the decisions adopted by Lutsk people’s viche’). In most of the cases, the councils justified their own claims by referring to the (abstract) will of the local community or responsibility to their constituencies (e.g. ‘expressing the position of our voters […]’; ‘being guided by the will of Stryy community […]’; ‘representing the interest of territorial communities of Bohorodchany rayon’), and/or the claims issued by Kyiv Maidan representing Maidan movement in general (e.g. ‘support the draft Resolution of Kyiv people’s viche’).

Claiming more powers at the local level

As the analysis suggests, the position of the local councils was closely intertwined with their interests, namely by attempts of acquiring more powers at the local level. The attempts of local councils (being local legislative bodies, members elected) to re-gain the control over powers delegated to the oblast state administrations (local executive authorities, head appointed by the President) started as early as December 2013, when some councils were revoking their decisions on power transfer to state administrations and terminating lease agreements to deprive the latter of the premises. Instead, executive committees of the local councils were to be established to take up the new functions. It is important to mention, that such decisions were recognized illegal by the (administrative) courts the day after and thus never truly came into force, but the local councils kept trying.

Local state administrations were systematically discredited and associated with ‘illegitimate’ and ‘non-constitutional’ Yanukovych’s regime (e.g. ‘express non-confidence to Ivano-Frankivsk oblast state administration and consider the existence of such institution inexpedient. The system of powers which includes local administrations should be subject to liquidation’). Often times, among other claims to central authorities,
local councils demanded Ukrainian Parliament and President to abolish state administrations (e.g. ‘demand the President to abolish the institution of state administrations and speed up the administrative reform’).

On February 19, 2014, creation of Narodna Rada (People’s Council) was voted on Kyiv Maidan (“Опозиційні депутати створили Народну Раду України [Oposition MPs created Narodna rada of Ukraine],” 2014) as supreme legislative body alternative to the existing regime-dependent power structures. The next day it issued a decision to establish People’s Councils in Ukraine’s oblasts (“Опозиція вирішила створити альтернативну владу (повний текст рішення Віче) [Oposition decided to create alternative authority (The full text of Viche resolution)]," 2014) as alternative oblast councils. People’s Councils were established in 19 Ukrainian oblasts.

Apart from name they rarely had much in common. If opposition parties held majority on the oblast council, new bodies de facto doubled the existing oblast councils. In other cases all sorts of intra-factional groups of council members, advisory and public councils and even non-governmental organizations were called People’s Councils (Дворецька [Dvoretska], 2014). In case the alternative Council received enough support, members of councils again re-claimed the executive powers from administrations, claimed control over local law-enforcement and even tried to obtain written statements of the officials to follow the orders of Narodna Rada (e.g. ‘the heads of departments of executive authorities, as well as their deputies, confirm their readiness to implement all decisions and orders of the executive committee of oblast Narodna Rada by providing written confirmations to the head of the executive committee’). As in case with earlier attempts, such decisions were found illegal by the court.

After Yanukovych escaped, the new government was voted on Maidan and the Chair of the Parliament temporarily took over presidential duties, local councils continued addressing Ukrainian Parliament demanding decentralization, which would grant them with powers on the local level in a legal systematic way (e.g. ‘we address Verkhovna Rada again to legally regulate the process of decentralization in Ukraine and transfer the powers to the local level’; ‘reforming the system of local self-government has to include the increased rights of local communities’).

**Responding to local Maidans demands**

The analysis of the ‘path’ local Maidan claims made into addresses of local legislatures suggests the latter were receptive to the ideas of their constituency, but at the same time selective and guided by their own interests. Local governments happily picked up the national-level claims, and addressed (on behalf of the community) national authorities. It would be fair to say, their administrative capacity and experience with state-level politics increased the protesters claim’s importance. Local councils acted as a loudspeaker to protestors demands, addressed to national government.

Local-level Maidans claims also seemed to resonate in local councils addresses. For example, resignation of pro-Presidential, often repressive heads of oblast/rayon state administrations was often supported, just as banning the existence of the ‘bloody’ Party of Regions. Cultural (renaming the streets) and social (ensure timely financial transactions for pensions and salaries) sphere claims of the protesters were also often
echoed in the local councils addresses. Yet, the decisions that would limit the powers (or the benefits) of local authorities, i.e. to impose direct democracy mechanisms and grant the local rule to the local community, can hardly be found in council’s documents. Alternatively, there are no statements on the need to open the new factory, create more jobs, revise local tariffs, repair roads, or build a new church, which was the case in some local Maidan resolutions.

**Conclusion**

This article addressed two key questions about Ukrainian 2013-2014 contention: What did participants of local Maidans demand? and What was the impact of their demands on local politics? I employed the qualitative analysis to the 94 resolutions voted by the protesters themselves in 57 cities and towns of 20 oblasts across Ukraine. To grasp the political impact I examined 208 addresses voted by 68 local councils in 20 oblasts where Maidans took place.

Most of protestors’ demands were concerned with stopping the incessant political crises that have characterized Ukraine; they want to make Ukraine politically strong and economically stable. These concerned a deep reform of Ukrainian politics that includes the resignation of key officials, and snap presidential and parliamentary elections. It also includes adoption of more democratic controls in the Ukrainian national constitution and new electoral laws. Local Maidans wanted democratic controls at the local level; claimants demanded more transparent governance and budgeting policy and the creation of direct democracy institutions, including granting the right of the local community to approve officials.

At the same time, simple and straightforward conclusion about immediate impact of local Maidans on local politics through local councils cannot be reached. In the process of Ukrainian contention local councils functioned not as mere intermediaries, but the mediators (in Latourian terms (Latour, 2005)), keeping in mind their own interests. This makes them yet another actor in comprehensive process of 2013-2014 Maidan contention. Better understanding of their position and actions is necessary to grasp the entire Maidan puzzle.

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The research of trust-rating to the sources of information about armed conflict in the south-east of Ukraine in 2014-15

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Introduction. Dissemination of reliable information in an aggressive Russian propaganda is an important part of forming an objective picture of events taking place in Ukraine. The presence of multiple unrelated sources, claiming to be objective presentation of information makes it difficult to grasp the situation. Today, the conflict in the south-east of Ukraine can learn not only from official resources, but also in the social networks and second-class sites. Most users often get the bulk of the information is from sources last two types. Therefore underestimate their influence will be wrong. Earlier, a source of objective and reliable information were news agencies and professional media, after which the audience could familiarize themselves with the information they offered. Today, professional media are themselves often sources of misinformation, acting in the interests of certain political forces. Even if the professional media will not knowingly publish false information, the ordinary citizen will still get it from other sources (social networks, websites, rumors, gossip, etc.). The consequences of this information evident to one side, and on the other - are unpredictable. Misinformation is always aimed at sowing panic and destabilizing the emotional state of the population, which turn in concrete decisions and actions of audience. So today actualized state's role in the conduct of a unified information security policy.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the use of the term "reliable information" in legal documents on the information policy of the state and to their understanding of this concept; show what political factors have led to an radicalization of information confrontation between Ukraine and Russia in the years 2013-14; identify the sources of information that are available to the majority of citizens of Ukraine about the anti-terrorist operation in the south-east of Ukraine and to identify those that have the highest level of

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confidence; to understand whether there is an in-coordination (in-conformity) in the information disseminated between different sources; and to understand their causes and consequences.


The right of access to information guaranteed by Article 34 of the Constitution, namely the right of everyone "to freedom of thought and speech, free expression of views and beliefs; the right to freely collect, store, use and disseminate information orally, in writing or by other means of their own choice". The exercise of these rights may be restricted by law: in the interest of national security; in the interests of territorial integrity; in the interests of public order; the prevention of disorder or crime; for public health; for the protection of the reputation or rights of others; for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence; for maintaining the authority and impartiality of justice.

Law of Ukraine "On information" specifies the constitutional right of citizens to information, lays the legal foundations of information activities. "Information" is defined in the Act as "any information and / or data that can be stored on physical media or displayed electronically". The implementation of the right to information should not violate the social, political, economic, social, spiritual, environmental and other rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of other citizens, rights and interests of legal entities. This law establishes the basic principles of information relations, namely the guaranteed right to information; openness, access to information, freedom of information exchange; the accuracy and completeness of the information; freedom of expression and belief; legitimacy of receipt, use, distribution, storage and protection of information; protection of persons from interference with his private and family life. The term of "reliable information" is defined in the Act as one of the basic principles of information relations.

Law of Ukraine "On Access to Public Information" determines the order of implementation and enforcement of the right of everyone to have access to information that is in the possession of power entities and other managers of public information as defined by the Act, and one that is in the public interest. Public information - it is such "information that is displayed and documented by any means and in any media: that was obtained or created during the execution of powers subjects its obligations under applicable law, or that is in the possession of the subjects of authority and other public administrators information as defined by the law". In 2011, the Law of Ukraine "On access to Public Information" "was the greatest achievement of Ukraine in the world rankings. Then Ukraine ranked 9th among the 89 countries rated for ensuring the right to information developed by two leading international organizations Access Info Europe (Spain) and the Centre for Law and Democracy (Canada). However, the concept of "reliability" in this document is not defined.
July 8, 2009 President of Ukraine signed the Decree 514/2009 "On the Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine". In all parts of the document states that information security is an integral part of each of the areas of national security. At the same time, information security is an important independent sphere of national security. That is why the development of Ukraine as a sovereign, democratic, legal and economic stability of the state is possible only under the condition that an appropriate level of its information security. The main purpose of the implementation of the Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine is the creation in Ukraine of development of national information space and the protection of its information sovereignty. The doctrine is determined by the reliability of the information among the basic principles of information security, including: freedom of the collection, storage, use and dissemination of information; the reliability, completeness and impartiality of information and so on.

In January 2011, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted in the first reading a draft law on the Concept of state information policy. According to the draft law, the main objective of the state information policy is "the creation of political and legal, economic, organizational and logistical conditions for the formation of the modern model of the state information policy, more efficient use of all kinds of information resources and management elements of information and communication infrastructure, state support production and dissemination of national information products, software development and protection of the national information sphere, and the like." State information policy is based on the principles of the rule of law; priority of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen, in particular the right of everyone to freely receive, use, distribution, and storage of information; balancing the interests of the person, society and state, their mutual responsibility; protection of national interests, in particular in the field of information security and the like. The main directions of state policy in the sphere of information legislation is to bring the legislation on information in line with modern requirements, adapting it to the norms and standards of European Union legislation, in particular the introduction of democratic standards regarding the realization of the right of access to information; settlement of issues concerning the creation of a system of public service broadcasting in Ukraine, and the like. In the introduction to the Concept states that the subjects of information relations attempt to manipulate public opinion by spreading false, incomplete and biased information in the media is a problem in the development of national information sphere. However, the reliability of the information in the document is not mentioned.

When preparing this material, it was announced that November 21, 2014 the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine has developed a new version of the doctrine of information security of Ukraine and the government introduced a draft Presidential Decree, which is requested to approve the document. This doctrine provides for a number of activities that will strengthen and guarantee the information security of the country. Specifically planned to strengthen outreach and educational activities about the benefits for Ukraine to join the EU, as well as deepen practical cooperation with NATO, including the perspective of full membership of Ukraine in NATO. In addition, activities will be undertaken to prevent the monopolization of the national information space. It is also planned to create a national register of critical national information infrastructure facilities with the obligatory introduction into it of all
such facilities regardless of ownership. In this document, the term "reliable information" are not mentioned. It only refers to the distribution in the global information space curved, inaccurate and biased information that harms the national interests of Ukraine as a real and potential threats to information security of Ukraine's foreign policy, the political, economic and environmental spheres.

In the basic documents of the Russian Federation, dedicated to information security of the state, namely the Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation and the Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the field of international information security for the period until 2020, the concept of "reliability" is given much more attention. According to the basis of the state policy in the field of international information security for the period until 2020, Russia aims to public policy in the field of international information security promotion of an international legal regime aimed at creating conditions for the formation of a system of international information security; achieve this objective, among others, will contribute to the creation of conditions for reducing the risk of the use of information and communication technologies for the implementation of hostilities and acts of aggression aimed at discrediting the sovereignty, the territorial integrity of states and pose a threat to international peace, security and strategic stability. Bringing reliable information about the state policy of the Russian Federation, its official positio.

The site of electronic encyclopedia "Wikipedia" in the article "Information" provides a classification of information. The information can be divided into types according to various criteria: the method of perception, form submission to the destination, according to the value in the truth. The reliability of the information relates to the criterion of "value" of the information and is defined as "information obtained without distortion (mis-representation)". In the article "Types of information and its properties," the reliability of the information is defined as one of its basic properties. "Information is reliable if it reflects the verity (true facts). Objective information is always reliable, but reliable information can be both objective and subjective. Reliable information helps us to take the right decision. Unreliable information can be for the following reasons: the deliberate distortion (disinformation) or unintentional distortion of subjective properties; distortion as a result of exposure to noise ("broken telephone") and not enough accurate means of fixing it".

Thus, the concept of "reliable information" is not displayed in legislative documents on the information policy of the state. In our view, in terms of the state information policy we can offer the following definition of reliable information: reliable information - is the information that is fully and correctly (objectively) displays existing phenomena and processes taking place in the state, corresponds to reality and has a clear source that is trustworthy.

Returning to the theme of dissemination of reliable information in the sphere of the Russian-Ukrainian information war at 2013-14, remember what events preceded the anti-terrorist operation in the south-eastern of Ukraine. The main historical events that led to the activation of informational confrontation between Ukraine and Russia were Euromaidan, the annexation of the Crimea and the armed conflict in the south-east of Ukraine.
Euromaidan - massive multi-month protest in the city center, as well as in other cities of Ukraine, which led to the early presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine.

- November 21, 2013 - the beginning of Euromaidan. The formal reason for the beginning of the action was suspending the process of preparing the Government of Ukraine to the signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. This order was officially announced by Prime Minister Mykola Azarov. The first action began on Independence Square in Kiev, about 22:00. Gathered for a rally from 1 to 2 thousand people, mostly students, journalists, social activists, opposition political leaders.

- November 22 in Lviv in front of the Lviv Regional State Administration held a rally of students, numbering about two thousand participants. Before them were Mayor Andriy Sadovy and rector of Lviv University Ivan Vakarchuk. On this day, significantly smaller number of participants "Euromaidan" took place in other cities of Ukraine: Vinnitsa (500 pers.), Donetsk (100 pers.), Krivoy Rog (70 pers.), Sumac (150), Kharkiv (50 people) and Chernivtsi.

- Since the end of November, in parallel with Evromaydan begin to organize rallies in support of the government called "Anti-Euromaidan." End of November - Simferopol - 100 people, Sevastopol - 3000 people, December 4 - Donetsk 12-15 thousand participants, Kherson - 10 thousand people. On the European Square in Kiev December 14, 2013 at a rally in support of the president and government gathered at the 60 th. Of participants. The official slogan of the rally was "Save the Ukraine."

- November 28-29, 2013 in Vilnius was held summit "Eastern Partnership", which was attended by the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych. By noon on November 29, it became known that the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU has not been signed.

- November 30th. Acceleration of Euromaidan. At 4 am, police demanded the release of Independence square in order to prepare it for the celebration of the New Year. An hour before the square was switched off mobile communications. According to the witnesses and journalists on the area at that time were mostly young people - students. As a result of the special operation, which involved 290 fighters "Berkut", 79 people were injured, including seven policemen, were among the victims and the citizens of Poland.

- December 1, 2013 took place in Kiev the opposition rally in support of the Euro-integration course of Ukraine. On the same day there was a seizure of administrative buildings (Kyiv City State Administration and the House of Trade Unions) and attempted to storm the building of the presidential administration. On the same day in the evening (December 1), a convoy of about 300 vehicles tried to get to the presidential residence "Mezhyhiria", but along the way they blocked the path of the bus 4 special forces "Berkut". This movement is called "AutoMaidan."

- In December 2013 in Kiev, the protesters continued to block the work of public institutions (Administration of the President of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Kiev city administration), the strike took place near the General Prosecutor of Ukraine.
January 16, 2014. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopts amendments to the laws, which contained a number of new restrictions, as well as increasing penalties for certain violations of the legislation already provided, many of which involved participation in the protests. In particular, laws were passed: the possibility of blocking sites by the decision of experts on administrative responsibility for installation without the permission of tents, stage and sound equipment for holding meetings, ban Spent demonstrations in masks and weapons, the need to register political organizations, financed from the -this abroad. These laws have received unofficial nickname "the laws of the dictatorship."

January 28, 2014 Prime Minister of Ukraine Mykola Azarov has resigned, which President Viktor Yanukovych approved.

On February 18, Kyiv renewed clashes of protesters with the police, which led to the deaths of dozens of people. According to the Ministry of Health of Ukraine, from 18 to 20 February in Kiev killed 77 people, which later became known as the "heavenly hundred."

On the night of February 22, President Yanukovych left Kiev. On February 22, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a resolution which stated that Yanukovych "in an unconstitutional manner withdrew from the exercise of constitutional powers" and does not fulfill its obligations, and called early presidential elections on 25 May 2014.

The 2014 Crimean crisis was a conflict unfolding in the region of Crimea, Ukraine that began in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution. President Viktor Yanukovych was deposed in the 2014 Ukrainian revolution. Russia sent in soldiers on February 27, 2014. Crimea held a referendum. According to Russian and Crimean sources 95% voted to reunite with Russia. The legitimacy of the referendum has been questioned by the international community on both legal and procedural grounds.

February 23-27, was made the change of executive authorities of Sevastopol and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and those, in turn, refused to recognize the legitimacy of the new Ukrainian government and appealed for cooperation and assistance to the Russian leadership.

March 16 local authorities of the Crimea, with the support of Russia and despite attempts by opposition from the authorities of Ukraine and the pressure of the West, in a short time organized and held a referendum on the status of Crimea.

March 17 based on the results of the referendum and the Declaration of Independence, adopted on 11 March was unilaterally declared a sovereign Republic of Crimea, of which entered Sevastopol as a city with a special status.

March 18 agreement was signed between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the adoption of the Republic of Crimea to Russia, according to which a part of Russia were formed new entities - Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol.

March 27th UN General Assembly adopted a resolution which has opted out of the Crimean referendum legality.
The armed conflict in eastern Ukraine - an ongoing conflict between Ukrainian government forces and anti-government separatists supported by Russian troops in the Donbass region in eastern Ukraine since April 2014.

- April 7, 2014 after the announcement of the pro-Russian activists on the establishment of Donetsk (DNI) and the People's Republic of Kharkov (HNR), as well as its intention to hold a referendum on May 11 "Crimean sample" Acting President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov announced the beginning of "anti-terrorist operation" in Donetsk, Kharkiv and Luhansk regions.
- April 17 negotiators in Geneva (Russia, EU, USA and Ukraine) approved the text of a statement on the situation in Ukraine. It urges the parties to liberate the occupied buildings, lay down their arms and sit down at the negotiating table. In addition, the US, the EU and Russia pledged joint efforts to help Ukraine cope with the economic crisis.
- Referendums were held on May 11 in Donetsk and Lugansk regions and, according to their organizers, were respectively 75% turnout and 75% and the number of votes "for" 89% and 96%.
- Siege of Sloviansk - April 12 - July 5, 2014
- Mariupol standoff - May 7-June 13.
- Confrontation in Donetsk - May 26.
- July 17 - crash Boeing airline Malaysia Airlines, to perform scheduled flight from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, in the east of the Donetsk region of Ukraine, near the village Hrabovo near Thorez.
- August 10-29 - Ilovajskij boiler.
- In the autumn of 2014 the fighting was over Lugansk and Donetsk airports.

Proceeding from the mentioned above, it is clear that the events of Euromaidan, Crimean crisis, Southeast confrontation developed very quickly. Accordingly, the quality of information support depended on several factors. Firstly, the experience of journalists, commentators, political scientists. Secondly, the mobility of data collection and processing. Thirdly, from a single state a position on this issue.

In the current situation of political uncertainty and informational confrontation we are seeing some in-coordination with the information activity of the Ukrainian side during the Russian-Ukrainian information war. Below we propose to review and identify the sources of information on the progress of anti-terrorist operation that affect the average citizen of Ukraine. All sources of information about the ATO can be divided into official and non-official.

OFFICIAL:
1. Information and Analytical Centre of the National Security and Defense Council. Established by Presidential Decree on the 12 April 2014. Daily Colonel Andrei Lysenko, who is an adviser of the IAC at 12-30 holds a press briefing in the Ukrainian crisis media center, where reports to-date information on the status of ATO.
2. Press Center of ATO. ATO's Speaker - Vladislav Selezev.
2.1. At the 31 of May this press center launched an ATO website for promptly informing the residents living in the area of ATO. The site is called "East-Online" http://vostokonline.info/. The site contains current news and videos, as well as the category list and contact numbers of the Staff of the ATO. According to the ATO speaker Vladislav Seleznev, the goal of the site – is promptly informing residents of the regions, where the anti-terrorist operation, the actions of Ukrainian security services, as well as objective coverage of the ATO.

2.2. Since 26 June an ATO's press center joint the Facebook, and publishes news, photos and video from the areas of fighting in the eastern regions of Ukraine. The page has more than 3,400 pages of subscribers. Alexei Dmitrashkovsky who is a spokesman for the General Staff of the Armed Forces maintains the page. He often acts as speaker of the ATO. At the moment the news reader’s activity is low on the page. If the posts of Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov on the events in combat areas gather at 200-1000 re-posts and hundreds of comments, the page of the press center has little comments and re-posts yet.

3. The Security Service of Ukraine. Head of the SBU Valentin Nalyvaychenko periodically appears in media statements about the elimination of criminal elements related to the ATO. For example, November 19, 2014, it was reported that the SBU defused sabotage and reconnaissance group of "DNR", composed of citizens of the Russian Federation. The group had the task to carry out exploration outposts of the armed forces of Ukraine in Donetsk region Telmanovskiy area and carry out the adjustment of artillery fire fighters. In addition, the Group had an order to seize Ukrainian soldier and get the items Ukrainian military uniforms (chevrons, emblems, insignia). SBU also opened a telephone hot-line for joint struggle against separatism, terrorism and corruption, in terms of communication theory can be described as "the organization feedback."

4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. At weekly briefings of adviser to Ukrainian Foreign Ministry Yevhen Perebiynis (which take place every Tuesday) than news about official visits and meetings with the leadership of foreign countries necessarily provides information on the status of eastern Ukraine in the context of aggression against our country from Russia. On November 25, Evgen Perebiynos stated that: "during 17-23 November we recorded the moving of two columns with technicals: one towards the village Металист-Счастье (6 units), the other - towards village Станично-Луганское (16 pieces of equipment ), noted throwing near the village of Uglegorsk group of 500 militants, marine units of the Russian Armed forces of 300 soldiers from the village to the district Telmanovo settlements Novoazovsk, Samsonov, Nameless and Shirokino."

5. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov on his pages in the social networks Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/arsen.avakov.1, 250,228 subscribers) and Twitter (https://twitter.com/avakovarsen, 179,051 reader) regularly publishes information on the assistance of Ukrainian Interior Ministry to the soldiers "of the National Guard of Ukraine." Ukrainian media regularly referred to his messages.

Advisor to the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Anton Gerashchenko regularly generates news on his pages in social networks:
International organizations:

6.1. OSCE (Organization for security and co-operation in Europe). In Ukraine, the OSCE observers are present since the beginning of March 2014, when Kiev asked for dispatching to Crimea an observer mission to fix the "unusual military activity" by stationed on the peninsula Russian troops. In the region came under the control of Moscow, they have not got. The new expanded mission - its size can be up to 400 people (currently - 250) - was agreed with OSCE on March 21 in order to "reduce tensions" in Ukraine as a whole. Geography its work encompassed almost the entire country: Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Odessa, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi. Since then, the mission on a daily basis reports on human rights violations. The OSCE should also be present in Donetsk and Lugansk, but in regional centers they are not working from 3 May and 11 June respectively. Observers twice fell to the militia hostage. The first group of four observers mission disappeared on May 26 in Donetsk region, with the second group (also of four) connection was lost on May 29 in the Luhansk region. They were released only a month later, under the terms established between Kiev and the rebels week truce.

6.2. NATO. Conduct an ongoing satellite monitoring of movement of troops and equipment. Through the Secretary-General and the press secretary of the organization gives information to the world community. For example, 23 August 2014, "Ohana Lungesk, NATO spokesman, said that the Russian side has sent to Ukraine artillery units, staffed by Russian soldiers who are fighting against the Ukrainian army. According to Lungesku, the Alliance emerged evidence of the presence of Russian troops in the east of Ukraine. NATO Press Secretary also noted that the purpose of the invasion of the Russian humanitarian convoy is to strengthen the escalation in Donbass ".

7. Media: own correspondents. In the area of anti-terrorist operation works special (correspondents):

7.1. Ukrainian media (Inter, 1 + 1, ICTV, STB, etc.).
7.2. Russian media (Russia 24, ORT, NTV, RTR, etc.).
7.3. World media (Euronews, DW, and so forth.)

NON-OFFICIAL

8. Think tanks and independent analysts - political scientists (Centre of national resistance leader Dmitry Tymchuk, Center of Oleh Soskin OCP-ua; politologist Vadim Karasev, Volodymyr Fesenko, Taras Berezovets, and others.)

9. Representatives of the DNR and the LNR. Pages in social networks Denis Pushilin https://www.facebook.com/d090581 3680 subscribers, http://vk.com/id10807485, Paul Gubarev et al. These pages also have subscribers and are being monitored by journalists and volunteers.

10. Refugees.
11. The ATO participants.
12. Rumors, gossip (word of mouth).


15. Volunteers.

Thus, we have identified 15 (!) Different official and non-official sources of information about the armed conflict in the south-eastern of Ukraine.

The next step was to evaluate the level of confidence (so-called trust rating) of the indicated above sources of information about the ATO. To this end, we conducted a survey among educated Ukrainian youth 19-22 years. The sample consisted of 200 people - students 4-6 courses of the Institute of International Relations of Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko University. The survey was conducted in October-November 2014. This survey should not be extrapolated to the entire population of Ukraine, because the sample is fairly narrow. On the other hand, the results can be quite revealing, as IIR students - are educated, wealthy, progressive young people from all regions of Ukraine. We asked them to assess the credibility of the sources of information about the ATO on a 10-point scale, where 10 - completely trust, 1 - fully not trusted. The results of the survey are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. The level of trust in sources of information about the ATO in the southeast of Ukraine in 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>source of information</th>
<th>confidence score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information and Analytical Center of the National Security and Defense Council</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATO's Press Center</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Service of Ukraine</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International organizations (OSCE, NATO)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian media</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>world media</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian media</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think tanks and independent analysts - political scientists</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives of the DNR and the LNR</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ATO participants</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus, we see that the highest trust rating among younger audiences have ATO participants (10 points). Lowest trust – level have the information from the representatives of the DNR and LNR (2 points).

Next, we asked the question - why the trust level to official sources of information is quite low. We hypothesized that the reason for this lies in the presence of in-coordination in the news that is distributed through the above sources. Monitoring of media reports during May-September 2014 revealed a large number of uncoordinated information disseminated by Ukrainian media and through social networks, volunteers and members of the ATO. Here are some examples of such incoordination.

**Example 1:** October 1, 2014, the battalion commander Donbass Semen Semenchenko states in Shuster Live, that the separatists have already captured the two terminals of the Donetsk airport. Such information about the capture of the Donetsk airport announced warlord DNR "Motorola". He said that the separatists failed to gain a foothold at the airport and catching up ammo and additional forces. At the same time ATO press officer Vladislav Seleznev at TV channel 112.Ukraine denied information about the capture of militants two terminals Donetsk airport. "The situation in the Donetsk airport is quite difficult, there are fights. Repeatedly today militants stormed the airport, but all attacks, including attempts to capture the first and second, or new and old terminals were reflected by the ATO. As of this moment, the airport is completely under the control of the ATO," – said Seleznev.

**Example 2:** October 25, 2014 President of Ukraine Poroshenko on his page on Twitter said that 32 roadblock of ATO forces near the village Slavyanoserbsk was delivered water and food. At the same time, a journalist and activist Anastasia Bereza said that the Ukrainian servicemen surrounded by militants on 32 roadblock has not brought any water, no need warm clothes and food. The same discrepancy confirmed chief editor of the online publication tsenzor.net Yuri Butusov on his Facebook page.

**Example 3:** 30 July 2014 site of the Ukrainian news agency UNIAN was reported referred to witnesses that Ukrainian aircraft was shot down over Harczisz. However, within a few hours this informations was denied by the head of the press center of the ATO Vladislav Seleznev and the Speaker of the information center RNBO Andrei Lysenko.

**Example 4.** On May 30, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine reported that they already distributed 300,000 sets of dry rations (packed lunches) between the Ukrainian
military units, which came to Ukraine as part of the US aid. Subsequently, the coordinator of the group "Information resistance" Dmitry Tymchuc said that instead of the promised American packed lunches Ukrainian soldiers the ATO area eat "domestic" biscuits and American (packed lunches) dry rations in the meantime is selling through Internet.

The monitoring of information on the progress of ATO revealed many discrepancies between media reports, witnesses, volunteers and official statements of RNBO and ATO press center. It should be noted that the discrepancies between messages of RNBO and press the center of the ATU has not been identified.

Still, experts believe that at this stage Ukraine is losing the information war. In our opinion the following reasons:

- the lack of a single speaker representing a single state center for a long time;
- lack of a single government co-ordination center;
- in the country have not been established traditions (culture) of informing the public about the external and internal threats;
- has not been the practice of proactive public informing;
- the public hunger for sensational news;
- lack of reliable and stable sources of operational information from the scene of hostilities;
- low verification of the information by media;
- subjective perception of information by eyewitnesses;
- lack of complete information.

All this is due to the fact that there is still no law that would define the concept of the state information policy of Ukraine. Accordingly, there is no single plan, a unified state position or strategy of development of information industry, and hence to ensure information security.

The possible consequences of this situation could be:

- the disintegration of the information space;
- misinforming of the society;
- the emergence of new centers of information influence;
- uncontrolled growth of information flows;
- loss of information control over the situation;
- drop in morale among the military;
- panic among the population.

Therefore consider it appropriate to adopt and implement the concept of public information policy of Ukraine; establish of a single state information center on the ATO.

By the way, On the 30 of November Anton Gerashchenko proposed to create a Ministry of Information Policy. The main task is to protect the information space of Ukraine from the Russian propaganda and release counter-propaganda in Russia, Crimea and Donbas Prime Minister Yatsenyuk earlier noted that a key issue for Ukraine is a question of information security and information policy of our State.
Initially aimed at promoting changes in a society and country as a whole, social movements have their peculiarities in each nation. Whatever can bring to success in one society may fail in another one. The reasons for this are various – starting with the systems of governance ending with traditions and social norms, which play a crucial role in decision making and promoting actions. Sh. Shwartz, W. Bilsky, G. Melech, A. Lehmann and others suggest that every individual or social group in a society is guided by certain social norms and values and in order to understand their actions and the possible promotion of changes, it is of ultimate importance to study their background.

According to Schwartz, people in a large number of cultures distinguish several types of values as guiding principles in their lives. And, of course, their motivation is not universal and can be based on both independent and public interests. Out of the differentiated types of the values by Schwartz, the following need to be highlighted when dealing with preferences of groups and individuals engaged in social movements:

- Self-direction – the defining goal of this action is independent thought and action – choosing creating and exploring.
- Stimulation – the motivational goal of stimulation values is excitement, novelty and challenge in life.
- Hedonism – which is derived from generic needs and pleasure associated with satisfying them. It was formerly called “enjoyment”.
- Achievement – the defining goal of this type of value is personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards. Achievement values emphasize demonstrating competence in terms of prevailing cultural standards, thereby obtaining social approval.
- Power – the functioning of social institutions requires some status of degree differentiation. To justify this fact of social life and to motivate group members accept it, groups must treat power as a value.
- Security – the motivational goal of this type of value is harmony, stability and safety of the society, of relationships and of self. It derives from basic, individual and group requirements. This depends upon the fact whether security stands as a primary interest for the society.
- Conformity – conformity values emphasize self-restraint in everyday interaction (obedience, self-discipline, politeness, honoring parents and elders).
- Tradition – traditions quite frequently are based on religious grounds, beliefs and norms of behavior [5].

If we take a look back to the major Armenian social movements since 1988 and map them according to their scale and importance for the society, we can see that on the basis of the massive social movements are the value types of self-direction, power and security. In 1988 when Armenia was still one of the States of the Soviet Union, a social movement over an ecological issue was initiated. In no time, in about two-three days, it was reshaped into another huge nation-wide movement over Nagorno Karabakh issue, which put as its primary goal to restore historical justice. This movement became contagious for many Soviet countries and as a consequence turned into an independence movement throughout the USSR. The movement was able to consolidate people since it had a well formulated aim and touched the interests of all social groups.

Civil society, as a manifestation of non-formal and self-organised associational life, has been a vital element of the Armenian nation throughout the centuries. During the various periods of domination and oppression and after the loss of statehood, the Armenian people demonstrated an alternative form of self-organisation, developing a strong survival system of voluntarism within the church and community. The importance of ‘human relations’ has been traditionally cherished in Armenia [2].

Throughout the history of the third independent Armenia as a state, there have been a number of social movements, which unfortunately did not take place right after the proclamation of independence but almost two decades later. Until recently Armenia had rather a weak civil society, which used to be associated mainly with NGO activities and was not taken seriously. According to A. Ishkanian “civic initiatives, which began to emerge in 2007 and expanded in larger numbers in 2010-2011, have achieved important small victories on a diverse set of issues ranging from legislation on maternity pay to the preservation of historical buildings and urban green spaces. Until 2012, in the absence of political and policy level discussions, civil society activists, working through civic initiatives and formal, professionalised NGOs, played a key role in raising awareness about and campaigning against the potential dangers for sustainable development in the country” [1]. Probably one of the first social movements that could be referred to in terms of changing the culture and perception of social movements in Armenia was an environmental one (Save Mashtots Park movement) in the result of which the park was not destroyed and the intended construction was dismantled. In this particular case the active use of social media has been registered. The public activists fighting for the park spent days and nights there in winter 2011 and spring 2012. They were able to make their offline activity more effective through the Internet. Facebook was used for rapidly spreading information [3]. Opinions over its success may vary but it unequivocally had a great impact on the mindset of the people who fairly and peacefully achieved their short-term goal by means of democratic tools.
As everywhere in the world, in Armenia as well, social movements succeed when the social layers involved are diverse, when the issue is supported not only by direct interest groups but also the ones who consider it unfair. Social movements don’t get that easily formed in Armenia because quite often they do not have formulated tangible and achievable aims. Besides, it requires getting out of comfort zone, which cannot but face social resistance.

In 2013 when the government decided to raise the transport fare from 100 AMD to 150 (hence, the name “100-Dram Movement”), an unexpected resistance arouse. It started with the active minority and soon began to expand. The active minority were mainly students who stood in the streets at the bus stations with posters in their hands and urged people to pay 100 AMD instead of 150. Soon young actors and singers in Armenia joined this movement and offered carpool to people with definite routes every day. This initiation got immediately supported by ordinary people, which day by day made the social movement even louder. The authorities had to encounter with the situation and finally made a decision to leave the transport fares unchanged. This was one of the strongest short-term victories, which made people regain the belief and confidence that social consolidation can intervene into the governmental decisions and change them.

Culturally, for Armenians it’s much easier to struggle for the rights of their friends, neighbours even unknown people than for their own rights. This is a matter of dignity and pride; protecting another person is an honorable job meanwhile voicing one’s own problems can be labeled as “weakness”. In the case of “100-Dram Movement”, many people claimed that the problem did not touch their own social interest directly but they struggled for those vulnerable layers of the society who would suffer most. This statement got widespread and the idea of carpool appealed to people especially strong, which engaged more and more volunteers and eventually brought success.

A UNDP survey conducted in 2012 on social cohesion revealed that although people in Armenia realize the need to actively engage in social and political life in their communities, they admit that their participation in the processes cannot be considered active. Despite these findings, there is a recent informal move to civic engagement, pointing to: strengthened civic consciousness and understanding of one’s role in the future of the country; dissatisfaction with current policies; a sense of belonging within country and culture [4].

Thus, in 2014 the government decided to implement the practice of mandatory pension funds, which touched only a specific layer of the society. The ones born after 1974 had to pay extra taxes, which was going to be stored as a pension fund in the vaults of private organizations. The government claimed that the State would be a guarantee of the transactions between the citizens and the organizations. A vast sector of young employees qualified this governmental step as an unfair and unequal initiation. It didn’t give an opportunity for them to choose to make an independent decision about storing a part of their income in the vault of an unknown organization. Shortly after the project was announced, the “Dem.am” (“I’m against”) movement was initiated. It mainly consisted of young people who set their primary goal to make the government withdraw the bill from their agenda. The thing that made this social movement strong was that its initiators and activists were mainly programmers working in the organizations, which are out of governmental domain and influence. In the end, the social movement succeeded partially,
the international and private organizations managed to round this law but the ones working in the state sector, still, are obliged to make transfers to mandatory pension funds.

The classical approach claims when a social movement turns into a political movement, the authorities cannot return to the startup point and will never be able to satisfy the social needs of the interest group for when the social group raises the bar and puts the issue on a political level, they are no more interested in the social aspect of the problem. This concept was the main fear of the authorities related to the above-mentioned issue.

In the era of social networks, the Internet and digital technology, the culture of social movements has changed. Social networks allow people to receive information easily, track developments, react and mobilize for real-time action. The online activity of friends and their social networks may encourage others to join, establishing a feeling of community online. This also provides a means of self-expression and communication, which in turn may lead to the mobilization of groups to stand up for protection of their rights [4]. Mobilization over a certain social activity has become much easier irrespective of people’s location, occupation and business. In no time it is possible to spread an important piece of information for a target social group and react to an emerging problem very rapidly. Evidently, the examples of recent social movements in different countries of the East and West come to prove the statement asserted above. On the other hand, this digital century has its side-effects on democratization processes. People get used to watching political and major social events through the screens of their computers or smart phones and occasionally may express their opinions through social networks, which leads to passive citizenship. Even very loud events in the country’s social and political life cannot make this group of people get out of their comfort zone and rush into the streets to express their complaint or demand justice. This is a new culture, which did not exist a decade ago. It has led to the formation of the so-called “virtual society”.

Nevertheless, in the case of Armenia the relatively passive approach towards social movements is mostly related to national mentality and the historical impact on its formation. For centuries Armenians have been under the reign of foreign powers, which contributed to the emergence of the concept “compatriotism”. In the absence of state we were related to each other with blood and gene bonds. The family and the compatriot mattered more than the state itself. The idea of state was tightly related to assisting and sticking to one another. We were consolidated over the idea of the united nation and all the so-called “wrong” was outer, foreign, not anyhow associated with us. This is the reason that the concept of the citizen wasn’t enrooted in us for centuries. This approach was still predominant after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fact that social movements began to become popular only starting from 2007, 19 years after the independence movement, vividly shows that the Soviet generation never stood up for social issues even being independent and not having a Soviet totalitarian control. They stood up in 1988 because the “institute of compatriotism” was being endangered and because the Artsakh people are Armenians who needed our assistance. The generation who did not manage to feel the impact of the Soviet Union and the ones who are now called “Independence Generation” step by step change the culture of the previously adopted concept state, democracy, human rights, equality, and social justice.
The growth and expansion of civic initiatives since 2010 is foremost due to the fact that the ones engaged in civic initiatives are representatives of the generation of Armenians who never personally lived through the Soviet period and hence, they not only have a different worldview, but also, having grown up in the neoliberal context where a strong welfare state never existed, they have different expectations and understandings about the state and its relationship to citizens [1]. Apparently, the present socio-political realities in the world have played a crucial role. People have access to diverse sources of information and are able to make judgments, draw parallels and conclusions themselves. Due to alternative sources of information Television has undoubtedly lost its dominant power over the vast majority of the population and this regress of dominance has a growing trend. Open boundaries and education/interaction opportunities have a stronger impact on the formation of the people’s worldview and the need for struggle for one’s own rights becomes a vital need. Usually the active sector of social movements in most countries comprises young people and the shift in the culture of the movements is conditioned by their own development and the values they are guided by. The younger generation in Armenia who skillfully makes use of digital technology and social networks, who breaks the stereotypes of social norms, who values analytical form of thinking, changes also the culture of SMs in Armenia. If previously social movements would be viewed as one-time “mass complaints”, which could at best serve as a means of releasing emotions rather than giving solutions to the existing problems, nowadays are apprehended as an accepted way of democratic struggle to achieve specific goals.

If we sum up the statements made above, we can claim that the essence of social movements in Armenia is mostly of preventive character and can also demand restoration of violated rights. These two functions can sometimes be linked to each other and can cooperate but this is not necessarily the case. Although social movements and democratization processes are in dialectic relationship with each other and are conditioned by one another, in the times of digital information social movements play a crucial role for the democratization of the country.

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Chapter 5

Labor and new left movements
Is there the genuine influence of the trade union movement in the privatised companies in Serbia?

Dr Marija Obradović
Dr Nada Novaković

Abstract

The main aim of this research paper is to analyze whether the current trade union movement has a capacity to genuinely represent the short- and long-term interests of its membership in the privatized companies in Serbia.

The paper seeks to explore the capability of the trade union movement in Serbia to utilize institutionalized Social Dialogue in order to avert the impact of negative economical and social consequences of the privatization policy upon its members, such as redundancy, decrease of wages, tax burden, worsening of working conditions, etc.

In order to underline structural dynamics of changes in the trade union movement during the process of privatization of socially owned firms, this research paper examines the trade unions participation in Social Dialogue in privatized companies in Serbia in areas of information, consultation and collective bargaining.

Introduction

Trade unions in Serbia have made the strategic decision to be among the social forces supporting the privatization policy after the violent collapse of Yugoslavia. At the same time, the process of privatization of social capital undermined the influence of the trade union movement in Serbia and led to a considerable setback in trade union membership. Moreover, excessive pluralism in the trade union movement in Serbia had a negative impact on the quality of the representation of workers’ interests during privatization of socially owned property. This resulted in piecemeal and fragmented trade unions’ reactions to negative effects of the privatization policy in Serbia endured by the working class.

It has been suggested that the privatization policy in Serbia did not successfully attain its proclaimed goals to contribute towards achieving sustainable economic growth and social prosperity in the country by attracting export-oriented direct foreign investments. On the contrary, it led to weakening of national economy, the perpetuation

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of underdevelopment, social disintegration, the pauperization of working class and large-scale poverty.

I. TRADE UNION STRATEGY IN RESPECT TO PRIVATIZATION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN SERBIA

Trade unions in Serbia mainly support strictly controlled privatization of certain economic sectors. They believe that privatization should fulfill a number of basic criteria, such as economic efficiency, mandatory character, rapidity, social fairness and continuous presence of public control of that process.

Confederation of Autonomous Trade Unions of Serbia and Montenegro organized a debate on the implementation of the privatization process and directions of trade union action in Serbia and Montenegro on 30 March 2004.

In this debate, Budimir Šljivančanin, President of the Confederation of Autonomous Trade Unions of Serbia and Montenegro, stressed in his keynote address, that privatization process, following the sale of capital of nearly 1,200 socially-owned enterprises in Serbia and over 60% of enterprises in Montenegro, resulted in transition crisis, and failed to bring about any increase in industrial output. Statistics recorded a 3% decline in industrial production in 2003, while exports decreased as well. During 2003, trade deficit rose by 37% compared with the previous comparative year, reaching the amount of USD 4.85 billion, with extremely unfavorable structure of exports. The share of import of equipment, technology, knowledge and necessary raw materials and inputs that would in turn boost the growth in domestic product was extremely low. At the end of 2003, external debt of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro reached 14 billion dollars, and unemployment rate shot up to 32%. Employees’ position significantly deteriorated during the privatization process as their jobs became more insecure and/or lost, while their rights and rights of workers’ organizations were violated and/or ignored. According to unofficial data, during the period of ten years, over 400,000 young and educated people left Serbia and Montenegro.

In his keynote address, Šljivančanin particularly stressed that proceeds from sale of social capital in Serbia and Montenegro have been used not to finance development, incentives and favorable crediting of businesses, but to cover budgetary deficits, finance public spending and offset losses.316

However, despite pointing to adverse economic and social consequences of privatization of social capital in Serbia and Montenegro, the Confederation of Autonomous Trade Unions of Serbia and Montenegro in its document Positions and Tasks of the Trade Union in the Further Course of the Privatization Process stresses “that there is no alternative to privatization and that this process leads to improvement of the general efficiency of economy, establishment and development of competitive market, significantly higher employment, better living standards, social security and higher level of safety and health at work.”317

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316 Savez samostalnih sindikata Srbije, Sprovođenje procesa privatizacije i pravci delovanja sindikata, Belgrade, June 2004, pp. 7-9
317 Ibid, pp. 107
Trade Union Confederation “Nezavisnost” (TUC NEZAVISNOST) emphasized in its program document dating to 2005 that it “advocates privatization, its transparency, economic efficiency and social justice”, as well as clearly defined, harmonized and realistic strategy of privatization of the public (state) sector of economy. “Public sector must not be subjected to privatization without clear national strategy, just as a mere object of trade and interests of the most powerful international financial lobbies and multinational companies whose only aim is to buy market, to the detriment of citizens and employees, and/or society as a whole.”318

TUC NEZAVISNOST was actively involved in the adoption of the national Program for Dealing with Redundancies in the Process of Rationalization, Restructuring and Preparation for Privatization which was in force since 22 July 2005. (Official Gazette of RS No. 64/2005). In all enterprises in which TUC NEZAVISNOST was representative, it participated in collective bargaining and conclusion of company-level collective agreements, insisting that criteria and metrics for determining redundancies, as well as protected categories of employees, be compulsory elements of collective agreements. In most cases it was successful in this effort.

Furthermore, in the process of privatization of a given enterprise, TUC NEZAVISNOST was an active participant in designing a social program, i.e. program for outplacement of employees who were to lose their jobs in this process, and which used to be an integral part of the purchase agreement. It endeavored to ensure social programs that would be most beneficial for the employees.

Through its Privatization Center, and in cooperation with the Privatization Agency of the Republic of Serbia (RS), TUC NEZAVISNOST monitored the compliance with sales agreements, particularly provisions regarding the implementation of social programs. Certain sales agreements (e.g. Prosveta AD publishing house, Belgrade) have actually been annulled at the initiative of this trade union for failure to observe the social program obligations.

A TUC NEZAVISNOST representative was an active and equal member of the Task Force appointed by the Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Policy of RS in charge of evaluating the documentation of the mentioned national Program. By the end of 2005, about 60 entities with some 16,000 employees made their social programs. As many as 50% of these employees (about 8,000) were declared redundant and were included in one of the options for addressing the problem of redundant workers (at their own discretion, but mainly by taking severance pay). Between the end of 2002 and the end of 2005 there were 247,208 workers employed in privatized enterprises, and this trade union estimated the number of technologically redundant workers, i.e. total number of redundant workers (including employees on paid leave of absence) at about 500,000.

The Privatization Center of TUC NEZAVISNOST provided all required and necessary professional advice and concrete assistance to companies undergoing privatization.319 However, during 2012, the Privatization Center of TUC NEZAVISNOST mainly focused on providing support to minority shareholders and their associations, including collection of data referring to privatization and post-privatization period.

(databases of the Privatization Agency, Business Registers Agency, Belgrade Stock Exchange, direct talks with trade union members from enterprises, etc.); writing letters to the Privatization Agency, Ministry of Finance and Economy of the RS, Parliamentary Board for Privatization and other competent institutions dealing with privatization; presence at inspections of performance of sales agreements; assistance to members in the organization of small shareholders’ associations (consulting, drafting of documentation).


On the other hand, the Confederation of Autonomous Trade Unions of Serbia assessed in 2009 that the past course of privatization in RS was unsuccessful and stressed that it resulted in lower output, winding-up of businesses, growing unemployment, violation of basic employees’ rights and their growing deprivation and poverty. ‘Failure of privatization in Serbia, among other things, is reflected in the large number of cancellations of sales agreements; in the fact that the aim of privatization was primarily to acquire ownership of building land and facilities for their further sale and use for the purposes that had nothing to do with the business of the acquired entity rather than further development of production; and the fact that the primary motive for the government were its revenues, i.e. inflow in its budget instead of overall economic development; in the fact that restructuring of business entities in the privatization process lasted unreasonably long; in the fact that there are many companies which did not manage to get the new owner despite several attempts to privatize them and in the end were subjected to bankruptcy proceedings, etc.’

Therefore, the Confederation of Autonomous Trade Unions of Serbia advocated majority ownership to be retained by the government in major public enterprises and selective privatization of other companies. The Confederation of Autonomous Trade Unions of Serbia is the biggest representative trade union center in Serbia with 410,150 members. The Confederation includes 28 autonomous federations organized in the following industries and activities: eight in the real sector (agriculture and food industry, metals and electrical industry, textile and leather industry, construction, chemical industry, non-metals industry, printing industry and the media, energy and forestry); nine in non-productive activities (education, health, administration, pre-school establishments, banks, judiciary, science, culture and entertainment industry); and eleven in the service

320 Godišnji izveštaj UGS “Nezavisnost” 2012. godine, p. 4
sector (trade, crafts, HORECA services, utility services, road transportation, road maintenance, railway transportation, air transportation, river transportation, port services and postal services).  

**II. MAIN INDICATORS OF THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA, 2002–2009**

Through analysis of indicators of the privatization process in Serbia in the period 2002–2009, the Confederation of Autonomous Trade Unions of Serbia came to the conclusion that it was economically and socially unsuccessful social and historical process.

**Table 1**

*Overview of business entities sold in the RS (1 January 2002 – 25 July 2009)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>Privatization 2002 – 2009</th>
<th>Total sold</th>
<th>Number of employees</th>
<th>Sales price EUR 000</th>
<th>Value of investments EUR 000</th>
<th>Value of social programs EUR 000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Sale of capital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Tenders</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>83,891</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1,145,501</td>
<td>276,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Auctions</td>
<td>1,717</td>
<td>142,699</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>229,462</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tenders + Auctions</td>
<td>1,825</td>
<td>226,590</td>
<td>2,310,657</td>
<td>1,374,963</td>
<td>276,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Capital market</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>130,910</td>
<td>585,873</td>
<td>5,902</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Previously annulled contracts</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>17,712</td>
<td>60,400</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Previously privatized</td>
<td>(817)</td>
<td>(82,046)</td>
<td>(3,614)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>113,190</td>
<td>521,859</td>
<td>5,902</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL I + II</td>
<td>2,504</td>
<td>357,500</td>
<td>2,896,548</td>
<td>1,380,865</td>
<td>276,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Annulled contracts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Auctions</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>43,184</td>
<td>286,589</td>
<td>52,106</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Tenders</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13,783</td>
<td>471,878</td>
<td>154,306</td>
<td>2,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>424</td>
<td>56,967</td>
<td>758,467</td>
<td>206,412</td>
<td>2,042</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Out of the total number of enterprises privatized by tender and auction (1,825 enterprises) for 424 enterprises (23.23%) the contracts have been annulled: 21 contracts.

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(19.44%) for enterprises privatized by tender and 403 contracts (23.47%) for enterprises sold at auctions. Observed by years, between 2002 and 2009, the highest number of annulled contracts – 166 – was recorded in 2003 and included 163 contracts for enterprises sold at auctions and 3 contracts for tender sales. Most annulled contracts referred to enterprises engaged in various construction activities and trade.

As the consequence of privatization of social capital in the Republic of Serbia, 49 enterprises employing over 20,000 workers went on strike during 2009 (e.g. Ikarbus – Belgrade, PIK Zemun – Zemun, Galenika – Belgrade, Niteks– Niš, Nova Srbijanka – Valjevo, 7. juli – Kuršumlija, Elektro Rača – Kragujevac, FGM Trudbenik – Ub, Trajal – Kruševac, Srbolek – Belgrade, Ravanica – Ćuprija). The most frequent reasons for strikes were: non-payment of wages (36 enterprises), failure to perform obligations under the sales contracts (5 enterprises), failure to honor employees’ right to social program as guaranteed by law (2 enterprises), failure to pay contributions for compulsory health and pension insurance, as well as cessation of production in privatized enterprises.

Privatization of social capital in Serbia resulted in the change in economic structure of the Republic of Serbia. In many economic sectors (agriculture, forestry, water management, fisheries, mining and quarrying, processing industries, construction industry, trade, catering, transportation, financial mediation, health) the number of jobs was reduced by 400,841 between 2001 and 2008, while in other activities (insurance, pension funds, real estate business including leasing, government administration, social security, education, utility services, social services and personal services) the number of employees rose by 82,567.

Huge drop in employment in the real sector, as we have seen, practically witnesses of deindustrialization as the consequence of privatization of social capital in the Republic of Serbia. Serbian metals industry lost 90,000 jobs. Textile industry was more than halved and over 66,000 workers lost their jobs. Agriculture lost one third of its workforce (62,000 employees). Tourism remained without 30,000 of its employees, and transportation without 20,000. As the result, unemployment rate rose sharply and stands at about 25%, while in certain cities it exceeds 50%, 60%, and somewhere as much as 70%.

As for deindustrialization, privatization of social capital in the Republic of Serbia resulted in devastation of the significant share of light and processing industries, particularly: machine building, electrical industry, production of engines and tractors, textile industry, chemical industry, agricultural processing (particularly meat industry). Gross domestic product (GDP) of the Republic of Serbia in 2012 was at the level of 61.3% of GDP recorded in 1989, and industrial output in 2012 was at the level of about 38.4% of industrial output in 1989, while the share of industrial production in GDP creation is 17%, compared with 32% as its contribution was in 1990.

The number of cities – industrial centers with more than 1,000 workers in Serbia was by 54.84% lower in 2007 compared with 1990. In Belgrade, for example, the number of industrial workers in 2007 relative to 1990 was 94.36% lower. The number of large industrial complexes with more than 1,000 workers dropped 74.65%. The total number of industrial workers in March 2013 was by 671,520 or 66.4% lower than in 1990.324

324 Izvod iz Izveštaja o radu Saveza samostalnih sindikata Srbije između 14. i 15. Kongresa, Belgrade, April 2015, p. 9
III. TRADE UNIONS IN PRIVATIZED ENTERPRISES

As we have shown above, privatization of social capital in Serbia resulted in devastation and destruction of production systems, leading to change in economic structure of economy toward its deindustrialization. The number of employees in manufacturing declined sharply, unemployment rate spiraled upwards, while the trade union movement became weakened and fragmented.

Reduction of trade union density was dramatic. While 86% of employees in Serbia were organized in trade unions in 2000, in 2012 only 29% of employees were organized within different trade union centers. Trade union movement not only weakened in terms of numbers, but became fragmented. As a result, at the end of 2012 there were 26,000 trade unions registered in Serbia. The Labor Law sets forth that every trade union organization must be entered in the register kept by the Ministry of Labor. That is not a usual practice in developed countries, where several trade union centers are registered, and individual trade union organizations operate within the scope of such centers. A large number of trade unions breeds lack of solidarity among them and inefficiency in the protection of employees. Employers (government is the biggest employer in Serbia) amply take advantage of this situation in their opposition against trade unions and employees.

Unionization became mainly limited to public enterprises and government institutions, while possibilities for trade union activity are nonexistent in private companies. Situation on the labor market, with over 700,000 unemployed, is also an obstacle to stronger trade union organizing and undertaking direct action as a method of industrial action against poor working conditions and low wages.

However, despite these adverse overall operating conditions for the trade union movement in Serbia, in October 2001 trade union centers managed to organize a general strike against the government’s proposal of the Labor Law and to significantly modify it. Industrial action in 2003 brought down Zoran Živković’s Government.325 However, despite these successes, trade union movement, small in numbers and fragmented, could neither protect workers’ rights in the process of privatization of social capital in Serbia, nor become an institution for solving disputes arising from and in connection with employment through collective bargaining mechanism in privatized companies.

Half of 2,402 socially-owned enterprises privatized from 2002 until the end of 2011 ceased to operate, while 626 (26%) of privatization agreements have been terminated.326 Within the given period almost all socially-owned economy of the Republic of Serbia was sold for 2.6 billion dinars,327 which means that the average value of proceeds from privatization per sold company was about 1.151 million euros. In the

325 „Sindikalni pokret u Srbiji ne postoji” and „Država je kriva i odgovorna što je ovakvo stanje” in Od radničkih borbi ka socijalnom pokretu, Ed. Branislav Markuš, UG Ravnopravnost, Belgrade, 2013, pp. 134, 132, 133
327 Efekti privatizacije u Srbiji, Stalno radno telo Socijalno-ekonomskog saveta za ekonomska pitanja, Belgrade, November 2011, p.6
same period, the average sales price per company in the privatization of social capital in Kosovo and Metohija was about one million euros. In the same period (since the beginning of 2002 until 6 July 2011) the costs of consulting services for privatization advisers in the Republic of Serbia totaled 4,268,742,767.69 dinars,\(^{328}\) equivalent to 42,266,704.89 euros.\(^{329}\)

Many workers lost their jobs and means of support, and representative trade unions have not been sufficiently powerful and organized to initiate alternative social trends despite the fact that trade union representatives participated in the work of tender commissions carrying out the sale of capital of socially-owned enterprises in Serbia.

In this part of the paper we would attempt to provide a systematic analytical presentation of the operation of trade unions in privatized companies in Serbia. However, cognitive limitations of this presentation arise from difficulties in gathering relevant material which is only partly available, making the documentary analytical corpus of this paper incomplete. However, despite these limitations, the results of this research, although partial, point to main tendencies and perspectives in the development of trade union organizing, as well as the results of collective bargaining and social dialogue with employers in privatized enterprises in Serbia.

The possibility for trade union action is not equal in all privatized enterprises in Serbia. After privatization of social capital, there were no obstacles for trade union activity in certain companies, and collective bargaining was taking place without problems, with dominant participation of the Confederation of Autonomous Trade Unions of Serbia (e.g. chemical industry Merima in Kruševac, whose new owner is German company Henkel) or in cooperation with TUC NEZAVISNOST (e.g. pharmaceutical company Zdravlje Actavis in Leskovac, whose new owner is U.S. company Watson, pharmaceutical company Zorka Pharma in Šabac, whose new owner is Hemofarm concern of Vršac, itself owned by German Stada).

On the other hand, in certain privatized enterprises in Serbia there are no trade union organizations, either because the company has no employees (e.g. oil company Beopetrol in Belgrade, now owned by Russian Lukoil), or because the company was destroyed through privatization (e.g. chemical industry Župa in Kruševac),\(^{330}\) or else, the new owner, with the consent of government administration, prohibited unionization, such as in the Zastava Elektro factory in Rača, which employs 1,000 workers, and whose new owner, as strategic partner, is Korean company Jura.\(^{331}\)

After privatization of socially-owned enterprises in Serbia, in most cases the companies became heavily downsized, as in the case of pharmaceutical company Zdravlje Actavis in Leskovac, privatized in 2003 (new owner is American company Watson), where the number of employees was reduced from 2,000 to 500; oil company Beopetrol in Belgrade, privatized in 2004 (new owner is Lukoil from the Russian Federation), which retained just 100-odd employees in the management and

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\(^{329}\) As at 6 July 2011, 1 euro was worth approximately 101 dinars.

\(^{330}\) Sindikat u privatizovanim preduzećima. Studija slučaja, prepared by Dragan Vesić, executive secretary of the „Nezavisnost“ Manufacturing, Energy and Mining Branch Union

\(^{331}\) Od radničkih borbi ka socijalnom pokretu, ed. Branslav Markuš, UG Ravnopravnost, Belgrade, 2013, p. 61
administration of its former 1,700 employees; chemical industry Župa in Kruševac, privatized in 2004, which had 1,300 employees, of which only some 50-odd remained. In the meat production complex Banat in Banatski Karlovci, after privatization of this socially-owned enterprise (new owner – Mesopromet from Pančevo), the number of employees declined from 1,000 down to barely 100; in the enterprise for the production of technical and architectural stone Venčac in Arandjelovac, after five privatizations, only 60 workers remained out of original 540; in the corporation Zastava automobili in Kragujevac, after privatization in 2010 (new owner is the Italian FIAT from Torino, which was a strategic partner of this company since 1954) 45,000 out of 150,000 employees retained their jobs; in textile company Raška in Novi Pazar, after beginning of the privatization of its social capital, barely one hundred workers remained out of original 4,000; in Zrenjaninska industrija piva (ZIP) brewery in Zrenjanin, after privatization in 2003 (new owner Momčilo Rajić, a “businessman from Subotica”, formerly arrested for resale of alcoholic beverages, tax evasion and money laundering), the number of workers was halved; in Šinvoz, Zrenjanin, in the workshop for maintenance and repair of rail vehicles the number of workers in the course of privatization was reduced from 1,600 to 20–30 production workers.

It should be noted that most of these enterprises have a long tradition and were very successful in the economy of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), and they had significant export to foreign markets.

In addition, the new owners of privatized social enterprises in Serbia often reduced workers’ wages by as much as 50% or introduced minimum wage. Increasingly frequent practice is that the buyers of social capital fail to pay pension and health insurance for employees in their enterprises, suspend company-level collective agreements and substitute them with labor rulebooks, which by their scope and contents provide less rights than collective agreements, lay off workers, while some “bosses” even physically attacked workers (e.g. in Zastava Elektro in Rača).

As we have already stressed, almost half of privatized social enterprises in Serbia ceased to operate or went bankrupt, mainly after annulment of privatization contract.

Because of so dramatically deteriorated working conditions, dismissals and drop in wages, but also because of cessation or declining output, trade unions organized major strikes in some of them.

The most significant strikes in terms of the number of participants and duration rather than their results included the following: in pharmaceutical company Jugoremedija, Zrenjanin, started on 27 December 2003, then on 11 May 2004 and, following auction sale of 41.93% of shares of this company from state-own portfolio, on 10 September 2002; in the workshop for maintenance and repair of rail vehicles Šinvoz, Zrenjanin, started in the summer of 2006 and lasted for a month, following auction sale of this enterprise in 2004; in enterprise for the production of technical and architectural stone

332 Sindikat u privatizovanim preduzećima. Studija slučaja, prepared by Dragan Vesić, executive secretary of the „Nezavisnost” Manufacturing, Energy and Mining Branch Union
333 Od radničkih borbi ka socijalnom pokretu, Branislav Markuš (Ed.), UG Ravnopravnost, Belgrade, 2013, pp.44, 57, 86, 89, 98, 101, 102
334 Ibid, p. 60
These strikes cannot be considered successful, although their result in many instances was annulment of privatization agreements (for pharmaceutical enterprise Jugoremedija, Zrenjanin, in December 2006 with pharmaceutical, cosmetics and dietary industry Jaka 80 a.d. Radovište; for the enterprise for the production of technical and architectural stone Venčac, Arandjelovac, in 2007 with buyers, companies Šumadija Granit, Arandjelovac, and Peštan, Arandjelovac; for the workshop for maintenance and repair of rail vehicles Šinvoz, Zrenjanin, in January 2008 with the buyer, physical person, Nebojša Ivković; for the enterprise Zastava Elektro, Rača, in September 2009, with a consortium of buyers led by Ranko Dejanović from Kragujevac; for the publishing house IP Prosveta, Belgrade, in September 2010 with the buyer, company IPS Media II, Belgrade; for the company Zastava PES, Surdulica, on 26 November 2010 with the buyer, company RS United Group, Belgrade), since most workers of these enterprises lost their jobs, their source of income, and were brought to the brink of survival, while leaders and participants of strikes have been fired, harassed and even arrested, as in the case of pharmaceutical company Jugoremedija in Zrenjanin, construction enterprise Trudbenik gradnja d.o.o. in Belgrade, pharmaceutical company Srbolek, Belgrade, and many others. Significant number of these enterprises ended in bankruptcy (Zrenjaninska industrija piva– ZIP, Zrenjanin, in July 2010; construction company Trudbenik gradnja d.o.o., Belgrade, on 13 July 2011; pharmaceutical company Srbolek, Belgrade, on 11 May 2011, pharmaceutical company Jugoremedija, Zrenjanin, on 27 December 2012).

Those who organized these strikes see the reasons for their failure in “disunity of workers along the trade union lines, between production workers and office workers, between those on strike and those loyal to the management”. Another reason quoted in this context is inability of the trade union movement in Serbia to overcome the bond established in the society between “corrupt government, judiciary, police, politics and so-called tycoons”.

335 Ibid, p. 89
336 Isto, str.104
CONCLUSION

The scientific contribution of this empirically-based research on the operation of trade unions in privatized enterprises in Serbia is that it highlights the weakening of trade union movement as the consequence of its strategy to support the process of privatization of social capital.

Privatization, as economic and political mechanism for transformation of social and state ownership into private resulted in the change of ownership and class structure of society and enabled the transition from the system of socialist self-management into the system of peripheral capitalism. In the course of this social and historical process, Serbia experienced the change in the structure of the national economy toward deindustrialization and overall decline in investment activity in the country. This resulted in enormous rise in unemployment, deterioration of the general social and economic position of the working class and its pauperization.

Demodernization of society and weakening of all social movements, including the trade union movement, occurred as the consequence of deindustrialization. Few and fragmented trade union organizations cannot protect the interests of the working class in production relations, nor assert themselves before employers as strong partners in collective bargaining and social dialogue. With declining trade union density in Serbia, the social and economic influence of the trade union movement as an institution of social emancipation of the working class weakens as well.
Chapter 6

Research and actors
For an extended notion of precarity: militant research in the movements

Danijela Tamše

Abstract

The author discusses militant research as an epistemological tool in activist struggles. She briefly describes three cases of militant research in the local movements and shows the possibility of its political implementations. In the second part the author proposes the use of militant research in exploring precarity, the condition she defines as a rejection to the access to services and resources that subjectivities need to fulfil their needs and desires. She sees a metropolis as a factory of precarized biopolitical producers. Accordingly, she believes that the fight against the gentrification processes through the use of militant research is crucial for the struggle of precarious.

Key words: militant research, Invisible Workers of the World, Direct Social Work, Eco Circle, precarity, gentrification, Rog.

Introduction

Recently, word “precarity” became very popular in Slovenia and the frequency of its appearance increased significantly. With the exception of small militant and academic circles, the term was virtually nonexistent, so this surely is a positive change of political and economic discourse. Unfortunately, using the proper name of the phenomenon does not necessarily bring a progressive perception of it. In Slovenia, bringing the term to the forefront opened a new space for – not politicization, but victimization of precarious. We believe that one of the main reasons for this is closely connected with the epistemological perspective that was widely used in mainstream representation of precarity. The term has been discussed in strictly normative way, meaning that the fulltime guaranteed employment was set as a norm. Anything diverting from the full-time job was perceived as an anomaly. That perspective did not only victimize the precarious but also reduced the phenomenon to employment status. But on the other hand, a few militant collectives proposed an alternative conception of precarity. This is a discussion that had been around since the early 2000s. This interpretation of the issue is much wider: it’s opposed to the mainstream victimizing discourse, but unfortunately it has, at least for now, stayed on the margins of the public discourse. In this paper we will examine the importance of militant research for building a liberating notion of precarity. We will do this in two steps. First,

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we will analyze how the militant research in the movements can transform discourses and practices. This will be done by examining three different cases from Slovenia, namely migrant workers’ movement Invisible Workers of the World, radical social work group Direct Social Work, and ecological initiative Eco Circle. Second, we will expand the concept of precarity and open up space for defining the processes of gentrification as a part of precarization. On this basis we will argue that militant research is the only research approach that can grasp the multidimensional totality of precarity.

**Militant research: who, why, how?**

What is the chief difference between militant methodology and other, perhaps more conventional approaches? It’s distinguishing characteristic isn’t a method, but rather an ethical and epistemological point of departure. Militant research is characterized by epistemology of liberation. It is a non-transcendental, immanent practice of organization that critically addresses hierarchies and relations of domination. The “truth” that is being produced in the process of militant investigation is an embodied truth of subjectivities. In that sense, militant research is as political as it can be, because its main goal is transformation of power relations without seeking some higher “objective” truth. It arises from the field and always returns to it.

Following philosophies of Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari and Michel Foucault, we can trace the origins of militant investigation in a nomadic research tradition that creates subjugated forms of knowledge. Deleuze and Guattari oppose hierarchies immanent to state/Royal science (the chief metaphor here being a tree) and promote nomadic knowledge production, i.e. science characterized by power-organizing flight. And the metaphor of this kind of knowledge is, as we know, a rhizome, an underground network of links and ties without any discernible centre. On the other hand, for Foucault, established science is being juxtaposed to critical, bottom-up knowledge, produced outside of institutions, and that kind of knowledge addresses relations of power and domination. Through the history, this epistemological perspective has been often adopted by minority organizations that have tried to overcome social and political hierarchies by changing the situation on the terrain. Those organizations of emancipation did not use self-referential frameworks of what scientific investigation should look like because their main goal was a transformation of existing relations of domination; a transformation that would be achieved together with the dominated: labourers, women, institutionalized, colonized etc. In the last decades, researchers are trying even to liberate the concept of identity: by this, they turn a struggle of particularity into the one of singularity, in which anyone can recognize all and vice versa. One of the main points of this perspective is that there is no division between the one being researched and the one doing the research: everyone is a subjectivity in a never-ending becoming.

In terms of methods applied, militant research uses all those methods that are usually conducted in social sciences but with one crucial difference: it does not use it as the measurement of some objective reality that only needs to be described, but as a tool for gaining knowledge about that which needs to be transformed. Because its main goal is achieving political and social transformations, it also uses method of direct action,
including everything from petitions to street action. Direct action is a way of manifesting the knowledge and indignation; it’s a way to put pressure on the institutions of power.

**Three cases: Invisible Workers of the World (IWW), Direct Social Work (DSD), Eco Circle**

To understand what is the role of militant research epistemology in achieving transformations, we’re going to take a look at three cases of successful employment of the approach. We have chosen those cases particularly because they challenge a mainstream definition of precarity, even thought that is not their primary focus. At the end of every part of this section we will highlight a connection between the movement activities and the changes in the definition of precarity they suggest. Namely, we’re going to take a look at how militant investigation opened up a path towards a new theory of precarity.

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First, let’s take a look at a movement Invisible Workers of the World (IWW). The movement started in autumn 2007. Its main goal was to politicize the question of the migrant labourers’ position by addressing border and visa regimes in European Union. At the time, the discourse on migrant labour was built around social dumping perspective: migrant labourers were seen as thieves of “Slovenian” jobs and as the ones to blame for lowering labour standards. On the one hand, this notion was forced by populist anti-migration public resentment and, on the other, by state institutions, supported by the official stream of the largest corporative union organization with clearly protectionist approach to labour market. In those years, Slovenian labour market was strongly affected by construction boom. At the same time, construction was defined to be one of the deficient sectors, meaning that there was, in Slovenia, virtually no workforce available for doing hard labour on construction sites. Consequently, migrant labour was essential for keeping up with market demands and, even more importantly, it kept a separate labour market. What militants were aiming at was exactly to show that border and visa regimes are the reason for this.

This was done with a thorough investigation of working and living conditions of migrants and policies that constrain their free movement on labour market. The investigation showed that migrants are pushed in deficient low-paying sectors by the means of state policies severely limiting their rights to stay and work in the country. The story is more or less similar to those we know from other countries: so-called third world citizens are welcome only as labour-capacity containers. Big union confederations reacted by forcing a quota reduction and taking a leading role in legal struggle for better living conditions. The chief goal of the IWW movement, however, was to open up the borders and to break the link between citizenship and constraining conditions of living and doing work. After analyzing restraining policies, the movement organized a comprehensive public campaign. The campaign included different kinds of direct action, from street manifestations, leaflets distribution and blockades of institutions in charge, to organization of round tables and different social events, all addressing the issue and presenting demands of the movement. Thanks to the pressure exerted on the institutions,
no one could ignore the problematic nature of existing legal framework anymore. At the same time, public discourse and opinion changed. It was made clear that it is not some “evil” migrants that steal jobs and lower labour standards; it is the existence of visa regime that pushes the boundaries of labour exploitation to its unprecedented dimensions. On this basis, some changes of migrant labour visa regime were finally possible. While it is true that this changes failed to abolish strict entry conditions to labour market, they simplified the process of gaining entry permission to the country.

In short, the policies and public opinion on migrant work actually changed for the better. We’ll never be sure whether this is due to the effect of the economic crisis that significantly reduced the number of visible migrant labourers, but the change cannot be overlooked, and I believe the IWW played no small part in it. And it is without doubt that using militant research was crucial for politicizing the question of migrant labour. What seems to be the most important dimension of the struggle are the new sociality and the way of handling day-to-day migrant issues. In the context of our discussion the experience of IWW is crucial for understanding of how precariousness of working and living is connected to access to citizens’ rights. Part of IWW militants had a vision of making IWW a movement of the precarious in general, but failed due to strong presence of migrant workers. A desire to generalize the question of precarity was later translated into movement #15o, part of which was also the initiative Direct Social Work; and that initiative is also our next case.

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After the occupation of the square in front of Ljubljana stock exchange, a group called Direct Social Work (DSD) was established. It was an initiative that appealed mostly to the students of social work at University of Ljubljana who felt that doing social work should follow the ethics they are being thought in the classroom. They have been extremely critical towards state driven system of social work bureaucratization and were promoting – as the name of the group suggests – direct approach to the people in need of social work. This work, the group felt, should be done with the users of the social work, rather than for them. They should be treated as subjects, or co-workers, rather than passive recipients. The group widened the definition of social work to include any kind of activity that promotes solidarity and builds strong, emancipating community. Consequently, social work became an activity that is being conducted by anyone for everyone and vice versa. A conscious decision to take a minoritarian stand towards social work meant that the group was challenging the mainstream way of performing social work and dealt with questions that are otherwise pushed to the margins. Their militant research perspective included subjectivities that are in any sense excluded from welfare state; they challenged the usual moral arguments based on the idea that one needs to be a good citizen in order to get access to social services. Besides in-depth conversations with the excluded, the group promoted direct action as a method of pushing the boundaries of state defined access to rights. Accordingly, the group attracted significant public attention, organizing manifestations, doing graffiti, blocking the Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Work, occupying the Faculty of Social Work, doing sit-ins and various artistic performances. The “subjects” of this social work were people with mental health
conditions, the homeless and addicted – groups that fall out of the established system of state organized social welfare.

It is important to highlight that through addressing these issues, militants of Direct Social Work were basically conducting a research on precarity. That is, a wider theorization of access to social services was extremely important for widening the notion of precariousness: the concept was no longer understood merely as a specific work relation, but rather as a more fundamental living condition. Later we will see that our definition of precarity is, in the same way, based on the problem of access of biopolitical producers to the means of living. Before we do that, let’s take a look of a third initiative, Eco Circle.

Eco Circle is a movement that has successfully set up a counter-expertise on environmental issues, namely industrial emissions in Zasavje region, a valley between Ljubljana and Maribor. Zasavje is a common name for three small municipalities, Trbovlje, Hrastnik and Zagorje ob Savi, all together counting 32034 inhabitants as of 2011, living on 264 km². The valley, resembling more a series of gorges, has been strongly industrialized throughout history: in early 19th century, two mines were opened in Trbovlje and Hrastnik; in 1860, a glass factory was established in Hrastnik; and in 1875, a cement factory in Trbovlje started to operate. All this heavy industry operated until recently when a mine was closed. However, glass and cement factory are still in business. Overall, this industry is based on using fossil fuels and various carcinogenic and otherwise dangerous chemicals. The problem of chemical compounds containing exhausts is intensified by the geography of the area: dangerous exhausts can float in the valley for days due to surrounding hills preventing the wind from blowing them away. The health of the local population is strongly affected: the number of people suffering from lung dysfunctions (asthma, cancer) is above national average; average life expectancy is also a few years lower. Things started to go even further downhill in 2002 when international concern Lafarge bought the majority of shares of the cement factory and started to ignore all existing environmental standards, however weak they have been in the first place. The conditions in the valley deteriorated significantly and this is when a few already existing ecological associations merged into one, i.e. Eco Circle.

The problems the militants of Eco Circle deal with are very typical of neo-colonial attitude of corporate business. Weak social environment with above average unemployment level lowers environmental expectations of the locals and opens up a path for the well-standing company to camouflage its doings. At the same time, the company has enough resources to hire “experts” that falsify data about emission levels and determine the scope of the affected area. This area, however, is curiously limited to the uninhabited space. Environmental inspections do come upon a call, but not without first announcing their visit. That gives the company enough time to hide the evidence of illegal fuels (namely petroleum coke or, shortly, pet coke) usage and lower their production rate. Accordingly, the environmental tests show that the factory operates according to the regulations. Yet they are far from being credible. Consequently, militants were left with no other option but to set up their own expertise, namely the counter-expertise. The power of the method became clear in a few years: professionals from different fields (jurists, mathematicians, physicists, chemists, doctors, sociologists)
combined their expertise in a common struggle for a right to live in a clean environment. They pass their knowledge to non-expert militants and together they’ve been successful in several legal suits against the company, which was forced to pay large penalties. Not two months ago, Lafarge actually gave in to the demands and moved out of the region.

In the context of our discussion, the Eco Circle struggle is important because it opens up a crucial question: Is it more important to have production running or to live in a clean and safe environment? One of the biggest issues Eco Circle has to deal with is the perception that cement factory is important, even necessary for providing jobs to poor locals (no matter how few those jobs are). If our understanding of precarity had been narrower – that is, reduced to employment security – we would simply ignore the effect the industrial production has on environment (this opinion is, in fact, shared by several political parties). But because the quality of life is a multidimensional phenomenon including healthy and save environment we cannot agree with that kind of perspective. A struggle of Eco Circle is therefore important because it shakes the perception about the nature of precarity: precarity is not defined solely by job security neither by the level of access one has to human produce. What we need to take into account when defining precarity is the right to life itself.

Precarity: definition

As already mentioned, a term precarity has been present in Slovenian public discourse in last few years. That doesn’t mean that phenomenon itself is new; it just hadn’t been a matter of public discussion. The reason for sudden popularity of the concept is at least twofold. First, crisis brought austerity measures and for the first time in last decades a large part of population was left without access to state guaranteed social services. At the same time, family welfare deteriorated due to worsening living conditions of retired population. Consequently, parental help became less and less available to those who might or did lose their means of living. At this moment, the search for a wider narrative that would explain the present living and working conditions arose. In this conditions, and this is the second reason for the public rise of precarity, the previously marginalized militant narratives have finally found fertile ground. The concept was spread and different groups started using it. Unfortunately, as the concept was, at the time, still quite indeterminate, various actors were able to define it in multiple ways. What happened is that in time the negative definition prevailed. This can be explained by the well-known fact that it is much easier to understand social phenomena in dualistic terms, especially when the opposing term, here the guaranteed work, enjoys full public recognition. It is then easy to conclude that every form of labour that diverges from this paradigm is in fact merely a deficient, or negative form of work. Even though precarity is a complex social phenomenon that can be adequately constructed only via affirmative, internal and vital difference, it is easier to comprehend it via negative external difference. And this is what has happened. In the first phase, the social downhill of the precarious was attributed to job insecurity. This is how the phenomenon was politically impoverished. The next step was to oppose it to the guaranteed work and, consequently, to victimize the precarious. Accordingly, the precarious worker is someone suffering from not having a guaranteed work. She is, in short, a victim of her labour conditions.
Our perspective on precarity is radically different. First, in terms of job security, precarity is not an anomaly, but rather a norm. We base this claim on two facts: historically speaking, precarity has always been a prevailing form of employment; at the same time, the statistics show this still is the case. The second supposition is that nowadays precarity has less to do with job security and more with changing conditions of work and value production that is becoming hegemonic. This type of production is based on biopolitical work, a work not concentrated on producing material objects, but relations that further produce subjectivities. The case of Eco Circle suggests that human productivity is no longer defined neither by the amount of objects people produce nor by the number of jobs guaranteed. What is important, rather, is the quality of life produced by this very productivity. The right to access to nature and clean environment is then opposed to labour-oriented industrial conception of growth that measures productivity solely on the base of production rate. It is then no wonder that some ecologists speak of de-growth.

According to this, we define precariousness in terms of access to rights, goods and services we need to fulfil our desires and maintain satisfactory quality of life. The dynamic, relational state of precariousness is not defined by job status but rather by the denial of access. Moreover, the precarious are in many cases the producers of the same goods that are being appropriated from them and then turned into payable services. Three examples we’ve presented indicate this broadening of the concept. At the same time, they signal the importance of militant methodology for investigating precarity. The thesis is then as following: every approach that doesn’t try to transform the politics of access is an approach that victimizes the precarious. The only way of changing living conditions of precarious is by politically transforming our perspective on precarity. As long as precarity is understood in terms of job insecurity, research stays chained to moralizing about bad employers and poor employees. But when those conceptual chains are shattered, new areas of struggle for access open up. One of them is the fight against gentrification, which we’re going to examine in the following section.

**Gentrification: The case of Rog and production of the commons**

Soon after it was coined, the term “gentrification” gained a critical undertone. It designates a process of encroaching upon and investing in areas with low value. Consequently, value and prices raise and drive away locals who cannot afford living in the area anymore. The process is widespread. It rests on a biopolitical production of value: areas of gentrification are being chosen according to investors’ sense of the opportunity to raise value due to area’s history and lifestyles. Some of the most known cases of gentrification are Barcelona’s Macba and Berlin’s Mediaspree. Due to time limitations, we’ll examine only a case from Slovenia.

In Ljubljana, the trend of gentrification is clearly visible in the case of ex-bicycle factory, Rog. The production stopped in 1992 and in 2002, the town of Ljubljana bought the factory. It was left abandoned until 2006, when a group of militants squatted it and claimed right for a temporary use, i.e. free use until the owner decides what to do with it. The owner quickly realized it could turn the squat into a profitable centre for popular culture and modern art. The sudden promise of the moneymaking cultural machine was, if
I may say so, like a phoenix rising from the ashes of the abandoned bicycle factory. Initially, the users thought the occupation would last for short time: their primary goal was to show the possible uses of the empty urban spaces. But after some jostling users were left to stay and the concept of temporary use turned out to be insufficient for them: they started investing in empty spaces themselves and consequently did not want to be temporary anymore. After nine years of usage, Rog is still squatted. Various political, social and artistic activities take place there. In the mean time, the town authorities developed a project called Second Chance. The main idea they have for Rog is to change it into a public-private property, proposing to privatize the majority of the complex and to construct parking lots, luxurious apartments, hotel, shops etc. The small remainder of the public space would then be left to the so-called creative industries: studios for artists producing high-end objects. It goes without saying that this is something radically different from what current users imagine under a word “creativity”: for authorities, creativity is an individual activity that can be sold and made profit of, whereas for users, creativity is first and foremost defined by non-commercial, community building activity.

What is happening in Rog has to be put to wider context. Rog is placed on a border of a city centre that has in recent years faced big gentrifying pressures. A popular slogan of town authorities is “Ljubljana is a beautiful city”, showing the vision of city development into tourist haven. Tourism has actually become a big source of municipal budget, and to make city even more welcoming, the authorities try to clean off all unwanted elements. These elements are supposed to be anyone and anything that doesn’t bring profit or, even worse, occupy spaces that could’ve been used for profit making. Autonomous cultural area Metelkova, positioned only five minutes of walking distance from Rog, has been strongly commercialized in recent years, also due to advertising it as tourist-welcoming space with an ex-prison turned hostel. At the south border of Metelkova, Ethnological Museum and Museum of Contemporary Arts have been built and the adjacent squares have been revitalized. These institutions represent a deeper conflict of the idea of creativity: on the one hand, there are non-institutionalized, autonomist creators, on the other hand – perhaps only a few doorstops away – we have nationalized, canonical art. We can see that the Rog users find themselves in a similar situation vis-à-vis the Second Chance project. Additionally, in the area comprising both Rog and Metelkova, several governmental offices have been established, including the newly built Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Matters and Equal Opportunities. Not far on the banks of Ljubljanica river new bridges are being built and expensive bars are opening their doors. As for the latest developments, Metelkova is under authorities attacks that delegitimize their activities and force them into soft normalization and legalization. On the other hand, by re-inventing a sense of community, Rog users managed to, at least for now, defend their gates and keep their autonomy. But at the same time, one of the derivatives of Second Chance project, Rog Lab, was launched and started to work under the concept of creative arts.

Now, let us see how this process is connected to precarization. For Ljubljana authorities, one of the most important dimensions of creating tourist friendly city is to manifest its openness to different cultures and cosmopolitan values. This is an added value of the city that can be created only by the biopolitical production of the commons. Ljubljana presents itself as a youthful city, full of opportunities. Accordingly, a lively
youth and alternative culture is a must-have. Therefore, the city has to let autonomous culture develop. In that sense we see a sprawling of alternative creativity that, paradoxically, raises the value of the area and prepares the terrain for later potential appropriation of the common. Rog occupation brought to life different collectives and movements and revived upper part of Trubarjeva street. But for authorities, the Rog alternative is too alternative: it’s rooted in the production of common, and not in public or private property. This is the moment in which all the hypocrisy of gentrification processes become clear: alternative is acceptable only until it’s not an alternative to the economic order. As long as it could be sold as a lifestyle, authorities approve of it — when it goes beyond economic utilitarianism and rationality it becomes unwanted.

The production in occupied Rog is biopolitical. That means it is an immaterial and socialized production of subjectivities; but those subjectivities aren’t limited to the subjectivity of a producer or consumer. Following post-Operaist terms, a primary sight of building relations that produce subjectivities is a metropolis, also called by some (e.g. Negri and Hardt) biopolitical city: it is a factory of precarious biopolitical workers that by constant deterritorialization and reterritorialization create a multitudinal movement. A metropolis is a place of the production of the commons and inventions of tactics of struggle against its appropriation. If relations are politically organized relations of joyful encounters, to use the words of Deleuze and Guattari, then they are producing unsellable commons that cannot be evaluated and measured by time, price of raw material invested, transport costs and scarcity of the produce. But metropolis is a laboratory of unforeseeable in which the encounters are not always joyful – sometimes they are encounters of capitalist exploitation and hierarchies. Hardt and Negri claim that capital cannot produce joyful encounters and therefore only preys on the ones already produced outside capitalist logic. And this is where gentrification steps in: what capital is interested in is to appropriate the commons and put a price on it. So, what happens is that already precarious biopolitical producers produce commons. These commons are later appropriated (e.g. by gentrification) and the original producers are denied access to them. The circle continues: precarious are getting even more precarized.

**Conclusion: Militant research of precarity**

Following from here, we can outline the main reason why it is that the militant approach in researching precarity is so important. What the transformative ethics of militant research suggest is that the only truly ethical way to examine precarity is to simultaneously fight it. But, as we’ve tried to suggest with our definition of precarity, we can fight precarity only by constantly reinventing it. Precarity is not some static, objective phenomenon, but a dynamic one, embodied in subjectivities. To overcome its underlying conditions, we have to again and again detect where the process of appropriation is taking place. We can achieve this only by implementing the nomadic research approach; the approach that is in constant becoming and that doesn’t submit itself to abstract rules of academic conduct. Militant research on precarity liberates the notion of precarity, as well as the struggle against it. By exploring the possibilities for re-appropriating what has been taken away from us, we free ourselves from modern call for solving the “problem” of the precarious by granting them fulltime labour contracts.
So, in terms of doing militant research in precarity, we suggest to first take a clear political stand: we don’t want to be precarious, because we are the primary biopolitical producers of the goods and services that capital constantly appropriates and denies us access to. And it is only this what makes us precarious. Secondly, to research militantly means to self-organize into strong bodies without organs that fill every hole in the society and actively struggles for defending and re-appropriating what has been taken away. Thirdly, this should be done not only using classical research methods but also, and more importantly, by including a method of direct action. To mention just some forms that have already been used in Slovenia: organizing alternative student and worker protests, collectively writing a blog with stories about precarity, doing a teach-in in financial capital’s institutions, talking about precarity in connection to the crisis. Fourthly, struggle for the right to the city should be detected as one of the crucial to fight precarity. There are of course other elements of precarization (in the fields of knowledge production, art commercialization and lifestyle creation, to name just a few), but it seems to us that gentrification process is the clearest of the cases. This is so because it is materialized in most tangible way: it is placed on our streets, our squares and our parks that start slipping away as soon as gentrification starts. A struggle for metropolitan areas that were created by precarized biopolitical producers is therefore one of the most effective methods for fighting the precarity.

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1. Introduction: Beginning and Aims of ‘Citizens of Science’

The talk of the crisis of social trust in Poland and the low social capital of Poles has been around for a long while (Czapliński 2014). This mistrust concerns not only politicians, colleagues at work or neighbours, but also institutions that have hitherto seemed important for culture and society. Poles do not engage in pro-social activities and rarely work as volunteers (Adamiak 2014). The crisis of social trust affects also the academia and the prestige of scholars is declining: they seem to lose their status of authority (in their scientific field and in general) and become mere employees of the enterprises traditionally called universities (Clark 1998).

In this article I will be describing the initiative known under the name ‘Citizens of Science’ (Obywatele Nauki, ON), which aims at restoring that social capital. The movement commenced at the instigation of Polish academics from diverse institutions and fields of research. Its members represent a wide spectrum of professional experience and include eminent, distinguished and world-famous professors as well as doctoral students or even undergraduates. The activists are highly qualified, as it can be seen in the track record of their research stays abroad or management of sizeable research grants. The Citizens have extensive knowledge not only of their respective fields, but they are also very knowledgeable in the day-to-day running of academic institutions, often with vast experience that allows for comparisons. One should also mention their remarkable social involvement and the initiatives they take to secure the improvement of Poland’s education system. Therefore their activities can be called elitist (Kola 2011a, 2011b).

The ON movement began in a way similar to that of another citizen initiative concerning culture (broadly conceived), namely the ‘Citizens of Culture’ (Obywatele Kultury). The principle underlying the emergence of the latter movement was the conviction that culture represents a part of social life, which requires uttermost care from citizens, state and politicians. Neither of the two is attributable to any interest group or political party. Both

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339 The ‘social movement’ with capitalized letters refers to the Social Movement ‘Solidarity’.
postulate reforms, but prefer evolutionary changes instead of revolutions. Both are very active as they define their status as a process rather than an organization.

2. The Activity of ON

The ON address their activities to local groups associated with universities. It is there that they look for leaders who may attract others. The group of initiators co-ordinate the work of the leaders and members, their role, however, is organizational in nature – they abstain from exercising the leadership directly (they are not formed into the kind of structure e.g. the board of ON). It is from the outset that they devise and co-ordinate the activities of the movement. They also act as the spokesmen of the ON: they attend important consultation sessions organized by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, the Polish Academy of Sciences and the National Science Centre, take part in conferences concerning the role of research (e.g. the Academic Culture Congress in Cracow, 2014) and gain wide acclaim in the public sphere, mainly on account of their ever more frequent interviews for newspapers and radio stations.

The ON aim to initiate a public and fact-based debate on the shape of Polish science and education. In their view, it has to be rid of ideology and politics and instead focused on action and pro-quality goals that would not merely serve the development of research as a goal in itself, but also foster the advancement of Polish academics. The citizens, weary of the wailing and pessimistic tone of the current debate, approached the topic from a broad perspective and for this reason decided to use not only the media, but also the non-governmental sector. The private sector is also given its say, especially the companies that have to take part in creating new technologies – and (co-)finance the related research work – so that they may be truly innovative and compete successfully on the global market. The goal of the debate promoted by the ON is to seek answers to such questions as the purposes of scholarly work and scholars themselves as well as the desired approaches to education and research that would influence the social development in a possibly all-encompassing manner.

The movement is bound not only to promote specific solutions, but also provoke a systemic approach which would include scholars themselves. The success is supposed to be gauged not merely by the introduced changes and the reform of universities, but it also has to bring about the increase of the sense of community in the academia, the restoration of the value-based ethos, the call for solidarity, responsibility and involvement. The informal nature of the movement, as well as the absence of any inner structure, is their undeniable asset.

The first action of the ON was the publication of *The Manifesto*, their main appeal for social backing, which is concerned with the whole range of education practices (from pre-school all the way to university education). Its principles are widely conceived so that everyone can support them and take for their own. They form a system of related

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340 The difference between the two is that the Citizens of Culture is a movement that advocates full realization of the rights and freedom guaranteed in Poland’s Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, namely the universal and equal right to participate in cultural life as well as the freedom of artistic expression. The Citizens of Culture worked out the *Pact for Culture* which was signed on 14 May 2011 with Polish government represented by the prime minister Donald Tusk.
elements that includes schools, universities, research institutions as well as private, NGO and public sectors. The ON emphasize the role of truly modern schools, which are able to prepare children to fend for themselves in the modern world and provide them with the capacity for independent judgment and the opportunity to discover the world. The university education in its turn has to prepare for social and professional life and sharpen up the critical thinking. Another element in this system is the innovative economy, which appreciates the potential of science. This potential increases the capability of Polish companies to compete on the global market and create new jobs. The research has to be of cutting-edge quality to open the possibilities to enter into global competition: not in terms of academic rankings, but in respect of the actual influence on society, technology and finance. It needs to be supplemented with outreach campaigns which can re-establish the reliability, social responsibility and prestige of science. The final element is the funding and the appeal to spend at least two percent of the government budget on research (long-term development, incremental increase of spending on research).

Under The Manifesto was signed by prominent ON professors and people known for their public activity: prof. Katarzyna Chałasińska-Macukow (the former rector of the University of Warsaw), prof. Barbara Engelking, prof. Marcin Kula, prof. Karol Modzelewski, prof. Krzysztof Pomian, prof. Henryk Samsonowicz, prof. Maciej Żylicz. Among them there are prof. Małgorzata Omilanowska (the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage) and prof. Włodzisław Duch (the Secretary of State in The Ministry of Science and Higher Education). It ought to be mentioned that The Manifesto was signed also by public persons, engaged in popularization of science – dr. Adam Leszczyński (a journalist works in Gazeta Wyborcza), Adam Wajrak (a journalist-ecologist), dr. Emanuel Kulczycki (a blogger who teaches how to reach a success in science with digital tools). The Citizen of Science’s postulates are supported by different institutions (usually non-governmental organizations), e.g.: Citizens of Culture, Stefan Batory Foundation, Forum Akademickie, Collegium Invisibile, MaMa Foundation, The Children’s University. This strong support for ON demonstrates the need for such an initiative.

Apart from The Manifesto, the ON have taken up other initiatives. First of all, they organize debates on important subjects such as the equal rights for women in science, the role of ethics in research, open science, the future of Polish science, doctoral studies and academic career. They broaden their appeal by addressing a wide range of audiences, also by posting their videos on YouTube.

The ON act also as spokespersons. They take part in other initiatives, feature in the media, polemicize with other groups or high-impact press. They comment on the role of controlling institutions in science, e.g. concerning the Central Commission for Academic Degrees and Titles. They do their own research on Polish science, promote good academic practices and discuss such issues as:

1. Discrimination against such factors as age, sex, creed, race, nationality, health, sexual orientation and opinions.
2. Abuse of superior position against subordinate employees, doctoral students and undergraduates.
4. Disobedience to labour law.
5. Lack of transparency in employment procedures and their supposed openness.
6. Ambiguous and inadequate criteria for employees’ assessment.
7. Lack of pro-quality approach to teaching and/or research obligations. The consent to poor scholarship and teaching contradicts the mission of researchers and university teachers.
8. Promotion of conformism and passivity, disapproval of social engagement.
9. Open access to research results and dissertations (with qualification for patent protection, defence-related matters, etc.)

The above list illustrates the diversity of interests evinced by the ON. They broaden the perspective on the possibilities to enhance the quality of scholarly work by including such factors as family and social life, culture and local community.

Their current work includes the establishment of the Pact for Science which gathers academics whose scholarly work is focused on universities as well as the employees of Polish academic institutions. The Pact offers recommendations concerning various spheres of academic life: funding, the models of higher education systems, doctoral studies and academic career, outreach campaigns. At the moment of writing, the text is being prepared for public consultation (also with all political groups).

I am myself involved in the ON movement and it is for this reason that I take the liberty of saying what is, in my view, the most important aspect of the activity of the ON. Most of all, I would point out the fact that I can use my knowledge to serve a good cause, most notably the knowledge I developed while doing my research on doctoral students, also at some of the best universities in the world. Another reason is the necessity of action: it is worthwhile to make the best of the opportunity to introduce desirable changes.

The Citizens of Science movement is strikingly different from playing an instrument, travelling, playing bridge or horse-riding. First, it is an activity closely linked with professional life. Second, it gathers a group of people dedicated to the development of society and education, with whom I share similar (but not identical) views. I could hardly pursue my academic interests without them. Third, it is intellectual in nature, but one can feel their influence in practice. Fourth, it may appear political when its activities are viewed from ideological rather than instrumental perspective. Fifth, it results from a passion for democracy, open to everyone, but with a particular focus on the professional component (the meritocratic element grows with the engagement in pursuing this passion).

3. Paths of interpretation

How should this unusual passion of the Citizens and myself be described, explained and explored? It is a daunting task, not least because it involves theorizing the practice in which I am engaged almost from the very beginning. It is not merely a cross-section of the movement, but rather a vivisection in which I make use of the tremendous force which drives also my actions (no matter if I like that or not). It is not my intention to point at the shortcomings or difficult moments in my cooperation with the Citizens, but I will definitely propose some interpretative paths that can help to understand our actions. It is also hard to adopt adequate proportions of what this analysis should provide and how

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it should be carried out – should it deal with myself or with others, should it be concerned with actions, problems and solutions? As an academic, I have made the decision to deal with this subject in a scholarly manner and look for analytical tropes and research topics which I present below.

There are three main paths which may help to do this research. In particular it refers to the contemporary theories of social movements (Gorlach, Mooney 2008; Krzemiński 1996, 2013; Sztompa 1993; Żuk 2001; Touraine 1977, 2009, 2014; Touraine, Dubet, Wieviorka, Strzelecki 1984), which analyse these activities from macro-, meso- and microstructural perspectives, for instance in studying cooperation or public roles (Sennet 1992, 2013). K. Gorlach and P.H. Mooney define social movements by referring to an adequate metaphor: ‘Collective human activities are undertaken to achieve the desired state of affairs, to challenge or defend the existing social order and externalize a collective identity. They are like laboratories shaping more sustainable forms of social life’ (Gorlach, Mooney 2008: 9). It follows that the Citizens of Science (as a group and as individuals) can be seen as the subjects/objects of research on the important social process of change in the transformation and reform of higher education (which has taken a neoliberal turn). ‘Therefore, the observation and analysis of the various accompanying phenomena is an important instrument of understanding the fundamental mechanisms that shape the social life’ (Gorlach, Mooney 2008: 9).

This is partly in line with the views of Alain Touraine who defined new social movements as efforts aimed at re-establishing the social reality so that the social subject could gain greater control of itself (its historicity) instead of focusing on individual, particular objectives. It was typical of post-industrial societies where such phenomena were seen as a universal stage of development. New social tendencies had to be rid of the class-oriented theory of conflict which lingered as a Marxist legacy. The pursuit of new social goals had to be based on such values as equality, self-development, participatory democracy, human rights, non-violence and subsidiarity.

Having considered Touraine’s theory, it is worthwhile to look at the issue in another way, namely by referring to the Social Movement Solidarity (Touraine 1977, 2009; Ost 1990, 2005; Staniszkis 2010) and pointing at certain analogies between its actions and those of the ON (anti-systemic resistance, a sort of polity, the concern with living conditions – not just political factors, the role of leadership etc.). Another useful tool in this analysis can be the concept of network (Osa 2003; Diani 2001), which can mobilize waves of protest and constitute social movements in democracies (Osa 2003). How does this work in practice? M. Osa described the mechanisms of its foundations, which may be applied to the characteristics of the ON. At the outset, networks offer alternative ways for the exchange of information and they are an important channel of communication between citizens and institutions. They can also shape the pattern of information (Osa 2003). Moreover, the networks make use of their social contacts to collect funds and distribute their materials. As the network grows, its activities become more widespread (less illegal) and the individual risks run by its members diminish. Information and resources increases the social solidarity and the emergence of a collective identity (Osa 2003). It all leads to the following result: ‘The network expands and assumes the identity of the opposition what causes replacing the public sphere. New organizations articulate a variety of interests and adopt alternative strategies of
confrontation with the state’ (Osa 2003). This is an example of bottom-up democracy which is based on the principle of emotional, personal engagement (Collins 2001; Pollentta, Amenta 2008; Baker 2001). The explanation provided by C. Baker rests on the fact that ‘Communicative interaction and practical action are always creative processes, much of that creativity consisting in the emotional, moral and aesthetic tone with which we invest what we say and do’ (Baker 2001: 176). He takes a broader view on the issue: ‘In the tradition deriving from Le Bon, individuals engaging in collective action lose their identities and their rationality, overcome by crowd emotions. It is surely more useful to suggest that they change their identities and rationalities. In a dialogical account, we see people shifting the meanings of their identities, adopting new ones, both personal and social, in processes of communicative action full of their own emotional colours’ (Baker 2001: 193). The identity of being in the opposition works by means of reinforcing the state of mind (Morris, Braine 2001: 26). This process brings about a certain culture of opposition, which gives rise to ‘the framework of oppositional ideas and worldviews that permeate the larger culture of certain subordinate communities. These framework also contain partially developer critiques of the status quo as well as knowledge of isolated rebellious acts and prior episodes of organized collective action’ (Morris, Braine 2001: 26).

Andrzej Friszke proposed an interesting distinction between opposition and resistance. He sees the former as an intentional, planned and programme-based activity (organizational or intellectual) aimed at bringing down a system or reforming it by disrupting the monopoly of the party and restoring the society as the subject. The resistance in its turn manifests itself in various spontaneous actions that are not organized: this sort of contestation of the imposed political system has no leaders.

It can be doubted, however, if the comparison of the contemporary social movements with those active in the distant past, can be in any way appropriate, useful and advantageous. One should pay attention to the context in which the object under scrutiny is situated. Is there anything that the following could have in common: the student strike in Vilnius against the institution of ‘bench ghettos’, the Solidarity movement and other contemporary initiatives? Is historical analysis of any help in understanding the present day? Another important factor which has its impact on the analysis is the emotional and ideological engagement in the object of study.

The third interpretative option is the theory of performative democracy (Matynia 2009) which is a particular dimension of social life forming an alternative to the undemocratic, unjust practices of the government. As pointed out by E. Matynia (2009) it is neither a model, nor an idea, but an activity which serves to develop the practice of democracy. The sense of effectuality is crucial here, for it guarantees the engagement in the life of citizens (in analogy to the movement’s name) and the responsibility for the sphere of life that has to be changed. The actors initiate performative acts which provide conducive conditions for democracy in a given social, political and economic context, to which Matynia refers as the free public space – hence the need for debate, also with the representatives of the government who as a rule do not engage in discussion with their subordinates). It is in this free public space that the citizens may claim respect for their rights and their freedom can be broadened. The anonymous mass turns into a polyphony of individual voices of equal citizens. This is a beginning of a genuine change, which
does not merely mean a transformation of the system, but entails the education of the citizens so as to prepare them for playing important roles.

The idea and practice of performative democracy is a particular dimension of political life which has been shaped by the events of the recent past decades and can be found in both democratic and undemocratic contexts. It is closely related to the politics of hope. It is a project which aims to oppose the culture of injustice and oppression by organizing the public sphere so that the people may stand up to the violence or discrimination which they (can) experience. Elżbieta Matynia quotes few examples from different part of the world e.g. the erosion of communism in Eastern Europe, the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street. It is important to notice, that performative democracy is not a theoretical model or a political ideal, but a locally-conditioned process of establishing and fostering democracy stimulated by and for the citizens.

The performative categories were first devised in the 1950’s with the sociologist Erving Goffman proposing the dramaturgical approach. Every single act of a human being takes place in front of the public. The masks, so cherished in classical theatre, represent the desire to save face, which is compulsory – we conceal everything that is intimate and emotional. The very name of the paradigm – performative studies – emerged from the lectures on ‘How to do Things with Words’ delivered by the philosopher John L. Austin at Harvard University in 1955.

The paradigm of performative studies focuses the work of researchers on social practice, on what is being done here and now. In this perspective, culture, politics and social life are no longer seen as texts that require interpretation. This process is occasioned with genuine sense of authorship, it thrives owing to the individual voices of social actors, it is imbued with their stories, their cultures and the specific economic context. In fact, it is their life experience and social imagination that lends its energy to the system.

On the other hand, performative democracy resists all attempts at institutionalization. The performance does not last forever, it usually appears unsolicited and its disappearance is equally unexpected. Surely, one may arrange suitable conditions for the democratic dramaturgy, lay the foundations for centres of dialogue and set up trilateral committees. Thus it is good to put the idea into practice. In some European countries one can take part in so-called consensus conferences. A group of inhabitants interested in a particular issue meet for a few days in a secluded place, away from the media and political campaigners, to debate, discuss with experts and work out a common solution. The whole process is funded by the government.

4. Pedagogical context

For a pedagogue, several educational issues come to the fore. They refer primarily to educational action research (the ON work on a project basis, see: Červinková, Gołębiak 2010, 2013), critical pedagogy (Giroux 1991; Szkudlarek 2009, 2010; Szkudlarek, Sliwerski 2010), and pedagogy of emancipation (Czerepaniak-Walczak 2006, 2013a, 2013b). The matter-of-fact questions addressed by the ON situate the movement in the scope of research which includes the higher education didactics and
the interdisciplinary study of university education. The activity of the ON involves members who represent various disciplines but not the whole array of professional positions (note the conspicuous lack of support from professors). The movement works in the context of global and local changes of the university and its functions. These changes are occasioned by the mercantile approach to the university conceived of as a company, factory, laundry or school. The ON also deal with problems related to the reforms initiated by the government and the EU (including the Bologna Process). In their reports they often make reference to gender-related issues such as, for instance, pursuing an academic career and having a family.

5. Conclusions: Perspectives, barriers and problems – the future of the movement

By the way of conclusion I would like to add some comments concerning the development of the movement and the perspectives on its future and effectiveness. Only a minority of academics participate and few are involved in pursuing the cause of the ON (which can be seen also in Toruń). The movement lacks distinct leadership, even though this changes as the representatives of the ON appear ever more frequently in the media. The ON form a democratic group of academics employed at various universities in Poland which makes it more difficult for the network to become firmly established and results in blurred responsibility for their actions (which, on the other hand, is at the core of democracy). One can also point at the low media appeal of the issue – no blood, no suffering, no sensation. The question remains: what will be left of the solutions that have been worked out once the direction of university reforms changes? Who may claim property rights to these recommendations? There is a number of other questions, but it is worthwhile to go beyond them and become involved in the work of the Citizens of Science.

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Social classes and social movements
- building up a collective identity in Albania

Ardian Hackaj

The social movements are a new and not well-developed phenomenon in Albania. They achieved their apex – in number of individuals and clarity of objectives - in the 1991 demonstrations against the communist regime. The following ones up to this day have been more collective actions born mainly “against” punctual central government decisions. They have been linked to direct threats to citizen’s livelihood (such as the case of the mayhem of 1997 following the bankruptcy of the pyramidal financial schemes where Albanians lost almost EUR 1 bn in savings), or to perceived ones impacting their safety. Safety-linked movements have mostly been kneejerk reactions of different communities - sometimes structured, sometimes not - to protest against physical damage of their neighbourhood. They can be characterised as bottom up initiatives, restricted in their geographical spread to the “endangered” location or community, with no clear political party affiliation and with no traditional left or right ideological base.

Taking into account the societal developments of these last 20 years, the above-mentioned evolution of social movements can be explained by the destruction of the elements that were the corner stone of the “collective identity” in communist Albania. The principal ones may be classified as below:

- “the ideological void”: from 1944 until 1990, generations of citizen were educated and worked under a very charged ideological system. This part of the population was used to get in the squares when ordered and organised by party mechanisms in a very centralised and bureaucratically system. With the disappearance of the communist ideology and of the party, this mass of people lost the “ideological reason” and the respective “logistic mechanisms” to manifest in the way they were used to. Furthermore today in Albania there is no clear left or right policies. Or on the best case, there is a mix of them, which creates the same confusion. For example the current socialist government, while introducing progressive tax, also continues resolutely forward towards the privatisation. As a result the “social movement phenomena” in Albania misses the ideological background. Consequently during the last 10 years in Albania there have been no relevant social movements related to democracy, Europe, or anticorruption, all themes with a distinct ideological dna.

- “des-industrialisation and chaotic urban swelling”: this ideological vacuum was compounded by the disbanding of the local features that determined historically the belonging of an individual, and the intensity of social interaction. With the destruction of

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the traditional industrial workplace in the cities, of the cooperatives in the rural areas, an
because of the massive and un-controlled migration towards urban centres, today there is
no a working class, neither a rural mass, neither urban communities that would offer
distinctive collective identity features to the citizen, and the benefits that result from
“belonging” to one group;

- “atomisation of society”: with the establishment of uncontested (neo) liberal
democracy and the overall domination of the market mechanisms, the remaining social and
community structures were put aside in favour of the promotion of individualistic features.
This trend was reinforced by the abrupt replacement of traditional community & social
structures such as family, community, neighbourhood, workplace (and even nation through
free trade agreements, no borders, etc). Social interaction and its corollary, trust - left its
place to contractual relations, and / or by (partly) virtual social networks for those that did
have access to internet. Imposing market mechanisms in a society without neither
functional democratic institutions (rule of law is still a significant issue even today), nor any
previous market tradition, would naturally define any individual decision to participate in a
social action – from setting up a civil society organisation to mobilising for a social cause –
as a market transaction where the citizen would aim to maximise its benefits related to
costs. Hence the importance of free riding phenomenon in Albania today.

As a result, it became ever more difficult to create the critical mass compounded
with the critical social stamina to initiate and sustain a collective movement that could be
qualified as a social movement.

**Bottom up movement as the first step towards fully fledged social movement**

From an institutional point of view, citizen movements in Albania are localised
and serve or protect the interest of the individuals directly affected. They answer to
negative externalities of economic growth ranging from industrial & urban pollution, to
governmental (local or central) decisions that impact their environment. These features
condition their range of activity and duration, resulting in few initiatives reaching
regional level or national level. As such their life-cycle depend on the reaction coming
from the public authorities.

In the next part we will focus on the three most important social movements that
have been related to “green causes”: “Vlora Citizen Initiative” against the establishment of
a petrol storage facility – Petrolifera; “Aleanca Kunder Importit te Plehrave” against import
of waste for recycling & transforming; and against the relocation in Albania of the Syrian
chemical weapons. Mjaft Movement (Enough in Albanian), which started as a reaction of
youth against Socialist Party (SP) policies, administration and corruption, may also be
eventually considered as a social movement. It was very well funded by external donors
and supported by certain courants inside the SP. It folded down at the very moment when
its charismatic leader entered politics as a MP for the Socialist Party. As such we decided to
leave it out for this presentation. Now Mjaft functions as standard local NGO.

**Environment as the cement of new collective identities?**

The movement against chemical weapons and against import of waste developed
into a structured organisation with a website (not functional now) and a Facebook address
(functional but not very active). Both were coordinated by the same structure – AKIP\textsuperscript{343} – that was created by people with experience in NGO activities. The Constitutional Court replied positively to the request of militants to hold a referendum. However, the referendum was not held as the Government changed the law and practically blocked the import, and so the movement ended.

Another victory was the movement against the import of the Syrian Chemical Weapons. A citizen started a petition on avaaz.org against the reception in Albanian soil of the Syrian chemical weapons, which managed to get 36,023 signatures\textsuperscript{344}. Under the pressure by the manifestants, the government came back on its promise to allow Syrian chemical weapons to be dismantled and destroyed in Albania.

The examples above were sustained for a couple of months (from three for the chemical weapons to more than a year) and mobilised an unusually large number of population. They all shared the following features:

- are perceived as a direct threat to the protesters or their families livelihood;
- protesters were mostly middle class – very few were poor and/or rural;
- media and social networks were very important in relaying the message.

Communities vs. Social Movements

Very important groups of the society: the rural and the poorer part of the population were not significantly and statistically involved in the above movements. This is an indicator of their perceived powerlessness combined with increasing distance from long-term goals, public policies, and the future of the country. One creates the impression that those groups have given up, are locked in poverty spiral and thus remain outside the democracy lift-up effect. In the worst case they do not perceive as “rational” behaviour to participate in the available democratic system dynamics whose the social movements are a part, neither have the resources or the access to information and/or to get organised. This argument may explain the rise of religious & political communities as their only available way to: a) be heard; b) go up the society ladder; c) be member of a certain group and profit from the benefit of a belonging.

Conclusion

Social movements in Albania until now have been the result of “against” causes and not “for” a certain objective. They’ve already started as a knee-jerk reaction against perceived existential threats. In a context of increasing inequalities, atomisation of society, and contractualisation of social interactions, it will become ever more “costly” to bring people together on a common cause to positively carry out social change.

\textsuperscript{343}Aleanca Kunder Importit te Plehrave – Alliance Against Waste Import
\textsuperscript{344}https://secure.avaaz.org/en/petition/Peticion_kunder_pranimit_te_armeve_kimike_te_Sirise nga_Shqiperia_No_to_Assad_Chemical_Weapons_in_Albania/?copy
The Polish nationalist movement - identity and discourse

Justyna Kajta

Abstract

In recent years, there has been an increase in the presence and activity of the nationalist, conservative and right-wing ideas in public space across Europe. The paper is based on the analysis of the biographical interviews with the participants of Polish nationalist movement which were carried out among members of three Polish nationalist organizations: the All-Polish Youth (Młodzież Wszechpolska), the National Rebirth of Poland (Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski) and the National Radical Camp (Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny). The author focuses on the different routes leading the narrators to the nationalist organization, on their motives and the ways they understand their involvement and activity. The internalist perspective and the analysis of the individuals’ narratives allows the author to present similarities and shared discourse as well as heterogeneity of the movement’s participants.

Key words: nationalist movement, Poland, biographical interviews, motives

Introduction

In recent years, there has been an increase in the presence and activity of the nationalist, conservative and right-wing ideas in public space across Europe. In Poland, the scale of the Independence Day March organized on November 11th by the members of the main nationalist organizations, the All-Polish Youth and the National-Radical Camp, started be surprisingly large since 2010. The March gives rise to the same questions each year - who are people who belong to nationalist organizations and how do the nationalist organizations attract so many supporters? Moreover, the establishment of the social-political organization, the National Movement (Ruch Narodowy) in 2012 has caused the growing presence of the representatives of the nationalist organizations in the public discourse. Similar tendencies of consolidation of right wing movements can also be observed in other countries in the region. According to my earlier research, the current nationalist movement can be described as protest, counter-postmodern social movement. It has became a new kind of political counter-culture and taking under consideration their growing popularity they have chance to became a real political power. Nationalist movement attracts a huge number of participants as well as supporters who join its manifestations.

This paper aims at contributing to a growing body of research on nationalism and far-right activism in Poland by taking a rather uncommon methodological perspective.

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While the majority of the existing research tends to adopt an externalist perspective, based on historical research, the discourse analysis (Wrzosek 2010) or the analysis of the Polish national populism (Pankowski 2010), this research is based on the analysis of the biographical narrative interviews which were carried out among participants of Polish nationalist movement.

The paper will focus on two main issues. First of all, I will present the motivations of people who decide to join the nationalist organizations. Who are the people who (re)create the movement and how do they find themselves there? What motivations do they have? Secondly, I will consider the narrators’ way of understanding of nationalism and activity in the nationalist organization. What kind of goals do they have and how does it influence their identity? The results presented in the paper are tentative since the fieldwork and data analysis have been not completed yet.

**Methodology**

Research is based on the grounded theory methodology (Glaser, Strauss 1967) in which theory is secondary to empirical data. The first step is data collection. According to the grounded theory methodology, I use theoretical sampling which means that researcher collects data, analyzes them and then decides what data to collect next. The paper is based on the analysis of a set of 22 biographical-narrative interviews with the participants of the All-Polish Youth, the National Rebirth of Poland, the National Radical Camp. Some of the interviews have been carried out by me and some by my students who participated in the fieldwork research training entitled: “Activists and supporters of the national movement”. Narrators were asked to tell their story of life while the structure of interviews followed that used by Fritz Schütze’s including an uninterrupted presentation of the whole life story in the first part of the interview followed by specific biographical questions in the second part and problem-driven questions in the third part (Schütze 1992). The organizations mentioned above are the most noticeable, but not the only one which build Polish contemporary nationalist movement. Therefore, the research results refer rather to the main actors of the nationalist movement but not to the movement as a whole.

The analysis of the nationalists’ life stories lets researcher have deeper insight into the ways leading the narrators to the radical organizations. The biographical-narrative interviews enabled me to reconstruct the narrators’ life stories, life experiences, values, motivations, opinions as well as their family, educational and social background. What is important, interviews with the activists give an access not only to their own life stories but also to the narratives about the movement documenting its collective identity, ideology and strategies. The knowledge of the process of shaping activists’ identity and movement identity lets us better understand the idea of the contemporary nationalism. What is crucial, the internalist perspective in the sense that it involves direct relations between nationalist activists and researcher, enables us to acquire the knowledge from the people who build the movement (Blee 2007, McAdam 2001).

On the grounds that nationalists express their awareness of their negative image and hence, feel stigmatized or even marginalized, one could have impression that an interview constitutes an opportunity to modify that unfavourable notion. Many of my interviewees appeared to hide their own opinions which was caused not only by possible
notion about the researcher’s views but also by the presence of a tape recorder. More than once I had impression that they try to present positively their activity and organization. They tell stories about their initial fear concerning affiliation to a nationalist organization which disappeared just after the first meetings with its members. Some of them describe some extreme cases of people who wanted to join but they were rejected in recruitment process because of their radical views. What is quite common, they highlight that there are mostly students and well-educated (doctors, academics, lawyers) people in their ranks. Another example of attempt of destigmatization concerns statements about the goals and activities of an organization – the stress is put on charity, cooperation with schools, children’s home or veteran’s organizations.

**Who are they?**

Given the lack of statistically representative data and limited number of cases collected it is difficult to obtain a clear picture of the narrators’ socio-economic profile. Most of them are young, male students or graduate of history (8), European studies (3), political science (2), law (2) national security (1), mathematics (1), computer science (1) and veterinary medicine (1). There is also one student of technical college. One narrator is already PhD candidate in law, few are going to start PhD studies in their fields. Despite the efforts to get access to women in the movement, to date there are only two interviews with female activists who study history and pedagogy. The fact that all of the narrators are students or university graduates is used by my informants to show that that the character of the nationalist organizations has changed. Some of the nationalists proudly present it as a change from hermetic skinhead group into intellectuals’ and activists’ milieu.

The nationalist movement is pretty heterogeneous. People whom I spoke with come from different social classes, have parents with various education degree and in a different economic situation. It does not seem that the engagement in the nationalist organization is the simple result of family socialization or the answer to economic deprivation. Parents’ or grandparents’ political beliefs differ. While some of the narrators were brought up in conservative or right-wing families, others’ parents support PO (the Civic Platform) or are not interested in politics at all. Both voting for the governing party (the Civic Platform as of 2015) and the lack of any political interest meets with the narrators’ criticism.

Taking into consideration that Polish nationalist movement is quite closely connected with the Catholic Church, it is worth mentioning that not all of the narrators believe in God or are religious. All of them come from more all less Catholic families, but some stopped to going to the church or even believe in God at some stage of their life. According to the organization’s status, they need to just respect Catholic heritage and values. Another important diversifying factor refers to the narrators’ views on economics. While some of the interlocutors tend to support liberalism, others prefer

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346 Civic Party is a liberal political party (can be considered as centre right) which has been the major coalition partner in Poland’s government since 2007.
347 All narrators belong to nationalist organizations connected with Catholic faith, but there are also nationalist organizations which refer to Slavic, native faith (e.g. Zadruga)
nation-based free market, so-called ‘third way’ or have no specific ideas. What is common for all with regard to their political attitudes is a strong criticism of the Polish transformation after 1989, today’s government and its economic decisions. However, it seems that what really makes the nationalists bond together refers rather to cultural than economic dimension.

**How do people become actively involved?**

It seems to be relevant to analyze both routes leading to the organizations and motives of their membership’s engagement. What is common for all of the narrators is their interest in history but it is hard to believe that it could be the only factor here. Owing to the fact that nationalist movement presents quite wide ideological frame, people can join it because of different reasons. It happens that they are attracted not only by the nationalist ideology itself but rather by the content of organized manifestations and readiness to support some common issues/themes (e.g. pro-life, anti-governmental or anti-homosexual slogans).

On the basis of analysis of the interviews I distinguish three routes into nationalist organization:

1) **individual project**
2) **the significant others’ influence**
3) **being ‘found’ by the organization**

There are general types which refer to the whole process of becoming a nationalist movement participant. What is relevant, the types mentioned above cannot be analyzed as completely separated. Their boundaries are not fixed and in the majority of cases the narrators combined some features of the types.

The first type of the route, individual project, is the most complex. Broadly speaking, it involves independent ‘meeting’ with the nationalist ideas, individual searching for the knowledge and information about nationalist activity and eventually applying for one of the organizations (via the online application form). However, there are different subtypes of this route. Despite the fact that all the narrators who individually found the organization put stress on their independent search, there are stories which more or less raise the significance of family traits. Patriotic values, Catholic upbringing or former parents’ involvement in the anti-communist fight are presented as important moral foundations of the worldview shaping. Radomir, one of the narrators, presents himself as independent searcher but at the same time he admits that his patriotic, Catholic family with the tradition of anti-communist struggle was relevant for getting involved in this particular ideological way. Owing to the fact that his father had left his family, these were his grandfather and uncles who handed over to him patriotic attitudes.

Radomir: *I adhered to some ideals...the more so because of my family, especially my uncles...they fought with communism...so...since I was kid I had been turned against the system...and...I was 16...I discerned that that world is incomplete in some way...that people around me follow no ideals...they don’t have even these three basic words which we believe in...God, honour, homeland...[...] I think what pushed me to live this way was the fact that I come from very good home...[...] I was looking for some path in my life...of
course...unfortunately I came across...Nietzsche...it was maybe an introduction to...of
course I had some experience in Adolf Hitler’s national socialism...but it didn’t attract
me...I was looking for something else...and I came across right paths...dmowski...I came
across right paths of the national democracy...and then I met the National-Radical Camp

Quest for the ideological commitment can involve meetings with different
approaches and people. For example, some of the interlocutors had experience with
anarchist milieu but they always present it as a youthful play and immature stage of the
search for the right ideological point of reference rather than real interest.

Decision about joining the organization is not always preceded by getting
extensive knowledge of the nationalist idea or having specific, well-developed political
beliefs. While for some of the narrators the affiliation to an organization seems to be a
culmination of their search, for others it is just the beginning of nationalist education and
the turning point in becoming a nationalist. They share some opinions with the
organization but without ideological background. That is why older participants’
knowledge and discussions are often impressing or even overawing for them.

There also cases in which family matters but not as the source of important
values but rather as the negative point of reference. Activity in organization can be a way
of dealing with family/personal problems. For example, Weronika whose father spends
most of time abroad, tries to prove him her own value. Besides, she deals with her
grandfather’s story who was in the Red Army. She does not seem be interested so much
in the nationalist idea itself but she concentrates more on pro-life activity which
has become an inherent part of the nationalist organizations discourse. As she states,
political debate about the abortion was a direct spur for her to join the organization.
Another narrator, Dominik, is an example of the participant for whom joining the
organization was the result of his interests and being a football fan. His family is not
presented as the important source of knowledge or values.

Dominik: As regards who I am now...I think everything started with my interests because
as regards my friends I did not have such milieu...nationalist milieu...there were not such
values at my home as well. Everything started with my strong interest in history and with
the stadium...it instilled strong local patriotism and the notion of nationalism...I went a
long way to it because I was scared at first...I had been interesting in politics since I was a
kid. Unfortunately I watched ‘Fakty’ and it was the first time I heard about the National
Radical Camp, the National Rebirth of Poland...It’s obvious what the kind of overtone it
had (media relation about the nationalist organization)...fascists...that was what I thought
then...but something touched me then and I started to searching deeper for the
information about it and surprisingly it turned out that what I heard wasn’t completely
true...In the beginning I had negative-neutral attitude...I was afraid of term of
nationalism, national radicalism...I didn’t know what it exactly meant but with the
passing of time I started to adapting to it...reading books.

After familiarizing with different sources, including the organization website,
Dominik found out the similarity between values presented by the National-Radical
Camp and his own. He decided to send his application.
As I mentioned above the individual project is the most complex of the routes. There are different scenarios of this independent search. However, it seems that the narrators who found the organization after lasting search and who were brought up in patriotic values tend to be more confident and involved.

The second type links with significant others’ influence. There are cases of the narrators who were informed about the organization or invited for the meetings by their friends, mates or family members (uncle, brother). Most of the narrators were already interested in national ideas or their worldviews were at least partially coincident with the profile of nationalist organizations. However, the others’ persuasion seems to have constituted the crucial point for their decision. Some narrators’ interests in nationalist organizations started or intensified because of friends or classmates.

Eryk: As regards my other than science activity...that is first of all the activity in the National Radical-Camp...it all started with the high-school...I met my classmate, Radomir...he had been active before...there were our casual discussions initially and finally I was tempted...at the beginning I was not the national radical, right, as it is said...no...it all had been developing...at first there were things I liked and both Radomir and the organization in which he was liked the same...and he persuaded me to appear on the blockade of the homosexuals’ march [...] and I came out...I very liked the atmosphere there...I discerned that it doesn’t look like media present it...that there are bold troublemakers...there were regular people...let’s say...mediocrities, people in different age...but first of all...not necessarily only bold, radical and bad people.

Meeting people who mediated or accompanied the first meetings with the organization constitutes relevant, biographical turning point in the narrators’ life stories (Schütze 2005). Direct contact with the organization representatives seems to be more binding and convincing – individuals start to participate in meetings.

Andrzej: By sheer coincidence it turned out that there [on manifestation] were two girls from my high school...and we met later at school and they invited me and my friend...for the meeting...and once we came there...it was in pub...we were standing close to this place and two big guys were standing in front of this pub and my first thought was (laughs) I turn and run away, right, because it will be unpleasant but it turned out that they are very nice people...despite they look quite horribly...and actually once I went into this pub...I stay in the ONR [the National Radical Camp] until now.

Those who were invited by their mates for regular every week meeting tell more often about their doubts or even longer breaks in participation. As other study shows ‘involvement is likely to become deeper if potential participants are recruited by strongly engaged activists (Passy, Giugni 2001). The narrators had different impressions during first meetings. As I mentioned above some of them were enthusiastic and impressed since the very beginning whereas other needed more time to get used to new people. All of them stress the interest in idea and topics which were discussed. Negative memories connect with the disappointment of the number of people, atmosphere or finding herself/himself as foolish and less experienced in discussion.
Third type which I distinguished is being ‘found’ by the organization. It involves the cases of the narrators invited for the meetings by the organization representatives who were not friends or mates. Being ‘found’ was possible because of the narrators’ previous activities or interests (manifestations, online forum). To provide examples, Artur was invited for the meeting via the Internet because he was active on one of the nationalist forum: Nacjonalista.pl (it is forum run by the National Rebirth of Poland but he got the message from the All-Polish Youth activist). Artur started being interested in nationalist milieu during his studies in history. It was why he began to be active on the forum. Michał and Marek, two friends, recognized the leader of the All-Polish Youth after the Mass and they decided to come and congratulate him on the organization of the Independent March in Warsaw. The movies from this event had aroused their interest in the organizers.

Michał: *I remember the most that there was a movie which was filmed from some flyover...and the length of the movie was...let’s say 10 minutes and this march was still moving...and Polish flags...I liked it...that such power marches...the crowd with flags...something like this...[...] I read a little bit about this Independent March but there was nothing like a plan to...to actively support it or something...I just thought that it’s a pity that I wasn’t there...probably I will go next year*

During the conversation with the leader they were offered to share the contacts and maybe to meet. Pretty soon they started to get invitations for the meetings. Marek, who was not so convinced of the idea of join to the organization at first, decided to do it after participation in the winter school. People whom he met there and the quality of papers made him willing to be a part of the organization. Participation in such groups as football fans, historical reconstruction associations or studying history can lead to increased contact with like-minded people and increase a chance of being invited to join the nationalist milieu.

As it was said, some informants joined because of their political views, some because of the need of expression of their patriotism and others because of their support for anti-homosexual and anti-leftists manifestations. However, embedding in the organization involves the consolidation of the beliefs, confirmation of their rightness as well as development of ideological knowledge and language. It creates favourable conditions for calling themselves nationalists. Movement can be a ‘safe harbour’ (*Bauman* 1998:85) where the narrators found people who think similarly and therefore, they feel safe. Besides the feeling of belonging the activity has made them people socially involved, active and needed.

The nationalists with whom I talked were in different stages of the involvement in the organization – the route into it, the length of affiliation and function which they perform were the main factors which influenced the extent of their involvement. People who found the organization by themselves, act longer and occupy higher positions in organisations are more confident of their knowledge but also of their identity. Although new members have their own fears, a time of entering to the organization is decisive. For majority of them it was the first experience of affiliation to any kind of organization. For others this experience turned out crucial – it became the one of the main axes around
which they live and create the identity. Affiliation to the movement affects emotions and expectations, it also leads to new acquaintances. It involves the process of deepening ideological knowledge by common trips, preparation of papers, summer and winter schools, exams. What I should mention, people who want to join the All-Polish Youth or the National Radical Camp have to complete 6-months candidate’s probationary period. The candidate should prove his value and involvement, that is, she/he should participate in meetings, help in organization of running events and first of all, read the canon of required reading. It ends with the exam of knowledge. It is also a time after which the candidate should know if she/he wants to stay. Such activities cause that members are acquainted with the same field of knowledge and hence, they are consistent in their statements and views. Ideological literature is something new for some of the candidates and they often adopt the way of interpreting it from others, more ‘experienced’ members.

Filip: It can be said...that it [participation] made me aware of many issues which I was deaf to. It means...that now it has been going on bad...gently speaking, I realized things which I hadn’t discerned before and now they are noticeable for me. Another thing, I met people and...for sure the activity and participation have developed me in intellectual way. My horizons have broaden

Embedding in the movement is connected with reinforcing views and training in ideological language. It is a process in which axiological sphere of collective nationalist identity is adopted by the individual and hence, it influences on his or her personal identity and worldview. I would state that the participation in the nationalist movement gives people a specific interpretation of the history, included the post-communist transition, and hence, their way of thinking is generally coherent.

**Why do they became active?**

Some direct spurs for affiliation to nationalist organizations were mentioned in the section discussing the routes into organization. The fact that contemporary nationalist movement seems to have varied ideological frames enhances its chances for attracting new supporters. Today’s lack of strong spaces of resistance in Poland causes that people from different social environments find themselves in nationalist milieu. It gives them opportunity to feel a part of anti-governmental, anti-system movement, to express their dissatisfaction as well as to be socially/politically involved. The participants discern this gap and perceive it as their great opportunity to develop. They stress ongoing increase in numbers of new members and supporters.

Tadeusz: The All-Polish Youth or the National Radical Camp have constant and increasing inflow of people or support because they are out of the [political] connections...these organizations are established by young, idealistic people I think...and there is very transparent message...very clear message...it is uncompromising...there is nothing like masking...nothing like gentle words in describing phenomena which one has to describe in harsh not gentle way...there is no agreement for such behaviours...there is no agreement for such behaviours as were presented for example by...let’s say so-called right-wing parties in West Europe or so-called Christian
Democratic parties...that the right-wing there thought that if it they conduct according to fashion and...had supported new laws for homosexuals...or I don’t know...abortion or euthanasia...or more and more lukewarm attitude towards religion, the Church they would achieve something.

Klandermans and Mayer adopt a social psychological account in explanation of the motives for active participation in extreme right organizations. They describe three types of motives:

a) instrumentality– movement participation as an attempt to influence the social and political environment

b) identity– movement participation as an expression of identification with a group

c) ideology – movement participation as a search for meaning and an expression of individual’s beliefs (2006: 8)

Similarly, the participants of Polish nationalist movement explain their organization involvement by the need of change, the need of belonging to a group or the desire to give a meaning to their life and express their views.

The need of change can also refer to individual level and attempt to change one’s environment or way of life. Some of the narrators express their need of doing something with their life to make it more meaningful and active. Some even divide their biography into two parts: life before and after meeting the organization. The former is perceived as worse – it is described as the vapid time without specific goals.

Andrzej: I don’t especially ponder over that time...because I have impression that I used to be completely different person then...more entangled in such...in everydayness, in such unimportant issues as playing football, having a beer and so on...which are completely unimportant from today’s point of view and I don’t know...there is nothing to tell about (laughs).

Many of the narrators had been outsiders as regards their worldview – nobody around had shared their opinions. The need of meeting people who have similar ideas and thus, the need of confirmation of the individuals’ identity is one of the reasons of looking for an organization. It refers to identity and ideology-based motives. For some of the interlocutors the very first impression of organization was that their new colleagues use the same language and have similar observations. Being a nationalist can be a kind of stigma (Goffman 1963). When informants become the members of nationalist groups, they need to carry out the destigmatization – firstly in their own eyes and later on – among relatives and other people. Parents are those who have a lot of fears and they need to be convinced that the participation in the movement is nothing wrong or harmful. Meeting with these anxieties makes people aware of their devalued position and the lack of legitimization for their activities. Therefore, it can be a source of resistance identity (Castells 1997). Even if parents and relatives accept the situation, nationalists still have to deal with social stigmatization. They are aware that their activity is perceived in a negative way. It is another reason why their organization means so much for them – their identity is not undermined or criticized there. Spending time with their own group
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involves a feeling of safety. The nationalists are held together not only by ideals and activity but also by the strategies of dealing with their devalued position.

Many narrators refer to instrumentalities, that is to political or social change. It is sometimes difficult to assess if these were their socio-political goals which made them to join the organization or vice versa, these goals were shaped in the course of being involved and adopting nationalist discourse. The distinction between personal and organizational goals is often blurred. The narrators who present such motives speak often about the main goal of the nationalist activity, that is education of new generation of patriots aware of Polish history and tradition. The nationalists present various reasons for their activity: (1) the need to defend history and collective memory; (2) the awareness of threats to Polish identity and memory (the others such as homosexuals, feminists, Muslims; liberal media, post-communist politicians, the European Union); (3) the desire for change peoples’ way of thinking and make them more politically active. All of these reasons are coherent with traits of the Polish nationalist discourse. The section below presents these main issues with reference to shaping the participants’ identity.

How do they perceive themselves and the activity?

The concept of collective identity is subject to ongoing discussions in social sciences. In this paper, I defined it as ‘the shared definition of a group that derives from members’ common interests, experiences and solidarity’ (Taylor and Whitter 1992: 105). Therefore, I think it is worth to present the narrators’ motives, common beliefs and goals of their activity in order to better understand both their individual and collective identity. Analysis of the narrators’ biographies suggests that construction of their identity is based on the dissatisfaction and rebelliousness against the present. It concerns both political-economic circumstances and social changes. Today’s situation is usually explained by the reference to history where the past is presented as the time of huge ideals and authorities. Historical attachment involves similar interpretation of some historical events, anti-communist attitudes, strong criticism and disappointment of Polish transformation after 1989 and the need of remembrance of specific historical figures (e.g. Cursed Soldiers-Żołnierze Wyklęci<sup>348</sup>). The engagement with the organization sometimes involves involvement in other non-profit organizations or historical associations which focus on help to veterans or on historical education. Some state that nationalist activity is an obvious result of getting historical knowledge. With regard to history they focus not only on promoting some figures and events but also on highlighting the significance of anti-communist struggle. What is crucial here, some of them do not see communism as a closed chapter of history but rather as alive enemy and a real opponent. Left wing politicians and organizations are perceived as the carriers of this threat (Lipiński 2009: 218). Moreover, the Solidarity is presented not as a grass-roots movement but a communist project. The nationalists have made the anti-communist rhetoric crucial component of their identity. They use it as their symbolic resource and consider themselves as more anti-communist.

<sup>348</sup> It was a set of Polish resistance organizations and movements formed during the 40s. After the World War II they fought against the Stalinist power. Most of them stopped to exist around 1950s. Only few years ago nationalists started to talk about them and demand commemoration.
than the other right wing organizations. It involves the criticism of the way of Polish transformation and today’s politicians seen as post-communist elites.

Filip: *We state that current elites in Poland are postcolonial and come from the Stalinist time...from...decades of the communism. Ee...I state...we state that these elites are wounded because of it. We state that it has to be changed...that one should highlight traditional traits...traits concerning Catholic worldview but also...what is important from political point of view...national interest. So we put stress on it...because it is understood everywhere but not in our state.*

The narrators do not agree with liberal consensus which occurred after 1989 and appearance of postmodern watchwords such us freedom of choice or equality of rights, in a public space. Transnational, cultural flows and activity of new social movements have brought new ways of thinking and new challenges. These changes were accompanied by growing pluralism of religiousness. A feeling of freedom and new possibilities of creation of an identity became a source of risk and anxiety (Giddens 1991, 1994). Late modernity and characteristic of it ambiguity (Bauman 1998) turned out unacceptable and unbearable for some people. It concerns the nationalists. Dominance of relativism, postmodern values and growing number of different opportunities arouse a fear of eradication and disappearance of national identity.

It seems that the narrators build their identity mainly as resistance one which is constructed by social actors who feel marginalized and define their situation as worse and devalued by current situation (Castells 1997: 10-12). Opponents of the nationalist movement could be seen as the same who threaten to Polish identity: the already mentioned post-communist politicians, European Union leaders and supporters, liberal media, left-wing activists, feminists, homosexuals, minorities (the huge stress is put on the risk of islamization). Discussing the issue of the revival of nationalism in the time of globalization, Castells states that it concerns the reconstruction of identity based on nationality and against otherness (Castells 1997:360). It is worth to notice that the concept of otherness does not have to connect with ethnicity and nationality - nowadays *the other* more often means the representative of left-wing, feminist or LGTB identity movements rather than foreigner. The category of the otherness concerns more often ideological beliefs, life styles than ethnic affiliations.

As I mentioned above, the nationalist identity is shaped as the resistance identity. The nationalist movement becomes a protest movement. I define it as the counter-postmodern social movement. Counter-postmodernity is manifested in rebelliousness against values connected with postmodernity, political system, liberalization of society, activism of the left-wing social movements, government, media and the passivity of society. As nationalists state, globalization enhances the circulation of negative behaviour patterns. Homosexuality, tolerance and feminism are most often criticized. There is a visible distinction between public sphere and private sphere. Informants highlight that any minorities have the right to live in Poland but they should adopt to local conditions. They should not be too visible or active since the public sphere is reserved for Polish values. There is ostensible acceptance for the others combined with excluding them from...
the public life due to their national or sexual affiliations. According to nationalists, the public sphere should belong to national, Catholic values and ‘normality’. The participants differ in the level of radicalism or the spot they focus on such issues in the interviews but what is common is the dissatisfaction of Poland’s change and feel of significance of the active resistance to it. What is more, they are disappointed with the Poles’ passivity in the face of the social and political changes. Many narrators present themselves as conscious citizens as well as defenders of Polish identity. The nationalist activity is perceived as a social work or even a kind of mission, as a opportunity to both expose threats to Poland them and rebel against them.

Wiktoria: National movement because…we should prove...prove by our way of living that we can change something in this country...because I don’t like the place where Poland has been striving. And I don’t want my child to bring up in such country. And when we look at the place where Poland has been striving...it will be soon that in 10 or 20 years guys...I don’t know...will be standing on the streets, kiss and I don’t know what else...and I don’t want my child to live in such a world. I am against abortion because the notion that a child exists only since 3 month of pregnancy makes me laugh. I want to prove it. As I already mentioned pro-life attitude is one of fields of the nationalist activity. Weronika’s case shows that activity can be understood as a duty and courage. She studies pedagogy because she wants to educate young people to live according to national values. At the same time she cannot understand that none of her classmates share and support her pro-life views. The way the interlocutors have chosen is perceived by them as the only right. The nationalists organizations are presented as a movement of people who are real patriots. Regardless of personal political aspirations, the nationalist organizations are presented as grass-roots, non-profit and socially profiled.

Patryk: I think that if man is involved in the activity of such organization it mean he cares about public good...that is property...which is in some sense also his...and I think that being a nationalist might have pejorative meaning but it’s essential element if the man realized that he exists in civic society and he has to care not only about his own property but also about public property because that is the way I understand Poland...that it is what everyone has and all of us should care about it. And there is nothing like that in leftist environment despite the fact that there are often quite well-educated people...in those Antifa’s or other organizations but this is a question of psychology why that happens...I cannot explain that.

The deep conviction about standing on the right side and the feeling of being ignored or excluded from public discourse deepen dissatisfaction with reality but do not cause the withdrawing from the activity. It becomes another important source of shaping resistance identity. Contemporary nationalist movement could be understood as a peculiar cultural resistance against moral liberalization and globalization. Nationalists have become a self-appointed defenders of tradition, history and Polish values. They fight for a control on historicity, thus, for a dominance of national values. It leads us to concept of social movement as a peculiar social conflict. Participants act in order to take over a
control on so-called historicity which is defined by Touraine (1977) as the capability of a society to take action upon itself. As Steven Buechler writes:

The growing capacity of social actors to construct both a system of knowledge and the technical tools that allow them to intervene in their own functioning – a capacity Touraine calls historicity – makes possible the increasing self-production of society, which becomes the defining hallmark of postindustrial or programmed society. The control of historicity is the object of an ongoing struggle between classes defined by relations of dominations. In postindustrial society, the major social classes consist of consumers/clients in the role of the popular class and managers/technocrats in the role of dominant class. The principal field of conflict for these classes is culture, and the central contest involves who will control society’s growing capacity for self management’ (Buechler 1995: 444).

Conclusions

The analysis of the participants’ life stories shows that there are different types of routes leading to the organization. What is crucial is that people are motivated by different factors as well. It can be the need of change one’s life, the need of being actively involved in something, the result of interests and meeting people who are already participants, the effect of long search because of the interest in nationalist ideology, the interest in specific slogan (e.g. concerning anti-communism, the Cursed Soldiers, anti-homosexual, pro-life) or in the Independent March, the need of belonging to some community, the search for a place of opportunity to express one’s views. It seems that the nationalist movement can be an answer for different people’s needs and expectations. It attracts cross-class participants with various family background. Explored from the biographical perspective the movement participants do not constitute the homogenous masses motivated by irrational emotions as they are often depicted in mainstream mass media. Their involvement often constitutes an individualized project which draws its justifications from nationalist discourse even if the motives to join the movement are not primary ideological. This conclusion still requires theoretical elaboration and further analysis.

Regardless of type of route or motives the participants seem to share similar worldview and dissatisfaction of Polish political and social reality. However, the shared discourse can be a result of embedding in the organization and participation in schools, lectures and other activities. Their common beliefs concern rather culture than economics. The nationalist movement has become a kind of new counter-culture which could be understood as an opposition both to government and to liberal discourse.

References:


From the margins to the frenzy rise. Right-wing extremism in Greece. The case of Golden Dawn

Vera Tika

Introduction

Golden Dawn, one of the most extremist and rapidly successful political parties in Europe, entered the public attention during the last years when Greece experienced a severe economic crisis. Shortly, after the global financial crisis of 2008, Greece signed a memorandum of structural adjustment programs in return of taking a loan from the so called ‘Troika’, namely the IMF, EU and ECB on May of 2010. The adaptation of the economically strict programs from the Greek governments, very soon created a state of post-political and post-democratic (Crouch: 2004) dominance in which social problems where not to be immediately addressed. That in turn provoked high disillusionment with the political class, lack of trust in the public institutions of the country and a climate of pessimism (Georgiadou and Rori, 2013). Since then, Greek society and Greek political system have experienced unprecedented transformation with the major, traditional parties that were established during the Metapolitefsis (the period after the fall of dictatorship in 1974), of Pasok, on the left, and Nea Dimokratia, on the right of the political spectrum, being fragmented politically and electorally. Additionally, the political system experienced the rise of the party of Radical Left of Syriza and that of Golden Dawn.

The phenomenon of Golden Dawn per se, its history and the inner elements with which its history comprises, constitutes the bulk of the present work. The main orientation will be that of presenting the genealogy of its history till the moment that, as a chrysalis, underwent complete transformation and emerged violently in the public scene of Greece.

1:1 Political and ideological formation

Golden Dawn [Χρυσή Αυγή (Chrysi Aygi)], whose name refers explicitly to the secret society of the British occultist writer Aleister Crowley, was created on 16 of December of 1980, on the birthday of its leader Nicolas Michaloliakos. The form it took firstly was that of a journal whose aim is to produce and to publish writings in the same vein as the

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349 Panteion University of Greece. Many grateful thanks go to the Foundation of Education and European Civilization (IPEP), Greece
intellectual movement of Alain De Benoist ‘Nouvelle Droite’ in France did (Georgiadou, 2013).
However, in a strikingly different way from the intellectual work of de Benoist’s circles, the work of the journal was a direct reproduction of the theories of National Socialism in which prominent position have the race, the Jewish people, the glorious past, grandiose goals of re-establishing the ancient greek civilization and the immediate need to overcome the present.
The fifth editorial of the journal (May-June 1981) refers:

We are nazis, if this does not bother at the level of oral expression (this bothers us) because in the miracle of the German Revolution of 1933 we saw the Power that will free humanity from the Jewish rot, we saw the power that will lead us into a new European Renaissance, we have seen the splendid revival of ancestral instincts of the race, we have seen a massive escape from the nightmare of man of the industrial mass towards a new and yet ancient and eternal kind of man, the man of gods and demigods, the pure, naïve and violent man of myth and instincts. (http://temi.repubblica.it/micromega-online/nazisti-sullorlo-del-potere-il-caso-alba-dorata/)

In 1983 the entourage of Michaloliakos joined their forces to create a political organization known as People’s Association. Two years later, in 1985, the organization became a political party called People’s Association-Golden Dawn, acquiring its legal status as a party only in 1994, in the eve of the European parliamentary elections (Georgiadou, 2013:85).

During this period, from 1985 till 2010, Golden Dawn was involved in actions of demonstrating a nationalistic, paternalistic stance in relation with the, so called, major national issues such as the recognition of Fyrom in 1993 and in relation with the inclusion of religious affiliation in Greek Citizens’ Identity cards in 2000 (Anna Frangoudaki, 2013:53).

During the first phase of its life, Golden Dawn performed very poorly in the electoral level. During the electoral contests of the European and national elections, the party received very small percentages. In 2005 Michaloliakos decided to suspend the activity of the party and to establish a new party, the Patriotic Alliance. In 2007 Michaloliakos, one year after the dissolution of Patriotic Alliance, will decide to reestablish the party of Golden Dawn (Anna Frangoudaki, 2013:53).

1:2 The road to electoral success.Strategy and socioeconomic preconditions.

The first electoral success of Golden Dawn came during the municipal elections of the city of Athens in 2010. It receives 5, 29% of the share votes electing its chief Michaloliakos in the municipal council. According to a research provided by Vassiliki Georgiadou(2013) the success of Golden Dawn was intrinsically linked with a carefully and slowly concentration and then diffusion of forces at a grass root level in specific areas of the city of Athens in which the high density of immigrants was one of their main characteristics. The residents of the areas nearby St. Panteleimonas, from 2008 till 2010, having nurtured strong feelings of frustration and fear, had been self-organized in
resident’s committees. In such a context, Golden Dawn found a favorable milieu of opportunities, penetrating into at least 10 out of 20 committees (Georgiadou and Rori, 2013), following a dual strategy: firstly, in transforming the area into its own stronghold (Hochburgen) (Georgiadou, 2013: 89) and, secondly, offering, in a kind of explicitly chauvinist Welfare system, goods and services exclusively for Greek citizens. Its presence was accompanied by the use of violence with paramilitary squads in black shirts mainly as a social strategy and as a means of imposing (renegotiating) the power’s relationships (Tedeschi J.T. and R.B. Felson, 1994) against immigrants.

The rising trend of Golden Dawn was consolidated further during the double parliamentary elections of 2012. In this electoral contest it received approximately 6.9%, (426,000) of the share of the votes, occupying 21 seats in the parliament.

From 2010 till the elections of 2012, three main factors are considered accountable for its rise: the media focus on the danger coming from immigrants that provoked an expansion of its fiercely action beyond its traditional strongholds due to a series of incidents occurred between Greek citizens and immigrants (http://temi.repubblica.it/micromega-online/nazisti-sullorlo-del-potere-il-caso-alba-dorata/)(http://blogs.mediapart.fr/blog/reny-p/301013/aube-doree-origine-et-developpement-dun-parti-neonazi), the decline of the radical, populist right-wing party of LAOS as a result of its participation in the government of National Union of Lukas Papademos, mostly seen as a betrayal by its voters, and thirdly the high disaffection of voters from the center to the Left and Right of the political spectrum (Georgiadou, 2013: 90).

Golden Dawn received approximately the same percentage of votes, 6.28%, occupying the third place in the national parliament of 300 seats, in the national elections of January 2015. With a little loss of its percentage in comparison with the prior national elections, Golden Dawn managed to preserve its electoral strength.

According the main exit poll data and public surveys, the main motives of the voters of Golden Dawn in the elections of 2012 were the desire for punishing the political elite of the country and secondly, the immigration issue.

As regards the electoral geography, high scores were registered in the areas of the so-called “Old Greece” that comprises Lakonia e.t.c. and constitute a line of continuation of the preferences of the voters that traditionally voted for Rightists and conservative parties (http://archive.efsyn.gr/?p=66373).

As for the sociological and demographic profile of the voters, they were predominantly males, of an intermediate level of education, white-collar workers, unemployed, public servants, students, young people and farmers (Georgiadou, 2013: 94).

350 In May of 2011, three immigrants of Afghan nationality assassinated a man in the center of Athens in order to steal his video camera. The same night, Golden Dawn launched an immigrant’s haunting that ended up with the assassination of two immigrants. In 22 of May 2012 another incident was registered with the assassination of a Greek citizen by immigrants which provoked a rallying violent shock of the activists of Golden Dawn against immigrants.

(http://temi.repubblica.it/micromega-online/nazisti-sullorlo-del-potere-il-caso-alba-dorata/)
A boy shout slogans with supporters of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party during a rally commemorating the Fall of Constantinople in 1453, in Athens, 29 May 2014 (Photo: Reuters)

As a research from the university Panteion revealed, the youth voting for Golden Dawn, predominantly was a result of the identification of their ideology with that propagated by the party namely the nationalism and its mythology, the splendor of the Ancient Greek civilization, its supremacy, the biological racism and the xenophobia (https://usilive.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Golden-Dawn-and-Young-People.pdf).

If we take a closer look in the professional structure of the public servants voting for the Golden Dawn, we can observe a high concentration of votes in the police forces. This trend is being confirmed also after the party is being investigated in the grounds of being a criminal organization after the murder of the musician Pavlos Fyssas in 2013. In a total of 2,738 police officers voting in 18 polling stations near the central police headquarters, the GD took between 16.32% and 22.32% of the votes (http://www.thetoc.gr/eng/news/article/police-officers-overwhelmingly-vote-for-golden-dawn).

In the national parliamentary elections of 2015, Golden Dawn percentages of votes confirmed a loss in the big city centers and in the regions with working classes. Simultaneously, it increased its power in the traditional strongholds of the Right and in the provincial’s areas of the country. As for the group ages, Golden Dawn continued to have an appeal to voters under 60 years old, but has lost power in the group age 18-24(-2, 7%) and in 25-34(-3, 4%). We can observe also that Golden Dawn preserves privileges relations with farmers, pensioners and housewives (http://jailgoldendawn.com/2015/03/25/%CF).

The electoral fortunes of Golden Dawn since 2012

Conducted by researchers of Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences in the context of MYPLACE project, the research revealed that the vote for Golden Dawn was a conscious decision due to the closeness of their ideology with that of Golden Dawn.
1:3 The ideology of Golden Dawn

Since the beginning of its activities in 1980, Golden Dawn, in the two of its versions, as a journal and later as a political, late-comer party of the European traditional extreme right\textsuperscript{352}, revealed identity elements of a formation that explicitly referred to a mixture of the basic tenets of fascism and Nazism.

In a more specific way, one of the basic features of both branches of fascism is Nationalism. Within the Golden Dawn’s politics, nationalism reveals itself in a form of occupying or regaining the lost, according to them, territories of Greece. However, this characteristic is related in a sine qua non condition with specific issues of the agenda of the party. For instance, nationalism reveals its paternalistic character in relation with the asylum seekers and immigrants that are seen by G.D. as armies invading the country and changing the biological basis of the ADN of the Greek people (Frangoudaki: 62). It is an ideological position strongly supported by theories of racism, as found in the theories of National Socialism.

Connected with the element of Nationalism is the use of Violence and that of Terror connected with intensive political activism. Indeed, one can mention a lot of incidents provoked by Golden Dawn militants, parliamentary representatives, and the leader of the party. Street fighting, use of an aggressive language towards their “enemies” during debates, the attacks on immigrants and other activities clearly denote a direct preference for the use of violence as a political/social act but also as a “soft monster” in order to eliminate everything goes against their political perception (Raffaele Simone: 2008), have been high in the agenda’s profile of the movement. Violence defines the movement also as a criminal organization especially after the assassination of Pavlos Fyssas by an activist of G.D and brought to justice a lot of other cases committed by GD activists.

Golden Dawn is also characterized by a strong willingness to apply the principle of leadership for the organization of its activities and its political ecosystem. All this elements have in their composition also a strong opposition to Jews, to international

\textsuperscript{352} According to Ignazi the Far right Family may be divided into two groups. The first comprises residual old traditional parties which have ties to fascism and its heritage and the second consists of new-post- industrial parties grown in the basis of the confrontation of the “silent revolution” (Ronald Inglehart:1971, 1990) and of counter-revolution(Ignazi:1992, 1996, 2003).
economic centers and supranational organizations such as the EU, a denial of the Holocaust and a strong commitment to the ideals and the personality of Hitler as an editorial of 1987 with the title “Hitler for 1000 years” written by Michaloliakos demonstrates.

“1987, 42 years later, with our thought and soul given to the last great battle, with our thought and soul given to the black and red banners, with our thought and soul given to the memory of our great Leader, we raise our right hand up, we salute the Sun and with the courage, that is compelled by our military honor and our National Socialist duty we shout full of passion, faith to the future and our visions: HEIL HITLER!”

(http://observatoiredesextremes.com/?p=764)

Concluding remarks

In its vita activa as an underground movement, rallied mainly around issues of nationalist hatred and expansionism of the 1990, Golden Dawn managed to enter in the visible political scene of the country. Its journey was long and the arrival abruptly violent. Since its electoral rise in 2010, Golden Dawn extended its power in a plethora of ways. Political imposition, social acceptance and “rationalization” of its actions, silent counter mobilization against the “system” and ideological diffusion mostly in the cohorts of the youth are some of its characteristics of building political power and presence. Talking about the Front National (FN) the UMP chief Jean-François Copé said that this kind of movements ask the right questions but give wrong answers. (www.americanthinker.com/articles/2012/05/french_elections_virtue_the_debt_and_the_jewish_question.html) Golden Dawn presents a similar case. It exploited the opportunity for the demand of the citizens to reestablish a connection with Politics: either
in a negative form of expressing a hardcore resentment either in a form that shows the ideological affiliation with the party.
The abovementioned pattern has been reconfirmed during the national parliamentary elections of January 2015. The electoral geography and data of the party show that even after the revelations of its criminal activities, Golden Dawn maintains its strength and for the first time in the history of Greece is obtaining a social basis. (http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2012/09/28/en-grece-la-banalisation-d-aube-doree_1767494_3210.html).
The lack of other viable political solutions concentrated around the thatcherian style saying “there is no alternative” is producing the golden opportunity for Golden Dawn to create a solid ground for its consolidation and furthermore a culture of banalization of the violence.

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